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this legislation. He has assembled and presented unassailable facts and reasons for its enactment. He has given the matter of civil defense in this thermonuclear age a new promise of success. His work has been tireless. He has been unyielding both to frustrations and to opposition. He is a great public servant.

Mr. Chairman, the arguments which have been made here leave no doubt of the complete interdependency of the military and the civil defense in building realistic, effective protective readiness for this Nation.

The Congress of the United States and the Federal Government have dragged their feet too long in establishing a meaningful program to develop adequate fallout shelter space for our Nation.

This is not the time for vacillation or timidity, for second-guessing or the nurturing of moral qualms. Mr. Chairman, now is the time to fish or cut bait.

This is not a handout. By no stretch of the imagination can it be construed as one. It is an austere program over which the Congress has abundant control. It is a product of the disciplined planning of the Defense Department and the wise congressional overseers of the Committee on Armed Services. Since this program has been brought into the Department of Defense, fallout shelter space has been located for over 100 million Americans.

Today, one of the gravest perils to the United States—and to all nations—is the possibility of nuclear warfare. Hopefully, this possibility is remote.

But may I remind you that so long as the destiny of the world is controlled by men, the danger of war will remain with us.

We cannot look at this fact and then back away from it, saying that there is nothing we can do, especially when expert testimony has demonstrated that fallout shelters do offer a prime means of survival for the Nation.

This bill is supported by a great cross section of thinking Americans—businessmen, scientists, our senior military officers, and the clergy. It is not defeatist. The thinking behind it does not accept the inevitability of war. On the contrary, building fallout shelters will buttress our powerful weapons systems. A nation not in danger of being brought to its knees through annihilation of its people is, by this fact alone, a more powerful adversary, a Colossus which the hostile world could never topple.

Mr. Chairman, the people of our country are looking to us for leadership. We have procrastinated too long.

We cannot avoid this responsibility. We must pass H.R. 8200.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. HÉBERT] to close the debate.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, there is nothing that can be added to what has already been said. I am sure the points have been well presented and the question is understood.

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.

Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. O'NEILL, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee having had under consideration the bill, H.R. 8200, to further amend the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended, to provide for shelter in Federal structures, to authorize payment toward the construction or modification of approved public shelter space, and for other purposes, pursuant to House Resolution 512, he reported the bill back to the House with sundry amendments adopted by the Committee of the Whole.

The SPEAKER. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered.

Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment? If not, the Chair will put them en gros.

The amendments were agreed to.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.

Mr. FOREMAN. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.

The SPEAKER. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?

Mr. FOREMAN. I am, Mr. Speaker, in its present form.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report the motion to recommit.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. FOREMAN moves to recommit the bill (H.R. 8200) to the Committee on Armed Services with instructions to report it back forthwith with the following amendment: On page 4, line 3, Shelter Financing, strike out all of section 207 down through page 8, line 3.

The SPEAKER. Without objection, the previous question is ordered.

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion to recommit.

The question was taken, and on a division (demanded by Mr. FOREMAN) there were—aye 67, noes 172.

Mr. FOREMAN. Mr. Speaker, I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were refused.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the passage of the bill.

The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were refused.

So the bill was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND REMARKS

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to extend their remarks in the RECORD on the bill just passed.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Louisiana?

There was no objection.

ST. CLAIR COUNTY SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION DIS- TRICT—25 YEARS OF PROGRESS

(Mr. PRICE asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Speaker, farmers, conservation leaders, and numerous co-operating organizations can be justly proud of the conservation achievements in the St. Clair County Soil and Water Conservation District. This district, organized 25 years ago, has made outstanding progress in the field of soil and water conservation and is a unique example of successful Federal-State-local cooperation. The conservation program in St. Clair County has provided a means of insuring local direction and leadership in pursuing conservation practices that have been responsive to the needs and desires of our own communities.

Since the district was organized a quarter century ago more than 1,000 cooperators have been approved for participation in the program. Currently there are about 861 active cooperators. During this 25-year period 887 basic conservation plans have been prepared for operation of the farms of the local district of which 688 are currently active. The achievements in connection with 20 or more major conservation practices pursued to implement these basic plans on the farms of the district have been most impressive.

Among the leading projects pursued in St. Clair County, the Hog River-Pig Creek watershed project is of particular significance during the past year. This project, cosponsored by the local conservation district, the city of Mascoutah, and the Mascoutah Surface Water Protection District, is intended to solve problems of floodwater and drainage damage to more than 2,000 acres of cropland, 65 acres of grassland, and 818 acres of urban and miscellaneous land. The cost of conservation work required on these lands is estimated at about \$582,000—\$369,000 Federal and \$213,000 non-Federal. The project scheduled for completion in fiscal year 1964, was about half completed during 1962. Reports indicate that the partially completed work has been effective in dealing with the water problem in the area and that there is reason to believe that the completed project will give the protection desired.

It is encouraging to observe the continued interest in farm conservation planning in the St. Clair County district. It appears that it is becoming more and more difficult to work out plans with farm owners and tenants because of the changing character of agriculture in the area. Recent census data indicate that St. Clair County has changed from a predominantly dairy-wheat type of farming to a corn-soybean-hog producing area. This change in land use has necessitated an increase in terracing, grass waterways and structures to try to handle this more intensive cropping. Incentive payments made under provisions of the agricultural conservation program have speeded up application of soil and

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water conservation practices. Many farmers have been encouraged to move ahead of their program by these payments. This program, in cooperation with the technical assistance provided by the Soil Conservation Service, has done an outstanding job in the area.

Achievements of the conservation program in the St. Clair County Soil and Water Conservation District confirm once more that the soil conservation district program is a great success. It is a fulfillment of the belief and hopes of those who 25 years ago saw in soil conservation districts a great new opportunity for democratic action in the best traditions of our democracy.

NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

(Mr. CURTIS asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in the body of the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. Speaker, under the Constitution, the U.S. Senate has the responsibility for ratification of treaties. This, of course, does not ban comment and discussion on the question of ratification of a particular treaty by the general public or by the House of Representatives. Indeed, there is an obligation on the part of the public and Members of the House of Representatives to speak out on the subject if it is of sufficient importance and one feels that a contribution can be made in moving the debate forward.

Certainly the proposed nuclear test ban treaty being considered by the Senate has become the symbol of an important and very basic issue to our people, a step toward world peace. If the proposed treaty itself does not warrant this symbol, it is very important that our people understand that the symbol itself, a step toward peace, is not being rejected, but rather something falsely marketed under that fine label is being rejected.

President Kennedy has asked for forthright debate on the issue, a ratification of the treaty, but at the very same time he asked for forthright debate he and those who decided, in camera, to support ratification fouled up the rules of fair debate by begging the basic question. The question is: Is ratification of this treaty a step toward world peace, however small? Let us discuss the question.

The arguments of those opposing ratification of the treaty which have been reported to the people, subtly though unintentionally, help to further conceal the fact that the basic question has not been debated.

These arguments have as their basic theme that ratification of this treaty is dangerous to our national defense. Hence there is the overtone of acceptance of the administration's unsupported contention that the treaty is a step toward peace.

I certainly believe that the secondary question of whether we should take the risk to our national defense of a small step toward world peace needs serious debate once the premise that it is a step toward peace were established; and I commend those who manfully are trying to conduct such a debate in the atmos-

sphere of such heavy emotional odds against them, stemming from the strong feeling our people, or any humane people, have to take risks for even a small step toward peace.

I have written a letter to my people who have been writing to me on this important subject. I seek to meet the basic question, not beg it. Is the proposed nuclear test ban treaty really a small step toward peace? Or is it really a step away from peace? A step back toward ignorance, fear, and irrationality? I believe a calm examination of the treaty in full context of the state of world's scientific knowledge reveals that it is a step backward from peace. It is a step away from honest search for the truth. A step toward peace only comes from a step toward justice, as best we can define it. And progress toward a better understanding of justice comes only from search for truth.

I am setting out this letter for whatever value it may be in furthering debate on this matter. I am also setting out a very fine editorial appearing in the Friday, September 13, 1963, St. Louis Globe-Democrat entitled "If I Were a Senator." As one can see from reading the editorial it follows a different theme from that of my letter, the secondary theme which accepts the premise, but then asks is it worth the risk. It is cogently put. It too moves the debate forward.

Is it indeed too much to ask the President and those who follow his philosophy on this important matter to abide by the rules of fair debate? Debate the basic question. Do not beg it.

IF I WERE A SENATOR

The conscience of the Nation is on the 100 U.S. Senators as they prepare to take the most fateful vote of this decade on the nuclear test ban treaty.

Each Senator must look deep into his own heart and mind in determining his vote. Each thoughtful citizen must decide what he would do "If I were Senator," and should communicate these views to his Senator.

Supporters of the treaty include former Presidents Eisenhower and Truman, Director John McCone of the Central Intelligence Agency, some members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—with reservations—and a number of leading Senators, though chiefly those generally associated with Kennedy administration policies.

Opponents include Dr. Edward Teller—our most knowledgeable scientist in this field and one whose previous predictions have unfailingly been correct—a number of military leaders now retired and not under the thumb of the President, including Adm. Arleigh Burke and Adm. Lewis Strauss, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and General Power of the Strategic Air Command, and the two most knowledgeable Senators in this field, Senator Russell of Georgia and Senator Stennis of Mississippi.

The chief argument for the treaty is that it will be a first step toward reduction of nuclear tensions. We concur in this only to a superficial extent.

The treaty itself is a triumph of Madison Avenue techniques, whereby dozens of nations—including many whose main offensive potential is throwing coconuts at each other—have agreed not to build nuclear weapons, whereas the two actual, or potential, members of the nuclear group—France and Communist China—have made no such commitment.

It is very easy for nations to forego things which they have never had and have no possibility of obtaining.

The proponents also state that rejecting the treaty would put us in a bad light in world opinion. For what it is worth, this is probably true—though not nearly so bad a light as if the world were eventually lost for lack of U.S. strength.

If we now reject the treaty, we unquestionably shall be accused of being warmongers. This is a dreadful position for President Kennedy to have placed us in, in the first place. Yet, we are there.

Air Force General LeMay, for example, states that he would oppose the treaty if we were not already committed to it by our President.

These, then, are the most substantive arguments made for the treaty. No proponent has yet said that it will add strength to America.

It has only been a question of how much it will subtract, and whether the political considerations of the subtraction of strength will outweigh the very real disadvantages of this loss of present and future deterrent power.

Against the treaty is, first, the fact that the Russians undoubtedly will cheat on this treaty, as they have in everything else throughout the entire history of the Bolshevik regime. No one seriously believes that they will, this once, keep faith.

This pact allows the Russians to progress in those areas where we lead—and restrains us in fields where they lead, because we have always kept the sanctity of treaties.

Further, there is the deep-seated conviction—despite disclaimers—that there are more to these negotiations than meet the eye.

The continuing suspicion of a deal involving a nonaggression pact and recognition of the satellites of Eastern Europe, and especially East Germany, which would cut the heart out of the pledges we have made from the very beginning of World War II for the self-determination of people, and for liberty and freedom of the captive nations, persist despite disclaimers.

Of equal importance is the great suspicion that this treaty may be not so much the first step toward peace, but the first step toward disarmament as planned by the misty-eyed dreamers and unrealists of the Kennedy palace guard, who are convinced that the future of the United States lies not in strength—as the lessons of history have taught us—but in getting away from deterrent strength, which they term provocative, down to a level of assumed weakness with the Russians.

This effort to buy peace by trying to appease the unappeasable, and satiate the insatiable, has failed every time we have ever tried it—starting with Teheran and Yalta up to the very present moment.

The Kennedy administration is trying to sell the treaty on the basis that its weaknesses are compensated by the political gains made. We could agree if any political gains—other than ephemeral world opinion, for which the Russians themselves have never striven—were apparent.

For example, if—as a collateral of this treaty—the Russians would honor their pledge to withdraw their weapons, technicians and armed forces from Cuba, or tear down the Berlin Wall, or cease their provocations in Southeast Asia or their subversion of peaceful governments throughout the world, then we could easily understand that the risks involved in this treaty would be compensated by the real gains toward eventual world peace and disarmament in good faith, consonant with security.

Not a single shred of evidence points to this conclusion.

On balance, we think the treaty is dangerous for the United States, in that the loss

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of strength is very real—and the gains, outside the will-o'-the-wisp of world opinion, are undiscernable.

At the very least, the treaty raises a reasonable doubt, on the basis of learned testimony, as to its value. Reasonable doubts of this sort should be resolved in favor of strength and safety for America, not possibly reckless gambling with our future.

World opinion is the most overrated commodity today. We have spent over \$100 billions essentially to build a favorable climate of world opinion for us—and we are universally mistrusted, our motives scorned.

World opinion follows the strong and the correct—not the weak and vacillating.

Every lesson of history has taught us that only the strong remain free. Yet, this treaty panders to weakness and abjures strength.

It breeds suspicion of the future, not confidence.

It leads us down the road to accommodation, with its dangerous pitfalls of being caught unprepared and unwary, without any compensating advantages to the United States and to those—whatever they may say today—who have owed, and will continue to owe, their survival to one factor, and one factor alone, the ability of the United States to deter aggression.

For all these reasons—acknowledging the good intentions of those who think otherwise—we urge the Senate to reject the treaty until such time as Russian commitments to peace are more meaningful and more realistic, in the light of past performances and future hopes.

DEAR CONSTITUENT: Thank you for your communications regarding the nuclear test ban treaty among the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain. This proposal provides: "Each of the parties to this treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control in the atmosphere, beyond its limits, including outer space; or underwater; including territorial waters or high seas; or in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted."

Because of the number of letters which I have received on the subject of this treaty, and because of the importance of this issue, I am resorting to a mimeographed reply to your communications. I hope that you will excuse this, but since it is my desire to fully answer all the questions asked of me on this subject, this type of response is the best way to say more to more people.

Let me say at the outset of this discussion that the impact of my opinion upon the final outcome of the treaty is greatly limited due to the fact that its ratification rests solely with the Senate. This, however, in no way lessens my concern over this issue, nor does it reduce my determination to do all I can to influence my colleagues in the Senate.

Turning to the nuclear test ban treaty itself, I believe that it is important to consider this issue in its proper perspective. Nuclear power can be good or bad, depending on how it is used. Not only does it pose a threat of mass annihilation, but also it holds the promise for further peaceful technological development. By channeling the power of nuclear explosives into civilian and industrial areas, it could be used for the creation of harbors and sealevel canals at much less expense. For example, if a second Panama Canal were built by a nuclear explosion rather than by conventional methods of earth moving, it has been estimated that something like \$8 billion could be saved. Also it has a bearing on space, underwater, and other propulsion. It has a bearing on

medical and botanical advancements. We cannot get around the fact that space utilization requires maximum energy releases and nuclear explosions are the method through which maximum energy releases can be produced—and produced most cheaply. Further, plowshare explosions which can be so useful on earth, if we can learn to make them clean, may be required for the building of stations on the moon. Is it not self-evident that to establish anything like a useful environment on the moon a great deal of earth moving will be necessary? Hence, we would have to transport vast amounts of energy into space, which would be impossible unless we can package the energy into minimum weights. Again, the nuclear explosive provides the solution.

All of this speculation is dependent on the continuance of our nuclear testing. We have already produced the raw explosion, the uncontrolled explosion, the explosion dangerous to mankind. Now, we must learn to refine and control this phenomena which can be so wonderful, if only we will let it be. Only by further developing our knowledge of nuclear explosives will we be able to produce a so-called clean explosion—that is, a nuclear explosion which does not produce deleterious fallout. The test ban treaty threatens to end our partial improvements and achievements toward this end. As Dr. John Wheeler said: "It will prevent us from developing a technology of pure hydrogen devices free of fission fallout." We must let the scientists continue their experimentation, not only in the laboratory but also in the field of nuclear testing. The basic threat to mankind is nuclear war with dirty bombs not nuclear testing. The real threat, nuclear annihilation, comes from the potential fallout of all the dirty bombs that Russia and the United States now possess in their stockpiles. These stockpiles will not be dissipated by a lopsided, cheatin'prone, illusory nuclear test ban treaty. Indeed, a test ban of this sort would prevent us from developing the more efficient weapon which would not cause damage to the innocent bystander. The loopholes only would increase the threat to America and her free world allies.

While this is my main reason for rejecting the present treaty, it is supplemented by several other concrete arguments. Nuclear weaponry is a new science which needs further refinement. Although war, if it should ever come, can never be made humane, it can be made less inhumane if nuclear testing is allowed to proceed so that nuclear weapons which might be used will affect only the intended target, not innocent civilians or the personnel using the weapon. This is particularly true in the case of the defensive nuclear weapons, those designed to shoot down the enemy's nuclear missiles. We certainly want no fallout from our anti-missile missiles which will operate close to our own lands and so hurt the very people they seek to protect. In addition we have to consider whether Russia can be trusted to live up to any treaty let alone a nuclear test ban treaty which involves the very survival of nations. It must be pointed out that the United States has gradually reduced its demands for on-site inspections from 20 to 8-10 to 3, and now the present treaty requires no control posts, no on-site inspection, with no international body doing the checking. In other words, we are considering entering into an agreement with the Soviet Union which seems to have no adequate policing or controls. Dr. Edward Teller's words must be considered, even though we may end up going against his advice. He says of this proposed treaty that "such a ban would be virtually unpoliced. It would endanger our security and would help the Soviet Union in its plan to conquer the world. The test ban would prevent vital improvements of our atomic explosives.

The test ban will not interfere with Russian progress. It may endanger the NATO alliance."

Experience should teach us that the Communists will enter no agreement which does not give them a net advantage in their unremitting campaign to destroy the non-Communist world.

These reasons, therefore, are the basis of my stand against the proposed nuclear test ban treaty. With further development we would be able to produce clean, nuclear propulsive and explosive power which would enable us to employ this newly discovered power for the peaceful advancement of mankind. It also would enable us to make a horrible weapon much less horrible. Instead of killing millions upon millions of innocent bystanders, the nuclear weapons without deleterious fallout could be confined to a much smaller area and affect fewer people. Scientific advancement cannot be made in the academic laboratories alone. There is only one way to snatch bits of truth from the dark and boundless abyss of the unknown and that is by patient, intelligent trial and error-testing, checking, and then testing again and again and again. The treaty, far from making the world safer by attempting to put a cap on the status of human knowledge actually is preventing the world from gaining the knowledge necessary to use nuclear power safely. If we are to forgo the benefits of advancing scientific knowledge in this important area on the assumption that this will lessen the chance of a nuclear war with the terrible dirty bombs the Soviet and we presently possess by a test ban agreement, I would recommend strongly that it be only with greater controls and inspection systems which will prevent our nuclear advantages from being lost, thus becoming "second best." We have before us now an unpoliced and inadequate treaty which works to the benefit of the Soviet Union and threatens our security. It is a drastic, unimaginative, somewhat cowardly step backward in mankind's search for truth and, yes, peace, instead of an important first step forward.

Finally, as to peace itself. Peace only comes through working in the hearts of men not with the great forces of the inanimate world. Whether men kill each other with spears, arrows, bullets, TNT, Torpex, or nuclear bombs it is death and destruction to those who die. Real peace can only come through pursuit of justice and justice can only be found through an unsullied search for truth. If we would write peace treaties, write treaties around new and advanced principles of justice, not banning forces that in themselves are neither good nor bad. Fire is bad if it burns a home and destroys people. It is good if it cooks food and keeps us warm. Explosive forces are bad if they are used to kill and maim people but good if used to propel ships and planes to bring people closer. Let's don't attack search for truth in the guise of seeking peace, let's attack the real villain, inhumanity, and if this battle is won, peace will be the prize.

With best wishes,
Sincerely,

THOMAS B. CURTIS.

POLICE DESERVE COMMENDATION

(Mr. ASHBROOK asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this time to offer my personal commendation to the Capitol Hill and Metropolitan police who were present last week at the hearings of the House Committee on Un-American Activities and preserved order. They showed great restraint in the face of

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contemptuous, offensive conduct and deserve our sincere thanks. They were attacked, cursed and abused in every manner but in the face of this they were calm, deliberate, and decisive.

By no stretch of the imagination could the unkempt, beatnik type youth who rioted in the caucus room of the Cannon House Office Building be called typical college youth. To use contemporary terminology, the best thing that could be said about them was that they were "off-beat." A number of the youth were ordered expelled from the hearings by our chairman, the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. WILLIS]. In defiance of these orders and the uniformed symbol of law and order, the policemen who were present, many resisted with verbal abuse and physical assault. I doubt that many red-blooded Americans would have used the same restraint exercised by these fine police officers under the same circumstances. The patriotism of these so-called students is best exemplified by their applause when a Communist propaganda film showed an American plane being shot down over South Vietnam. During the rioting, the off-beat sympathizers shouted "What's wrong with communism?" and "there's more freedom in Cuba than Louisiana."

Dispassionately and objectively, the policemen dispersed the rioting, ejected the hecklers and restored order. This is the American way of doing things and the charges that we will undoubtedly read in the Communist Daily Worker and other far left publications of "police brutality," "Fascist tactics" and so forth will have absolutely no basis in fact.

In its usual manner the Washington Post tinted their account of the melee to give the benefit of the doubt to the unruly students. The subheadings read "Student, Police Clash at Hill Quiz" and "Youths Dragged from Hearing on Cuban Tour." Their slanted version certainly did an injustice to the policemen on duty that day.

It is no secret that one of the strategies of the Communists in the country is to discredit the FBI, internal security laws, and the police whenever it can be done. Unfortunately, they are joined by a great number of civil liberties groups who are silent when gallant police officers are shot in the line of duty, such as Sgt. Peter Voto and Gary Tedesco, at Lodi, N.J., on August 27, 1963, but cry "police brutality" if the policemen use necessary means to defend themselves.

For example, on August 29, New York City Police Lt. Thomas Quinn, a 53-year-old veteran and father of two children, led a police raid into a room in the Manhattan Hotel in New York City on a tip that Frank Falco, 25, a major suspect in the slaying of Sergeant Voto and patrolman Tedesco 2 days before, was hiding out in the hotel. Falco was also wanted for the murder last month of Robert Munos, 19, whose body was found in the East River and Falco's criminal record showed convictions for third degree robbery and arrests for felonious assault and simple assault. As the story is reported, Lieutenant Quinn, with gun in hand, awakened the sleeping Falco who fought the police. Falco was shot to death in the ensuing struggle.

The New York Civil Liberties Union called Falco's death—

An example of police employing standards not unlike a Ku Klux Klan lynching party when they get their hands on a so-called cop killer.

As the reputable newsletter Counter-attack puts it—

The police are citizens of the United States too and have rights the same as anyone of us. They are paid to keep law and order and to protect our society from lawbreakers but that does not presuppose that they therefore give up all their rights to protect themselves too.

I for one am glad that the overwhelming majority of police officers in this country act in the same responsible manner as did the Capitol Hill Police and the Metropolitan Police in maintaining law and order at the September 12 and 13 hearings. Too few of us take the time to commend them for their fine work. Of course, it can be said that it is their job and they should do no less but we should also realize that the vexing nature of their work calls for more than ordinary conduct in the face of taunts, jeers, profanity, and assault.

THE VICIOUS KILLING OF FOUR LITTLE GIRLS IN BIRMINGHAM, ALA.

(Mr. ROOSEVELT was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ROOSEVELT. Mr. Speaker, I rise to express the shock I felt, which I know is shared by all Americans, at the vicious killing of four little girls in Birmingham, Ala. It is imperative that the perpetrators of this outrage be brought to justice with all possible speed. In addition, as the President reiterated so eloquently yesterday, it is necessary that steps be taken to assure racial justice throughout the country, so that tragedies like that in Birmingham will never again occur. This must be done if inflamed emotions are to subside and a terrible bloodletting is to be avoided. In addition, the public officials of the city of Birmingham, the State of Alabama, and all other areas where heinous acts of intimidation are commonplace, must tell the extremists of their constituencies in no uncertain terms that acts of violence and terror will be dealt with with the greatest possible firmness. The responsibility of certain of these officials for an inflamed situation which encourages the actions of depraved fanatics cannot be overlooked.

I hope that this tragedy will serve to remind Alabamans and all Americans of the need for the proposed civil rights legislation, so that equal rights for all Americans will become a reality, and the violence and despair engendered by the present situation will pass away forever.

THE VICIOUS KILLING OF FOUR LITTLE GIRLS IN BIRMINGHAM, ALA.

(Mr. LINDSAY was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point

in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. LINDSAY. Mr. Speaker, the bombing that took place in Birmingham last Sunday wantonly and brutally killing four children, ought to shake the conscience of America to its "root pins."

If it has been unclear to some that the country must take hold of this unsolved problem and resolve it according to basic principles stated in the Declaration of Independence and in the Constitution of the United States, it should be clear enough now. There is nothing that we legislators in Washington can say or do that will bring these little children back or that will wash away the stain of blood. But we as legislators can do our appointed task with fresh determination and conviction.

That task is to draft a proper civil rights bill that is nationwide in scope and that calls upon all Americans, through our constituted Federal Government, to respect the equal protection of the laws and the full mandate of the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments to the Constitution. I call upon the Congress to act on legislation and to stop fiddling while the country burns.

I call upon the U.S. Department of Justice to multiply its efforts 100-fold to uncover the facts surrounding this crime and to bring to justice the persons who committed it. But no FBI technique is needed to tell us that this crime weighs heavily on the conscience of every American and that the tears shed by the fathers and mothers, brothers and sisters of these little children are shed for all of us.

Mr. Speaker, we have done little enough in this Congress; let us at least, in this area of primary importance, accomplish what we have set out to do. We live under a body of laws, and we are governed by these laws and not by men. The law must be adjusted to put an end to daily humiliation and to guarantee equal opportunity for our citizens in all facets of American life. If we fail in this we fail altogether.

CASTRO AND COMMUNISM IN CUBA

(Mr. PEPPER was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, we are all agreed that the screws must be tightened on Castro and communism in Cuba if we are to rid this Nation and this hemisphere of the curse and threat of communism so close to our shores.

You will recall that on Thursday last I advised the House of the resolutions adopted by the 45th Annual National Convention of the American Legion meeting in Miami Beach, Fla., proposing that our Government take stronger action than we are now taking toward strangling Castro and communism in Cuba. One of the actions which the American Legion convention recommended and which I was privileged to suggest to the foreign relations committee of the American Legion was that we tighten the restraints on shipping now serving Castro and Cuba and bar U.S. ports to ships and ship captains who

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have transported passengers, cargo, or both, to or between Cuban ports and to ships of ship proprietors who or which have caused any ship to serve Cuba. I gave notice on Thursday last that I would introduce on Monday legislation to accomplish these recommendations of the American Legion.

On account of the death of our distinguished colleague, Mr. Leon Gavin of Pennsylvania, I was not able to introduce the bill to effectuate such end yesterday. I do so today and commend this proposal for the thoughtful consideration of the President, the Secretary of State, and the Congress and the country. My bill which I have offered today provides as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) it shall be unlawful for all vessels owned by any individual, company, corporation, or other association (American or foreign) owning any vessel used for the transportation of persons or property to or from, or between points within, Cuba (other than United States installations in Cuba), during any period when Cuba is Communist-dominated, to enter any port of the United States at any time; (b) it shall be unlawful for any vessel which has been used for the transportation of persons or property to or from, or between points within, Cuba (other than United States installations in Cuba), during any period when Cuba is Communist-dominated, to enter any port of the United States at any time. Any vessel which enters a port of the United States in violation of this subsection shall be subject to a penalty of not more than \$100,000, which penalty shall be a lien upon the vessel and such vessel may be libeled therefor in any district court of the United States within the jurisdiction of which the vessel may be found.

(c) For the purposes of subsections (a) and (b) of this section, Cuba shall be deemed to be Communist-dominated from the effective date of this Act until the date of publication in the Federal Register of a proclamation issued by the President of the United States stating that Cuba is not Communist-dominated.

Sec. 2. It shall be unlawful for any individual who acts or has acted as master of any vessel described in the first section of this Act to act as master of any vessel entering a port of the United States. Whoever violates this section shall be fined not more than \$10,000, or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both.

Sec. 3. The foregoing provisions of this Act shall take effect as of the thirtieth day following the date of enactment of this Act.

(Mr. LINDSAY (at the request of Mr. BATTIN) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. LINDSAY'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

HOWARD JOHNSON ON RELIEF ARA RIDES HERD AGAIN

(Mr. WIDNALL (at the request of Mr. BATTIN) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. WIDNALL. Mr. Speaker, the Area Redevelopment Administration on September 15, 1963, announced a new

industrial loan of \$2,275,000 toward building a motel in Carolina, Puerto Rico. This continued the disregard of the expressed intent of Congress that has been evidenced many times by that administration prior to this.

This loan, representing 40 percent of the project cost, is to the Howard Johnson Motor Lodge, Inc., an organization which is building motels and restaurants all over the country without any Government assistance. To the best of my knowledge, it has had no credit problems and has shown no signs of bashfulness in establishing itself in any spot where the tourist dollar beckons. This is a classic example of the Area Redevelopment Administration's willingness to ignore the expressed intent of Congress regarding the operation of the depressed areas program.

The Senate Banking and Currency Committee in its report on the proposed new ARA authorization bill, S. 1163, issued a warning to the Area Redevelopment Administration to go slow on loans to motels, hotels and similar tourist facilities. The House Banking and Currency Committee, when it considered S. 1163, was emphatic in its majority report when it stated that "considerable doubt" had been raised about motel projects and the House committee by its action cut off all future loans to hotels, motels and nursing homes.

Why should the American taxpayers subsidize Howard Johnson's at a low 4-percent interest rate in an island economy featured already by tax concessions to lure business? If Puerto Rico qualifies for area redevelopment aid, there can be no objection to a sound program that will provide the maximum number of jobs. There must certainly be far more worthy projects for Puerto Rico. If not, this could be a deliberate attempt to get rid of present appropriated funds so that the agency can cry about its need.

Only a short time ago ARA provided an industrial loan for an expanded clay plant totaling \$670,000 in Rio Piedras, P.R. The agency estimated that 2,051 indirect and direct jobs would be promoted. This is at a rate of \$802 per job in terms of the Federal contribution, since the ARA loan amounts to 40.7 percent of total cost. Yet this new motel project would create only 300 jobs at a rate of \$16,021 per job in terms of the Federal contribution.

This is not only ridiculous economics, it flies in the face of clear congressional directive. In the Senate report the committee specifically states that motel loans should not exceed the cost per job of other types of projects assisted. This ARA loan multiplies the cost 20 times the cost of other jobs in Puerto Rico. The Senate committee also stated that a higher Federal cost ratio would only be justified in a case where tourism had not previously been important to the area. Who can maintain that tourism has not been important to Puerto Rico?

This action on the part of the Area Redevelopment Administration betrays the position of the Kennedy administration. It indicates that the provision striking out hotels and motels in the new House version of the Senate bill, which

was put in as a sop to critics and to avoid the civil rights question on public accommodations, is dead. The administration obviously expects it to be dropped in any conference between the House and the Senate.

In fact, if you take the majority report's interpretation of the motel amendment, even passage of this provision would be meaningless. According to the majority report, the amendment "does not, of course, apply retroactively, to interfere with the completion of any such facility for which the ARA has already received an application." In other words, as long as an application is in, regardless of approval, the ARA is free to work its will. In light of this inexcusable "tourist" motel project in Puerto Rico, the next 2 years will be no vacation for the American taxpayer.

WE SHOULD SHARE NUCLEAR ARMS WITH OUR ALLIES

(Mr. FINDLEY (at the request of Mr. BATTIN) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, if I were a Member of the Senate, I would oppose the test ban treaty in its present form. My negative attitude is shared by many of my colleagues in the House. Some of them are speaking up, but others, for a variety of reasons, tell me they feel they should be silent at this time.

In fact, based on my survey, I predict the treaty would be rejected if ratification were up to the House instead of the Senate.

For several reasons, I consider it to be against the interests of the United States.

No. 1. A total ban on atmospheric testing is not necessary in order to safeguard public health.

Normal decay of radioactive fallout in the atmosphere is sufficient to permit adequate testing—for both military and peaceful purposes—by the world's leading powers.

No. 2. The treaty will impede development and application of nuclear power for peaceful purposes.

Peaceful uses have been almost completely neglected in the test ban debate. The potential for good is impressive. Up to now, we have had but a glimpse of the wonderful ways in which nuclear power can benefit mankind in a nonmilitary way.

For example, nuclear explosive can be useful in excavation, propulsion, space and weather activities, in medical and botanical advancement.

In a sense we are today at the primitive level in nuclear development. We have produced raw or "dirty" explosions. Vast research, experimentation and testing are needed to refine this power.

The treaty would retard this refinement, if not prevent it altogether. It would block many peaceful uses.

No. 3. The treaty is a military disadvantage to the United States. Expert opinion on this point differs, but enough of our top military leaders have spoken out to give us cause for grave concern over the military implications. Why

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take a chance? Certainly, there has been no showing that the test ban treaty will improve our military position.

If I could believe it is a step, however small, way from nuclear catastrophe, I would certainly support it in every way possible. Dr. Edward Teller, father of the H-bomb, has expressed eloquently my own concern. He feels as I do that it may actually move us closer to war. It will weaken our military position and tend to invite Soviet aggression.

No treaty is worth any more than the character of the signatories. The Soviet Union without warning broke the long-standing moratorium on atmospheric testing less than 2 years ago and conducted a series of high-yield explosions. This is but one in an almost endless series of broken agreements by the Russians.

A recent study, by Dr. F. G. Lassner of Stanford University, shows that the Soviets habitually violate treaties that have strategic importance. We will certainly live up to our end of the test ban, but there is little confidence on the part of anyone that the Russians will do likewise.

Suppose, under treaty limitations, we build what we believe to be a workable antimissile missile. How can we be sure it will work if we are barred from atmospheric testing? We would be foredoomed to rely on an untested weapon that might prove to be a complete fizzle.

Certainly reservations to the treaty which would improve our military position are wise and proper.

To illustrate, Senator GOLDWATER proposes that the treaty's effective date be delayed until all Soviet military power is removed from Cuba, and the removal confirmed by onsite inspection. This is not a novel or new proposal. The President himself announced he would insist on these very conditions last October before he lifted the blockade. Ridding Cuba of Soviet power would help to counterbalance some of the test ban's military disadvantage. It would not make the treaty acceptable, but it could certainly improve our position.

No. 4. The treaty tends to weaken the NATO alliance.

It attempts to freeze the status quo in nuclear arms development, and is directed against so-called proliferation of nuclear power. The emphasis is on bilateral deals between Moscow and Washington. In ratifying the pact, we bargain with Moscow to keep our own allies disarmed from the nuclear standpoint.

NATO is a defensive alliance, dependent in great measure on U.S. nuclear power. By agreeing to curb our nuclear activities, we are at the same time agreeing to curb NATO's defensive position. We do so without offering any alternate plan to strengthen NATO.

The treaty is essentially an arms-control deal with Soviet Russia, a Communist power that is notable for breaking treaties.

Instead of an arms control deal with an untrustworthy dictatorship, I propose arms sharing with nations we can trust.

Instead of weakening the defensive armor of freedom, we should strengthen it by sharing it with our friends.

The test ban treaty, our talk of disarmament, our pullout of missiles from Turkey and Italy, and our lack of follow-through in dealing with Soviet military power in Cuba have caused wide concern among our allies.

Who can blame them for wondering if we would really defend their cities with nuclear weapons if Khrushchev pushes the attack button?

We can dispel that doubt, and at the same time strengthen NATO, by giving them the know-how and the weapons they need and deserve.

FREEMAN'S PARTIAL END OF DIS-CRIMINATION APPRECIATED

(Mr. FINDLEY (at the request of Mr. BATTIN) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, I have thanked Agriculture Secretary Freeman for partially ending export subsidy rate discrimination against soft wheat varieties.

I protested September 6 against a 14-cent per bushel advantage accorded hard wheat in USDA export subsidies. Since then the disparity has been reduced by 6 cents.

In my letter to Freeman I said:

As of this moment, you have washed away nearly half of the subsidy discrimination against growers of soft wheat. By the time this letter reaches you I hope the rest of it will be gone.

On behalf of the soft wheat growers in Illinois and elsewhere, I wish to express my appreciation for this prompt—although partial—response to my request.

As you close the export subsidy gap, I hope you will also end the discrimination against soft wheat in Public Law 480 agreements. Illinois wheat farmers deserve the same treatment as wheat farmers elsewhere.

176TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SIGNING OF THE CONSTITUTION

(Mr. BOB WILSON (at the request of Mr. BATTIN) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BOB WILSON. Mr. Speaker, today marks the 176th anniversary of the signing of the Constitution and the start of Constitution Week, pursuant to a resolution passed by the Congress.

I feel that this week should be observed with special significance this year. All Americans should take a few moments to read the Constitution, a divinely inspired document that spells out the finer motivations and aspirations of mankind.

Unfortunately, our Constitution is under attack. We have in the executive branch of our Government many leaders who have publicly downgraded this noble document and relegated it to the ash heap of history. Men may come and go, but principles do not change.

The inspiring phrases of the Constitution and the deep basic principles they espouse will survive the New Frontier and the Kennedys. All Americans have

a vital stake in seeing to it that no group of self-centered men, no group of misguided zealots can alter or erase the guidelines that our wise Founding Fathers set up for our Government.

Our Republic is still the most noble experiment in decency in history. We can only retrogress by attempting to change the precepts that created this Government.

WHILE THE FDA TWIDDLES

(Mr. KEITH (at the request of Mr. BATTIN) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. KEITH. Mr. Speaker, currently under consideration by Congress are several important proposals to strengthen the American fishing industry and protect traditional American fisheries from foreign exploitation. Similarly, and for many years, Congress has seen untold millions of dollars appropriated to help feed the starving and malnourished in the developing nations of the world.

I request permission to include in these proceedings the text of an editorial that bears eloquently on both of these problems. It is titled, "FDA Bottleneck," and has pointed reference to the continuing struggle some of us are having in getting this Federal agency to update its thinking with respect to a remarkable new food—fish flour, or as it has become known, "fish protein concentrate." Published by the Standard-Times of New Bedford, Mass., it was prompted by news last week that our good friends in Scotland are now ready to mass-produce a high-protein fish concentrate for export to the developing countries.

This news will be hailed by health experts and will be welcomed, I am sure, by the millions of people in the world today who still suffer from inadequate supplies of protein—nutritionist Nevin Scrimshaw, writing for the current issue of Scientific American, estimates that nearly half the world's population "is underfed or otherwise malnourished." Yet, and without detracting from the significance of the news from Glasgow, I feel almost impelled to say "I told you so" to the Food and Drug Administration, and with a touch of bitterness.

Frustration and delay have been our only rewards in dealings with this agency. Despite the overwhelming weight of scientific evidence to the contrary—and logic—Mr. Lerrick and his staff have consistently stuck to their arbitrary ruling that fish protein concentrate would be "esthetically" objectionable to the American people, and that because the process uses whole fish, the food should be considered "adulterated" under the law. This ruling and the agency's subsequent opposition to a bill I filed in the last session to overcome it, have stymied American production of a product that could go far toward solving the world's age-old problems of malnutrition. At the same time, it would give the beleaguered American fisherman an exciting new market for the abundant supplies of so-called trash fish off our

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Krasnodar is at Mankato's latitude, as I said, but Krasnodar is in the far south of the Soviet Union. Most of the Soviets' farmland is farther north, and a lot of it is much farther north. Moscow is about 400 miles north of Winnipeg. So you can readily realize what this means in shortened growing seasons in much of the Soviet Union.

We visited a research institute at Krasnodar that has done a great deal of work with hybrid corn—and here again the American influence was pronounced. For areas with a short growing season, the scientists at Krasnodar recommend a hybrid variety developed right here in Minnesota. When the season is longer, they recommend Wisconsin and Illinois varieties. Hybrids are now used on about 70 percent of Soviet corn acreage, and within a very few years, we were told, they will be used almost exclusively.

At the Krasnodar Institute, the outstanding achievement is a new beardless wheat—one of the parents of which was an American variety. This new wheat which is the only one used throughout a large region in Russia and which has spread to Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania, is claimed to have increased yields 35 percent.

The mention of midwest corn varieties in Russia leads me naturally into my second point—about the benefits to be derived from continued and expanded scientific, technical, cultural, and people-to-people contacts with other countries—including countries with a political system much different from ours.

We ought not to be fearful of the interchange of ideas. Agriculture is a peaceable pursuit. It is an open window between East and West. Its scientific innovations are published in agricultural journals for all the world to see and to read. We discovered again and again that the Des Moines newspapers are well known in the Soviet Union because they proposed the idea of exchanges between the two countries some years ago.

Keeping diplomatic and personal lines open between countries is an important way to avoid serious clashes. Witness the new "hot line" between Washington and Moscow; this is regarded as a major step, and rightly so, in preventing accidental or thoughtless adventures that could wipe out most of civilization. I said before that agriculture is a peaceable pursuit. So why can we not have an augmented peace line—an expanded line of agricultural exchanges—between our two countries? What better way to make sure that no one ever has to make a call on the "hot" line.

The people of the Soviet Union—even Mr. Khrushchev—agree with us that American agriculture is the best in the world. It follows, therefore, that perhaps Russian agricultural scientists and practitioners have more to learn from us than we from them. For that reason, we might selfishly say: "Let's go slow on exchanges." But that would be a grave mistake, not only because our agricultural knowledge is given wide publicity and is translated and studied by the Russians but also because shutting off agricultural exchange would close down lines of international communication over which flows the broad good will that accompanies personal contact. Of course, we can never for an instant let down our own security guard. We must never delude ourselves into thinking that the Communists have abandoned their goal of world conquest—that would be a negation of Marxism, on which their whole philosophic structure is built.

Both countries benefit from such exchanges. Cross-fertilization of our own ideas and techniques is important to the United States, just as is cross-fertilization of some of our plants and trees.

In Leningrad we visited the All Union Institute of Plant Industry, which maintains plant exchanges with 80 countries. Scientists are sent out all over the world to col-

lect plants and view the work in agricultural schools and institutions.

Years ago the exchange program between the United States and that institute was allowed to lapse, but in 1959 this exchange was reestablished. Since that time, we have received 2,300 lots in exchange for about the same number sent over there from this country.

We are interested in sending explorers to the Soviet Union to search among wild plants, and we recently concluded an agreement to permit two American scientists to do this. They are now in Moscow and soon will be in the Uzbek Republic. This can benefit us, since many of our wheat, fruit, and vegetable species originated in that part of the world. By exploring among wild species, we can perhaps find strains that resist diseases and insects—and which have other desirable characteristics. We can also search for insect predators and parasites that might be used here to combat our insect pests.

Our explorers have been doing this in other countries—and we are interested in doing this kind of work within the great land mass that is the Soviet Union. We discussed the possibility of further arrangements of this kind with the Soviets at several levels and found a great deal of interest. I brought it up, then, with Premier Khrushchev, and he replied that plant exploration is important, and that he is in favor of such exchanges.

One of the plant characteristics that we can use in our breeding program was present in some low-growing apples and cherries that we saw in Moscow. These little trees—which came from Siberia—are no more than 18 inches off the ground and spread out like a creeping plant. We understood that when winter comes, the snow covers up the whole tree, and it can, therefore, survive—despite the bitter Siberian winters. It gets cold in Minnesota, too, as I recall.

We are interested in learning more about their beardless wheat; and about hard spring wheat we saw at Orenburg that was reported to test at an unusually high protein content. In Bulgaria, we saw a beautiful hybrid tomato which our scientists said was one of the best in the world; Bulgaria exports 250,000 tons of this hybrid annually. At a general agricultural collective in Yugoslavia, we were shown alfalfa and corn pellets that had been developed on the farm. We saw some interesting vitamin pellets developed on a first-rate hog farm in the U.S.S.R.

What I'm saying is that both nations—all of our nations—can benefit from the kind of scientific exchange we are trying to enlarge.

The third point I want to make—and it is an encouraging one—is that even under a Communist system that has survived for a generation and a half, as it has in Russia, a feeling of individualism continues to be a part of the human spirit.

The success of the small private plot is an example. In the Soviet Union a collective farmer may cultivate a little more than 2 acres, and a worker on a state farm about a third of an acre for himself.

Although private farm plots are not officially encouraged and do not benefit from the Government's extension service, these small private enterprises are very productive and make up a significant part of agricultural production in the U.S.S.R. because they give individual farmers a chance to exercise their own initiative.

I want to mention one other item on the durability of the human spirit. The first collective farm we visited in Poland had over the mantelpiece not the inevitable picture of Lenin which we saw everywhere in the U.S.S.R. but, instead, a crucifix.

In the Soviet Union it is possible, though not always easy, to attend church services. In Minsk, for example, Mrs. Freeman asked the Agriculture Minister at our first briefing session about attending church the following day, which was Sunday. The Agriculture

Minister said he was a Communist and did not go to church, and in fact he didn't even know where there was a church, but that he would find out and see that it was arranged. So she and I went to a service at a Russian Orthodox Church. We had been told ahead of time that we might expect to see only peasant women of advanced years there. We were pleasantly surprised. There were a number of middle-aged men and women, and some young people, too.

The members of our traveling party had many, many visits with everyday citizens in the countries we visited—people on the farms, in factories, in the streets. Whenever possible, I would say a few words to farmhands, to staff people, or just to curious onlookers, along these lines: "I bring you greetings from President Kennedy and the American people and expressions of friendship and a desire for peace in the world."

And in each case, the people, many of whom had never seen an American, responded with warm applause and crowded around happily to shake hands.

I must admit that I had not anticipated such a completely friendly response as we received from the Russian people, particularly in view of all the anti-American propaganda calling us imperialist warmongers, that they have heard over the years. We discovered an immense reserve of friendship for the United States among the people themselves. Their talk was always about peace, and they responded spontaneously to the message that President Kennedy and the American people want peace. It is hard for me to communicate the intensity of their feeling about peace.

Then we visited cities that had been destroyed—leveled to the ground—in World War II. In those cities, and in that country where 20 million people lost their lives in the war, the memory of total destruction of life and property is still very real. Kiev, for example, on the Dnieper River, has been mostly rebuilt since 1946. Minsk, a city of 600,000, was a battlefield in World War II, and is still being rebuilt.

We were in Russia at the time the nuclear test ban treaty was initiated. When the news came, I was having a rather technical discussion with the Ukrainian Minister of Agriculture in Kiev. The session immediately dissolved into a big round of speeches of friendship. Other members of our party were on a state farm. Applause and shouts of approval greeted the announcement there.

To summarize our agricultural observations, let me point out again that the specialists in our party did not completely agree. But it was unanimous that there has been progress in Soviet agriculture. The extent of this progress, and the amount of future progress to be expected, are more difficult to assess.

It is clear that Soviet science and research have improved, and some of it is good indeed.

It is clear that the Soviets are communicating know-how to farmers and local managers better and more effectively than was the case 5 to 10 years ago.

And it is clear that total production has risen considerably. They have the ability to feed their people, although with a very limited diet.

As you might expect, the Soviets are the most successful in producing those crops where production can be routinized and standardized. That is, grain and the row crops—sugarbeets, cotton, and sunflowers.

In the more diversified kinds of farming—such as livestock, dairying, fruit and vegetables—they are lagging far behind. Part of the reason is that this kind of farming calls for so many day-to-day and week-to-week decisions on the spot that a remote decisionmaking process breaks down under its own bureaucratic weight.

Another reason for the Soviet lag is a poor marketing system. This is a big deficit in

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Soviet agriculture. If you can't market and transport and preserve milk and meat and vegetables—you can't produce them successfully on a large scale. There is a big shortage of marketing, distribution, storing, and processing facilities.

As for the future, it seems certain that the Soviets will begin to put more of their capital resources into agriculture. So—while I don't believe that with their system they will ever catch up with us in productivity per man-hour—their total production will continue to increase.

The single greatest impression from my visit to the Soviet Union is that we need to increase our person-to-person contacts with the Russian people—consistent, of course, with security principles and remembering always that the Communists still are striving to dominate the world. Agriculture offers perhaps our best and most peaceful opportunity to do this.

But the people of the Soviet Union—as contrasted with their leaders—don't necessarily share the desire to dominate the world and to "bury" the United States, as Mr. Khrushchev has expressed it. They want peace. They feel a friendliness for Americans.

Agriculture offers perhaps the best opportunity to meet these people on common terms. The exchange of information on agriculture can be a process of mutual improvement. Every American citizen who goes to the Soviet Union learns something. Russians are strongly impressed by our institutions and our way of life, whenever they have the opportunity to experience them.

I strongly suspect, in the light of Mr. Khrushchev's recent emphasis upon economic targets—his references to "economic war" and his statement to me that he means to take over our agricultural priority by 1970—that he now seeks to transform the cold war into an economic war. This may account for his desire for military peace—for relief from the economic burdens of building weapons for a nuclear war which might destroy communism as well as all the Communists.

If Khrushchev wishes an economic war, we are willing and able to take up that challenge. And this is my fourth point—in such a contest, agriculture will play an important role. American agricultural productivity today has proved its superiority over any Communist system ever devised.

I am certain that this will become more and more apparent to people everywhere—even to those behind the Iron Curtain—as they have more and more opportunity to learn about our achievements. In a contest involving either ideology or economics, we can whip the Communists hands down. And in such a contest you, the farmers of Minnesota and the United States, will lead the way.

A NEW AMERICAN LEGION COMMANDER—DANIEL FOLEY OF MINNESOTA

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, on Thursday, September 12, a singular honor was given to the State of Minnesota by the election by the American Legion of Daniel F. Foley, of Wabasha, Minn., as national commander of this great organization of veterans.

As a long-term friend and admirer of Dan Foley, it gives me great pleasure to congratulate the American Legion on its choice of leadership for the coming 12 months. Mr. Foley's election commemorates the first time that a Minnesotan has commanded the American Legion, the world's largest veterans' organization. Dan Foley combines the

qualities of quiet courage, intelligence, and a balanced and reasonable attitude toward controversy. He is a careful and considerate man, whose deep commitment to the public welfare, as well as to the welfare of veterans and their families, will certainly mean that the American Legion during the coming year will be wisely and judiciously led.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an editorial from the Minneapolis Star of September 13, 1963, entitled "Commander Foley," and the article from the Minneapolis Morning Tribune of September 13, 1963, entitled "Foley Elected U.S. Legion Commander," be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

There being no objection, the editorial and article were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Minneapolis (Minn.) Star, Sept. 13, 1963]

COMMANDER FOLEY

The American Legion has recognized the fine leadership qualities of a solid Wabasha, Minn., citizen in electing Daniel F. Foley its national commander. He comes of a family long prominent in State and national public affairs and he has devoted most of the years since World War II to Legion responsibilities.

The Legion's farflung welfare activities sometimes are obscured by controversy over some aspects of its Americanism program. But there is no objection to such fine projects as Boys State, junior baseball, high school oratorical contests, school patrols, get-out-the-vote and go-to-church campaigns and all the other similar efforts of the Legion.

The Legion's child welfare proposals have led to much of the State and Federal legislation in that field. The Legion pioneered the veterans rehabilitation program after World War I. With its women's auxiliary it has been an outstanding force for the betterment of America.

Commander Foley seems the right man to carry forward such endeavors and he brings to his high office diplomacy as well as administrative ability.

[From the Minneapolis (Minn.) Morning Tribune, Sept. 13, 1963]

FIRST MINNESOTAN TO WIN—FOLEY ELECTED U.S. LEGION COMMANDER

(By Mercer Cross)

MIAMI BEACH, Fla.—Minnesota's Dan Foley thundered to a 3-to-1 victory Thursday to become the top man in the American Legion.

The Wabasha lawyer is the first Minnesotan to command the world's largest veterans organization.

In the State-by-State balloting on the final day of the Legion's national convention, Foley collected 2,251 of the potential 2,974 delegate votes.

His opponent, Joe L. Matthews, Fort Worth, Tex., had 709. It was his second defeat in 2 years.

Matthews attributed his loss to alleged calling in of Legionnaires who would support Foley as the supposed choice of Legion "king-makers."

"Poppycock," said outgoing Commander James E. Powers of Georgia.

"We knew we were fighting a stacked deck," said Matthews. He wouldn't say whether he would make a third try next year.

Foley, in his acceptance speech from the platform of Miami Beach's immense Convention Hall, made this pledge:

"Though the forces of atheistic communism may beat with all their fury on the breasts of liberty, this Nation shall endure strong in justice."

"This Nation shall prosper, rich in compassion.

"This Nation shall stand down through the corridors of time, secure in freedom."

"Time and again," said Foley, "history has shown that the course of extremism, either to the right or to the left, is in the course of failure."

"The American Legion," he said, "is the greatest stabilizing factor in America today."

Powers placed the red cap of the national commander on Foley's head and pinned the commander's medal on his navy blue jacket.

Minnesota Gov. Karl F. Rolvaag mounted the platform with Foley and told the convention: "I trust this is as great a day for the American Legion as it is for the State of Minnesota."

Adolph Bremer, city news editor of the Winona (Minn.) Daily News, made Foley's nominating speech.

"Here is a Legionnaire with rare courage," he said of the 41-year-old former commander of the Legion's Minnesota department. "Here is a man of action."

As soon as Bremer had finished, the 9th district Legion band from Crookston, Minn., struck up the "Minnesota Rouser."

Hundreds of Legionnaires, led by 323-pound John (Butch) McDonald of Foley's Wabasha Post 50, paraded around the hall with placards.

Leading the cheers was a convention within the convention—Foley's relatives.

His cheering section consisted of his wife, Ellen; their five sons, ages 8 to 16; his four brothers, and two of his four sisters.

Matthews' demonstration was considerably more noisy and spectacular as his followers paraded to Texas songs and chanted, "Go with Joe."

But the votes meant more than the cheers.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

The Senate resumed the consideration of Executive M (88th Cong., 1st sess.), the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater.

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, after much deliberation upon its provisions and implications, I have decided to vote to approve the test ban treaty. This is the most difficult decision I have had to make since coming to the Senate 9 years ago.

Candor compels the confession that I shall cast my vote for approval without great enthusiasm. The test ban treaty does not outlaw all testing of nuclear weapons. It carefully preserves the right to test underground.

While compliance with the test ban treaty will lessen the overmagnified danger of nuclear fallout, it seems obvious that the United States should not have negotiated with Russia any test ban treaty other than one which prohibits all testing of nuclear weapons and establishes, within the borders of Russia, a system of inspection sufficient to detect any clandestine testing. Such a treaty would not have subjected the United States to disproportionate military disadvantages. Besides, it would have virtually assured the discovery of any attempt to test in secret.

Until the negotiators of the test ban treaty went to Moscow, the United States had consistently and wisely taken

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admitted that he endorsed the treaty before hearings were started in his committee, and that was all that my constituent had charged.

The following is taken from page 1617 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of Monday, September 16:

Mr. ROBERTSON. Then let me say that today I received from a lawyer a letter in which he asks whether it is the normal procedure for the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee to announce his support of the treaty before he heard one word from anyone about it—while he was in Moscow.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I will say that is a lie.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Then I will write him that the Senator says it is a lie.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator can tell him it is a lie. The record shows what happened. Before then, I had seen this treaty. It was brought before our committee before it was even initialed. The Senator from Virginia says he has received a letter in which it is said that I announced my approval of the treaty before I had seen it; but such a statement is nonsense.

Mr. ROBERTSON. I will write to him that that is what the Senator from Arkansas says.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The record shows what I said. Such a statement is not true. Not only did I see it, but a majority of the members of the committee saw the treaty before it was initialed. We were consulted at considerable length about it.

Mr. President, I now come to the essential part of that comment which my former friend, Bob Albright, deliberately ignored:

Mr. ROBERTSON. I did not say the Senator from Arkansas did not see the treaty. The letter states that the Senator announced his support of it before he started the hearings. Is that true or not?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is true. This is a good treaty.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Then the one who wrote the letter did not lie, did he?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. But the statement to which the Senator referred was that I had approved the treaty before I had even seen it.

Mr. ROBERTSON. The statement was that the Senator from Arkansas announced his support of the treaty before he heard any testimony on it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Oh, no; I had heard a great deal about the treaty. I heard from the Secretary of State; and we read the treaty, and discussed it at length.

Mr. ROBERTSON. I am not referring to statements from the State Department; I mean the testimony of witnesses before the committee. The Senator from Arkansas announced himself as favoring the treaty before he opened the committee's hearings, did he not?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is quite correct.

If Mr. Robert Albright wishes to retain my previous high opinion of his ethical standards, he will publish in the Washington Post tomorrow an apology for writing a piece that hit me below the belt, and explain that he did not understand exactly what was involved. If he does not do so, the conclusion will be inescapable that he deliberately sought to smear me in the article published today.

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I yield.

Mr. SMATHERS. First, the Senator made reference to the statement that some of those who supported the test ban treaty grudgingly admitted that those

who opposed it were patriots. In my judgment every Senator who supports the test ban treaty recognizes the total and complete patriotism of every other Senator, even though he may oppose the treaty. I am happy to say that insofar as the knowledge of the Senator from Florida is concerned, I do not know of any Senator who in any way questions the patriotism or the purity of the motives of the able Senator from Virginia, the Senator from South Carolina, or any other Senator who conscientiously and sincerely opposes this particular treaty.

We do not happen to agree with them, but we recognize their patriotism.

With respect to the particular article to which the Senator has referred, which appeared in the Washington Post this morning, I also know Bob Albright. He does not necessarily need any defense from me. I have a high respect for him, although he does not write anything particularly friendly to me. I do not believe he usually writes much which is very friendly to any Senator from the South. It is not that he has any personal vindictiveness or feelings about us.

One of the problems is that those in the press gallery have a hard time hearing all that happens on the floor. I know friends who have sat in the family gallery have said, "We cannot follow what is said."

The Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] sometimes does not talk very loud. The Senator from Virginia is always well heard. He has a strong voice. He articulates well. There are some Senators who do not talk with the strength of voice of the Senator from Virginia, so that the people in the galleries can hear.

I recall that several years ago a motion was made that what we needed to get, if we wished to do the job we ought to do, so that the people who come to the galleries could hear—and certainly so that those in the press galleries could hear—was some kind of a microphone system. I know that in most legislative bodies throughout the world there is a system whereby one can get a little extra power if he needs it when he talks.

In these rapidly developing colloquies which go on between Senators, sometimes it is very easy for people in the visitors' galleries, as well as for those in the Senate Press Gallery, to miss a point or to miss a word or a line, and come to an erroneous conclusion.

I am satisfied that is what happened in the case of Bob Albright, who is a most respected newspaperman.

I am satisfied, once the RECORD is read—I know everyone has great respect for the able Senator from Virginia—that this matter will be corrected.

I read the story this morning. I thought about it. I have served 16 years in the House and in the Senate. Never during my service in this body have I heard any Senator—and that is true even of the House—say what was printed in the newspaper this morning.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Of course not. It would be against the rules of the Senate. In the old days one would have been involved in a duel. Somebody would have been killed, if anyone could shoot.

Mr. SMATHERS. That is correct. I agree with the Senator with respect to the fact that it was a little shocking.

On the other hand, I think once the able Mr. Bob Albright understands what did transpire, it will be corrected. I think we must make allowances for the fact that some of those who are now in the gallery cannot hear exactly what I am saying, yet they must make a report of it. They have to report in time to meet a deadline. They do not have time to look at the RECORD. They have to write their stories based on what they hear.

I am sure the able Senator from Virginia will be as charitable with respect to Mr. Bob Albright as he customarily is with respect to his other good friends. I think this difficulty can be solved easily—and it will be.

In connection with the possible changing of the rules of the Senate, perhaps some of them should be changed, but I think one of the first things we should do is to work out a system whereby Senators can be heard without having to shriek. The distinguished Senator now occupying the chair, [Mr. WALTERS] presiding over the Senate at this time, is a very able Senator who has developed unfortunately, over the years, something wrong with his vocal cords. It is quite difficult at times for him to be heard. The able Senator has a great mind and a great heart, and he should be heard. I am certain that when he speaks in his home State of Tennessee he has a microphone.

When a Senator makes an address to a group or organization outside of the Senate, there he will find a microphone so that he can be heard by all in the audience. But he cannot find one in the Senate Chamber today where such an audio system is certainly needed. If we had such a system each Senator could hear each other and could also be heard in the upper reaches of the galleries. The press and the public are entitled to hear what is said on the Senate floor. It seems a little ridiculous that unless a Senator shrieks and wears himself out he cannot be heard.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I have noticed that the able Senator from Tennessee [Mr. WALTERS] gets his points over, just the same.

Mr. SMATHERS. The able Senator from Tennessee has never missed getting his point over very well.

I appreciate what the Senator from Virginia has had to say. I make the point that I am certain it will be solved to his satisfaction. I hope that out of this we may develop some improvement with respect to making it possible for Senators to be heard.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, I greatly appreciate the kind words of my distinguished friend the Senator from Florida, who is our acting majority leader. It may be that some of us who are getting criticism of the kind we have never known before are becoming a little tender.

I have held public office continuously for 46 years. Never in that period of time have I received the type of criticism I have been getting about the test ban treaty.

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the adamant and implacable position that our country would not agree to any test ban which did not provide for adequate inspection.

The test ban treaty constitutes a complete surrender, upon the inspection issue, by our negotiators to Russia. I find scant comfort in the suggestion that we may be able to develop improved methods of detection which will minimize the need for inspection within the borders of Russia. This is true because I cannot indulge in even an uneasy hope that the total surrender upon the inspection issue has not implanted in the Russian mind the abiding conviction that negotiators from our State Department do not possess sufficient fortitude and stamina to withstand for long any demand which Russia may make in any negotiations on any subject.

Since being assigned to the Senate Armed Services Committee about January 1955, I have given much consideration to the things affecting our military posture and that of Russia. As a consequence, I am satisfied that the proposed test ban treaty imposes upon the United States disproportionate military disadvantages. As a matter of fact, virtually every military man and nuclear scientist who has testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee admits this to be true. For reasons of national security, I refrain from detailing these military disadvantages.

I would vote without hesitation to reject the proposed test ban treaty because of these military disadvantages if the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others possessing expertise in military and nuclear matters had not given the Senate and the Nation positive assurances that the United States can overcome these military disadvantages by extraordinary measures, and if the President had not given the Senate and the Nation positive assurances that the executive branch of the Government will pursue with unrelenting energy such extraordinary measures.

Despite these assurances, I would vote without hesitation to reject the proposed test ban treaty if my judgment permitted me to base my decision solely upon military considerations. The tragic truth is that this particular test ban agreement should never have been negotiated. Even with the extraordinary measures suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and promised by the President, the treaty will not enhance in any degree the capacity of the United States to defend itself and the free world against a potential enemy which is preoccupied with troubling the peace of mankind and is threatening to bury us.

Unhappily, however, we are not confronted with the comparatively simple question of whether the test ban treaty should have been negotiated.

It has been negotiated, and it has been submitted to the Senate for approval or rejection. Moreover, it has been acclaimed and adopted by most of the nations of this earth, in the uncertain hope that it presages a more peaceful existence for all mankind.

When a Senator votes on the question of approving the test ban treaty, he will not be making an easy choice between what is good and what is bad, or between what is wise and what is foolish. He will be making a choice between somewhat undesirable alternatives. If he votes in favor of approval, he will vote for approval of an agreement which imposes upon his country military disadvantages. If he votes in favor of rejection, he will vote to cast cold water upon the hopes of mankind.

I entertain misgivings, based on military considerations, concerning the wisdom of ratification of the test ban treaty.

Nevertheless, I shall vote for approval of the treaty, because I think it the lesser of the two undesirable choices available to us. This is true because I am convinced that the political and psychological impact upon the other nations of the earth of rejection of the treaty by the United States would irretrievably damage, if not absolutely destroy, any opportunity for the United States to furnish to the free world any effective leadership during the foreseeable future.

We must not permit the making of this treaty to blind us to the realities of our precarious world, or to lull us into a false sense of security. Eternal vigilance is still the price of liberty.

The men of the Kremlin have not changed their hearts or their purpose. They and their puppet governments still hold in captivity behind the Iron Curtain hundreds of thousands of Bulgarians, Czechs, East Germans, Hungarians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, and Rumanians. The men of the Kremlin still maintain armed forces in Cuba—only 90 miles from our shores, in violation of the letter and spirit of the Monroe Doctrine. They still hold fast to their dream of world conquest.

Let us remember the solemn warning given us by the late Elmer Davis:

Atomic warfare is bad enough; biological warfare would be worse; but there is something that is worse than either. It is subjection to an alien oppressor.

If Americans are to preserve their liberty and that of the free world, they must keep their hearts in courage and patience, and lift up their hands in strength. There is no other way.

THE ALBRIGHT ARTICLE ON THE TEST BAN TREATY—PERSONAL STATEMENT

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, I regret that Mr. Robert Albright is not present in the Press Gallery. I shall refer to him in my statement. I shall send him a copy of it. I do not know whether he will get it. If he does not get it, I hope someone will bring it to his attention.

Mr. President, judging by public statements which they have issued, my present guess is that proponents for the test ban treaty outnumber the opponents at least 5 to 1. All of us who have spoken against ratification have made it crystal clear that we are dealing with a vital military problem which must be handled free from partisan politics, and that we do not challenge the sincerity of any Member of the Senate who does not share the conclusions we draw from mili-

tary testimony that the military disadvantages outweigh the so-called political advantages.

It is, therefore, very surprising to me that proponents of the treaty very grudgingly admit the sincerity of the opponents and that members of the fourth estate even will attempt to smear Members of the Senate who express opposition to the treaty. In the Washington Post of today, we see two illustrations of that unfortunate fact.

One columnist charges that all of the members, except one, of the Stennis Preparedness Investigation Subcommittee who brought in an adverse report have a self-interest in opposing the treaty because they are reserve officers who get paid when on active duty and are fearful that if the treaty be ratified, defense appropriations will be cut. The answer to that absurd charge will come immediately after we have voted on the test ban treaty. Today, the Senate Appropriations Committee will mark up the biggest peacetime defense budget in our history and that, a measure providing for increased defense spending, will be passed by the same Senators who so enthusiastically supported the test ban treaty.

The second illustration occurred in a story written for the Washington Post by its top Senate reporter, Mr. Robert Albright. In our younger days, Bob Albright and I were good friends, but I regret to say that throughout my service in the Senate, which now goes into the 17th year, he either has never written, or the Washington Post never has published, one commendatory sentence of anything I have ever done in the Senate. But, with all due deference to the left-wing articles that Bob Albright has written for a leftwing paper, he never has, during my service in the Congress, been unfair to me. His report on the Senate debate of yesterday on the test ban treaty is published in the leading column of the front page of the Post today. I was greatly surprised that Albright had seen fit to include in that report the following statement concerning me:

But when ROBERTSON suggested that Senate Foreign Relations Chairman J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, Democrat of Arkansas, had endorsed the treaty before hearing any testimony on it, FULBRIGHT shot back: "That is a lie."

Considering, as I say, that Bob Albright never has in the past deliberately misrepresented anything I have said in the Senate, I shall proceed today on the assumption that he either did not hear what actually occurred in the exchange between Senator FULBRIGHT and me on yesterday, or else he misunderstood what he said. I shall read from the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD the official report, which is a correct report of what actually was said to show: First, that I did not suggest, as the Albright story implies, that Senator FULBRIGHT had endorsed the treaty before hearing any testimony; second, that Senator FULBRIGHT did not call me a liar, as the story would imply, and incidentally I do not think that has ever happened in the Senate since dueling was abolished; and third, the RECORD clearly shows that Senator FULBRIGHT

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I hope that I misjudged some of my distinguished colleagues when I said that they grudgingly admitted the sincerity of those of us who were on the minority side, on the unpopular side. I do not know with certainty the exact value of the Gallup poll, but it claims that the country is 4 to 1 in favor of the treaty. I should say that the Senate is about 5 to 1 in favor of the treaty.

I am glad to have the assurance that no Senator who is for the treaty either criticizes or challenges the sincerity or patriotism of those of us who have drawn the conclusion that the military disadvantages outweigh the so-called political advantages.

As to our friend Albright, I gave him the charitable interpretation. There are some able reporters in the Press Gallery at the present time. Most of them have served throughout my term of service in the Senate. Not one of them has ever misquoted me.

I agree that it is not easy for them always to hear. I frankly admit that normally I am calm, but if anybody moves in on me in a hostile way, I go into a defensive position very fast. Sometimes when I do that I speak a little rapidly, and perhaps the news reporters cannot hear everything I say.

So I say about my friend Albright that I will assume he did not correctly hear the colloquy; or perhaps he was not present and got a report from somebody else. But if that be true, he will have an opportunity, in the Washington Post tomorrow, to correct what on its face is a slander and a smear on me. That is all I have to say about it. I will be as charitable to him as the Senator from Florida in the statement that he did not mean to do me this injustice and that he is going to correct it. We will wait to see.

Mr. JAVITS and Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, I yield first to the Senator from New York, who has been on his feet for some time.

Mr. JAVITS. I merely wished to say to the Senator that I submitted a resolution to substitute a microphone system for these rather useless—at least today—sort of inkwell arrangements on the desks. An investigation was made. That is entirely practical and feasible. When I served on the Committee on Rules and Administration I could not get the resolution passed. But I am encouraged by what the Senator has said. I most respectfully invite Senators, if they are interested, to join with me; and I will resubmit the resolution. I think it is extremely necessary.

Mr. ROBERTSON. I say to my friend from New York that one of the most gratifying experiences I had during the 14 years I served in the House was the ability to go to the well, where a microphone was provided, so that everybody could hear. It was not necessary to shout, and those in the gallery could hear.

As the Senator from Florida has pointed out, in the Senate Chamber if a Senator does not have a "foghorn voice"

even those who sit in the front of the press gallery cannot always hear, and those who sit in the visitors' galleries behind the Senator cannot hear a thing. They are always very patient. They do not stamp their feet or say, "Sit down." They are very patient. They cannot hear what is going on, though they come to hear.

If it will do no violence to the traditions of what is supposed to be the greatest deliberative body in the world for us to install modern equipment, we can do so. This Chamber is quite different from the old Supreme Court chamber. At the time that was used there were only 25 States, and 50 Senators. It was a smaller room, about one-third the size of this. It had a little gallery, about one-fifth the size of the gallery here. When Daniel Webster spoke, not only could he be heard throughout the Senate, but also the reporters could hear him so well that he was heard around the world, like the shot fired at Concord.

I should be glad to support a resolution to install loud speakers, so that each Senator, who is required under the rules to stay at his desk, if anybody objects to his moving—I roam around sometimes, but that is what the rules require—could have some means of being heard.

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I yield.

Mr. SMATHERS. I recall when the able Senator from New York submitted his resolution. At that time I thought I should join him. Because of this unfortunate episode this morning, perhaps some good will develop. If the Senator will resubmit his resolution, I am sure that I and other Senators will be glad to join with him. As the Senator from Virginia so ably says, years ago there was a smaller body, a smaller Chamber, and a smaller press corps, and it was easy for Senators to be heard.

But today a Senator must shout in order to make himself heard. I have many constituents who come into the galleries and say, "Well, we sat there for 20 minutes. Not only were few Senators there"—which they complain about, and we have to explain that they are in committees, and so forth—"but those who were there mumbled." I say, "They did not mumble. It is 40 or 50 feet away. You cannot hear up there." They come here and they are quite disappointed that they could not hear.

I think the time has come—it is long overdue—when we ought to have the means of being heard in the Senate. I would certainly support the resolution.

Mr. ROBERTSON. I agree, because I would not want a reporter to publish something that was not true because he did not hear what I said. Incidentally, I see a distinguished reporter from the Washington Star in the gallery, who wrote a little piece about what I said yesterday, but he did not understand I had made an accusation against the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] and that the Senator on the floor had called me a liar. Maybe the other man did not hear.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator may have 3 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. THURMOND. I commend the Senator from Virginia for the address he made about the test ban treaty. I want to say that maybe the poll published in the Washington Post or some other poll shows that people favor the treaty by a vote of 4 to 1, or whatever it is. That is not in accord with the mail I receive. I get about 1,000 letters a day, half from within South Carolina and half from without. I have checked with my administrative assistant on this. The mail is 30 to 1 against the treaty. I do not know that this is an index of the sentiment of the people throughout the Nation, but certainly the people that have written to me, from within South Carolina and without South Carolina, are opposed to this treaty in the ratio of 30 to 1.

I say to the distinguished Senator from Virginia that the fight he is making on this treaty is a commendable one and characteristic of his courage and foresight.

Mr. ROBERTSON. I thank the Senator. I realize that, whether it is 4 to 1 or 6 to 1, we are on the unpopular side, but we are stating how we conscientiously feel.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, in view of the fact that Senators cannot be heard from back here, I wonder if the Senator from Virginia would mind if I used his desk? If not, I ask unanimous consent that when I speak this morning, I may speak from the seat of the Senator from Virginia.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, that desk was first designated by a former President, the Honorable Harry Truman. The Senator from South Carolina is welcome to it.

Mr. THURMOND. I believe I will stay where I am. [Laughter.]

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, I think that is a good illustration of what we are talking about. Nobody heard what went on. The people in the galleries are laughing. I see some very fine reporters in the galleries. Perhaps they could not hear, and they might write about what went on.

The Senator from South Carolina asked the Senator from Virginia if he could use his desk this morning, because he wanted to get out from under the galleries, where he could be heard. People cannot even hear the Senator from South Carolina from where he is. So he wanted to use the seat of the Senator from Virginia. Under the rules of the Senate, a Senator is supposed to talk from his Senate seat. So the Senator from South Carolina asked unanimous consent to use the seat of the Senator from Virginia. The Senator from Virginia said he would be delighted to let the Senator from South Carolina use his desk; that the desk had been used by former President Harry Truman, in my judgment, one of the finest Presidents,

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Whereupon the Senator from South Carolina said, "In that case, I do not believe I will use the desk."

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I would like to make a comment on that.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I have the floor. I yield.

Mr. HART. What has been suggested should be done, if only to obviate the necessity of repeating. There are times when it is difficult enough to hear what is said the first time. It is much worse if it must be repeated. If microphones will do what we desire, I am for it.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I had no intention of addressing myself to that subject this morning, but I will resubmit the resolution, and certainly will invite the Senator from Florida and other Senators to join with me in this effort to improve the archaic procedures of this great body.

Mr. SMATHERS subsequently said: Mr. President, so long as the able Senator from Virginia [Mr. ROBERTSON] is present and the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] is also present, I should like to make further reference to the matter discussed earlier by the able Senator from Virginia, which resulted in the idea that we probably needed some type of acoustical improvement, in order to be heard. The point was made—and I think wisely made—that in every one of the committee rooms which have recently been built—which are half the size of this room, with galleries half the size of these—microphones are provided; but in this Chamber, which was changed from the original Senate Chamber, as was so well pointed out by the Senator from Virginia, it takes a man with a real foghorn voice and the constitution of a bull in order to be heard around the galleries and up in the Press Gallery.

It seems to me, as Senators have suggested, that the time has come to do something about it. I know the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] is greatly interested in changing the rules and in making other improvements in the Senate. I have commended him for it. It seems to me this is something that would be in sympathy with his views.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SMATHERS. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. CLARK. I am very glad the Senator from Florida called my attention to this matter. Goodness knows, I am not an expert in the Senate rules. I may make a great deal of noise about it, but I am not an expert. However, I am happy to join the Senator from Florida in suggesting this badly needed reform. We can all remember that a former Senator from Wisconsin, Senator Wiley, urged this reform on us for many long years. I thought he was right then. I think the Senator is right now.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SMATHERS. I yield to the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I also should like to join the distinguished Senator from Florida on this particular point. Certain Senators were very difficult to hear. I remember specifically Senator Millikin,

from Colorado, who was impossible to hear, not only in the galleries, but even when one was sitting almost next to him. He was one of the most brilliant minds ever to serve in the Senate. Other Senators have very low voices.

I hope this suggestion will be given serious consideration.

Mr. SMATHERS. I thank the able Senator from Missouri.

I point out that earlier in the day the junior Senator from Oregon [Mrs. NEUBERGER] said that, sitting in the back row, in the corner, unless one gets up and goes to the well, he or she cannot hear what is happening sometimes between the majority leader and the minority leader.

It all comes back to the fact that sometimes members of the press who sit up in the galleries cannot hear us when we turn our backs or turn this way or that, and mistakes are possible in their reporting because they did not hear.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SMATHERS. I yield to the Senator from Virginia.

Mr. ROBERTSON. I appreciated the comments of the Senator earlier in the day, and I mention the fact that I am now in the Chamber again. In the meantime I have been attending a meeting of the Appropriations Committee, where it is planned to bring to the Senate, as soon as the vote on the test-ban treaty is over, a defense appropriation bill in the magnitude of \$47 billion-plus, which is exclusive of foreign aid for military assistance and exclusive of military construction, which, when added together, will exceed \$50 billion. During the period in question I was absent from the Chamber. I am present whenever possible, but occasionally we must attend committee meetings.

YOU CAN'T WIN

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. In connection with the limited test ban treaty debate—and I expect to participate in that debate later today or tomorrow—from time to time we hear very peculiar statements. A short time ago, a Member of the House of Representatives, Representative HOSMER, a Republican Representative from California, blatantly denounced the limited test ban treaty saying, "There must be some side agreements with Russia."

He made that statement in spite of the fact that the treaty is drawn in understandable language and is simply and directly written.

He demanded to know all about the arranged "sellout," as he called it, on the part of our President.

The following day, this same Member of the other body said he accepted President Kennedy's denial at his news conference regarding any side agreement, or any secret interpretation of the terms of the test ban treaty. Following that, this same Representative said:

I therefore withdraw my charge. However, I must reiterate that the failure to have made such an agreement, secret or otherwise, is both reckless and improvident.

I think I should leave that Representative and his two statements and give to them now the charity of my silence.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate is in executive session. The

question is on agreeing to the resolution of ratification of the treaty.

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, I understand that the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. THURMOND] is ready to make a speech on the pending business. I should like to have the Chair recognize him at this time. After he has obtained recognition, I shall ask him to yield to me.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. THURMOND. I thank the distinguished Senator from Florida. I am pleased to yield to him.

Mr. SMATHERS. Do I correctly understand that the Senator from South Carolina desires a quorum call?

Mr. THURMOND. The Senator is correct.

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

[No. 161 Ex.]

Anderson	Jordan, Idaho	Scott
Boggs	Keating	Simpson
Cannon	McGovern	Smathers
Church	McIntyre	Thurmond
Clark	Miller	Walters
Curtis	Morse	Williams, N.J.
Ervin	Morton	Williams, Del.
Hartke	Nelson	Yarborough
Hill	Randolph	Young, Ohio

Mr. HUMPHREY. I announce that the Senator from Alaska [Mr. BARTLETT], the Senator from Maryland [Mr. BREWSTER], the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. BURDICK], the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DONALD], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND], the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. EDMONDSON], the Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRIEVENING], the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY], the Senator from Missouri [Mr. LONG], the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSEN], the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. MONROE], the Senator from Utah [Mr. MOSS], the Senator from Maine [Mr. MUSKIE], and the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. RHEICOFF] are absent on official business.

I further announce that the Senator from California [Mr. ENGLE] is absent because of illness, and the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. McGEE] is necessarily absent.

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT] and the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] are absent on official business to attend a meeting of the Interparliamentary Union.

The Senator from Utah [Mr. BENNETT], the Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON], the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. CASE], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER], the Senator from Colorado [Mr. DOMINICK], the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. HRUSKA], the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. MECHAM], and the Senator from Texas [Mr. TOWER] are necessarily absent.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is not present.

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, I move that the Sergeant at Arms be di-

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retted to request the attendance of absent Senators.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the motion of the Senator from Florida.

The motion was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sergeant at Arms will execute the order of the Senate.

After a little delay Mr. AIKEN, Mr. BAYH, Mr. BEALL, Mr. BIBLE, Mr. BYRD of Virginia, Mr. BYRD of West Virginia, Mr. COTTON, Mr. DIRKSEN, Mr. DOUGLAS, Mr. ELLENDER, Mr. FONG, Mr. FULBRIGHT, Mr. GOLDWATER, Mr. GORE, Mr. HART, Mr. HAYDEN, Mr. HICKENLOOPER, Mr. HOLLAND, Mr. HUMPHREY, Mr. INOUYE, Mr. JACKSON, Mr. JAVITS, Mr. JOHNSTON, Mr. JORDAN of North Carolina, Mr. KUCHEL, Mr. LAUSCHE, Mr. LONG of Louisiana, Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. McCARTHY, Mr. McCLELLAN, Mr. McNAMARA, Mr. METCALF, Mr. MUNDT, Mrs. NEUBERGER, Mr. PASTORE, Mr. PELL, Mr. PROUTY, Mr. PROXIMIRE, Mr. ROBERTSON, Mr. RUSSELL, Mr. SALTONSTALL, Mrs. SMITH, Mr. SPARKMAN, Mr. STENNIS, Mr. SYMINGTON, Mr. TALMADGE, and Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota entered the Chamber and answered to their names.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is present.

The Senator from Florida is recognized.

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, I should like to say, in the absence of the able Senator from South Carolina, who asked that there be a "live" quorum call so that Senators would have the benefit of his views on the test ban treaty, that he has momentarily stepped out of the Chamber. I am sure he will soon return.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the treaty which the Senate is now considering constitutes major risks and jeopardies to the capability of the United States to deter a nuclear war in the future. These risks and jeopardies are military in nature, for our deterrent to nuclear war is military. Our deterrent has been and is the overwhelmingly superior strategic power embodied in our nuclear forces. It is our ability to deter nuclear war which is risked by this treaty.

The risk takes the form of military disadvantages, which result from the fact that in significant and crucial areas of nuclear technology, the Soviets have a lead on the United States as a result of their nuclear testing in 1961 and 1962. These military disadvantages are summarized by the Preparedness Subcommittee as follows:

First. The United States probably will be unable to duplicate Soviet achievements in very high yield weapon technology.

Second. The United States will be unable to acquire necessary data on the effects of very high yield atmospheric explosions.

Third. The United States will be unable to acquire data on high altitude nuclear weapons effects.

Fourth. The United States will be unable to determine with confidence the performance and reliability of any ABM system developed without benefit of atmospheric operational system tests.

Fifth. The United States will be unable to verify the ability of its hardened underground second-strike missile systems to survive close-in high-yield nuclear clear explosions.

Sixth. The United States will be unable to verify the ability of its missile reentry bodies under defensive nuclear attack to survive and to penetrate to the target without the opportunity to test nose cone and warhead designs in a nuclear environment under dynamic reentry conditions.

Seventh. The treaty will provide the Soviet Union an opportunity to equal U.S. accomplishments in submegaton weapon technology.

Eighth. The treaty will deny to the United States a valuable source of information on Soviet nuclear weapons capabilities.

These disadvantages are both serious and formidable. At the very least, they will seriously impair, if not completely nullify, our ability to maintain the overwhelming superiority in strategic power absolutely essential to the prevention of nuclear war.

Proponents of ratification of the treaty seek to mitigate the findings of the Preparedness Subcommittee by pointing out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified that they support ratification of the treaty. This mitigates not at all against the fact of the disadvantages, for not only are the conclusions of the Preparedness Subcommittee not in conflict as to the facts with the testimony of the Joint Chiefs, but in most particulars, the Chiefs' testimony supported these conclusions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff specifically recognized that the treaty resulted in military risks, but then professed to weigh them against nonmilitary considerations.

This was explicitly set out in the final paragraph of the presentation of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by General Taylor, who concluded his presentation as follows:

Having weighed all of these factors, it is the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, if adequate safeguards are established, the risks inherent in this treaty can be accepted in order to seek the important gains which may be achieved through a stabilization of international relations and a move toward a peaceful environment in which to seek resolution of our differences.

It is unfortunate that the testimony of the witnesses before the Preparedness Subcommittee could not be printed in time to be before this body during consideration of the treaty, but the declassification procedure is immensely time consuming, and essential from a security standpoint. But no security implications can arise from the quotation of the following excerpts from General LeMay's testimony. General LeMay stated:

But the net result is that there are military and technical disadvantages to the treaty. All of the Joint Chiefs agreed on this point.

However, there are political advantages that may accrue from the treaty. This is a field that I don't consider myself an expert in, and I have depended to a large extent on the advice of others.

General LeMay stated that he and the other Chiefs had been briefed on the political, or nonmilitary considerations, by both Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Under Secretary Harriman.

General LeMay was interrogated further with regard to this matter by Senator BYRD of West Virginia, who posed the following question:

You have indicated, General LeMay, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not to confine their judgment in connection with the treaty before us on the basis of purely military considerations, but that political considerations were also to be thought about.

Is this normal, General LeMay, or has it been the practice in the past for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to attempt to assess political considerations in reaching their judgments?

General LeMay responded:

It certainly has been true since President Kennedy came into office, because this is one of the first things that they told the Joint Chiefs they expected them to do. They expected them to put the political factors in at their level.

They told us this verbally many times. Actually, I think we have a note in writing on the subject, the Joint Chiefs.

Quite obviously, therefore, the testimony of the Joint Chiefs does not conflict with the findings of the Preparedness Subcommittee. The Joint Chiefs were instructed to consider the political considerations, which they were given by Mr. Rusk and Mr. Harriman, and this is the basis for their support of the ratification of the treaty. General LeMay not only stated that he had to rely on the advice of others on the political factors, because he did not consider himself an expert in the field, but he also stated in his testimony that he had less confidence than others that these political considerations could be realized.

As the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] has pointed out, the Joint Chiefs could hardly be classified as "supporters" of the treaty, but that a more accurate assessment of their position is that they "go along with" the treaty, or perhaps even more precisely, they "go along with" the White House.

The Chiefs of Staff may not have been threatened outright, and most probably were not; but the Chiefs live in an environment which daily demonstrates the rule of rigid compliance with decisions from above, and more and more of the details are being decided from above. Therefore, there is hardly a need for the Chiefs to have a picture drawn for them on each specific issue on which they are expected to conform to the policy decision.

It is significant to note that immediately after the treaty was initialed, the Chiefs were called to the White House individually one day, and then were recalled as a group the next day, ostensibly for consultation.

All in all, there is no reason to even suspect that there was any arm twisting of the Chiefs of Staff over the treaty. There was no need for it. Many lessons in the foolhardiness of disagreeing with policy decisions had been taught quite recently, with graphic and dramatic examples that could hardly fail to impress

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the Joint Chiefs of Staff and all other officers.

Both Adm. George Anderson and Gen. Curtis LeMay disagreed with the official position of the administration on the TFX award, which shows that the Joint Chiefs can disagree without literally facing a firing squad. No one, of course, would be so suspicious as to find any causal relation between the disagreement by these two Chiefs of Service with the official position and the subsequent decision by the White House which materially shortened their active military careers.

Although there was surely no physical arm twisting practiced on the Joint Chiefs, and they themselves denied that there was, it is not beyond imagination to suppose that they learned from the administration that opposition was hopeless, for ratification was assured, regardless of their position.

The Joint Chiefs are not expert in political matters, by their own ready admission. It is possible that they made an unduly modest judgment as to the weight that their opinions carry in the Congress; especially if they assume that their influence with one civilian group is about the same as with any other civilian group; and, therefore, that they would have about the same influence with Congress that they have with the civilian echelon above them in the Department of Defense.

Under such circumstances, they could well have reasoned that since ratification was inevitable, they would go along, while being as candid as consistently possible about the military disadvantages and covering their conclusions by reference to the "political considerations" which were given them by Mr. Rusk and Mr. Harriman. In this way, they may have reasoned, they might be able to salvage something in the form of safeguards, since they were going to have to live with the treaty, regardless of their position. At least with the safeguards, they secured promises to the Congress, and hopefully, Congress would take a continuing interest in insuring that the safeguards were kept.

While such reasoning would obviously be based on the false premise that Senate approval of ratification was a foregone conclusion from the time the treaty was initialed, once the premise was accepted, the logic of securing all that was possible under the circumstances—in this case, the four so-called safeguards—would seem reasonable.

Of course, all of this reconstruction of the possible reasoning of the Chiefs of Staff is purely conjectural. Had such been the rationale of the positions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, it might be hard to convince them now that it was erroneous.

At this point, it does seem from all appearances that Senate approval of the treaty is inevitable. Speeches are even made which resemble the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—admitting and warning of all or many of the obvious risks and disadvantages of the treaty, and then announcing support of ratification.

In fact, if the chiefs had merely concluded that to oppose ratification of the

treaty would be to incur the unmitigated wrath of their civilian superiors, they could hardly be convinced now that their conclusion was inaccurate. The Air Force Association passed a resolution in opposition to the treaty, based on reasoning not unlike that of Gen. Thomas Power, Commander of Strategic Air Forces. In retaliation, Air Force Secretary Zuckert canceled his scheduled appearance before the Air Force Association, at the reception, and with wrath and fury characterized the association's position with such adjectives as "immoderate," "alarmist," "irrationalism," and in "disregard of the best interest of the United States."

If such unbridled and unrestrained intemperance is the reaction to a private association, taking a position contrary to that of the administration, what would have been the reaction if the Joint Chiefs of Staff had opposed the administration?

All of this does not paint a very bright picture of the future military career of the able and candid General Power. While I am not a gambler, I have had occasion to wonder what are the odds one could get against General Power ever being Air Force Chief of Staff under this administration, or does infinity reach that high?

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, professing not to be experts on nonmilitary or political matters, could not be expected to defend and explain the so-called "political" considerations on which they hung their decisions to go along with the treaty. It is, nevertheless, interesting to note the political aspects mentioned in General Taylor's presentation of the Chiefs' formal position. He stated that:

The risks inherent in this treaty can be accepted in order to seek the important gains which may be achieved through a stabilization of international relations and a move toward a peaceful environment in which to seek resolution of our differences.

This conclusion is qualified and re-qualified. Twice it is repeated that the purpose is not to get, but in the words of the presentation, "to seek." The elusive and undefined "gains" which General Taylor says we will "seek," "may" be achieved, not "will" be achieved.

The conditions for whatever is to follow is the only thing which the Chiefs assert as positive. This is twofold, one being "a stabilization of international relations" and the other "a peaceful environment." Both of these bear closer examination.

The clear implication of General Taylor's statement is that this treaty will contribute to what he calls "a stabilization of international relations" and "a peaceful environment."

In specific terms, however, no witness before any committee was able to back up these generalities, which are no more than a dream of "pie in the sky."

Will this treaty get the Russians troops out of Cuba?

Will this treaty rid Cuba of the despotism of Communist domination?

Will this treaty stop the sabotage in Venezuela?

Will this treaty eliminate the Communist subversion and espionage in Peru and Ecuador?

Will this treaty stop Communist agitation in Africa?

Will this treaty free any of the people enslaved in eastern European countries? How many?

Will this treaty tear down the Berlin wall, so that more people may express their antagonism to Communist despotism with their feet?

Will this treaty cause the Soviets to abandon their espionage rings in any free world nation?

Will this treaty end the constant irritations on the Korean truce line, or prevent future killings of American troops on that line?

Will this treaty prevent the shelling of Quemoy and Matsu in the future?

Will this treaty cause the Communists to cease their attacks on non-Communists in Laos, or mitigate their efforts to take over the country?

Will this treaty cause the North Vietnamese and Chinese to cease trying to take over Vietnam?

Mr. President, these are matters which would be the specifics of a process of stabilization of international relations. The treaty will not mitigate these matters, and in fact, it may result in the tempo of these agitations being increased.

Not one witness who testified in the hearings would say that this treaty would affect the Communist goal of world domination, nor slacken their efforts to achieve that goal. It is precisely this goal, and the myriad methods employed by the Communists to implement it, that insures that international relations will remain unstable so long as any free nation resists Communist aggression. There can be no peaceful environment in the presence of Communist aggression, suppression, and duplicity.

General Taylor, along with other witnesses, stated his concern that the treaty might induce in the free world what he calls "euphoria." Nothing could come nearer inducing a rosy glow of self-satisfaction and unconcern into the American public than the repeated assertion that this treaty will "stabilize international relations" and create "a peaceful environment." If a state of induced apathy can possibly be imposed on the American people, the propaganda barrage aimed at the American public, in an attempt to convince them that this treaty means "peace" and "relaxed tensions," will accomplish it.

The situation on this treaty calls to my mind a poem of Rudyard Kipling entitled, "The Truce of the Bear." It was written shortly after the Crimean war, in which the British had fought the Russians. Kipling, England's foremost poet of statesmanship, found it necessary to warn the British of the danger of treachery during a truce with the Russians. The poem is quite apropos the situation in which we now find ourselves. The last two stanzas read:

When he stands up as pleading, in wavering, man-brute guise,—
When he veils the hate and cunning of his little, swinish eyes;
When he shows as seeking quarter, with paws like hands in prayer,
That is the time of peril—the time of the Truce of the Bear!

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Eyeless, noseless, and lipless, asking a dole at the door,
 Matun, the old blind beggar, he tells it o'er and o'er;
 Fumbling and feeling the rifles, warming his hands at the flame,
 Hearing our careless white men talk of the morrow's game;
 Over, and over the story, ending as he began:—
 There is no truce with Adam-zad, the Bear that looks like a Man!

We are now considering ratification of the Truce of the Bear. Yet even those who profess to fear euphoria, as they call it, join in the propaganda chorus to lull the American people to sleep with a sedative of "stabilized international relations" and "peaceful environments." We have only their own expressed concern with euphoria as evidence that they are not the worse victims of their own propaganda, and the most vulnerable to "The Truce of the Bear."

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, will the Senator from South Carolina yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. JORDAN of Idaho in the chair). Does the Senator from South Carolina yield to the Senator from Nebraska?

Mr. THURMOND. I am pleased to yield.

Mr. CURTIS. I commend the distinguished Senator from South Carolina, not only for his speech today, but also for the material he has placed on public record throughout this debate.

The treaty was presented in such a manner that its ratification seemed to be a foregone conclusion. Nevertheless, history is being written in the Senate, and the Senator from South Carolina is bringing to light some very important truths that will make the record abundantly clear, and also should help Senators to arrive at their own conclusions.

During the course of the hearings, I asked the Secretary of State whether the treaty had strengthened Khrushchev among his own people. There was a bit of a pause, and I did not get a direct answer. Finally he said, "The treaty is popular all over." I regard his answer as quite significant. In every community in the United States the attitude toward Khrushchev and communism has softened. Every Senator knows that. At the same time, proponents of the treaty freely admit that they do not trust the Russians. No one claims that the great Communist design has changed; yet we proceed with the treaty. I, for one, am very grateful to the Senator from South Carolina for his important contributions.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I deeply appreciate the kind remarks the able and distinguished Senator from Nebraska has made. During the committee consideration of the nuclear-test-ban treaty, he made important contributions. He has propounded penetrating questions, and has been most helpful in bringing out facts with which the American people and the Senate should be acquainted.

To bear out the statement the Senator from Nebraska has just made, I should like to refer to an Associated Press article from Moscow, on August 26, in which it was stated:

The Soviet Union told Red China the limited nuclear test ban was a positive gain for communism because it would perpetuate the liquidation of the one-time American nuclear monopoly, and freeze each side's nuclear power.

It further stated:

The statement, in reply to the August 15 attack on Soviet policy by Peking, said that for years it would have been against Soviet interests to have a test ban, unless the United States agreed to destroy all its nuclear weapons.

In an Associated Press article from Tokyo it was stated:

The Soviet Union told Communist China today there was no need for it to try to manufacture an atom bomb because if attacked it could count on Russian nuclear might under the friendship and mutual assistance treaty.

In a Japanese-language broadcast, Moscow Radio reiterated that, despite Chinese-Soviet differences, the treaty with China remains in effect. A Moscow commentator asked:

"Why does China feel it must have an atom bomb? Is it for her defense? In this connection we would like to remind China of two things.

"One is that there is a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and China, and even now it continues in effect.

"The second is that the Soviet Union has repeatedly pointed out that it considers an attack on the Peoples' Republic of China to be an attack on the Soviet Union itself. Therefore, if the Peoples' Republic of China is subject to an attack, the entire might of the Soviet Union will fall upon the aggressor. What greater security can China ask?"

I believe these dispatches make clear the fact that there is no significant or encouraging aspect of the rift between Russia and China. They also bear out the fine remarks of the able Senator from Nebraska, whom I commend once more for the excellent service he is rendering our Nation in connection with this important subject.

Mr. President, General LeMay was more specific on one particular nonmilitary consideration, and it has more substance than any other I have heard mentioned, although it is not persuasive to me.

In answer to a question, General LeMay stated:

The United States, ever since the war, has been trying to make progress in control of nuclear weapons, in fact in disarmament affairs in general, and both the Democratic and Republican administrations since the war have tried to do these things.

I would think it would probably be a setback in many ways if the treaty were not ratified now. Whether this would be disastrous or not to our further efforts, I am not so sure.

But it certainly is a factor and one that we did take into consideration.

From this statement, it seems apparent that the timing was in no small part a significant part of the political considerations which weighed in the conclusion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

With General LeMay, there is reason to believe that it may have been decisive. I asked General LeMay whether he would recommend that the treaty be signed if it were being considered in the proposal stage. His answer was that he did not think he would recommend signing.

In connection with General LeMay's answer to my question, when he stated before the Preparedness Subcommittee, and again before the Foreign Relations Committee, that he did not think under those circumstances he would recommend signing the treaty, it has been pointed out in debate that General LeMay, subsequent to the open hearings, in an executive session of the Foreign Relations Committee, attempted to qualify his earlier answer.

It is also true that some time after he testified, a written proposed modification of General LeMay's answer was submitted to the Preparedness Subcommittee. After giving the same answer before two committees on different days, a change was submitted. If accepted, an evasive answer would have appeared in the printed record of the hearings. The Preparedness Subcommittee rejected the proposed change.

For the information of those who do not yet know, if any there are, I point out that the Department of Defense reviews carefully all the transcripts of hearings. The screening is done by Department of Defense censors. They screen not only for security—and in this instance they were not screening for security, for that is a process now in progress—but also for compliance with the policy of the administration. The corrections or changes which are submitted by an officer, of his own testimony, must be cleared for policy conformity by the Department of Defense, just as the prepared statements of all personnel for congressional committees must be cleared and censored, even if to be given in executive session.

It is hard for the Department of Defense to control responses of witnesses which are given to committees on the spot in answer to specific questions. But any changes or submissions for the record are subject to censorship. If a witness wants to get himself off the hook, especially when he is told to do so, he can always submit a correction of his testimony to conform it to policy. The committee does not have to accept it, but as long as the witness tries he gets off the hook, or at least, mitigates the breach of policy.

This is all really too disgusting to discuss, but that is the way Mr. McNamara's empire is run. The question was raised on the floor last Friday, and the facts should be set straight.

My own sympathy is with the witnesses. We cannot blame them. A committee of the Senate has said in strong words that testimony for congressional committees, particularly in executive session, should not be censored for policy by the administration, but it continues nevertheless. If the Congress will not or cannot enforce against executive departments its own rights to hear frank and uncensored opinions from witnesses in the executive branch, how can we expect witnesses to stand up and take chances with their own careers and jobs?

If the Congress hears a lot of "me too" testimony when it calls executive department witnesses, or polite evasiveness

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in some cases, then Congress has only itself to blame, because nothing has been done to stop the censorship. In fact it is worse than ever. All we can hear from the executive department is "one voice." We are fortunate to have three official witnesses on the treaty who broke the monotony—General Power, General Schriever, and Dr. John Foster. We should be thankful for them, for they have taken the chances and risks which Congress should long ago have eliminated. It is worthy of note that not one of these three witnesses had a prepared statement to be censored by the Department of Defense. They did not have a statement conformed to official policy with which they had to stay consistent.

To get back to General LeMay's point that now that the treaty had been signed, damage would be done to our disarmament program if it were not ratified, let me say that this would probably be an advantage, in my opinion, judging from what I know of our disarmament proposals.

It is not armaments that cause wars. The cause of war is political friction, usually brought on by the greed of aggressors. Armaments are material—inert, lifeless tools—and can do nothing by themselves. It is men who start wars, and they do so because of their depraved motivations, the most prominent of which is lust for power. Armaments can be used for good or for evil, depending on the morality of the men who control the armaments. The United States has had a superiority in armaments for two decades, at least. Who is prepared to say that these armaments have not been used as a force for good, keeping evil in check? If we had not had these massive armaments, we would have either had a war or would now be living under Communist dictatorship.

Wars will not cease if arms are destroyed. In the first place, evil men will not disarm themselves, for their evil motivations of power lust can only be gained by force. Evil men will always find tools with which to try to oppress others, and they will succeed in oppressing the weak.

For those, however, who still fear the temper of opinion of other nations and of people of other nations, should this treaty be rejected, Dr. Edward Teller gave the only answer:

If you reject this treaty, this will be a small mistake; if you ratify this treaty, I think you will have committed an enormously bigger mistake * * * You will have given away the future safety of this country.

Mr. President, the Foreign Relations Committee, in its report on the treaty, states that the main thrust on the treaty is political, and that excessive reliance on the military considerations might undermine the national security of the United States. If that be the case, why has the thrust of the arguments of the proponents of the treaty been concentrated on the negative side—that is, on trying to mitigate against the military disadvantages?

We have had over a week of debate on the treaty. We still have not heard what are the political advantages of the treaty. We have heard vague generalizations,

such as "peace" and "relaxed tensions," but no specifics.

In its report, the Foreign Relations Committee makes illusive references to some nonmilitary considerations. The report does not attempt to spell out or number any specific political advantages that flow from this treaty. There is no attempt to state that there is one, two, or three political advantages in the opinion of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Nomilitary aspects of the treaty are discussed in several different type contexts in the report. Some of these aspects are included under a discussion of possible Soviet motivations. Some are included in the concluding comments of the committee. One is included under the title "Other Considerations." None of these has been made any more specific or finite by the debate of the proponents.

The Foreign Relations Committee makes the general claim that:

The committee believes that the treaty reflects an identity of interest in the specific area of containing the arms competition.

As I have already pointed out, disarmament will not eliminate the cause of war for it is men and not armaments that start wars. It should also be noted that the Communists have no intention of disarming themselves. The Communist approach to disarmament was expressed by Mr. Khrushchev on January 16, 1963, in a speech in East Germany in these words:

Disarmament primarily means dismantling the gigantic war machines of the highly developed countries. General disarmament does not mean disarming the peoples fighting for national liberation. On the contrary, it would deprive the imperialists of the means to halt progress and crush the struggle for independence.

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. THURMOND. I am pleased to yield to the able Senator from Georgia.

Mr. TALMADGE. Is it the judgment of the distinguished Senator from South Carolina that Khrushchev construes the treaty to mean that it would disarm those who are seeking to stop revolutions but would not handicap those who are starting Communist revolutions throughout the world?

Mr. THURMOND. That is exactly correct. I am convinced that what Mr. Khrushchev and the Communists are trying to do is to get us to take this first step—and the President has called it a first step. In the words of the preamble, the treaty itself provides:

Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament—

And so forth. This is the first step to a disarmament program.

That is exactly what Mr. Khrushchev wants. He wants us to disarm. But you wait to see if the Communists disarm. They are cunning. They are deceptive. Their word cannot be relied upon.

I hold in my hand a list of agreements. This pamphlet was issued by the Defense Department on November 5, 1962, after the recent Communist act of perfidy in

Cuba. Evidently at that time the Defense Department did not know that the administration would come forward with this treaty, or probably the administration would not have allowed the Department to issue it. The pamphlet sets out on one side of each page the agreements and on the other side the results. The pamphlet is entitled "Soviet Treaty Violations." It is filled with violations of agreements made by these deceptive, cunning Communists.

I also hold in my hand a pamphlet issued by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, entitled "Soviet Political Agreements and Results." In this pamphlet there are listed the agreements into which the Communists have entered and the sad results. I wish every Senator would read these two pamphlets before voting on this treaty.

I understand that the Internal Security Subcommittee has now issued another pamphlet, as a supplement. It will be of great interest to the Senate.

Mr. President, how can we rely on the Communists to keep an agreement, in view of their past performance?

The American Bar Association made a study and reached the conclusion that the Communists have broken 50 of the 52 major agreements into which they have entered since World War II.

I am convinced that this treaty is a trap, that this is the first step to try to persuade this country to disarm. If we disarm, God knows, we are gone.

The only language the Communists understand is power. So long as we have had power—and we have had a superiority of military power since World War II—we have avoided a war.

If we enter into this treaty, we will freeze the gains the Communists now have in high-yield weapons and in the development of an antiballistic missile system. Where will we then be, considering the great knowledge the Communists have gained from their recent tests, in 1961 and 1962?

Again I say to the able and distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr. TALMADGE], that in my opinion we cannot place any trust in the Communists. Their purpose in this treaty is to freeze the knowledge they have gained, in order to gain time to manufacture the weapons with which to try to destroy us or to blackmail us into surrender. Why should they want to enter into a treaty for any purpose other than one which would help them? Why don't the proponents of this treaty look at the seamy side of Soviet motives rather than just what appears to them to be of a rose color.

The able Senator from Georgia was a distinguished and capable lawyer and the able Governor of a great State. He served as a distinguished officer in the Navy in World War II. He knows the treachery of the Communists; and he knows that no trust can be placed in them.

Mr. TALMADGE. I thank my distinguished friend. I congratulate him for his magnificent contribution to this debate.

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Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. THURMOND. I am pleased to yield to the able Senator from Louisiana.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Does the Senator recognize that under section 2 of Article I of the treaty the statement is made:

Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or—

I now emphasize the next four words: any other nuclear explosion.

I repeat:

any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described—

Which refers to in the atmosphere, underwater, or in space—or have the effect referred to, in paragraph 1 of this Article.

The clear language of this particular section would prohibit this Nation from using nuclear weapons to fulfill its treaty obligations in Korea, in Vietnam, or in Formosa, in the event the Communists decided to move. It is very clear, under the language of the treaty, that we would be precluded from using weapons in such a fashion.

Someone sent an opinion from the State Department saying, "That is not what it means; it does not mean that. We would have the right to use them."

In the committee report the committee says:

We do not mean that. We clearly mean by this language that this Nation would reserve the right to use such weapons to fulfill our defense commitments.

The Senator well knows that in law, as in a treaty, the clear language of the law or the clear language of a contract speaks out over and above some legislative history. The leading case on that had to do with the Mann Act, as the Senator will recall. The Mann Act was passed to prevent transportation of prostitutes across State boundaries. Some young boy from the District of Columbia went with a young girl to Baltimore. He was indicted under the act. All the legislative history showed that that was not the kind of thing the act was intended to outlaw, but the man still had to go to jail, because the court said the law was clear and that the court would not look to legislative intent when the law was clear in itself.

The Senator well recalls that, I am sure. The Senator, as a lawyer, knows that any one of the nearly 100 signatories to the treaty would take this country before the World Court, of which the United States is a member. The interpretation of a treaty is clearly a matter within the jurisdiction of the World Court. This country could be taken before the World Court, and the World Court would tell us, in my judgment, that the treaty means exactly what it says. We would be said to have made a treaty clearly contrary to what President Eisenhower said we should do, and clearly contrary to what the President himself says we are doing by this treaty.

That in itself is reason enough to reject the treaty.

Mr. THURMOND. The able Senator from Louisiana is eminently correct. The treaty itself is clear, as the Senator from Louisiana said it is. The wording is crystal clear.

The treaty itself is clear. It outlaws "any nuclear weapons test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion" except underground when the nuclear explosions do not send radioactive debris outside one's borders. The President, moreover, in transmitting the treaty to the Senate, said that "this treaty is the whole agreement—the treaty speaks for itself."

The State Department contends that "any other nuclear explosion" does not mean any detonation on behalf of an ally attacked or in our own self-defense. This interpretation goes against the clear wording of the agreement. There is nothing in international law to support a contention that the rule of construction of a treaty is any different in this respect than the rule of construction of a statute or any legal document; namely, if a document is clear on its face, recourse may not be had to any other source.

The State Department justifies its interpretation by consulting the minutes of discussions during the negotiations to justify its position. But then it does not make these available in their entirety to the Senate. It also comes up with the conclusion that detonations for peaceful purposes, such as canal building, are proscribed.

The Senator is absolutely correct. If some nation took this treaty to the World Court, I agree with the able Senator that the World Court could well say that this wording, this verbiage, was clear and the Court would have to construe the intent from language of the treaty.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield further, whoever this lawyer was—in my opinion, he was instructed to write an opinion saying this, which is clearly contrary to the language of the treaty—relied upon the preamble to put a construction on the language of the treaty different from what the treaty provides. I say that if one compares that language with the preamble, it does not support the contention. For example, the preamble uses the words:

Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and—

I emphasize this—desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances.

The treaty then proceeds to provide that we will proceed, first, to stop testing, and then to stop other explosions, under the treaty.

The preamble actually follows the clause. It says:

(1) You will not conduct the test explosions; and (2) you will not conduct any explosions.

So it is now very clear that any court composed of lawyers, rather than politicians, would have to rule that the

treaty forbids all explosions, even those for our own self-defense. Under the terms of this treaty, it would be illegal for this Nation or any of our allies to use an atomic explosion for an antiballistic missile to stop a missile aimed at one of our cities, which could destroy 5 or 6 million people in a single blast. It would be against the treaty to use an atomic explosion to defend ourselves. We would have to violate the treaty in order to fire a shot in self-defense.

Mr. THURMOND. The Senator from South Carolina is in accord with the construction placed on this matter by the able Senator from Louisiana. The treaty is as clear as crystal. Article 1, section 2 reads as follows:

Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect referred to, in paragraph 1 of this Article.

There are no exceptions. How could the World Court find exceptions or place a strained meaning on the construction? It would be forced, if its members followed their oath of office, to construe it according to the language in the treaty.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. THURMOND. I yield.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. As the Senator well knows, based on this Nation's agreement to be a party to the World Court, and based on the agreement which this Nation made when we became a part of the United Nations, it is not what we say in a committee report that this treaty means; it is what the World Court says about this treaty that will determine it.

Mr. THURMOND. The Senator again is correct. Under article 36, the World Court has a right to construe treaties. That is one of its responsibilities. Under article 36, section 2, paragraph (a), interpretation of a treaty is that Court's responsibility.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The Senator knows that the same persons who would ratify this treaty are also among those who would have us submit to the complete, unfettered jurisdiction of the World Court. As things stand now, under the Connally reservation, this Nation reserves to itself the right to determine whether a matter is an international matter or whether it is a purely domestic matter. But the Senator well knows that the question of interpretation of the treaty is clearly an international affair, and we would stultify ourselves if we tried to pretend it was anything but that.

Mr. THURMOND. There is no question about that. The able Senator from Louisiana, who is an astute lawyer, has construed this question properly, in my judgment. I commend him. He was an able officer in World War II, in the Navy. He is a great patriot. He has given this matter much consideration, and his opinion is well worth serious consideration by the Senate.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The Senator knows that former President Eisenhower, who did not negotiate the treaty, made the statement that we should not ratify the treaty unless we made it clear

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that we reserved the right to use these weapons to fulfill our treaty commitments and to defend ourselves. If we are to leave that matter to the World Court and rely upon the World Court—which has three Communist judges sitting on it—to say that the treaty does not mean what it says, we have made a bad mistake. As the Senator knows, any time Russia decides to attack this country, she is going to attack us, treaty or no treaty. So far as defending ourselves is concerned, for the most part, this Nation abides by treaties.

Can the Senator tell me how many treaties this Nation has violated?

Mr. THURMOND. Our country keeps its treaties. We keep our word.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. That was my impression. The Senator may recall that before World War II this Nation entered a disarmament treaty. The Japanese burned up a great many blueprints, and we burned up many ships to fulfill our part of the disarmament treaty. That proved to be a bad mistake. We could have used those ships at the time when we were taken by surprise. This Nation kept its agreement even when it proved to be a very bad bargain.

The Senator knows that this treaty could work out to be a Communist trap, and prevent us from doing the things necessary in our defense and the defense of our allies, whereas the Soviets could break the treaty whenever it suited their purpose.

Mr. THURMOND. The Senator from South Carolina is in thorough accord with the Senator from Louisiana. The Senator from Louisiana had much experience in World War II in the Navy. A few days ago he discussed, very intelligently, our sad experience with torpedo duds in the Pacific in World War II because we did not test them in advance, just as we will not be able to test our vital nuclear weapons in their environment if this treaty is ratified.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I believe the record is clear on that portion. I may discuss it later.

I thank the Senator for yielding.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, in view of Mr. Khrushchev's definition of disarmament, I would sincerely hope that the Foreign Relations Committee is incorrect in its assessment that the treaty reflects an identity of interest in limiting the arms race or achieving disarmament, for that would mean that Mr. Khrushchev's definition of disarmament reflected the official policy of the United States.

In support of its contention that the treaty reflects an "identity of interest in a specific area of containing the arms competition," the Foreign Relations Committee advanced two hypotheses. The committee states:

First, the treaty will inhibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons, thus reducing the danger of accidental or catalytic nuclear war, as well as nuclear war by design.

As the Senator from Washington [Mr. JACKSON] pointed out last week, the role of the treaty in inhibiting proliferation has been generally overestimated. We have little to fear from most of the

nations, other than the Soviet Union, which signed the treaty, even if they obtained a limited capability with such weapons. In point of fact, very few of them have the capability of achieving any significant nuclear capability; and if they did manage the development of a warhead itself, they would still be faced with the problem of a delivery system which, for most of them, would be impossible.

The major concern to the United States of proliferation is centered in one nation—Communist China. No one has contended that Communist China will sign the treaty, and the only disagreement about the Chinese nuclear program lies in the estimates of when they will actually begin detonating nuclear devices. The Chinese Communists unfortunately do have an aggressive intent, as they have repeatedly demonstrated, and any significant nuclear capability by China does increase the defense problems of the United States and the free world. The treaty does not inhibit development of nuclear weapons by Communist China. The major problem of proliferation, therefore, and the only one of major consequence, will remain unaffected by this treaty.

The second hypothesis of the Foreign Relations Committee in support of the "identity of interest" contention is that the treaty has already deepened and complicated the divisions within the Communist orbit. The Foreign Relations Committee makes it clear that it is referring to the so-called Sino-Soviet rift. Incidentally, this is not the only place in the report where the Sino-Soviet differences are discussed. The Foreign Relations report also sees the Sino-Soviet schism as one of the possible motivations of the Soviet Union in signing the treaty.

The implications behind the discussions of the so-called Sino-Soviet schism lead one to believe that Khrushchev is actually afraid of the expansionist policies of Communist China. Obviously, it is conjectural at this point as to what is the real nature of the differences between China and the Soviet Union, for in point of fact, the only intelligence we have on this matter is what the Soviets and the Chinese themselves tell us. Judging from experience, this is a very poor basis for realistic estimates.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. THURMOND. I am happy to yield to the able Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. SIMPSON. Does the Senator from South Carolina believe that the Sino-Soviet rift is as patent and sure as it has been represented to be?

Mr. THURMOND. I do not believe that the so-called rift between Soviet Russia and China is as it has been purported to be or as it has been reflected in the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations. The major difference between Russia and China is how they will go about burying us. Russia says, "Let us take more time. Let us do it through infiltration and subversion and nibble away on one country after another. Let us build up a powerful defense system and intimidate and coerce other countries, so that they will be

afraid not to come behind the Iron Curtain."

That was the case with Czechoslovakia. Mr. Khrushchev has been quoted time and again as boasting that he will overtake the United States in superiority of strength and that in effect America will undo itself, as we will help in doing if we ratify this treaty.

The Chinese want to do it more hastily and in a more revolutionary manner. The Chinese and the Russians have the same goal. It is a matter of how to attain this goal, whether it will be the Soviet way or the Chinese way. As I stated earlier today, when I read the Associated Press articles from Moscow and Tokyo, they do not seem to be far apart on the essential elements of mutual defense and their aim to take over the world.

Mr. SIMPSON. That is the point I wished to bring out. Is it not correct to say that upon an overture from the Soviet Union, the Chinese people would immediately effect a reconciliation with the Soviet Union, and that the rift is less real than seems to be indicated?

Mr. THURMOND. There is no question that if a showdown should come between the United States and Russia, China would be on the side of the Soviet Union. The Senator from South Carolina propounded this very question to the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the hearings before the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee. He asked, if the United States had a showdown with Russia on which side would China be. All of them said that China would be on the side of the Soviets.

Then the Senator from South Carolina asked the question, If the United States had a showdown with China on which side would Russia be? All of the men said that in their opinion Russia would be on the side of China.

If they are going to be together, what difference does it make if there is a rift on the question of how to "bury us." The only question is where they will be in case of a showdown. In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they will not be on the side of the United States, and they will be together if a showdown comes. The rift will then fade away like cigarette smoke.

Mr. SIMPSON. I thank the Senator from South Carolina. In view of the fact that he is such a great Army officer and high in the echelons of the Department, I am sure that people of America will listen to him, though the Senate is not listening to him.

Mr. THURMOND. I thank the able Senator from Wyoming. I commend him for the great attention he has given to the discussion. Several days ago he delivered a masterly address. He is a great American and a great patriot, of whom the people of his State can be proud.

At page 361 of the hearings of the Foreign Relations Committee the Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN] propounded a question to General LeMay, which I believe is pertinent today, as follows:

Senator AIKEN. I say nobody can guarantee that any future officials of government

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will carry out their duties as they are expected to or not, but it is safe to say any official who failed to carry out the responsibilities in this respect would also undoubtedly be very lax in other respects as well.

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Just one other question. This Sino-Soviet split must have very significant strategic implications.

For instance, suppose China launches a more aggressive attack on India. I know there is a question in the minds of a good many people what Russia would do. Do you think the split between Russia and the Chinese is a real split?

General LE MAY, I think they probably have some differences of opinion. But I believe that they are mostly on how to advance world communism, and it is my opinion if there was any real trouble in the world we would find that very quickly Russia and China would get back together again. They do have a mutual defense pact, and I certainly think it would be invoked and operating efficiently if it was necessary.

I believe that answer is on this point, and further substantiates the position of the able Senator from Wyoming. Further, at page 362 of the hearings, the Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON] asked a question of General LeMay, as follows:

TREATY'S EFFECT ON SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Senator CARLSON. General LeMay, as I have listened to you and the testimony this morning of the Joint Chiefs I gather that from the political standpoint you are recommending that this treaty be ratified on the basis that there would be some restraint on the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and that it would reduce world tension. If I remember correctly, I think General Taylor added another item. He thought it important that the treaty would further accentuate the split between Red China and the Soviet Union.

Do you agree with that?

General LE MAY. Well, probably not to the same extent that General Taylor does. I think there is a possibility that it may, but I don't think it is a very great possibility.

In other words, I don't see that we are going to be able to split Red China and Russia. We may cause trouble between the two, but not to the extent that when the chips are down they won't get back together again.

Senator CARLSON. Do I understand from that statement you have a feeling this treaty would have no effect one way or the other as far as driving a wedge between the Red Chinese and the Soviet Union?

General LE MAY. No. I think it may cause further trouble between them but not to the extent that they are going to break off completely.

(At this point MRS. NEUBERGER took the chair as Presiding Officer.)

Mr. THURMOND. That further substantiates the position of the able Senator from Wyoming [Mr. SIMPSON].

The Soviet Union and China share the Communist goal of world domination. Perhaps if and when they accomplish this overriding obsession, they would in time fight each other for possession of the spoils. In the meantime, it is hard to take much solace in the fact that there is an inner dispute between them as to what is the best method to eliminate either us or our freedom, or both.

As it is, and as long as the apparent difference in approach to aggression persists between the Soviet Union and

China, we will have to face the dangers of both strategies. For all we know, however, the apparent schism between the Soviets and China could be a variation of the old tactic of the carrot and the stick. Instead of alternating, they may now just be using both at the same time.

Some have intimated, of course, that the Soviets are now mellowing or evolving, and that we now have less to fear from this center of communism. The implication is that Communist China now constitutes the principal threat from the Communists.

If anyone really is convinced that Red China is now the main source of danger to the free world, rather than the Soviet Union, he should come right out and say so. Beyond the question of whether it is the Soviets or the Chinese who have the nastier intentions toward us, it would be interesting to hear who has the bigger stick. Of the two criminals, the Soviets clearly have the more polished grammar, and may hurl the more so subtly phrased insults at the United States, but it is quite clear that they both mean to do us in, and the more dangerous is the one with the largest capability to try it. The Soviets still have, and for the foreseeable future will have, the bigger stick.

The Foreign Relations Committee seems to find some comfort in the fact, that although acquisition by the Chinese Reds of nuclear weapons—which the treaty will not inhibit—will make the Chinese stick look a lot bigger to China's neighbors, that Red China's failure to sign the treaty will make the Chinese appearance more offensive to the sensibilities of its neighbors. Should we really conclude, as the committee suggests, that these developments will "encourage greater resistance to Communist expansionist policies" from southeast Asian nations?

The question is, Which will impress the little neighbors of Red China more—Fear of the bigger and atomic powered stick, or increased dislike at another display of Red China's belligerence?

The discussion of the so-called Sino-Soviet schism raises another question by its implications. Are we to believe that Khrushchev is really afraid of Red China?

Where did Red China get its jet fighters, and where do the spare parts and ammunition come from?

Where did Red China get the SA-2 antiaircraft missiles with which to shoot down a U-2 plane flown by Nationalist Chinese?

Where did Red China get its tanks, and where must the spare parts come from?

Where does Red China get its military transport, and from where do the spare parts come to keep it running?

If Khrushchev is really afraid of Red China, does anyone believe that he could not cause the complete collapse of the Red Chinese rulers by cutting off all the supply lines to Red China from the Soviet Union?

Before we base any hopes on advantages to ourselves on the apparent Soviet-Chinese schism, these questions

must be answered along with many others.

In many respects, the nonmilitary aspects of this treaty referred to in the Foreign Relations Committee report are contradictory.

For instance, the committee alleges that the primary purpose of the treaty is "to inhibit the arms race." Yet the testimony of the Secretary of Defense in support of the treaty follows the principal thrust that we can determine all the information necessary to support an all-out increase in our armaments by underground testing and by reliance on knowledge we already have. Obviously, the Soviets can follow the same course, and the only hitch is that the Soviets have more knowledge already than do we in certain critical areas, and possibly have more knowledge in a number of crucial areas.

Madam President, I wish to read from page 637 of the hearings of the Committee on Foreign Relations on the nuclear test ban treaty to show what Dr. John Foster, head of the Livermore Laboratory, had to say on the question of underground testing as a substitute for testing in the natural environment. The questioning is by Senator BYRD of West Virginia.

UNDERGROUND TESTING NO SUBSTITUTE FOR ATMOSPHERIC TESTING

Dr. Foster, I asked you earlier, if by using the information that we already have, and by conducting aggressively underground tests under the conditions of the treaty, we could acquire information which would satisfy our fears with regard to weapons effects upon sites and systems, and you indicated, I believe, that we could not.

Would your answer still be the same if I had framed my question differently to the extent that I had included the safeguards the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended?

Dr. FOSTER. Yes, it would have been the same. It is simply that the question of how hard anything is to electromagnetic phenomena, be it antiballistic missile defense or hardness of silos, has to do with matters that, in my opinion, are not sufficiently well understood to be able to say with full confidence that they will function as designed in a nuclear environment and this nuclear environment cannot be created by underground experiments.

Senator BYRD of West Virginia. And so safeguards are no—

Dr. FOSTER. Correct.

Senator BYRD of West Virginia. We are taking a great chance with the security of this country if we approve a treaty which prohibits our further testing in the atmosphere, and, consequently, learning by such testing important facts dealing with effects upon sites and systems?

Dr. FOSTER. You are taking a risk, and you cannot calculate it.

Senator BYRD of West Virginia. Regardless of these safeguards?

Dr. FOSTER. Regardless of these safeguards.

Senator BYRD of West Virginia. Even though they are implemented to the fullest?

Dr. FOSTER. That is correct.

Madam President, in attempting to assess the Soviets' motivations in signing this test ban treaty, the Foreign Relations Committee speculates that it may have been for the purpose of permitting "some diversion of resources away from nuclear weapons development and toward the consumer goods area."

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Of course, this is pure speculation, for even if the Soviets were able to convert some resources, there is no assurance that the savings would go into consumer goods rather than Cuba-type ventures, or their agitation and subversion operations in Latin America, Africa, and southeast Asia.

But the very allegation, that the treaty will result in a diversion of resources from weapons development, is contradicted by the claim that it will be much more expensive for the Soviets to move their testing program underground in an effort to catch up with their assumed lead in low-yield weapons technology. General Taylor, in support of the treaty testified:

If the Soviets are to catch up with the United States in the low-yield field, particularly in numbers, they will be subjected to a major additional expenditure of national resources which are already under heavy strain.

Of course, there is no objection or particular offensiveness in advancing abstract theories, providing, of course, that they are understood clearly as hypotheses. The remoteness of many of the speculations as to the nonmilitary aspects is emphasized by the fact that they are contradictory to other such speculations, and contradictory to some of the arguments advanced for the purpose of mitigating against the obvious military disadvantages of the treaty.

Some years ago, efforts to obtain a cessation to atmospheric testing were based primarily on the need for eliminating the hazards of radioactive fallout. There is little question but that the magnitude of the hazard from radioactive fallout, as a result of nuclear testing, has been grossly exaggerated. Where conditions permit, all possible steps should, of course, be taken to eliminate even the most remote hazard.

The risk of danger from radioactive fallout as a result of nuclear testing, however, pales in significance by comparison to the risk to our security, our military preparedness, and our ability to deter nuclear war which flows from the treaty.

The Foreign Relations Committee pointed out in its report that:

It is generally agreed that radiation from fallout amounts to considerably less in terms of human exposure than normal background radiation. Moreover, informed opinion appears to be that radioactive fallout produced to date has remained well below a level to which it might be deemed hazardous.

President Kennedy, himself, stated on March 2, 1962, in his announcement that the United States would resume atmospheric testing, that:

It has been estimated, in fact, that the exposure due to radioactivity from these tests will be less than one-fiftieth of the difference which can be experienced due to variations in natural radioactivity simply by living in different locations in the country. This will obviously be well within the guides for general population health and safety as set by the Federal Radiation Council; and considerably less than the one-tenth of 1 percent of the exposure set for adults who work with industrial radioactivity.

The Federal Radiation Council estimates that man's natural environment

will give him a 70-year dose of radiation 17 to 35 times greater than the one he will receive from fallout from all tests conducted through 1961.

The Senator from Connecticut, who formerly was Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, pointed out, on September 9, 1963, that:

We must face the fact that the land on which we live and work, the air we breathe, the water we drink and use in industry, agriculture, and recreation have been altered over the past half-century by a manmade fallout far more abundant and potentially more dangerous than the contamination of nuclear weapons testing.

Madam President, as appears on page 214 of the nuclear-test-ban treaty hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, an exchange on this subject occurred between the able Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] and Dr. Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, as follows:

Senator RUSSELL. Dr. Seaborg, I read in the paper, I believe the day before yesterday, that there is twice as much radiation in milk today as there was 3 years ago.

Is that approximately right?

Dr. SEABORG. That would depend on the section of the country that was being referred to. I would like to say that there are probably sections of the country where there is twice as much strontium 90 in the milk now as there was 3 years ago, yes, sir, Senator.

Senator RUSSELL. Has that yet reached a point where it is sufficient to endanger the human family?

Dr. SEABORG. No, sir.

Senator RUSSELL. It is a long way from it?

Dr. SEABORG. It is a considerable distance from it, yes, sir.

Senator RUSSELL. I must express my surprise that you did not refer to any advantages to be gained from lessened fallout. Some of our practicing politicians have been predicated their vote on this treaty on what they call very cynically and irreverently "the mother vote," because the treaty would lessen the dangers of increasing the fallout.

But I commend you for being frank and honest with the committee and not bringing in an objection that is captious and not genuine.

As appears on page 632 of the hearings of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I had an exchange on this subject with Dr. Foster, as follows:

Senator THURMOND. Dr. Foster, on the question of the fallout to which Senator BYRD referred to a few moments ago, that seems to be the question that is disturbing a great many people today who tend to favor the treaty where otherwise they might be against it.

On this question, if I recall correctly, last week or the week before some scientists made the statement that one would get more radiation from living in the mountains of Colorado than from fallout.

Dr. FOSTER. That is correct, sir.

Senator THURMOND. That is correct.

I believe it is also true that one living in a brick house would get 20 times more radiation than he would get from fallout.

Dr. FOSTER. Well, sir, there you are ahead of me. I do not know that because—

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Earl Voss, I believe, brought that out in his book "Nuclear Ambush."

Dr. FOSTER. Yes.

Senator THURMOND. And one wearing a wristwatch with a luminous dial, as I have on here, would get 10 times as much radiation as he would get from fallout.

Dr. FOSTER. I am familiar with the arguments, sir. I do not know that a wrist-watch—

Senator THURMOND. Does that sound reasonable? In other words, do those statements sound reasonable to you?

Dr. FOSTER. It is true that natural background is large compared with the additional activity, radioactivity, associated with fallout from all past tests.

Senator THURMOND. Isn't it a matter of fact that the fallout mentioned by some of those who favor this treaty, the propaganda that is being disseminated and the bugaboo that is being raised, that the fallout is imperceptible, and is of little consequence?

Dr. FOSTER. I think, sir, that the problem or the question of fallout is of insignificance, of little significance, compared to the major issue with which the development of warheads is attempting to deal.

Senator THURMOND. What people want to know is this: We have been reading about fallout, fallout in milk, and fallout in food and resulting injury to the future generation. Is it possible for this fallout to bring about sterility and various other reactions?

I just want to ask you whether you feel that there is danger to people's health from the little fallout radiation resulting from the tests we have conducted?

Dr. FOSTER. No, sir.

Senator THURMOND. Your answer is "No"?

Dr. FOSTER. My answer is no.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you.

Madam President, much of the exaggerated fear of fallout has been caused by the normal human fear of the unknown and of things that cannot be understood, and also by very poor public relations treatment by the U.S. Government. For instance, the American public has never been effectively told of the radiation hazards which have been eliminated as a result of the better understanding of radiation that we have obtained from testing nuclear devices. Far greater radiation hazards, in the form of excessive medical X-rays, repeated and excessive dental X-rays, and even toy and shoe store X-rays, which formerly existed, have been eliminated than have those created by radioactive fallout from testing.

Should nuclear testing in the atmosphere be continued, the advent of clean nuclear devices would probably result in even less radioactive fallout per test than has been the case with former tests. Unfortunately, from the military standpoint, but encouragingly from the standpoint of lessening the hazards of radioactive fallout, even the Soviets have demonstrated a capability of utilizing remarkably clean nuclear warheads. In June of this year, the United States detected what were presumed to be nuclear tests in the Soviet Union, but there was no radiation debris which came out of the Soviet Union from which to prove that the signals received were, in fact, caused by nuclear detonations.

Under these circumstances, and without in any way mitigating the desirability of eliminating all radioactive fallout from nuclear testing, the degree of hazards from radioactive fallout as a result of atmospheric testing is not of sufficient magnitude to make it a major consideration in weighing the merits and demerits of the treaty.

Madam President, if there are significant nonmilitary or political advantages to ratification of this treaty, then they

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should be enumerated and spelled out. The specifics should be given of each such political aspect so that it may be objectively weighed in the balance. This is no time to delude ourselves or the American people with idealistic statements and hypotheses which becloud the hazards to which this treaty subjects our very existence.

We have experienced the penalties of indulging in the "Truce of the Bear" before. One such instance was at Yalta. There, too, we professed to find an "identity of interests" with the U.S.S.R. We would do well to recall the assessment of our position at Yalta by the none other than Mr. Averell Harriman himself, who on April 6, 1945, as U.S. Ambassador in Moscow, cabled the U.S. Government as follows:

It may be difficult for us to believe, but it still may be true that Stalin and Molotov considered at Yalta that by our willingness to accept a general wording of the declaration on the Red Army for security behind its lines, and of the predominant interest of Russia in Poland as a friendly neighbor and as a corridor to Germany, we understood and were ready to accept Soviet policies already known to us.

It was Mr. Harriman's conclusion that the continued "generous and considerate attitude" adopted by the United States was regarded in Russia only as a sign of weakness. We need to keep in mind Mr. Harriman's own words:

Our experience has incontrovertibly proved that it is not possible to bank general goodwill in Moscow.

We entered another "Truce of the Bear" in 1958. That "Truce of the Bear" took the form of a moratorium on atmospheric testing. Once again, we suffered the consequence of Soviet duplicity and our own idealism.

It is not enough to soberly express our concern with "euphoria," as it is called. As a result of the treaty—despite the expressed cautions—our guard is already being let down mentally, if not yet physically. Many illustrations could be given. For instance, an article appeared in the Washington Post of September 14 entitled "Bill Would Ease Arms-Cut Pain." The first three paragraphs of this news article state:

A pioneering blueprint designed to soften the economic impact of a cut in arms spending was unveiled yesterday by Senator GEORGE McGOVERN, Democrat, of South Dakota.

McGOVERN showed reporters the draft of a bill he plans to introduce after the Senate votes on the test ban treaty. It would create Federal machinery to take some of the pain out of converting swords into ploughshares.

The Senator's move comes against a background of growing congressional interest in the problems flowing from a future reduction in military outlays. Senator JOSEPH CLARK, Democrat, of Pennsylvania, heads a manpower subcommittee that will conduct hearings in November on the employment aspect of arms reduction.

Madam President, it is hard not to conclude that the most significant political effect of this treaty, despite all the pronounced intentions to keep our country prepared, is what the witnesses have called "euphoria," which, when translated into practical effect, means diminished military preparedness and less capability to deter a nuclear war.

This political aspect of the proposed treaty has long been recognized, even before the treaty was considered seriously by the Soviets. In 1959, to a confidant, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles is reported to have stated:

Since a (test ban) treaty is what the Russians want, it wouldn't be difficult to come up with one which would look good on the surface. We could include in it all the fuzzy language of diplomacy—and believe me, I know some of the phrases—and present it to the world as a great achievement for peace. All of this would result in a relaxation of world tensions, generate a feeling of international good will, and probably elect a Republican President in 1960.

But we're not going to do it. If we signed such a pact with the Soviets, there would develop a tremendous pressure to cut back on our defenses, reduce the size of our Armed Forces, and curtail our armaments. And we'd have only the word of the Russians that they were doing the same. Our NATO, SEATO, and other alliances would be endangered, perhaps to the point of deterioration. As a result, within a few years, we could be as a sitting duck for the Communists to pick off whenever they felt the time was ripe.

This analysis is just as accurate today, if not more so, than in 1959.

Even were there no military disadvantages to the treaty, the nonmilitary considerations, on balance, weigh against the ratification of the treaty.

It is the military consequences which are determinative, however.

Political considerations have not and will not stay the hand of the aggressor bent on world domination. Until now, we have maintained such an overwhelming superiority in nuclear power that the alternative of nuclear war has been foreclosed to Khrushchev as a means of extending his dictatorial control.

We have followed a policy of deterrence of nuclear war. To make this policy work, it has been necessary for the United States to maintain not just a lead in quality and quantity of nuclear weapons, but to maintain an overwhelming superiority. The wide margin of superiority is necessary because we have made it clear that we will let the enemy have the advantage of the first blow. Our deterrent force is, in fact, therefore, composed only of that portion of our strike force which the Soviets believe could survive the hardest first blow that the Soviets could throw at us.

During the period since September 1961, the Soviets have managed, through a determined and comprehensive testing program, to achieve a lead in technology in certain critical fields of nuclear weaponry, and possibly to achieve a lead in certain other crucial areas. It is possible that they drew abreast of the United States in still other areas of nuclear technology. From this knowledge, it is possible that the Soviets now have the know-how, which, if converted to weapons, would give them the capability to cripple our second strike forces with a first blow to the extent that Mr. Khrushchev might judge any possible retaliatory blow by the United States to constitute an acceptable risk.

The Soviets did not gain this advantage in technology because of any inherent superiority. During the moratorium, while we neither tested nor prepared for

testing, the Soviets made intensive preparations and, as a result, were able to mount two comprehensive, complex, and full-scale atmospheric test series involving more than 100 tests. By comparison, our one-test series was hastily prepared after the moratorium was broken and was, therefore, only partially successful. While the Soviets concentrated their tests on a search for technology which would directly affect their ability to knock out the U.S. forces in a first strike and defend against what survived, the U.S. tests were diversified by a number of other factors. We limited the size of our tests in terms of yield. The VELA series, designed at improving our detection, identification, and analysis capability, constituted a substantial part of our testing. Some of our tests were on Project Plowshare, to experiment with peaceful uses.

To maintain our position of clear superiority, it is incumbent on the United States to do more testing than the Soviets, for we must have additional knowledge for the design of weapons capable of surviving a nuclear attack. The Soviets, who do not intend to allow anyone else to start the war, do not have this additional requirement, for they intend to launch their attack first, and they know that the United States will not attack first.

We can, through atmospheric testing, if we have the will, overcome any Soviet lead in technology. We can proof test our weapons systems on an operational basis, so that we can insure their survivability. We can find out from our own atmospheric testing just how much the Soviets do know. We have the capability of maintaining, or regaining, our superiority in technology in all fields of nuclear weaponry and weapons effects if the treaty is not ratified.

If this treaty is ratified, momentous risks to our capability to deter nuclear war will result. We cannot assess the degree of risks with any confidence on the basis of information we now have.

It is unthinkable for the United States to play blindman's bluff with nuclear war, and that is precisely the effect of this treaty.

For the sake of the United States and all mankind, the treaty should be rejected.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Madam President, only a few minutes ago I was handed a telegram sent to me by one of the most respected Members of Congress I have ever known. I served with him in the House of Representatives and I got to know him intimately and well. He is a man of great integrity, great understanding and great knowledge. I refer to our old colleague, former Representative Carl Durham, of North Carolina, whose career in the House of Representatives was both long and distinguished.

The telegram reads as follows:

Hon. MIKE MANSFIELD,
Majority Leader, U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MIKE: As one who has closely followed and strongly supported our nuclear weapons program from its inception and as twice past chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy I believe it is in the best interests of the United States that the treaty

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now before the Senate be ratified as drawn without amendment and without reservation. Information developed by the Joint Committee over the years reflects that future uncontrolled atmospheric testing could constitute a danger to humanity. This treaty represents a beginning toward control of this potential danger. In my opinion the United States possesses the finest nuclear weapons laboratories in the world. If we keep them and our testing capability in full readiness and continue a vigorous underground testing program we will in my opinion more than adequately protect our security.

CARL T. DURHAM.

Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that there be a printing of the resolution of ratification, for use by the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Madam President, the Foreign Relations Committee, under the able leadership of the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], has kept itself informed of the test ban proposals which were the antecedents of the one before us today.

This committee, in its recent exhaustive hearings, has heard the testimony of some 44 witnesses, witnesses from inside and outside the Government, witnesses for and against ratification, witnesses appearing in open and executive session.

The record produced is impressive, and the report, taking into account both military security and foreign policy considerations, is a persuasive one. I congratulate the chairman.

Likewise, I express appreciation and admiration for the work done by the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee under the able chairmanship of the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS].

This subcommittee has compiled, I believe, the most complete and probing record ever made on the vital subject of the military and technological implications of nuclear test ban treaties.

Senator STENNIS had the foresight last fall, over a year ago, when the prospects for agreement of any kind with the Soviets were dim indeed, to begin these searching hearings, in order to obtain facts and opinions from the relevant Government departments and agencies, from military officials and from scien-

tists. This record of the Preparedness Subcommittee will be of inestimable future value to the Congress and the country.

I have the privilege of sitting on both of these committees; and therefore the opportunity, in both open and closed sessions, to hear and question witnesses in great detail as to the military security aspects of the problem; and also to look at the military aspects in the context of international affairs and foreign policy.

For many years I have been studying the activities of the United States in the area of arms control and disarmament, including test ban proposals. In 1955 I was appointed to the then Joint Subcommittee on Disarmament, when it was first formed.

It is my judgment that the action taken by the Senate on this treaty could well be its most important action during our time. Unless there can be some understanding among the growing number of nations that will have the weapon, a nuclear holocaust is only a question of time.

Before deciding that it would be better to take that risk than any risk inherent in the test ban treaty, let us consider the following:

It is estimated that a groundburst of one of the largest weapons would totally destroy, incinerate, everything within a radius of 7 miles, and create blast effects that would cause severe damage out to 23 miles. The thermal effects from an air burst below 50,000 feet would cause first degree burns on exposed skin out to 100 miles—or beyond Wilmington, Del., if the bomb were dropped at Washington—second-degree burns out to 70 miles. Under these considerations, although we must always remain stronger than any possible adversary, the basis of deterrence, it is hard to see how there could be any victor as the word has been used in the past.

As was stated in the concluding statement of the report of the Preparedness Subcommittee, the question is "one of weighing relative risks."

I have weighed the relative risks.

First I weighed the purely military risks, which were the focus of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee.

The question in this connection is whether the restraints imposed by the treaty, as compared with a condition of unlimited testing, disadvantage the United States militarily more than they do the Soviet Union.

It is clear—and all witnesses have so testified—that this test ban treaty will inhibit certain aspects of U.S. weapons development and weapons effects knowledge.

This is a disadvantage and is not a point in dispute. But we must weigh such disadvantages to the United States against comparable, if not similar, disadvantages to the Soviet Union.

For example, the Soviet Union, like ourselves, will be prevented from further exploration of blackout phenomena, from gaining all knowledge one would like to have about the destructive effects of large weapons on hardened sites, from conducting complete systems tests clear through to nuclear explosions, and so on.

It would appear that, from the military point of view, the limited test ban treaty is probably somewhat more disadvantageous to the United States than to the Soviet Union. It is possible that this is wrong, however; in fact it is possible that the treaty will disadvantage the Soviets militarily more than ourselves. The latter is the judgment of the Secretary of Defense.

The subcommittee report did not attempt to compare the military disadvantages it discussed with the military disadvantages of unrestricted testing by all countries who may acquire the capability to test. I think this latter point should be taken into account along with the other important points the subcommittee report does present.

In any case, I do not believe that the evidence supports the conclusion that the treaty is sure to result in significant military or technical disadvantages to the United States.

There were major differences of opinion among the experts, no doubt because of the newness of the nuclear art, and partially, I am sure, because the subject is so highly classified.

Some of the able, experienced, and completely honorable scientists who testified against the treaty made mistakes in fact, apparently because in the reasonably recent past they had not been cleared for all classified information. Specifically, apprehensions in the ABM field were not borne out, at least to me, in the highly classified intelligence briefings we received.

From a military standpoint, I believe the thrust of the disadvantage to the United States in future weapons development was overemphasized by some witnesses; and the comparable disadvantage to the Soviets underemphasized.

MR. GORE. Madam President, will the Senator yield?

MR. SYMINGTON. I am glad to yield to the able Senator from Tennessee.

MR. GORE. I concur in what the able Senator has said. I wonder if he would express his view, in discussing the possible disadvantages, comparable or similar, to be experienced both by the United States and the Soviet Union, as to the possible restraint upon other nations which might aspire and who may now have the industrial capability of becoming nuclear powers.

MR. SYMINGTON. Madam President, the able senior Senator from Tennessee, who is extraordinarily well versed on this subject, especially because of his long experience in the House, and in the Senate, as a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, has put his finger on one of the most important aspects of this treaty.

To date, I understand some 91 countries have signed the treaty. Many of those countries could not, in the conceivable future, have atomic weapons; but many of them could develop a nuclear weapon, and some of them are already close to it. The fact that those countries have signed this agreement, preventing their testing in the atmosphere—unless they desire to cheat, in which case, as I shall discuss later, I be-

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lieve they will be promptly caught—is indeed the most significant characteristic of the entire problem.

Have I answered the question of the Senator?

Mr. GORE. Yes. I thank the Senator from Missouri. Is not our security primarily involved in the avoidance of nuclear war? And if by means of the treaty there is discouragement and restraint—perhaps effective discouragement and restraint—from the proliferation of nuclear power, would that not diminish the possibility of an outbreak of nuclear war?

Mr. SYMINGTON. Madam President, I can see no alternative to the logic of the position taken by the distinguished Senator from Tennessee. In our lifetime, we have known men who wanted to conquer the world, and who, before they died, were considered insane. Certainly that was true of Hitler as well as others. That being true, it is obvious that with a proliferation of nuclear weapons, there would be more of a chance of such a person having the opportunity to start a nuclear war. In that event, as presented a few minutes ago, there would be little likelihood of a victor in the sense of the word as we have used it in the past.

Mr. GORE. So in weighing the advantages and disadvantages from a purely military standpoint, if we were privileged so to consider the treaty, one must realistically take into account the advantages and disadvantages of not merely the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, but the whole cosmic problem of a global nuclear conflict?

Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator from Tennessee is correct and I appreciate his typically constructive contribution.

In any case, I believe that under this treaty any significant cheating on the part of the Soviets could be discovered promptly; and this Government has pledged that we will remain ready to thereupon resume atmospheric tests immediately.

As I see it, there are four areas which could be considered in coming to a judgment as to the likely net effect of the treaty; first, the significance of the big bomb; second, the question of smaller nuclear weapons; third, the antiballistic missile; and fourth, the question of survivability of our deterrent force.

The first two of these areas do not cause me much apprehension. The United States, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has seen operating need for 100-megaton weapons. The Joint Chiefs of Staff place no emphasis on having yields in excess of those which can be achieved under the treaty.

Even Dr. Teller stated that desire for very high yield weapons did not figure significantly in his opposition to the treaty. Smaller yield warheads—still over 100 times as large as the Hiroshima bomb—are better for carrying out our war plans.

Second, the fact the Soviets can improve their lower yield weapons by underground testing does not appear to be an argument against the treaty, because they can improve those weapons faster and cheaper without the treaty.

So, as I say, the weapons development points do not cause me any great concern.

The other two points appear to me more important.

Two facts come through crystal clear in all testimony with respect to the antiballistic missile. First, it is extremely unlikely that an antiballistic missile defense can be developed which can be counted on to save a nation from lethal harm. Even ABM optimists claim only that such a system would reduce somewhat the damage. Second, the technical problems which face us in our attempt to develop an antiballistic missile system are heavily concentrated in the non-nuclear areas—in areas unaffected by the treaty, such as reaction speed, missile performance, traffic handling capacity, and capacity for decoy discrimination.

At the most, therefore, the treaty will raise the cost of any ABM the United States decided to deploy, because uncertainties about blackout will have to be built around by the addition of radars.

I regret this affect of the treaty on us. But the evidence before both committees is that the Soviets have not yet solved their antiballistic missile problems; therefore, the treaty, if it inhibits our ABM development, will likewise inhibit theirs.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Madam President, will the Senator from Missouri yield?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I am glad to yield to the able Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am much interested in the statement being made by the Senator from Missouri. I know he attended the hearings assiduously and followed them with deep interest.

On the antiballistic missile problem, I thought we received persuasive testimony from Dr. York to the effect that without any inhibition on the development of antiballistic missile systems, it was his opinion that the offense, the penetrability, could always stay ahead of the threat to create an antiballistic missile system. He used the analogy of the race between the hare and the turtle. If only the hare did not go to sleep—the hare being the United States—there was no question in his mind that we could always keep ahead of the defense by the development of operations of such things as the Senator has mentioned; for instance, decoys. Does the Senator subscribe to that viewpoint?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I do. The best illustration I could give is what occurred during the Battle of Britain and shortly thereafter, in England. I was in London the night of the most devastating Nazi raid on that city. It was a Saturday night. The next Monday, at work in the Air Ministry, I was amazed to find everyone apparently happy, whistling in the corridors.

I asked, "How can this be?" because most of the mess of Saturday night had been cleaned up, although it had been widespread early Sunday morning.

The reply was the experts had calculated that more than 5 percent of the bombers that came over London had been destroyed; and they had extrapolated that if the British had destroyed more than 5 percent, the Germans would not be able to afford that kind of attrition by future raids. This was proved by the fact this raid was the last organized air raid on England. There were one or two plane sorties; but it was estimated that on that evening some 300 bombers had been over London. It was the last organized raid on England until the V-1's and V-2 rockets came along some time later.

On the other hand, as the Senator from Arkansas realizes, when we have weapons like Polaris submarines, in which every one of the 16 weapons in that submarine has many times the power of the Hiroshima bomb. Even if it had been possible to get 95 percent of the bombers on that evening, instead of 5 percent, had these modern nuclear weapons been available, it would have been absolutely certain.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. They would have been out of business.

Mr. SYMINGTON. The enemy would have been destroyed. London for sure.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. There is quite a difference in the character of the weapons.

Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator's point is well taken.

Perhaps my greatest concern has to do with the effect of the treaty on the survivability of the U.S. deterrent force. The treaty will prevent atmospheric tests designed to test the vulnerability of our missile sites and control centers.

Present knowledge is based on extrapolation of small tests. Under the treaty, our further knowledge will have to be based on underground tests, where only some of the effects can be measured; presumably tests of less than a megaton.

I would much prefer that we learn more, that we reduce the uncertainties regarding our missile-site vulnerabilities. But the evidence is that the Soviets know no more than we do about such vulnerabilities. The evidence is that they have not conducted any large-yield tests of this kind.

This is a very important point. Upon first receiving this information, I investigated further, and am satisfied to make this statement to the Senate.

While I regret, therefore, that the United States did not, before now, find the answer to more of the gnawing vulnerability questions, I am convinced that the Soviets, limited as they are by the terms of this treaty, will not be able to change the elemental facts of the strategic nuclear power balance.

We should remember that the United States has, and will continue to have, enormous strategic nuclear power. This treaty will not affect to an appreciable extent our capability to destroy the Soviet Union if a retaliatory strike is required. I say that because I am convinced that under the terms of this treaty we could detect promptly any significant cheating. That was the aspect I wanted to study most carefully. If my conclusion in this regard had been different I would not support the treaty.

When the inquiry is broadened beyond military concerns to include all relevant factors—as it was before the Foreign

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Relations Committee, and as it is here before the Senate—the problem becomes more complex, but the possible advantages of the treaty become more clear.

The vital importance of this broadening into the field of international relations in this nuclear space age was clearly recognized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when they said:

It is the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, if adequate safeguards are established, the risks inherent in this treaty can be accepted in order to seek the important gains which may be achieved through a stabilization of international relations and a move toward a peaceful environment in which to seek resolution of our differences.

The four "safeguards" stipulated by the Joint Chiefs were:

First. The conduct of comprehensive, aggressive and continuing underground nuclear test programs designed to add to our knowledge and improve our weapons in all areas of significance to our military posture for the future.

Second. The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs in theoretical and exploratory nuclear technology which will attract, retain, and insure the continued application of our human scientific resources to these programs, on which continued progress in nuclear technology depends.

Third. The maintenance of the facilities and resources necessary to institute promptly nuclear tests in the atmosphere, should they be deemed essential to our national security, or should the treaty or any of its terms be abrogated by the Soviet Union.

Fourth. The improvement of our capability, within feasible and practical limits, to monitor the terms of the treaty, to detect violations, and to maintain our knowledge of Sino-Soviet nuclear activity, capabilities and achievements.

Madam President, the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense have all emphasized that these four stipulations are accepted wholeheartedly and will become part of the policy and programs of the Government.

My own conclusion is quite similar to that of the Chiefs. I was worried, as were they, about the possibility that a successful conclusion of the treaty might cause the United States to relax its guard, and therefore not be ready to respond promptly to any violation or surprise abrogation of the treaty by others. But after studying the matter, I am satisfied that the safeguards they suggested, and which the executive branch has pledged to implement promptly, will afford adequate protection against that risk.

As we consider the treaty in its international relationships during this nuclear space age, we realize that:

It is important to slow down the proliferation of nuclear weapon capabilities in other nations. We know the world will become an exceedingly risky place for all human life if the present trend is not stopped.

It is important to avoid destabilizing shifts in military power. The United States—as, unanimously agreed by the witnesses we heard—now holds a commanding lead in nuclear weapons systems over its potential enemies, and it is possible that unsettling challenges to this

lead can be avoided more easily under a condition in which the nuclear race is dampened all around.

It is important to stop polluting the atmosphere with radioactive debris. Although the amount of debris from reasonable atmospheric testing programs would not be great, fallout—resisted by, and frightening to, the world—would spread throughout the atmosphere.

It is important that the United States lead, not follow, the world in the direction toward which the limited treaty points. As presented in my additional views that are included with the report of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee:

I am worried about the treaty; but more worried about the possibility of an all-out nuclear exchange some day in the future—particularly if there is a proliferation of nuclear weapons among more countries.

I said further that:

This treaty, a very small step, nevertheless could be the first step toward bringing nuclear weapons under some form of satisfactory control, which action should promote the possibility of just peace under law.

In closing, Madam President, I do not imply, in supporting the treaty, that the struggle with the Soviet Union will stop with ratification of the treaty, or even that the struggle will change in any major way. On the contrary, the cold war will go on.

I believe the Senate of the United States should advise and consent to ratification of the treaty; but I also believe that the Senate, together with the other arms of the U.S. Government, should gird for the contest in the new situation. We must do our part, not only to insure that the four safeguards listed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff are effectively implemented, but also to maintain the vigilance and strength of the Nation while the small first step which the treaty represents finds its way into the complex of conditions from which the future will be made.

Our children and their children would not excuse us if we took this small step blindly, under any delusion that it was more than it really is. We must be ever alert; otherwise, we could deliver them and the free world into slavery.

Equally important, however, could our children and our grandchildren forgive us if we lacked the courage and wisdom, at so little risk, to take this small step toward the most desired of all goals?

With our eyes open, therefore, let us give weight to the fact that this treaty might point the way toward bringing nuclear weapons under some form of satisfactory control, and thereby furnish hope that a just and lasting peace will move out of the shadows into more of the light.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Missouri yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. McINTYRE in the chair). Does the Senator from Missouri yield to the Senator from Arkansas?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I am glad to yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I congratulate the Senator from Missouri for his very fine statement, which has come from one who has served the Federal Government not only as Secretary of the Air Force, but

also in many other important capacities, as well as in his present capacity as a Senator.

I believe his statement in support of the treaty is most very reassuring, not only to the Senate, but also to the country as a whole. He has rendered a most valuable service by his excellent and clear statement of his position and of the reasons for it; and I thank him very much.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Arkansas. It is a great privilege to work with him on the Committee on Foreign Relations of which he is chairman.

It is true that the treaty does affect very specifically the military problems incident to the security of the United States. It also affects economic problems and the international problems incident to all our various relationships with other countries.

As I have mentioned before, only a few years ago a trip around the world took many months; later, many weeks. Today, however, due to the telescoping of space and time—many men and one woman have gone around the world many times in a single day. In a world of that character, it is important for us to realize that, regardless of our military position—and the basis of all our statements is the fact that the United States must remain stronger militarily than any other country—even in a cold war, as well as in peace, military policy should be an arm of our overall foreign policy.

Mr. THURMOND subsequently said: Mr. President, when I addressed the Senate, I went beyond the lunch hour, and while I was at lunch the distinguished Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON] made an address on the nuclear test ban treaty. I have prepared a number of questions I intended to ask the distinguished Senator from Missouri, but which I did not have the opportunity to ask.

I ask unanimous consent that these questions may be placed in the RECORD at this point, together with the "Meet the Press" program of April 28, 1963, when the Senator from Missouri was the guest.

At a later date, before the treaty debate has been concluded, I would like to have the opportunity to debate these questions with the distinguished Senator from Missouri.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

QUESTIONS FOR SENATOR SYMINGTON

1. The Senator is in a unique position, since he is a member of both the Foreign Relations Committee and the Preparedness Subcommittee, and signed the reports of both committees. I believe the Senator from Missouri has attested that the factual data in the Preparedness Subcommittee's report is accurate. Is that correct?

2. Does the Senator subscribe to the opinion of the Foreign Relations Committee, stated in its report, that, and I quote: "But exclusive, or excessive, reliance on military considerations could undermine national security by encouraging comparable military efforts by others, thereby strengthening the destabilizing forces adrift in the world, possibly creating new ones."

3. I notice that the Senator states that "unless there can be some understanding among the growing number of nations that will have the weapon, a nuclear holocaust is

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only a question of time." Does the Senator mean to imply that armaments, rather than human weaknesses, cause wars?

4. The United States has maintained a level of armaments over recent years unequalled in all history. Would the Senator not agree that these armaments have been the very factor that has prevented nuclear war?

5. Would the Senator not agree that the only way in which one can be sure of preventing nuclear war, so long as the Communists maintain their goal of world domination, is to keep an overwhelming superiority in strategic military power?

6. The Senator from Missouri has correctly pointed out that the military disadvantages of the treaty to the Soviet Union must also be considered, along with the military disadvantages to the United States. Would not the Senator from Missouri agree that in assessing the relative military disadvantages of the treaty, that the starting point, in terms of technology, of both the United States and the Soviet Union, is largely determinative of the degree of disadvantage from prohibition of testing in a particular environment?

7. The Senator has pointed out that the Soviets will be unable to test for blackout phenomena after the treaty goes into effect, just as will the United States. Isn't it a fact, however, that the Soviets specifically tested for blackout phenomena, and particularly as it applies to ABM systems, in the 1961-62 test series, but that the United States has made no comparable test?

8. Another factor which bears heavily on the relative military disadvantages of the treaty, as I am sure the Senator will agree, is the different strategies of the United States and the Soviets. Since the United States must rely on second strike capabilities, it must test to determine every possible vulnerability in its weapons systems, for to leave one that is unknown could spell disaster in the event of any enemy first strike. Since the Soviets rely on the strategy of a first, or preemptive strike, they do not have to test for the purpose of insuring the invulnerability of their own weapons systems, but can concentrate on ferreting out one or two vulnerabilities of our weapons systems and the proper weapons design to exploit our weapons systems vulnerabilities that they have found. Does this factor not require, in effect, far more comprehensive nuclear testing for weapons effects and proof tests by the United States to maintain its second strike force than is necessary for the Soviets to advance their first strike force?

9. The Senator states that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have seen no need for a 100-megaton bomb. Is the Senator not aware that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have, in fact, recommended that we go ahead with the development of the big bomb?

10. Isn't it also a fact that General LeMay recommended the development of a big bomb as early as 1954, but that he was refused?

11. Isn't it a fact that one of the reasons that the recommendation of the military for development of a big bomb has never been approved lies in the fact that the defense policy of the Nation is based on a shift in reliance from manned aircraft, which could deliver a very high yield weapon, to ballistic missiles, in which we do not now have a capability of delivering the necessary weight to achieve the very high yield?

12. The Preparedness Subcommittee report, in which the Senator from Missouri attests as to the accuracy of the facts reports as a fact that, and I quote: "The United States will be unable to acquire necessary data on the effects of very high yield atmospheric explosions. Without such knowledge it is unlikely that a realistic assessment can be made of the military value of such weapons." Would the Senator not agree that the Soviets

have a distinct lead over the United States in this area, and that we do not now have the necessary information from which to assess the military potential of the 100-megaton bomb when used against us?

13. Would the Senator not agree, that regardless of whether the United States would decide, after acquisition of sufficient information on which to make a realistic evaluation, to build a 100-megaton bomb for its own arsenal or not, that it is a major disadvantage for the enemy to have a major weapon of which he knows the military potential, and for the United States to know the existence of the weapon, but to be precluded from ascertaining with some degree of certainty its military potential?

14. The Senator is quite pessimistic about the ability of either the United States or the Soviet Union to develop an effective ABM system. According to the information we now have, the Soviets have deployed an ABM system in one location to which we attribute significant effectiveness in defending against IRBM's, including the Polaris, which incidentally are not missiles which can be salvoed, but we attribute very little effectiveness to this system against ICBM's. In view of the fact that it is possible that the vulnerabilities of our missiles in silos could possibly be exploited by some weapons effects of which we are not now fully knowledgeable, to say the least, would the Senator not agree that under some circumstances the present Soviet technological capabilities in the ABM field are of large significance?

15. As the Senator correctly stated, the Soviets could not, if they abide by the treaty, obtain any more information from ABM testing than could the United States while the treaty was in effect. Is it not true, however, that the Soviets have already performed tests dictated by ABM considerations specifically on the blackout problem, to which the United States has made nothing comparable?

16. The Senator stated that "Specifically, apprehensions in the ABM field were not borne out, at least to me, in the highly classified intelligence briefings we received." Is it not true that the briefings to which the Senator refers included a specific description of Soviets ABM tests, to which we have performed nothing comparable?

17. Is it not true that the highly complex ABM tests performed by the Soviets could have, and probably did provide valuable information on the ability of an ABM system to operate in a nuclear environment, including radar and communications blackout, and that we do not know the precise results, or the thrust of the knowledge that the Soviets gained thereby?

18. Will the Senator from Missouri tell us whether the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when they made their assessment of the treaty, had all of the details of the Soviet ABM tests in their possession, or whether certain significant facts about the tests had never been disclosed to them?

19. In discussing the question of vulnerabilities of our missile sites, the Senator points out that the Soviets will not be able to make tests to determine vulnerabilities any more than will the United States under the treaty. Once again, we must go back and examine the point from which each side starts if we are to reach an objective evaluation. The U.S. reliance on a second strike strategy, together with the Soviet reliance on a first strike strategy, makes it incumbent on the United States to have a broader spectrum of knowledge on the vulnerabilities of missile sites than the Soviets. Is it not a fact that the Soviets have demonstrated in their tests that they know more about exotic radiation effects than does the United States?

20. Is it not true that the magnitude and residuality of some electromagnetic phe-

nomena varies substantially according to the time when the nuclear explosion takes place?

21. Is it not true that the United States has generally tested for weapons effects in the atmosphere only at periods when such effects were at a minimum, while the Soviets have tested for the maximum of such effects?

22. Is it not also true that the Soviet tests of very high yield weapons over the Soviet Union demonstrated a very long range effectiveness of some electromagnetic phenomena against communications circuits?

23. Is it not true that although the time of explosion of the nuclear warhead substantially affects the level of electromagnetic phenomena, even in the same medium where the warhead is detonated, that we have attempted to test the effects of this phenomena only underground, not even in the medium where the weapon would presumably be detonated, with a very small yield explosion and attempted to extrapolate the results?

24. Would the Senator not agree that the Soviets have demonstrated a capability for producing the maximum level and residuality of exotic radiation effects with a very high yield warhead, and that, if their tests were properly instrumented, they had the opportunity to learn much about the effects of these phenomena?

25. Would the Senator not agree that in these exotic radiation effects of nuclear explosions could possibly and even probably lie vulnerabilities to our missile sites and the communications and control circuits, as well to our early warning systems?

26. Would not the Senator agree, as is stated in the Preparedness Subcommittee's report, that the Soviets now enjoy a lead in knowledge of high yield weapons effects?

27. Would not the Senator agree that the knowledge of weapons effects, particularly the exotic radiation effects, and knowledge of the vulnerabilities of our missile silos and communications and control circuits are so closely related that they are for all practical purposes inseparable?

28. The Senator from Missouri has quoted the concluding paragraph of the presentation of Gen. Maxwell Taylor for the Joint Chiefs of Staff which states:

"It is the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, if adequate safeguards are established, the risks inherent in this treaty can be accepted in order to seek the important gains which may be achieved through a stabilization in international relations and a move toward a peaceful environment in which to seek resolution of our differences."

Does the Senator believe, as is implied by the statement he quoted, that the treaty will lead to a "stabilization of international relations"?

29. Does the Senator believe, as this same quotation implies, that the treaty is a move toward a "peaceful environment"?

30. Does the Senator believe that this treaty will cause the Berlin wall to be torn down, so that this destabilizing factor on international relations will disappear?

31. Does the Senator believe that this treaty will improve the situation in Vietnam caused by Communist aggression?

32. Does the Senator believe that this treaty will eliminate the Communist regime in Cuba, or reduce the all-out efforts of the Communists to subvert Latin America?

33. In what way, if any, will this treaty lead to the stabilization of international relations and a peaceful environment?

34. Would not the Senator agree that the principal power from whose acquisition of nuclear weapons the greatest danger of nuclear war arises is Communist China?

35. This treaty will not prevent the development of nuclear weapons by Red China, will it?

36. Is it the understanding of the Senator from Missouri from the testimony of official

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witnesses that the United States will withdraw from the treaty if Red China tests nuclear weapons in one of the three environments in which testing is banned by the treaty, although Red China will not be a party to the treaty?

MEET THE PRESS—AMERICA'S PRESS CONFERENCE OF THE AIR, SUNDAY, APRIL 23, 1963

Produced by Lawrence E. Spivak.

Guest, Senator STUART SYMINGTON, Democrat of Missouri.

Panel: Marquis Childs, St. Louis Post Dispatch; Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News; Robert McCormick, NBC News; and Warren Rogers, Hearst Newspapers.

Moderator: Lawrence E. Spivak.

Mr. SPIVAK. This is Lawrence Spivak, inviting you to Meet the Press. Our guest on Meet the Press is Senator STUART SYMINGTON, Democrat of Missouri. He is the only Senator who is a member of the two committees directly involved in the cold war: Foreign Relations and Armed Services. He is also a member of the Senate Space Committee. Senator SYMINGTON was the first Secretary of the Air Force. He was a candidate for the Presidential nomination in 1960.

We will start the questions with Mr. Marquis Childs.

Mr. CHILDS. Senator, as you know when Averell Harriman met with Khrushchev, shortly after the meeting, Khrushchev issued a statement saying that he believed in an independent and neutral Laos, but he apparently gave no assurances at all that he would do anything to stop the Communist takeover of that country.

What I want to ask you is whether you don't feel the time has come for this country to take some pretty active steps to check that takeover, including perhaps sending troops, American troops into Laos?

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Childs, based on my having been in that part of the world, I'd be very skeptical about any military action in Laos. I think it would be much better if we are going to have military action that we would consider what is necessary in South Vietnam. As you know most of this trouble is coming from North Vietnam, from Hanoi, specifically. We've got a good many billion dollars now invested in the defense of those three little countries that formed part of Indo China. My own feeling would be that we will have to face up sooner or later to what we want to do with respect to what is coming out of Hanoi.

Mr. CHILDS. We are already in South Vietnam. There are more than 12,000 American troops there. Laos is at stake apparently. Do you think the war can be successfully prosecuted in South Vietnam if Laos goes entirely Communist?

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me put it to you this way: I think we could be successful in South Vietnam militarily regardless of what the Chinese Communists or the North Vietnamese did. I would have my doubts about what we could do in Laos if the Chinese Communists and the North Vietnamese were determined about Laos. It is a very difficult country to have any military action in. As you know, it has no seacoast; it has very few roads. I was surprised to hear only this week that Souvanna Phouma has been sympathetic to and agreed to have his half brother, Souphanouvong, let the Chinese Communists build roads down from North Vietnam into Laos because that of course would help any aggression on the part of the North Vietnamese and the Chinese Communists.

Mr. CHILDS. If I understand you properly, Senator, you are then in effect prepared to see that country go to the Communists?

Senator SYMINGTON. I wouldn't be prepared to see it, but I think that the place to stop it is in Hanoi and not in Laos, and

I think you would do it from Hanoi—or to Hanoi from South Vietnam.

Mr. CHILDS. How do you mean, what would we do about Hanoi, would we move in and take over Hanoi?

Senator SYMINGTON. I think that we ought to notify the North Vietnamese that we are tired of their infiltrating into South Vietnam from Cambodia as well as from Laos and that we are tired of their infiltrating into South Vietnam itself. As you know, they are doing that, even south of Saigon, and that if they didn't cut it out, we would destroy their marshalling yards in Hanoi.

I don't think we can continue to put billions and billions of dollars into this part of southeast Asia and at the same time consistently be on the defensive politically as well as militarily. I don't think it will work out.

Mr. CHILDS. What you are saying then is, we would bomb Hanoi?

Senator SYMINGTON. We would either bomb it or we would go into Hanoi. I think that is the only way that you are ever going to satisfy the situation in what was formerly Indo China. Either that or get out.

Mr. CHILDS. This would mean a much larger number of American troops out there, would it not?

Senator SYMINGTON. Oh, not necessarily, if you did it from South Vietnam, because you have 600 miles of coastline with respect to South Vietnam, so you would utilize your naval forces in a way that would be totally impossible in Laos.

Mr. CHILDS. Senator, you have been talking about what we should do in Laos and South Vietnam. These are roughly 8,000 or 9,000 miles away. What do you think about Cuba, which is 90 miles away? Are there moves we can make there? Obviously, we are not—at least as far as anyone knows; you may know by your position on the committees—making any very positive moves to remove that Communist dictatorship from Havana.

Senator SYMINGTON. Of course Cuba is 90 miles away and is therefore a much serious matter. I don't at this time see anything more than we are doing that we could do. Everybody talks about Cuba. It is a little bit like Mark Twain and the weather. Nobody seems to have come up with anything practical in the way of a suggestion as to what to do. All of the prominent critics that I know say we should not invade, which I agree with.

On the other hand, I would hope we could do our best to interest the Organization of American States, and that we would be sympathetic to any Cuban movement with respect to eliminating the Castro regime, because I am one who does not think that as of today Cuba is a military menace in any serious form to this country, but I do think, Mr. Childs, that it is going to be used as a place to develop a great deal of subversion all through Central and South America.

As a matter of fact we know that it is going on now.

Mr. LISAGOR. Senator, to get back to Laos for just one moment, the suggestion has been made that perhaps we could agree to a partition of that country since the pro-Communist Pathet Lao holds the northern part of it now and the part the free world is interested in is the southern part, the Mekong River part, whereas you know the rightists have about 60,000 troops and it wouldn't be too hard for the West to help them there.

What do you think about the proposition of partitioning it as Vietnam is now partitioned?

Senator SYMINGTON. I don't think it would last, Mr. Lisagor. I don't think that the people of Peking or the people of North Vietnam are interested in any agreements with respect to that country. We have noticed over the years that the totalitarians from the Kaiser

in the First World War and Hitler in the Second are not interested in agreements if it bothers them in their desires for conquest and I believe the Communists are determined to pick up Laos as soon as they can. When I was out there a year ago last fall, with Gen. Maxwell Taylor and Secretary Walt Rostow, my feelings were just what they are today, and I think that it is fair to say that they would agree that I prophesied what has happened would happen at that time, which is about 16 months ago.

Mr. LISAGOR. But a line has been drawn, Senator, in South Vietnam and in Korea. Both are partitioned. You don't believe it will work at all in Laos because they want to take Laos? Is that your judgment?

Senator SYMINGTON. It is not working out in South Vietnam, and as you know the Communists are consistently violating the line that has been drawn in Korea, and I think it would be much harder to defend any line that was drawn in Laos based on the terrain and the nature of the people and so forth than it would be in either South Vietnam where again we are in a much better position from the standpoint of our own forces, or than it would be in Korea.

Mr. LISAGOR. Senator, as we all know Fidel Castro is in Moscow now and they are giving him quite a reception. You would think that he was a prodigal son returning home. I wonder if you believe the reason the Soviets are going all out for him is that they are trying to rub our noses into it because they have established a base in this hemisphere, and he is the symbol of that base?

Senator SYMINGTON. That might be part of it. It looked last—when Mikoyan was there—as if Castro was upset about the fact they took out their offensive missiles, but I would say they are doing everything they could to solidify Cuba as a Communist base a few miles off the American coast. I think that is a wise remark you have made, and I believe they want to show the world that they are right behind Castro all the way.

Mr. LISAGOR. Does this suggest to you, Senator, as the President and other administration officials have indicated, that the Soviets plan to get any of their troops out of there any time soon?

Senator SYMINGTON. I think they have taken some out. As to whether they have taken their combat troops out or not, as you know is an open question, but I think they have still got a great many there and apparently they intend to keep them there unless we decide to do something about it, and then they have got another decision to make.

Mr. ROGERS. Senator, I would like to question you about strategy, but first I would like to follow up your comments about bombing, attacking, or invading Hanoi. What do you suppose would be the reaction on the Red Chinese side if we did something like that?

Senator SYMINGTON. The Red Chinese might be upset about it. They might take planes off from Hainan, which is the island which they control fairly close to the northern part of what was Indochina, but I must say I don't think they want to tangle with the United States at this time in the air or any other way. They are already tangling on the ground, you might say, through the North Vietnamese. My only point in bringing that up is, that we put billions and billions of dollars into these three little countries, just like we put billions and billions of dollars into India and billions and billions of dollars into Pakistan, and I just don't think we can continue to put billions and billions of dollars all over the world, shoring up our defenses. I think at some time we have to show that we are willing to take a risk in order to avoid the type and character of disintegration that is now going on in Laos.

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Mr. ROGERS. Then I take it you are not afraid of any escalation of a war in that area into a conventional world war type of thing or else nuclear?

Senator SYMINGTON. No, I wouldn't be afraid of that at all.

Mr. ROGERS. You think we could do it and get away with it?

Senator SYMINGTON. I certainly do, and I am not at all apprehensive about how the Russians would feel about us doing it down there as against how they would feel, for example, if we did it around Berlin.

Mr. ROGERS. Senator, on the question of strategy, a couple of years ago you and some others were complaining about a missile gap, and how the only thing we hear about a missile gap is that the Russians have one and they have it bad. Secretary McNamara says we could absorb two strikes and have enough to obliterate Soviet society.

What has happened to bring about this remarkable change?

Senator SYMINGTON. First, let me make this point with you: If we know and knew and still know really as little about what actually is in Cuba, then I will leave it to you to decide how much we really know about what actually is in Russia. Now that is the first point. The next point is that the same man, a fine man, the head of the Central Intelligence Agency, between February 1959 and August 1961, reduced the estimate of the Central Intelligence Agency as to how many missiles were on launching pads in Russia by 96.5 percent. His own figures in both cases.

I am not at all sure that he was right in February 1959. I am not at all sure that he was right in August 1961, and I am not at all sure based on my experience as a member of the Preparedness Subcommittee that is looking at the Cuban situation, that we know what is in Russia today. The only thing that I am sure of, based on the many years that I have spent in this field, is that the one thing we know that the Soviet Communists, the Chinese Communists and, to the best of my knowledge, all other Communists respect is strength on the part of those whom they would like to conquer.

Mr. ROGERS. Are you confident now there is no missile gap, that we don't have any lag behind the Russians at this time in that field?

Senator SYMINGTON. I am not confident of that at all, no. And I don't think anybody can say with certainty what their position is as against ours.

For example, as you know, they've got some very fine airplanes flying. They probably have the finest supersonic bomber in the world flying today. And yet you have heard a lot of talk in the past about their leapfrogging the supersonic bomber to get into missiles. I have no confidence in any particular position, because in a closed society it is very, very difficult to know what they have.

Mr. ROGERS. Do you think that our defense budget is in line with our strategy? What I am thinking of is, are we spending too much on missiles and not enough on conventional warfare. For instance, are 16 divisions enough?

Senator SYMINGTON. I think that is a very good question. My criticism, if I have any, of the present operation is that we are putting too much attention or giving too much attention to computers. The greatest computer in the world is the mind of a man, and it seems to me that the new people are constantly degenerating the position of men and building up the position of machinery. If you have as much trouble finding out what is or is not in Cuba, 90 miles away, then the fact that we are now moving toward a position where a man in Omaha, Nebr., will press a button and something takes off from Wyoming, goes across the Atlantic, goes across Europe, goes into Russia, behind the

Urals and destroys a hardened base, from a perimeter standpoint, I think that is rather optimistic, frankly, and I wish we would put more attention into conventional weapons and more attention into positive control through the control of men as against instruments.

Mr. ROGERS. Do you think 16 divisions is enough for the Army if it is to fulfill its conventional role?

Senator SYMINGTON. I think if we are going to have 16 divisions, it is wise to have 16 good divisions, but I want to be honest with you, Mr. Rogers, I don't think that the people in Moscow or Peiping care too much whether we have 14 divisions or 16 divisions or 18 divisions.

Mr. MCCORMICK. Senator, I believe the full Armed Services Committee has recently studied the whole test ban question again. Khrushchev, of course, as we all know, has offered two or three on-site inspections a year, and we have cut our demands down to seven a year. If it is not classified, is there any indication that we would accept even fewer than seven a year?

Senator SYMINGTON. It was classified, but I think all this information should be given the American people, and therefore it has been declassified. Dr. Brown, who is the head engineer and scientist in the Pentagon building, has stated that he thinks six would be satisfactory. That is one less, and that has been declassified.

In addition to that, as you probably know, not only have all the Chiefs of Staff of the services, but also all the service secretaries have said before the Armed Services Committee in recent weeks that they felt that testing in the atmosphere was essential to the security of the United States.

Mr. MCCORMICK. Is testing in the atmosphere essential to the development of an anti-missile missile?

Senator SYMINGTON. We haven't gotten into the testing field in the Armed Services Committee the way we are going to, because the Senate Military Preparedness Subcommittee under the chairmanship of Senator STENNIS is about ready to undergo extensive hearings in this field. But the military people and the service Secretaries believe that it is essential to have atmospheric testing in order to develop adequate defense from the standpoint of anti-intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Mr. MCCORMICK. That brings up another question then: Do you think Congress would go along with ratifying our current test ban offer, to say nothing of reducing the number of on-site inspections?

Senator SYMINGTON. It is hard to say what the Congress would or wouldn't do. My personal opinion at this time is that it would not, because there are a good many very fine scientists who believe that the Russians are well ahead of us now in three important fields—certainly two of three. They feel—we know they are ahead of us in yield and therefore in all probability in yield to weight. They have done some very sophisticated testing in the atmosphere in 1961 and 1962 to the point where these scientists believe that they are ahead of us in the anti-intercontinental ballistic missile field. And they may well be ahead of us in the penetration development as a result of the extensive work that we know that they have done on nose cones. They broke their word to us after the 34-month moratorium by starting out a series of tests which they must have been preparing for many, many months before they actually did it in the fall of 1961. And so the way things are going now, it looks as if they are in pretty good shape from the standpoint of their nuclear position as against ours.

Mr. SPIVAK. Senator, a moment ago in answer to Mr. Rogers you said something about computers. Do I understand you to

mean by that that you think it is a mistake to phase out manned air power, as Mr. McNamara evidently is planning to do and that we ought not to put quite so much money into missiles? Is that what you were saying, Senator?

Senator SYMINGTON. Oh, yes, I do feel that way, I think that the degree of emphasis that we put on the Polaris weapon, which is a genocide weapon and not a part of the theory of counter force, and building up the Minuteman which, despite what people say, based on my analogy of going across to the Urals and hitting a hardened site, in my opinion, is also a weapon of that character. In fact, we have no airplanes—for the first time in our history we have no weapons systems in development at all that have to do with men, until you get to a program which also apparently may be in trouble, the Dyna-Soar, and I don't think that is right. I think we ought to maintain a positive control of weaponry and not be in a position of all or nothing. And actually—I believe Mr. Rogers mentioned the budget—if you are going to a theory of overkill and abandoning the theory of counter force, then I think you could save a great deal of money in the budget as it is today.

Mr. CHILDS. Senator, I would like if you could tell us correctly you said yesterday a year ago what has been happening now, is that correct?

Senator SYMINGTON. That is right.

Mr. CHILDS. Therefore you must feel that it was a great mistake for the Kennedy Administration to try to reach an accord on a neutral Laos?

Senator SYMINGTON. No, I never think it is a mistake to do your best to work out an arrangement where everybody signs some paper and then comes home and says "Peace in our time," but I have just never been one who believes, based on the activities of the Communists in places like Korea and based on this terrific misrepresentation that they gave President Kennedy with respect to offensive missiles in Cuba, that it was going to work. I am all for negotiation at any time, any place, on any subject, but I don't think that you are going to lick this problem by signing treaties with these people because it has been my experience, and based on history, that they never keep a treaty if they don't think it is to their interests.

Mr. LISAGOR. Governor Rockefeller of New York, and former Vice President Nixon and other critics of the administration's policy toward Europe have suggested that we ought to help the Europeans directly to build their own nuclear force, sell them the warheads and the know-how and the weapons that they need. What do you think of that argument?

Senator SYMINGTON. Of course if you did that, Mr. Lisagor, you would have to chance the McMahon Act. You could not do it under the present law.

Mr. LISAGOR. That was going to be my next question.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes. Actually we have helped the British. We have been in sort of a partnership with the British for a good many years in the nuclear field, and I am somewhat disturbed and distressed at the vulnerability, you might say, of Mr. Harold Wilson's desire to give up any nuclear position, because we have today as head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of Joint Chiefs, a very fine and able soldier and citizen, but he wrote a book in which he said there were two places we would certainly use nuclear weapons in case this country was attacked or in case we were sure it was going to be attacked. And then, he said there is a third possible case where we might use them and that would be an all-out attack against Europe.

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Now under those circumstances I think it is very clear why some people would want to develop their own nuclear force. As to whether we should help them, I would question that, although I think that proliferation especially with regard to other countries as well as France, is only a matter of time.

Mr. LISAGOR. What do you think about the act, Senator? Is it possible at all to amend that act today in any way?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, it would be possible if it was in the interest of the United States, but I think you would have to convince the Senate and the House that it would be in the interest of the United States to do it.

Mr. SPIVAK. Gentlemen, we have only 2 minutes.

Mr. ROGERS. Senator, before the editors recently, Mr. McNamara said that the Pentagon was in chaos when he took over. When you were Secretary of the Air Force, was the Pentagon in chaos?

Senator SYMINGTON. It was a chaotic condition spending \$13 billion, if it wasn't in chaos, and now they are spending \$52 billion. I must say this: I wouldn't want to give the wrong impression about Mr. McNamara and his work. I think we need control very badly, especially because of its weaponry, I am glad that he is doing a good job in

the decisions. I don't happen to agree with a couple of them, but that is the way our system works. We set the law in 1958 where he has direction, authority, and control, and in my opinion he is at least as good a Secretary of Defense as we have ever had.

Mr. MCCORMICK. Senator, in connection with the investigation of foreign lobbyists, you have already caught one apparently, one John O'Donnell. What comes next in that investigation?

Senator SYMINGTON. I think you would have to ask Chairman FULBRIGHT about that. We have a lot of hearings in executive session and some of it has been no more pleasant than the O'Donnell episode.

Mr. SPIVAK. Senator, why do the Chiefs of Staff and the chiefs of service want to test in the atmosphere at this time? I thought we had given up all question, even, of testing in the atmosphere. Can you tell us?

Senator SYMINGTON. I think in the short period of time you say we have left the best way to answer that is we believe in some fields the Russians are already ahead because they are testing in the atmosphere, and we think we might lose our country if they get well ahead of us in this field.

Mr. SPIVAK. Senator, can you tell us, is that the anti-missile-missile field?

Senator SYMINGTON. That is one of the three I mentioned.

Mr. SPIVAK. Mr. Childs, a very short one.

Mr. CHILDS. What about this crash program to the moon, \$20 or \$30 billion, do you think we should go forward with that?

Senator SYMINGTON. That is a difficult question, I think we might go forward a little more slowly, but I do feel again that those who control space in the years to come will control the world, just as those who control the air today control the world.

Mr. SPIVAK. I am sorry to interrupt, gentlemen, but our time is up. Thank you, Senator Symington, for being with us.

**CANADIAN WHEAT AGREEMENT
WITH THE SOVIET UNION**

As in legislative session.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr. President, news headlines this morning state "Russia Signs Agreement To Buy Canada Grain Worth Half Billion." This will bring total Canadian grain sales to Russia and other Communist countries

to more than \$1 billion, most of it sales of wheat and wheat flour. This comes at a time when the United States has on hand more than \$4 billion worth of wheat—over half of which is in the hands of the Federal Government.

These huge sales of farm commodities by our allies, together with huge sales of industrial goods, completely nullify our own program of withholding or restricting sales to Communist countries. This development makes our whole foreign policy look rather silly. It indicates an almost complete breakdown of cooperation between the United States and our allies for our major objectives throughout the world.

The time to take a new look at our foreign policy is long overdue. Certainly it would not be too difficult to figure out one that would be a bit more effective and realistic.

The economic position of the United States, as it relates particularly to the balance of payments with the rest of the world and our gold supplies, has been deteriorating year by year. During the last quarter, we lost more gold than during any other quarterly period in our history. If our present policy continues—that of vast foreign-aid gifts and other expenditures throughout the world, and with our huge military installations, with their costly drain on U.S. dollars, coupled with our present foreign-trade policy—we may find ourselves in a most serious economic situation.

These huge wheat sales by Canada will tax their railroads and other transportation facilities to the limit. It will mean their flour milling industry will have to operate at full capacity for the next 12 months to meet their orders. Agriculture and associated industries will be booming in Canada while here in the United States we will continue to spend billions on reducing food production, land retirement programs and the like.

While Canadian farmers will be urged to produce more to meet their foreign commitments, farmers in the United States will be asked to retire more land from production. It is being urged that some of this fertile land be used to provide golf courses, ski jumps, and other recreational facilities of all kinds. The great contrast between the situation in Canada and the United States will be difficult, if not impossible, for the average American to understand and particularly farmers.

By our foreign sales policies—which apparently none of our allies are cooperating on—we are withholding our greatest weapon to gain friends throughout the world, that of making our huge food surpluses available to starving people.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. The Senator from North Dakota has given the Congress and the country something to think about. About a year ago, when Canada announced a plan to sell wheat to Red China, I expected to be deluged with protests from this side of the border. Up to this time I have not received a single

protest against Canada selling wheat to Red China. Now Canada is disposing of nearly two-thirds of her entire crop of wheat this year to Red China and to Russia. We shall probably receive some complaints that Russia is reselling some of the wheat to Cuba.

First, I think we must stop and consider whether a strong solvent Canada—and Canada will have a favorable balance of trade because of the sale of the wheat—contributes more to our hemispheric defense than a bankrupt Canada would do.

As to the sale of wheat to other countries—particularly Russia's sale to Cuba—first, I should like to say that I do not recall any instance in history in which any people have been starved into democracy. They have been starved into totalitarianism, but not into democracy.

I am not sure we are in a position to criticize Canada's sale to Russia and Russia's sale to Cuba, because we have a substantial export business in wheat. Last year we exported about 700 million bushels. The quantity will be about the same this year. We will pick up the driblets, the smaller orders that Canada will be unable to fill. We sell largely to Western Europe. For some time Western Europe has been milling that wheat and selling it to Russia or any other country—including East Germany and probably Cuba—that is able to pay for it. We might be in the position of the pot that called the kettle black, with the exception that Canada gets the money for her wheat because Russia can pay in gold, if necessary, whereas we sell it to Western Europe at reduced prices and Western Europe gets the cream. We should take another very close look at the situation which the Senator from North Dakota has pointed out and decide whether we are as smart with our foreign trade as we have thought we were.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. First, I thank my friend the Senator from Vermont. I now yield to the Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. My State is not a wheat-producing State. I do not follow wheat as I do the fortunes of cotton and soybeans. But I was very glad that a Senator from one of the great wheat-producing States pointed out the problem. Perhaps the question is premature, but for my personal information, I should like to ask the Senator a question. I have been very curious about not only the attitude of the experts, but also the attitude of the representatives of the wheat-growing areas. I wonder if the Senator feels that perhaps we should negotiate with the Russians for the sale of wheat.

When I read the newspaper report, the thought naturally came to my mind that the order is a very large one. We are in such desperate straits in reference to our balance of payments that I thought that if there were no real good reason not to do so, it would be a great boon to our economy if we could sell some of our wheat to them. I understand that we now have approximately 30 million

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tons of wheat in storage. Is that approximately correct?

Mr. AIKEN. Approximately.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. We have a carryover of about 1,200 million bushels as of July 1 and we will have a crop of about 1,100 million bushels in addition.

In answer to the Senator's question, I believe it would be desirable if we would not provide the Communists with all the food and industrial goods they seek. But if our allies are going to sell to them, it does not make sense for us to sit back and bankrupt ourselves through not selling.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That thought is exactly what occurred to me. The Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN] has already pointed out that the Russians might come to us and seek to buy. We turn them down. They then go to West Germany and buy.

In Sunday's newspaper there was a story about Rumania, I believe. Rumania sought to buy some kind of textile or synthetic fibers plant. We turned them down. They went to Germany or some other country and bought it. Now we read that they are going to Canada for wheat. As the Senator from Vermont has already stated, in effect we have been giving away a great deal of wheat under Public Law 480 while the Canadians are selling it. It makes us look a little silly to be doing that continually.

I thank the Senators from the wheat States who have brought the problem to our attention. I would certainly be ready to support them in their efforts from what little I know about the situation.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. Our wheat undoubtedly has been going to the same places to which we object that the Canadian wheat is going, to a considerable extent, but we have been letting the middlemen, in the nature of one of the countries of Western Europe, skim off a good sized profit in the process.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I understand that Poland has received wheat from us under Public Law 480.

Mr. AIKEN. Yes, but I believe the wheat that we have sent to Poland has been used in Poland. I do not believe it has been resold.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I presume that it was used there.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. There may be some indirect benefits to the United States. Probably we can take over some of the wheat markets that Canada would otherwise have supplied. But those will be largely foreign currency markets. Canada has the dollar markets.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. I yield.

Mr. McGOVERN. I endorse wholeheartedly what the Senator from North Dakota has said this afternoon as well as the comments, in a similar vein, that were made by the assistant majority leader, the Senator from Minnesota [Mr.

HUMPHREY] last evening. From every standpoint it is in our interest—and it makes good sense—to reconsider our policy with reference to the sales of wheat and other agricultural commodities to the Soviet Union. Certainly it is in our economic interest to consider that possibility.

As the Senator has pointed out, sales of wheat will be made in any event by our allies. We are the greatest wheat-producing country on the face of the earth. We desperately need to broaden our markets, and this is an opportunity to do so. It is in our political interest—in the interest of the ideological struggle that we are carrying on in the world—because it is an ideal opportunity for us to demonstrate the superiority of our economic system.

The one great failure in the Communist world that stands out above everything else is their failure in the field of agriculture. There is not a single Communist state anywhere in the world that has solved the problem of food production. This is a perfect opportunity for us to demonstrate to people all over the world that we not only have the capacity to produce more food than we can consume at home, but also that we are willing to follow an enlightened policy to make use of it.

Finally, it is certainly in our moral interest to take the action proposed. The Bible tells us that if our enemies hunger to feed them. It does not say that we cannot take money when they are able to pay for it.

Here is a country—it may be an enemy, a rival—that is not only in need of food but is also willing to pay hard cash for the things we have to produce. During the 18 months time that I had the privilege of directing the food for peace program there was no single subject upon which we had the volume of mail that we received on the question of whether we ought to make surplus food available to people behind the Iron Curtain.

That mail was overwhelmingly in support of exactly the course the Senator is suggesting today. I wholeheartedly endorse the statement he has made.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr. President, I especially appreciate that statement, coming from the Senator from South Dakota. He has had more experience than any other Senator in dealing with the food program, as the Administrator of the food for peace program.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, I can only add one thought to the discussion which has been taking place. The sale of wheat was in part a sale to Cuba. It was done through the subterfuge of selling to the Soviet Union, for the Soviet Union to turn the wheat over to Cuba.

It strikes me that when the policy of our Government is to try to bring economic pressure to bear upon Cuba, to seek to help bring about a more democratic system and the removal of Russian weapons and troops from that beleaguered land, we have a right to expect greater cooperation from our allies than we have had in many respects, and specifically with respect to the sale of

wheat to Cuba. It shocks me that our friendly neighbor to the north should be prepared to enter into a transaction of this kind at this moment.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. RUSSELL obtained the floor.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Georgia yield to me, briefly?

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. MUNDT. I thank the Senator from Georgia.

RISE IN IMPORTS OF BEEF AND PRODUCTS

As in legislative session,

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, in recent weeks we have been reading in the newspapers about the sharp rise in imports of beef and beef products in competition with our own production. According to available figures this has had a seriously adverse effect on the prices which American producers receive in the market place.

In a recent issue of "Washington Farmletter," by Wayne Darrow, it was pointed out that in 1962 the United States took 79 percent of Australia's beef and veal exports, and more than 90 percent of New Zealand's boneless beef exports in the past 3 years. Wayne Darrow's letter points out that the Department of Agriculture concludes that the United States is the most liberal major nation in the world in agricultural trade, and is only mildly protectionist. The United States exercises import controls only on wheat, sugar, peanuts, cotton, and dairy products. All other products may come in unlimited quantities subject only to health, sanitation, and quarantine safety requirements, and to payment when specified on fixed tariffs. This country is the world's largest farm exporter and the second largest farm importer—being exceeded by only the United Kingdom.

While I firmly believe that through expanding our markets around the world we can relieve our agriculture surplus, I just as firmly believe that we should not permit imports into this country which depress prices of our own products and depress the agriculture economy.

There is good reason to believe that our entire farm program in America is imported from abroad. I think it is time that Government officials paid some attention to this fact.

For many weeks now many organizations throughout the Nation have been contacting me urging a halt to the import of beef and beef products. I have urged the Secretary of Agriculture, the State Department, and other administration officials to take necessary steps to protect our great beef industry. Today I received in my office a resolution adopted by the South Dakota Beef Council supporting the steps which I have been advocating. I ask unanimous consent that the letter be printed in the Record at this point so that all those in the administration dealing with this beef import problem can share with me

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

September 17

the thinking of the South Dakota members of the beef council.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SOUTH DAKOTA BEEF COUNCIL,
Brookings, S. Dak., September 11, 1963.
Senator KARL MUNDT,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MUNDT: At a meeting of the South Dakota Beef Council in Mobridge, S. Dak., September 7, the following resolution was passed:

"Whereas beef imports have risen to a point where we are now eating approximately 10 percent imported beef; and

"Whereas the American beef market price has suffered a decrease of approximately 30 percent in the past year; we, therefore,

"Move the South Dakota Beef Council go on record opposing the importation of beef and have it returned to the 1957 level."

We trust you will give this resolution your attention and if you can ever do anything about lowering beef imports, our South Dakota Beef Council, representing beef producers and feeders, will appreciate it.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN L. LEIBEL,
Secretary.

Mr. MUNDT. I deeply appreciate the courtesy of my friend from Georgia in yielding to me.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator from Georgia yield to me?

Mr. RUSSELL. I yield to the majority leader.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Apropos of what has been stated by the distinguished senior Senator from South Dakota, I wish to express my full accord with the views stated. When I was at home during the latter part of August and the first part of September I covered the eastern and central portions of Montana. One of the "beefs"—and I use that word literally—which was brought to my attention was the fact that the cattlemen in the area were feeling heavily the importation of feeder cattle from Canada into our area, as well as the increased importation of frozen beef from New Zealand.

I have addressed a letter to the Secretary of Agriculture suggesting that this matter be investigated. I have asked for detailed facts and figures. I have also advanced the suggestion that there be a moratorium on the importation of feeder cattle during the marketing period, so that the price will not be depressed for our cattle producers and they will be given some stability. I do this in part not only because of the need, but because of the fact that, by and large, the cattlemen have gotten by on their own and have not always come to the Government looking for assistance, in the form of subsidies or other methods of assistance, to keep them going.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I yield for a brief statement.

Mr. GORE. I think the distinguished Senator from Montana said the cattlemen did not often come for aid. As a matter of fact, they never have.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I was allowing a little margin. There are many things that I do not know, and I thought there might have been some assistance I did not know about.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I do not desire to get into an extraneous debate, but I remember that during the New Deal many cattle were brought to the South from the dry areas of the West to save the cattle. I was a Member of Congress at that time.

Mr. MUNDT. Let me add, in defense of the cattlemen, that when it was proposed, in furtherance of the desire that the Federal Government should get into all areas of American life, that price supports be placed on livestock, the cattlemen from all over the country came to the Capitol and said, "We will be able to look after our own problems." They have done that very successfully. Obviously, however, they cannot compete with beef that is allowed to flow into this country from all over the world. I am glad the majority leader had added his voice of considerable influence in this matter.

THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

The Senate resumed the consideration of Executive M (88th Congress, 1st session), the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I shall decline to yield for any other extraneous matters until I have concluded my remarks.

Mr. President, since the first draft of the pending treaty was presented to the appropriate committees of the Senate by the Secretary of State, I have earnestly studied all facets of the proposal and its probable and possible effect upon the welfare, security, and happiness of the people of the United States. With the desire to take any step, however short, in the direction of world peace and understanding, I have tried earnestly to bring myself to support the pending treaty. It is a matter of profound regret to me that I have reached the conclusion that I cannot in good conscience vote my consent to its ratification.

Viewed in the most favorable light, and assuming that the Soviet Government will faithfully observe the terms of the treaty, we are disadvantaged in the matter of armaments.

Viewed in the light of the long record of broken promises of the Soviets through the years, a record marked by intrigue, deception, and perfidy, the signing of this treaty, under its limitations, could plant the seed of our destruction.

Every person who has any awareness of the desolation brought by war and the almost unbelievable destructive power of nuclear weapons must desire an arrangement between the non-Communist community of nations and Soviet Russia that would lessen tension, decrease the possibility of war, and enable us to devote some of the massive effort and expenditures now made for defense to the abolition of poverty and a better life for all.

I yield to no one in my desire for a safe and truly effective treaty with Soviet Russia that would permit this.

The first comprehensive plan for international control of atomic energy was made in the United Nations in 1946 by

Mr. Bernard Baruch, representing the United States. Licensing and full inspection were fundamental elements of this plan. It was advanced at a time when the United States had a virtual, if not a literal, monopoly in nuclear weapons.

I supported this original proposal because I believed that it included adequate safeguards. But it was rejected by the Soviet Government. Consistently since 1946, I have favored any proposed agreement to reduce the threat of a nuclear war that contained similar protection.

I have followed as best I could the long series of negotiations with the Soviet Union looking to a nuclear agreement. There have been times when hopes have been high. But in every case, the Russians have, in the last analysis, refused any agreement of any kind that contained a practical, foolproof method of detection of treaty violations.

I have a simple but realistic standard of measurement of the good faith of those who talk about limitation of arms, whether nuclear or conventional. If any party is in good faith and intends to observe the letter and spirit of the agreement, it will accept methods of inspection that are certain to detect violations by any party to the agreement.

Time and again, I have declared my opposition to any program of disarmament, prohibiting testing of nuclear devices, or their use as weapons, whether partial or complete, that did not provide for onsite inspections, adequate in number and in scope. To me it seems to be the height of folly to adopt any other policy.

The Soviet has consistently refused any serious method of inspection. The treaty now before the Senate does not provide for any inspection whatever. I know it is urged that inspection is not essential for the purposes of the treaty because there is no limitation on underground testing, and we are told inspection is more important to detect violation of agreements not to test underground than to detect violations in space, the atmosphere, or under water.

Our methods of detecting violations in the environments contained in the treaty are undoubtedly better than the seismic instruments to detect underground atomic explosions, but I am convinced that it is important to make sure that testing in any environment is precluded if we are to limit ourselves as proposed in this treaty.

Our ability to determine whether any nuclear detonations have occurred is considerable. Indeed, to a person unschooled in the sciences, it approaches the miraculous. But this ability is not complete. There are dangerous gaps. The hearings we had on the treaty show that there are serious deficiencies in detection capability, and one of the safeguards sought by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a condition precedent to their acceptance of this treaty was necessary improvements of our methods of detection.

If Russia desires in good faith to bring nuclear testing in all environments under control, she would permit examination within her territorial limits of sus-

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tons of wheat in storage. Is that approximately correct?

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Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Georgia yield to me, briefly?

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Mr. MUNDT. I thank the Senator from Georgia.

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As in legislative session,

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, in recent weeks we have been reading in the newspapers about the sharp rise in imports of beef and beef products in competition with our own production. According to available figures this has had a seriously adverse effect on the prices which American producers receive in the market place.

In a recent issue of "Washington Farmletter," by Wayne Darrow, it was pointed out that in 1962 the United States took 79 percent of Australia's beef and veal exports, and more than 90 percent of New Zealand's boneless beef exports in the past 3 years. Wayne Darrow's letter points out that the Department of Agriculture concludes that the United States is the most liberal major nation in the world in agricultural trade, and is only mildly protectionist. The United States exercises import controls only on wheat, sugar, peanuts, cotton, and dairy products. All other products may come in unlimited quantities subject only to health, sanitation, and quarantine safety requirements, and to payment when specified on fixed tariffs. This country is the world's largest farm exporter and the second largest farm importer—being exceeded by only the United Kingdom.

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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the thinking of the South Dakota members of the beef council.

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Brookings, S. Dak., September 11, 1963.
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"Whereas beef imports have risen to a point where we are now eating approximately 10 percent imported beef; and

"Whereas the American beef market price has suffered a decrease of approximately 30 percent in the past year: we, therefore,

"Move the South Dakota Beef Council go on record opposing the importation of beef and have it returned to the 1957 level."

We trust you will give this resolution your attention and if you can ever do anything about lowering beef imports, our South Dakota Beef Council, representing beef producers and feeders, will appreciate it.

Sincerely yours,

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Secretary.

Mr. MUNDT. I deeply appreciate the courtesy of my friend from Georgia in yielding to me.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator from Georgia yield to me?

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Mr. MANSFIELD. Apropos of what has been stated by the distinguished senior Senator from South Dakota, I wish to express my full accord with the views stated. When I was at home during the latter part of August and the first part of September I covered the eastern and central portions of Montana. One of the "beefs"—and I use that word literally—which was brought to my attention was the fact that the cattlemen in the area were feeling heavily the importation of feeder cattle from Canada into our area, as well as the increased importation of frozen beef from New Zealand.

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Mr. MUNDY. Let me add, in defense of the cattlemen, that when it was proposed, in furtherance of the desire that the Federal Government should get into all areas of American life, that price supports be placed on livestock, the cattlemen from all over the country came to the Capitol and said, "We will be able to look after our own problems." They have done that very successfully. Obviously, however, they cannot compete with beef that is allowed to flow into this country from all over the world. I am glad the majority leader had added his voice of considerable influence in this matter.

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Time and again, I have declared my opposition to any program of disarmament, prohibiting testing of nuclear devices, or their use as weapons, whether partial or complete, that did not provide for onsite inspections, adequate in number and in scope. To me it seems to be the height of folly to adopt any other policy.

The Soviet has consistently refused any serious method of inspection. The treaty now before the Senate does not provide for any inspection whatever. I know it is urged that inspection is not essential for the purposes of the treaty because there is no limitation on underground testing, and we are told inspection is more important to detect violation of agreements not to test underground than to detect violations in space, the atmosphere, or under water.

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picious circumstances or inconclusive evidence. Without such inspection, we cannot be sure, and even the strongest advocates of the treaty disclaim reliance on the validity of the Russian pledge.

There is impressive evidence that this treaty gives Russia a military advantage. As a result of intensive secret preparations for a comprehensive series of tests during the previous moratorium on testing, which the Soviets arranged, the Russians announced an end to the moratorium on August 30, 1961, and on September 1 commenced a series of substantial and significant tests which continued through 1962.

It is generally agreed by both scientific and military witnesses that, in these tests, the Russians gained knowledge and experience in nuclear weapons of high yields—much higher than those of any weapons we have ever tested. I am not impressed by efforts to depreciate the value of this knowledge and experience by claiming that yields of this magnitude are beyond the point of diminishing returns, or more accurately, the point of diminishing devastation. These terror weapons would undoubtedly have a profound psychological effect, and we have reason to believe they may impair the electronic and communications systems upon which our retaliatory power depends.

Of great importance is the knowledge that the Russians may have gained of the effects of nuclear explosions on our weapons systems, such as blackouts incapacitating our retaliatory missile systems or the antiballistic missile system we hope to perfect. They may have developed information that is crucial to the successful development of the antiballistic missile system on which we know they are working.

The matter of blackouts and the impairment of our system poses a problem that baffles our finest scientists. It is classified information. I am sure most Senators are familiar with it. Some striking illustrations have occurred in the course of our own tests. It therefore concerns me that the treaty prohibits our testing large-yield weapons in the atmosphere to attempt to develop the same experience the Russians have in this environment, but that the Russians can continue to develop underground in an attempt to overcome our experience and assert their superiority in the area of small-yield tactical weapons.

It has been urged that when the number of types of nuclear weapons are considered, we have a superiority of technique at this time, and that the treaty would slow down the rate at which the Russians could otherwise catch up with us. The Russians have many defects in their code of conduct in international relations, but they surely are not negligent when it comes to looking after their own interests; I believe they would never enter into an arrangement as disadvantageous to them as some of the supporters of the treaty assert it to be.

They have delayed signing the treaty over a period of time when it would have been disadvantageous for them to do so,

It is generally agreed that in the atomic field the Soviets have superior knowledge of high-yield tests which the treaty would prohibit us from acquiring. We claim an advantage in the low-yield or tactical weapons that can be tested underground. The Soviet is therefore free to test in the area where we have predominance, but we are prohibited from testing in the area where they have superiority. I am not oblivious to the consequences of the Senate's refusing to consent to this treaty. I know that such action would be compared to the Senate's refusal to ratify participation by the United States in the League of Nations. But I am not one of those who think that this action led inevitably to World War II, and I am quite sure that a refusal to consent to the pending treaty would not in itself be the cause of another war.

I point out, in connection with the attempt to draw an analogy with our refusal to enter the League of Nations, the fact that in 1928 we entered into the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, signed by all the nations of the earth, forever renouncing war as an instrument of national policy, but that in a few years that treaty, along with so many others of the past, including, as I recall, the Holy Alliance after the Napoleonic Wars, in which the great powers of the earth agreed to outlaw war, was absolutely ineffective.

I also know that withholding of consent would be said to be embarrassing to the President in his conduct of foreign relations, and that such action, after our representatives had signed the treaty, would raise questions about who speaks for the United States on such subjects. I regret any action that might embarrass the President of the United States in the tremendous burdens that he is bearing in this area. However, I am completely convinced that all the governments represented in the United Nations, especially those most directly concerned, have full knowledge of our system of government, and that they know the Senate has a constitutional role and responsibility in this area.

The constitutional role of the Senate in connection with treaties would be vitiated if the Senate consented to treaties merely because refusal to do so might create some temporary misunderstanding abroad.

In opposing the treaty I assuredly do not lay any claim to superior patriotism or greater knowledge of what is best for our country. Supporters of the treaty include Senators whose ability and devotion to the national interest I have long admired and officials in the executive branch whose competence and devotion to our country are beyond question. However, in the last analysis, the merits of the pending question cannot be determined with mathematical precision; opinions and judgments are deeply involved, and each of us participating in the ratification process has the duty to record an independent judgment and opinion.

In the field of weapons, one of my doubts about the treaty is whether it unwisely handicaps our attempts to develop an effective antiballistic missile

system. Related to this is the question of whether it provides adequate protection against low-yield violations in certain regions of the atmosphere. The Secretary of Defense testified that it is most difficult for us to detect detonations that occur from roughly 6 to 20 miles above the surface of the earth; and it is obviously more difficult to detect low-yield explosions than high-yield ones. The area from 6 to 20 miles above the earth can be the critical range within which antiballistic missiles would have to neutralize the incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles, and in the vast reaches of the Soviet Union, Outer Mongolia, and Communist China clandestine tests of antiballistic missile warheads could well be possible.

So far as our own efforts are concerned, I am not reassured by the thought that we can test warheads for antiballistic missiles underground. It seems highly desirable to test such warheads in the environment in which they would be used if needed. Russia was not willing to sign the treaty until it had conducted actual tests in the atmosphere, in the area in which the antiballistic missile warheads would be used.

It is dismaying to me to reflect that the United States is spending billions of dollars on weapons systems that have, to date, never been actually test fired with nuclear warheads, and that the approval of the treaty would prohibit us from ever obtaining knowledge as to the effectiveness of such weapons systems.

What a paradox. We will not buy a simple rifle, or even the most primitive weapon in our arsenal, a bayonet, unless it has been subjected to exhaustive tests under every conceivable condition. Here we would accept, with childlike faith in mathematical formulas and extrapolation, the efficiency of the most intricate, complicated, and costly weapon without even one test under war conditions, and we bind our hands by this treaty against ever testing them under those conditions.

The second of my major doubts about the desirability of ratification is my conviction that this is but the first step of a series of disarmament measures, each of which is apparently relatively innocuous by itself, but actually to the advantage of the Soviet Union, and cumulatively resulting in an almost unilateral disarmament that could be ruinous.

It is my own belief that a comprehensive test ban that prohibited underground testing, but without adequate inspection rights, would have been entered into, except for the fear that the U.S. Senate would not consent to ratification.

Mr. President, in the course of my service, I have seen a number of instances in which the Congress has been caught up in a chain of events from which it was next to impossible to extricate itself. This treaty provides in article 2 for amendments when approved by a majority of all of the parties thereto, including the votes of each of the three original parties.

Mr. President, any treaty involves the surrender of a certain measure of our national sovereignty. Our experience shows that in treaties involving nearly every nation of the earth, it is exceed-

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ingly difficult to regain any element of sovereignty once it is placed in a common pool to be controlled by a number of states.

It has been alleged time and again on the floor of the Senate that the treaty is the first step toward total disarmament, which is advocated by many Senators; and that there will be no arms on earth except those in the hands of troops under the United Nations.

For my part, I am not now prepared, in the present state of world affairs, to subscribe to a course of action that would leave the administration of justice among the nations of the earth wholly in the hands of the United Nations, and would place the only effective armed forces on earth under the command of the commanding officer of the United Nations.

Time and again our country has taken action in various fields which imposed limitations upon our ability to change our course. Indeed, oftentimes the initial step has placed drastic limitations upon our freedom of action in dealing with subsequent proposals in the same area.

This is graphically illustrated today by the situation in Vietnam. It is hard to conceive of a more unhappy position than that we occupy in that strife-torn country. In common parlance, we are over a barrel. We have there an investment running into the billions and a current cost of over a million dollars a day. We have not been able to change the terrible conditions which exist in that unhappy land and the President said a few days ago that we cannot get out. We are captives of our own policies and have foolishly locked the door and thrown away the key.

Our vigorous support of the United Nations has drastically limited our right to define our own policy with respect to conditions in many areas of the world. Indeed, it would appear to the casual observer that we predicate our position on issues arising on the several continents on the course advocated by certain countries or peoples inhabiting that continent and without regard to basic principles or of an overall international policy.

This has us supporting dictators in one part of the world and denouncing them in others. We undertake to condemn aggression from without in some parts of the world, but when India, by a naked action of military aggression with overpowering forces, conquered Portuguese Goa we responded with a very light, almost pleasant and polite, tap of Mr. Nehru's wrist.

In Africa, the strident voices of Ben Bella and Nkrumah seem to move our diplomats greatly. We therefore vigorously support repression of liberty in Algeria and Ghana in favor of dictatorships of the worst sort, but follow Ben Bella and Nkrumah in demanding that Portugal get out of Africa—piously reciting our devotion to the right of self-government as the excuse, when everyone knows there is more freedom and self-government in the Portuguese pos-

sessions than exists in a number of the so-called emerging nations.

In the Organization of American States, we are loath to even mention the Monroe Doctrine for fear of offending the representatives and people of states that only exist because of the Monroe Doctrine. Indeed, if we even mention the Monroe Doctrine in this country we often do so in muted tones as if afraid that we would be overheard.

The pending treaty, Mr. President, is agreed by all to be the first in a series of agreements looking to general and completed disarmament, both in the field of nuclear and conventional weapons. This involves surrender of sovereignty in the vital area of military strength.

With general and complete disarmament as our declared objective, it is proposed that we take this first step in abandoning the basic principle of inspection without which our interests cannot be fully protected. We are surrendering complete freedom of movement with respect to vital interests in arms and armaments. We are placing some of our sovereignty, a great deal of our world prestige, and the totality of our image abroad into the hands of some 90 states, each of which has the right to propose amendments to this treaty looking to complete disarmament. Some of these states have much to gain and little to lose by a program of total disarmament. We in this country have much to lose if we delude ourselves by adopting a policy of unilateral disarmament. As for myself, I am unwilling to start out on this trek, Mr. President, leaving behind the only assurance that we could possibly have that we will not be deceived or mousetrapped into unilateral disarmament to such a degree that we cannot defend ourselves.

Mr. President, this is where I entertain fears for the effects of euphoria upon our people. This is the area where we are most likely to be lulled into trusting the promises of those who would destroy us rather than demanding onsite inspection to assure good faith and performance.

I am not a prophet or the son of a prophet, but I predict that it will not be long before amendments will be proposed to prohibit underground testing on terms that the Senate would not have accepted had such terms been proposed in the initial treaty that is before the Senate today.

The Senate will then be presented with the argument that the amendment has the support of an overwhelming majority of the signatory states and that it is only a logical extension and complementary action to what the Senate has already approved. I submit that it will be much more difficult to vote against an amendment which has the overwhelming approval of the other signatories than it will to reject this treaty and resume negotiations for a comprehensive test ban in all fields that will in fact assure that there is no surreptitious or illegal testing.

Senators who support the treaty will naturally defend themselves in their home States against criticisms of their action. Their action in constantly defending their approval of the treaty and in stressing their love of peace and their desire to have the armaments race ended will, of itself, lend persuasion to the arguments in behalf of support for amendments to the effect that we cannot afford to stop now, for fear of losing world leadership and offending world opinion or causing a breach of world peace.

I have seen in many fields the operation of this form of political and mental compulsion. Today, it is pronounced in the consideration of what we call foreign aid measures. For many years a majority of the Members of Congress have defended their position in support of foreign aid, and therefore each year Congress continues to approve increasing expenditures for this program. I am convinced that if it were presented to us de novo today, with the knowledge which most Representatives and Senators now have as to the operation of the program, Congress would not approve expenditures of anywhere near the magnitude of the ones in this field we finally shall approve this year. Very few Members of Congress have found a way to "get off this toboggan"; and I apprehend that a similar situation will exist when amendments disadvantageous to the United States are proposed to the treaty, with the support of a large number of other signatory states.

What defense would we have to an amendment to the treaty which would prohibit underground testing without any onsite inspection, if such an amendment were proposed by a majority of the signatories? It would be argued that the amendment would prohibit the Soviets from making underground tests, and that, therefore, we would have everything to gain, and nothing to lose, by agreeing to ban underground tests on the same terms as those by which the pending treaty bans testing in other environments.

This partial agreement, without provision for inspection of any kind within the territory of suspected violators, will make it extremely difficult to reject other proposals in the field of testing; and it can prove highly embarrassing if amendments outlawing nuclear weapons, providing for the destruction of all stockpiles of them, and relying upon the word of each signatory state to take action in good faith, are proposed.

Mr. President, there have been indications that the next proposal in this area will involve the stationing of observers at highway junctions and railroad marshaling points. For other reasons, I have supported proposals to increase our ability to respond to conventional wars; but I have never done so with much hope that a war with the Soviet Union would remain conventional. In a day when the greatest threat to our survival is from missiles with nuclear warheads, I am unable to perceive the

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usefulness of such a limited system of observation.

But, Mr. President, if the Soviet Union would permit on its soil observers who would make inspections in the marshaling yards and the highway centers, it seems to me that the Soviets should—logically—not refuse to permit observers to come anywhere near the Soviet nuclear test operations, to make inspections in that area.

I apprehend that if the Senate were to give its advice and consent to ratification of the treaty, such action would tend to cause the people of the United States to adopt an unjustifiably optimistic view of the status of our relationships with the Soviet Union and the need for us to continue to maintain powerful defense forces.

A common failing of the human family is a willingness to believe what one wishes to believe. A combination of dread of the consequences of an atomic war and an increasing trust in the pledges of the Soviet Union—as generated in part by the action of Congress—can start us down the road to destruction.

Mr. President, I have been impressed and touched by the arguments made in the Senate about the horrors of what occurred at Hiroshima and at Nagasaki. I have been impressed by the terrible pictures of the destruction resulting from an atomic war. But I submit, Mr. President, that every one of those arguments can apply to our embarking upon a unilateral disarmament program, as well as they can to the support of this program.

All of these horrors are known to the American people. But if the leadership of this country is unwilling to demand equality in a test ban treaty, and is unwilling to insist on it, will the American people be willing to take that risk?

There are so many ways in which this treaty can be violated.

It is not improbable that the Soviets might decide to conduct tests in violation of the treaty within the vast areas of their lands or in Outer Mongolia or in China. If we were to detect what we thought was an explosion there, and if we were to call upon the Soviets for an explanation, if they responded by saying such explosions had occurred, but that they had been carried out by the Red Chinese, and if they claimed Mao Tse-tung was conducting the experiments contrary to their wishes, what would the United States do? In that event, it would be difficult to bring about a decision by our Government to abrogate the treaty. However, I do not doubt for a moment that the Communist leadership will pursue such a course whenever it serves their purpose to do so.

Unfortunately, one of the prices we pay for our great system, which includes our guarantee of individual liberties, is the fact that our republican form of government cannot compete in speed or in definite action with a dictatorship. This is another reason why any agreement of the nature of the pending treaty should

be accompanied by provision of the right of inspection.

Russia can withdraw from the treaty or can violate it on a moment's notice, on the basis of a decision by four or five men. In the United States, under our system, we could not extricate ourselves from the toils of the treaty without having long, protracted debate and many explanations.

Let us suppose that dispatches from Stockholm or from some other neutral area were to state that there had been treaty violations somewhere in the vast expanses of Russia or in adjacent lands. Those who head our Government undoubtedly would meet and would debate any information of that sort which was obtained by our intelligence service, and would classify the information. If the Russians then denied the charge, and attributed it to the desire of "capitalistic provocateurs" to engender a nuclear war, our people and our Government would be in a terrible dilemma—one which could be avoided if we had maintained our demand for inspection.

We would be reminded of the effect of precipitate action on our "word image" that thousands are so dedicated to preserve. Other thousands would fear that to challenge the Russians' word and withdraw from the treaty would provoke a nuclear holocaust. Probably we would wind up by protesting the alleged atomic explosion to the United Nations and by falling further behind Russia in the development of nuclear weapons.

Next year, and for many years to come, we shall need to maintain our Armed Forces at high levels; the defense budget will still be necessarily large; and the Armed Forces will still require service by our young men and women. We cannot afford any inclination to relax and we should not deceive ourselves by believing this treaty means we are more secure or that we can trust the Soviets.

I recall not a single witness before the committees who thought the Russians would honor this treaty 1 minute longer than the Russians believed it would serve their objectives. One has only to review the record of agreements broken by the Soviet Union to begin speculating on the date that this one, with all the amendments thereto, might be breached. Unfortunately, we may be unable to supply the date on which it is breached. In this connection, I ask unanimous consent to include in the RECORD at this point an article published by the Department of Defense, Office of Armed Forces Information and Education, on November 5, 1962, entitled "Soviet Treaty Violations," showing the results under some of the agreements entered into by the Soviet Communist regime.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[ALERT No. 5—Soviet Treaty Violations, published by Armed Forces Information and Education, Department of Defense, Nov. 5, 1962]

SOVIET TREATY VIOLATIONS

Officials of the Soviet Union, from the 1917 Bolshevik revolution onward through 45

years of Communist rule, have established an undisputed reputation for breaking their most solemn pledges.

The Soviet regime's consistent viewpoint on the relative unimportance of promises is not restricted to its dealings with other countries, but extends with equal force to its relationships with the Russian people and the various minority groups which comprise the U.S.S.R.

Only 3 days after the November 7, 1917, revolution placed it in power, the Communist regime abolished freedom of the press as a privilege too dangerous to be entrusted to the people. The people were promised, however, that the decree would be rescinded just "as soon as the new regime took root." This 45-year-old promise notwithstanding, the order still applies today.

Other instances in which the Soviet public has broken faith with its own people are legion. The revolution of 1917 was carried out in the name of democracy, and ever since "democracy" has been one of the most frequently used words in the Communist lexicon. But while the Communists have capitalized on the word, they have radically altered its definition—from "government by the people" to "government for the good of the workers." Since the Communists keep for themselves the right to determine what is "good" for the workers, the Soviet definition of democracy in fact has become "government by Communists."

After 1917, the Russian people wanted not only democracy but its specific institutions: a constitution, a parliament, elections, a secret ballot, trade unions, etc. They were given all these things, but in name only.

The Soviet Constitution is an interesting document to read. However, it is violated or ignored by the regime as a matter of course. The Soviet parliament meets regularly, but it possesses neither power nor function. Elections are held every 4 years, but the single-slate ballot gives the voters no choice. A secret ballot is provided, but its purpose is to identify dissenters rather than protect them. Trade unions flourish, but only to make the worker more subservient to his employer, the state.

A RECORD OF BROKEN PROMISES

That promises mean next to nothing to the Communist official mind has been admitted by Soviet leaders:

V. I. Lenin—

"Promises are like pie crust, made to be broken."

"It would be mad and criminal to tie one's hand by entering into an agreement of any permanence with anybody."

J. V. Stalin—

"Words have no relation to actions—otherwise what kind of diplomacy is it?"

"Words are one thing, actions another. Good words are a mask for concealment of bad deeds. Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water or wooden iron."

G. E. Zinoviev (first head of the Communist International)—

"We are willing to sign an unfavorable peace—it would only mean that we should put no trust whatever in the piece of paper we should sign."

The Soviet Communist regime has entered into hundreds of international agreements. The following list shows how well the Soviet leaders keep their promises when it no longer appears to be in their interest to do so.

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May 7, 1920: Soviet regime signs treaty with independent Georgian Republic, pledging no interference in Georgia's internal affairs.

March 16, 1921: In trade agreement with Britain, Soviet Union pledges not to engage in propaganda in that country.

June 5, 1922: Soviet Union concludes friendship agreement with Czechoslovakia.

December 12, 1933: U.S.S.R. and Czech government-in-exile sign treaty of friendship and mutual assistance.

February 11 and 12, 1921: Soviet troops invade Georgia, in step leading to absorption of republic into U.S.S.R.

May 26, 1927: Britain ends agreement because of Soviet violations, including failure to stop pro-Soviet propaganda as promised.

June 29, 1936: U.S.S.R. compelled Czechoslovakia to cede Carpatho-Ukraine to the Soviet Union.

February 25, 1948: Czechoslovak Government forced to accept Communist Ultimatum, as Soviet Union completes arrangement to force country into its satellite empire. Ultimatum compels appointment of a cabinet of Moscow followers and climates Soviet postwar drive to absorb once-independent Czechoslovakia.

March 20, 1945: U.S.S.R. denounces this pact, begins campaign to secure control of Black Sea straits.

June 14, 1946: U.S.S.R. forces Afghanistan to cede border territory of Kushkha.

June 15, 1940: Soviet troops invade Lithuania.

August 8, 1940: Lithuania is annexed by Soviet Union.

Soviet Union violates this pledge by 1939-40 invasions of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Rumania, and Finland.

November 30, 1939: Soviet military forces invade Finland.

June 16, 1940: Soviet troops invade Latvia.

August 5, 1940: Latvia is forcibly incorporated in the U.S.S.R.

June 16, 1940: Soviet military forces invade and occupy Estonia.

August 6, 1940: Estonia is annexed by U.S.S.R.

September 27, 1928: Soviet Union adheres to Kellogg-Briand pact for renunciation of war.

January 21, 1932: U.S.S.R. agrees to non-aggression pact with Finland.

February 5, 1932: Soviet Union signs non-aggression pact with Latvia.

May 4, 1932: Soviet Union pledges non-aggression in agreement with Estonia.

July 25, 1932: Soviet Union signs non-aggression pact with Poland.

May 5, 1934: U.S.S.R.-Poland extend non-aggression pact for 10 years.

June 9, 1934: U.S.S.R. recognizes Rumania, guarantees her sovereignty.

September 15, 1934: U.S.S.R. enters League of Nations, pledging thereby "the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another."

August 21, 1937: Soviet Union signs non-aggression pact with Republic of China.

July 30, 1941: U.S.S.R. concludes agreement with Polish Government-in-exile, pledging mutual aid and cooperation.

October 2, 1949: U.S.S.R. breaks relations with Republic of China, after recognizing Communist Chinese regime it helped to gain power.

April 25, 1943: U.S.S.R. breaks relations with Polish Government-in-exile on pretext of Polish request for Red Cross investigation of Katyń Forest massacre.

September 24, 1941: Soviet Union pledges adherence to Atlantic Charter, which provides that agreeing countries seek no aggrandizement, that the countries desire no

THE RESULT

territorial changes not made in accord with freely expressed wishes of the people concerned, and that they respect the right of all peoples to choose their own form of government.

January 29, 1942: Soviet Union, with Iran and Britain, signs treaty of alliance, providing for military use of Iranian territory only until end of military operations against Germany.

February 4-11, 1945: At Yalta Conference, U.S.S.R. agrees on various postwar measures, including adoption of a resolution that the liberated peoples of Europe should have the opportunity to solve their economic problems by democratic means.

February 11, 1945: U.S.S.R. at Yalta Conference, agrees to declaration that Polish provisional government "shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot."

April 11, 1945: U.S.S.R. signs 20-year treaty of friendship, mutual aid, and cooperation with Yugoslavia.

June 14-18, 1945: President Truman and Premier Stalin agree, in an exchange of letters, to "free access by air, road, and rail from Frankfurt and Bremen for U.S. forces."

July 17 to August 2, 1945: At Potsdam Conference U.S.S.R. agrees that there should be uniform treatment of the German people throughout Germany.

August 14, 1945: The Soviet Union enters into treaty with Republic of China, containing these pledges: "Each high contracting party undertakes not to conclude any alliance and not to take any part in any coalition directed against the other high contracting party * * *. The treaty comes into force immediately * * * and shall remain in force for a term of 30 years."

March 10, 1947: Council of Foreign Ministers, meeting in Moscow, agrees that all German prisoners of war should be repatriated by December 31, 1948.

May 4 and June 20, 1949: Four-power agreements of New York and Paris guarantee United States, United Kingdom, France, and Soviet joint control of Berlin, all access routes to and from Berlin to East German regime.

September 20, 1955: U.S.S.R. unilaterally transfers Soviet control over all access routes to and from Berlin to East German regime.

August 13, 1961: Construction of Berlin wall completely prohibits free passage from the Soviet sector to the Western sectors.

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In violation of this agreement stands the U.S.S.R.'s record of domination in Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland, East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, and other countries which were forced into postwar roles as satellites of the Soviet Union.

January 5, 1947: Soviet Union refuses to participate in meeting with Britain and United States to secure compliance with the 1945 Agreement pledging free elections in Poland.

January 19, 1947: Communist-controlled fraudulent election carried out under conditions of Soviet military occupation.

September 29, 1949: Soviet Union announces this agreement.

April 1, 1948 to May 12, 1949: The Soviet Union imposes the Berlin blockade by severing all land and water routes between Berlin and West Germany. Western Allies supply Berlin by airlift. March 1952: Soviet Union harasses flights by Allied airplanes between Berlin and West Germany.

East Germany today continues to be a rigidly controlled Soviet satellite. Its people have been denied free elections, isolated from the people of West Germany, and victimized by the same kind of regimentation, police rule, and economic restrictions imposed on the peoples of all the Soviet bloc states in Europe.

February 14, 1950: These pledges were broken when the U.S.S.R. made a new agreement with the Communist Chinese regime it had helped create. The Soviets did not even bother to change the basic wording. The new treaty also pledges: "Both high contracting parties undertake not to conclude any alliance against the other high contracting party * * *. The treaty comes into force immediately * * * and shall remain in force for a term of 30 years."

The present treaty will be valid for 30 years.

August 3, 1955: Soviet regime furnishes West German Red Cross with data on the names and whereabouts of only 20 of the approximately 14,000 Germans known to be still held in the U.S.S.R.

September 20, 1955: U.S.S.R. unilaterally transfers Soviet control over all access routes to and from Berlin to East German regime.

August 13, 1961: Construction of Berlin wall completely prohibits free passage from the Soviet sector to the Western sectors.

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July 27, 1953: Military armistice established between United Nations command and opposing Communist forces, assisted by U.S.S.R. of China and North Korea. Armistice agreement pledges signers to "cease introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel."

January 14, 1956: U.S.S.R. signs agreement with Yugoslavia, pledging \$110 million in credits for industrial construction.

August 4, 1956: U.S.S.R. pledges an additional grant of \$175 million, bringing total to \$285 million.

October 19, 1956: U.S.S.R.-Japanese joint declaration pledges the Soviet Union to refrain from interference in Japan's internal affairs.

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July 11, 1955: U.N. command details long list of armistice agreement violations by Communist parties.

May 6, 1957: U.N. command, in another of series of official complaints, charges that Communists have sent troops in Korea's demilitarized zone six times in period of less than 4 months.

May 28, 1958: Yugoslav sources disclose that the Soviet Union has postponed for 5 years the grant to Yugoslavia amounting to \$285 million. This represented an attempt to retaliate against Yugoslavia for its refusal to accept the Soviet Communist Party's ideological leadership.

1958: During the weeks preceding Japanese elections of May 22, Soviet radio beams propaganda at Japan violently opposing the reelection of Premier Kishis government.

1959-60: U.S.S.R. threatens Japan with the possibility of nuclear war if Japan ratifies United States-Japan security treaty, signed January 19, 1960.

sors toward each other or toward the treaty and its amendments? But this treaty binds with ties of honor our President, our Commander in Chief of the United States, whoever he may be. We know that he will observe it.

To me the most plausible or most likely reason is the conclusion that the Russians know they passed us in knowledge in the series of tests after they broke the moratorium and wish to retain their advantage.

Once negotiations are begun on a subject, there seems to be a compulsion, unhappily endemic to the West, to come to an agreement—almost an urge for a treaty for a treaty's sake.

Compromise can be a laudable trait in negotiations on some subjects; but in agreements with treacherous adversaries, with whom one is dealing at arms length, affecting the life of nations, patience and obduracy are vital and complaisance can be fatal. Though opposing arguments become exhaustingly repetitious and despite the weariness of hearing repeated "Nyet," "nyet," "nyet," we the Senate should reject the treaty. We should continue our negotiations, and wait the Russians out for an agreement that offers more assurance and protection than this one offers our country.

If we are to endure as an independent nation, we must have patience, diligence, the will to sacrifice and to live dangerously, for this is a dangerous world, and those who cower or flinch are lost.

This is an instance in which I honestly hope and pray that I am completely wrong, that the doubts and worries which beset me will be proved to be baseless; but my judgment, based on such knowledge as I have of the world's history of the past five decades, tells me that even this first step toward the nuclear disarmament we so devoutly seek is wrong, because it does not afford us adequate protection.

The stated objective of the pending treaty set forth in its preamble is:

The speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the armament race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons.

I point out that the only reference to "strict international control" is in the preamble, where it is not effective. The treaty itself does not provide for observers or for inspection of any kind.

As for me, Mr. President, I will not take this first step down the road to disarmament without any pretense of inspection. If we take this first step subsequent amendments will likewise ignore the necessity of inspections. I remember that the Russians have often offered with great sanctimony to disarm completely under a system of self-inspection. If we agree to inspection by the nations involved, it can only mean we have faith and are willing to place our future security in their hands. I am not willing to embark upon a course that even implies placing this Nation's security in the hands of the Russians.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, if some of these broken agreements seem relatively old by now and if one is tempted to believe that the company is under new management, let us remember the events of last fall when the Soviet Foreign Minister was reassuring the President of the United States that Russia had no intention of placing missiles in Cuba, when in the drawers of the very desk on which Mr. Gromyko leaned there were pictures of Soviet missiles already in Cuba.

That is not the only experience we have had with a breach of faith on the part of the Soviets in the matter of inspections and agreements. I hold in my hand copies of the President's thrilling speech to the Nation on the Cuban situation when the missiles were discovered. It contains letters which he wrote to Mr. Khrushchev. In three instances he demanded on-site inspections in Cuba to determine that the missiles were removed. When the chips were down, Mr. Khrushchev agreed to the inspection. What happened? Since we did not insist upon the inspections, they were never held, and no American citizen that I know of today could take a categorical oath that those missiles are out of Cuba at this very moment. Millions believe they are out. It is our official position that they are out. But the inspection that was supposed to be on-site in Cuba wound up by the Soviets permitting us to see a tarpaulin pulled back from the end of a metal container that was observed from some 600 or 800 feet away from the deck of an American destroyer. We were told that that tarpaulin covered a container that held one of the missiles, and that all the missiles were therefore being removed from Cuba.

That is what we got into when we surrendered the onsite inspection that was guaranteed. In the present treaty we are not even insisting on any form of inspection.

We ironically note that the same Mr. Gromyko whom the President denounced categorically as a liar in his address to the American people is the man who signed the treaty on behalf of the Soviet Government.

I do not see how anyone could ask for additional evidence that the officials of

the Government with whom the treaty was negotiated are unreliable and that they will take advantage of us on any and all occasions and opportunities.

In searching for reasons the Russians are willing to enter into a treaty they had rejected in the past—because, forsooth, it had some form of inspection in it before—proponents have heavily stressed the family quarrel between the Soviet Union and Communist China.

I do not believe there is any doubt that there are differences between Communist China and the Soviet Union; but in my judgment those differences would be quickly resolved in the event that either one of them came into armed conflict with our country. If Russia were genuinely concerned about a threat from Red China, the Russians would abandon their specious argument about onsite inspections being merely a ruse for espionage. If they really thought there was anything to fear from China, they would agree to a comprehensive prohibition against all nuclear testing and provide for adequate onsite inspection.

If they were afraid, they would agree to onsite inspection and demand that Red China likewise adhere to the same terms. If they wished to cut off the production of nuclear weapons in China, as they assert is their purpose, they would agree to inspection in the treaty and undertake to get Red China into the treaty so that they could make sure that Red China would not develop any nuclear weapons.

I have been amazed to see so many intelligent men explain their support of this treaty by comforting themselves with the belief that there are such grave differences between China and Russia; that these two communistic states are at dagger's point and if we will somehow appease the Russians we will drive a wedge between these two Communist giants.

Unfortunately, these differences apparently spring from the clashing opinion of two men who, in the course of human events, will both pass away in the next few years. Mao Tse Tung and Khrushchev are approaching the end of man's allotted years. The treaty states that it is permanent. Who would dare to predict the attitude of their suc-

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This treaty has been called a small step forward in the direction of world peace. Mr. President, I do not believe that reliance upon the signature of Gromyko or Khrushchev, which disadvantages this country in weaponry development, is consistent with either world peace or the maintenance of our liberties.

Communism has not yet abandoned its dream of total world domination. It still ceaselessly applies itself to works of subversion through the world. The Communist still considers treachery, falsehood and deceit as laudable means to achieve advantage over those nations outside the Iron Curtain. They are firmly committed—even openly committed—to the doctrine that the end justifies the means.

I would wholeheartedly support an agreement banning nuclear tests of every kind of nature that provides for adequate inspection. I am willing to surrender the keys to our every secret as proof of our good will and good faith in complying with such a treaty if the Communist world will do likewise.

Moreover, I will support agreements limiting and prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons if those agreements guarantee full and complete inspection to assure that all parties will comply.

I would go so far as to support an agreement reducing or limiting conventional arms if all the other nations of the Earth which are signatories to the treaty—and that includes the Soviet Union—were willing to prove their good faith by guaranteeing adequate and constant policing and inspection.

I am willing to open every door in America as evidence of our compliance and our good faith; but, when we do so, I demand that the Soviet Union open every door beyond the Iron Curtain.

I am unwilling to place any part of our security in the scales to be weighed against the naked word of Soviet officials. I cannot support this program, even though it be entitled a program to begin "general and complete disarmament," when I feel in the very depths of my soul that when we abandon the elementary safeguard of inspection we endanger all that we hold dear.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. RUSSELL. I am glad to yield.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator has touched this point, clearly, but other Senators have come into the Chamber who did not hear it made.

The Senator made a powerful point about our surrender of our constant demands for inspection. The Senator's argument and belief, as I understood him, is that if we should abandon this concept now and take the first step, we would be abandoning it and surrendering it; and we would lose all opportunity ever to get any terms of that kind again.

Mr. RUSSELL. It would be almost impossible, considering the experience we are having today in the United Nations and throughout the world, ever to re-capture or to reinstitute the system of inspection sought.

I greatly fear—I hope I am wrong, but I fear I am correct—that the next step will be an inspection of highways and

railroad marshaling yards where the Russians will permit inspections, because they do not intend to strike us on the ground, but they will not permit us inspections with respect to those areas relating to the air.

Then there will come before us an agreement to ban underground tests. We will be told, "You have a great deal to gain from this. Now the Soviets can test underground. What will you have to lose if they do not observe the treaty?"

We have been mousetrapped. We have made ourselves a prisoner of the condition with respect to underground testing, because we are to approve the partial test ban.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator has made a new point, which is a powerful point, and explained it as clearly as a bell. I heartily agree with the Senator.

As I understood the point made by the Senator from Georgia before other Senators came into the Chamber, from the knowledge which the Senator has of our present condition with reference to our missiles, our capability, and our offensive capacity, and especially with reference to our ICBM's, we have never yet sufficiently tested them in simulated conditions to the extent that we know whether they will work under nuclear conditions. I do not refer to an actual hit, but to a near miss or to a miss near enough to contaminate the air with nuclear explosions.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, in the effort to reassure the nations of the earth as the leaders in this peace movement, we have only to take into consideration that one of the four intercontinental ballistic missile systems on which we are spending billions of dollars has been tested for actual war conditions. Only one has been fired with a nuclear warhead. Yet the treaty would bar us from knowing whether the billions of dollars we have spent on this weapon will be of any use to us.

Mr. STENNIS. The same question applies to the ability of our nuclear warheads to penetrate to the target, so far as we know.

Mr. RUSSELL. We do not know, nor do we know the effects on hardened missile sites of their detonation and what effects they will have in preventing them from continuing to fire from hardened sites.

Mr. STENNIS. So, from the standpoint of launching to the point of reaching the target, tests have not been made, and they would be cut off by the treaty.

Mr. RUSSELL. That is correct.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator answered the question about the antiballistic missile. As I understood him, he clearly said that we have no knowledge of how they would work under war conditions. The treaty would cut us off from adequately testing in order to make an effective antiballistic missile.

Mr. RUSSELL. I said it would prohibit us from testing in the environment in which the weapon is supposed to work, because we would not be able to fire in the atmosphere.

I would be willing to surrender much, but it must all be accompanied by assurance of good faith. I know the road

ahead upon which we are starting. I know what is going to happen when amendments to the treaty are brought before the Senate. I know the arguments that will be made. It will be said, "We have made the first step. We cannot stop now. We must go forward. What will the world think of us if we do not accept the amendments?"

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator has made a notable address. I commend him for the clarity and force of his argument.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL. I yield to the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. THURMOND. I take this opportunity to commend the Senator from Georgia for the magnificent address he has delivered today. I am only sorry that more Senators were not present to hear it. I wish more Senators had been present to hear the fine address.

Mr. RUSSELL. I thank the Senator.

Mr. THURMOND. The Joint Chiefs of Staff testified that the Soviets are ahead of us in high-yield weapons, and also are ahead of us in the development of an antiballistic missile system, and that we may be ahead of the Soviets in low-yield weapons. The Soviets can overcome their deficiency by testing underground. We cannot overcome our deficiencies without testing in the atmosphere, in order to perfect our anti-ballistic missile systems, in order to know the weapons effects of high-yield weapons, whether they are going to fuse wires, or knock out the electronic systems, neutralize the system and make them useless. The only way we can obtain knowledge is by testing in the atmosphere, testing in the environment in which the weapons would be used, and this would be prohibited under the treaty.

Is that not the opinion of the Senator from Georgia?

Mr. RUSSELL. That is my opinion as a layman. I realize that there is a school of scientific opinion that relies upon extrapolation. But as a layman I never felt I could have confidence in an instrument such as an ICBM that had not been subjected to testing under the conditions under which it would be used in the unhappy event of war—

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL. I yield to the Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. First, I should like to acknowledge the esteem and great affection and admiration in which we all hold the Senator from Georgia. It is always embarrassing to me to find myself in disagreement with the Senator from Georgia.

Mr. RUSSELL. I would feel much better if the Senator from Arkansas were on my side. I always feel better when he is on my side. That is why I expressed some doubts. I said I wished we were not in disagreement.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. With reference to the Senator's statement, which I do not wish to emphasize in this particular, of his willingness to sign a treaty if it provided for inspection, it so happens that the last treaty we signed with the Rus-

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sians, the so-called Antarctica Treaty, provides for inspections; and yet the Senator fought it vigorously.

Mr. RUSSELL. I did. I still think it was a mistake.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That particular treaty provided what the Senator from Georgia now says should be in this treaty, that is, full inspection. The Senator from Georgia did not agree to that treaty, and he fought it vigorously, as I remember, and made it very difficult for the junior Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. RUSSELL. The junior Senator from Arkansas always turns out the votes, with the pressures that are provided. I do not think he has been greatly concerned about the opposition of a feeble voice, when he has behind him not only the power of the administration and the Foreign Relations Committee, but also the almost unanimous support of the great media of communication, the press, radio, and television. I realize how remote is any chance possibility of unhorsing the Senator from Arkansas in this tournament against such odds, but I could not live with my conscience if I had not stated my opposition to the treaty.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. With regard to the last treaty, which I believe was in 1960—3 years ago—

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator does not know of the slightest rumor of violation.

Mr. RUSSELL. No; but we have not been inspecting. No inspection has been conducted.

I objected to that treaty because I thought it was the first step toward world government. We pooled the U.S. Government with the governments of a number of other countries—Norway, Chile, Australia, and the Argentine. We formed a joint administration of about one-fourth of the earth's surface. I could see the germs of world government in that treaty.

No later than yesterday Senators advocated the abolition of our arms and armaments and turning them over to the United Nations, and relying upon one world government. I am not willing to take that step. I opposed the Antarctica Treaty because I regarded it as one step in that direction. I think events will justify my opposition on that ground.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I was about to say next that I was disappointed in the Senator's alarm about our Government. I thought he had great respect for the Government of the United States—

Mr. RUSSELL. That is the reason why I am opposing this treaty.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think the Senator's sentiments about the relative efficiency of a dictatorship and this Government indicates that he feels that our Government is in a deplorable condition. I do not think we are. The Senator knows much about the conduct of the last World War. Our Government, including the Senate, can act efficiently and quickly when it must. I admit that we have not acted promptly this year, but perhaps it is not necessary.

Coming to the question of unilateral disarmament, the Senator knows that in

the U.S. Senate there are 64 veterans and in the House of Representatives there are 284 veterans. The Senator knows that we are spending the largest budget in peacetime in the history of the Nation. In view of these circumstances, does the Senator believe there is the slightest prospect, based upon the Senator's experience, both on the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, of a unilateral disarmament under the treaty?

Mr. RUSSELL. The treaty is a direct step toward unilateral disarmament. We are prevented from testing in the area where we are weak, and Russia is permitted to test in the area where we are strong. This is a step in military disarmament. It cannot be in issue. The treaty is a step, in itself, in the direction of disarmament.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I did not believe the Senator felt that this treaty was a step in the direction of disarmament.

Mr. RUSSELL. The Senator from Arkansas did not follow me closely. I pointed out four instances in which we were disadvantaged.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Disadvantage and disarmament are not exactly the same thing. They do not necessarily mean the same thing.

The Senator does not maintain that we should give up any arms that we now possess. We do not destroy any; nor are we in any way inhibited from building twice as many weapons as we have. The Secretary of Defense testified that, whereas we now have approximately 500 weapons of a certain type, by 1965 we shall have 1,700. Is it not a fact that all the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including the Chairman, testified in support of the treaty?

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes; they testified as military men, but they had been carried out into the political domain, and they said they thought the military would be disadvantaged. But when they considered the political consequences, if the safeguards that they outlined were included, they did not think the treaty was a blow to our national security. That is about the gist of their testimony.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator will recall particularly General Wheeler's testimony, as well as the testimony of others, to the effect that there is no clear-cut distinction between military and political considerations, and that it is not an easy distinction to follow. I believe this is borne out by the statement of the Senator from Georgia during the hearings on the military procurement bill.

Mr. RUSSELL. That is the unkindest cut of all. The Senator knows that I was sitting next to him at the time I was questioning the witnesses, and that I was trying to bring myself to support the treaty. He knows that my questions were directed at the witnesses in an effort to justify the treaty. That is true of every question I asked. I was trying to bring myself to support the treaty. I could not do so after hearing the testimony.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator misunderstood me. I am referring to the hearings on the military procurement bill for the fiscal year 1964, held in Feb-

ruary. Those hearings had nothing to do with the treaty.

Mr. RUSSELL. I apologize to the Senator. I thought he was referring to the hearings on the treaty.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator agrees that there is never a complete black-and-white distinction between military and political considerations. General Wheeler elaborated on it very clearly and effectively. I should like to quote from these hearings, at page 4 of the hearings:

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, we are living in a very unusual era of history, and sometimes the line of demarcation between the function of military strength and foreign policy is very dim, and they seem to run together.

Are you consulted with respect to foreign policy?

Secretary McNAMARA. I am certainly consulted with respect to the military implications of foreign policy.

There are a number of subjects that the State Department addresses itself to that have few, if any, military implications. Frequently even on those our counsel will be requested. But to the best of my knowledge there has never been since World War II a closer relationship between the State Department, the Defense Department at all echelons than exists today.

Chairman RUSSELL. I have always taken the position that the Congress has nothing to do with war plans and matters of that kind. But the strategic policies of the country do have a direct impact on our Armed Forces and are closely related to the constitutional mandate on the Congress to raise and maintain the military forces of the country.

I am sure the Senator agrees that it cannot be clearly said, "This is military; this is political." General Wheeler gave some illustrations. He said that a certain relationship—the Senator mentioned the relationship between Russia and China—while it could be considered political, in his point of view it has very grave military implications. It has much to do with plans and our capacity to defend ourselves.

Therefore I think the accusation that the military leaders were not in real support of the treaty—

Mr. RUSSELL. I have not made any such statement, Mr. President.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That has been implied by the Senator's statement.

Mr. RUSSELL. I do not believe the Senator should say that. I did not state it. I said that they took into consideration political implications.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is correct.

Mr. RUSSELL. That is all I said.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. After all, these are our principal military experts, and they are responsible for the security of our country. In addition to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and former President Eisenhower, who is no mean military and political figure, support the treaty. I do not quite see why the Senator is so deeply concerned that the treaty is not in the interest of our security, when all or most of the men who have the primary responsibility in this field endorse the treaty.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, let me say, first, that if the Senator's competent staff, who have researched all the questions I have ever asked and all the state-

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ments I have ever made over the years, have been unable to find anything more inconsistent than what the Senator has read, I feel that I have achieved greater success than I could have hoped, much as I talk in committee.

In the second place, let me remind the Senator that there are a few people on this earth who are, by nature, independents and insist upon making up their own minds after considering a question and carefully studying it. I am one who is not afraid to stand, and to stand alone, if necessary. I may be standing in the light of error, and I may be wrong; but if I have studied a question and have come to a conclusion, I stand on my own responsibility, not that of other men. I will stand that way; and even President Eisenhower, for whom I have great admiration and affection; President Kennedy, whom I highly admire; the Senator from Arkansas, whom I know to be an able scholar, 90 Members of the Senate, and even the 93 countries which have signed the treaty, will not convince me that merely because the crowd is going in a certain direction I should follow. It is easy to say "Let us go. Join up. Follow the crowd."

When conscience and judgment tell me I am in the right, I have never been afraid to stand alone and take the consequences. In this case they may be considerable.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I hope the Senator did not interpret anything I said to mean otherwise.

Mr. RUSSELL. The Senator from Arkansas said:

President Eisenhower, together with General this and General that, think this way or that way. Why does not the Senator from Georgia think likewise?

The answer is because I arrived at a different conclusion after I had studied the subject with my own intellect, such as it is. It may not be very much, but it satisfies me. That is the way I have to answer to my conscience for my action. My decision is not based upon what other people say, or the fact that the crowd is engaged in a great stampede.

It would have been much easier for me to support the treaty. I tried earnestly to reach a conclusion that would permit me to do so. When I had studied it, and after I had sat down and thought about it alone for hours, I saw that in good conscience I could not do it, because I was afraid it would endanger my country. I am not persuaded because a mass of people are going the other way.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I hope the Senator is not taking offense at my questions.

Mr. RUSSELL. I am not. I am merely explaining my position.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is traditional in the Senate to seek the advice of experts in the particular field with which the Senate is dealing. I was trying to bring to the attention of Senators who did not attend the hearings what men who are generally considered to be experts in their field have said on the subject.

Mr. RUSSELL. I heard what the Senator said.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am not implying that the Senator does not have courage.

Mr. RUSSELL. I lay no claim to exceptional courage or expertise. I do insist upon the right of independent judgment.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. All I was seeking to do was to put before the Senate some of the evidence that was given in the hearings.

Mr. RUSSELL. This discussion can continue ad infinitum.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am not seeking to labor the point. If the Senator from Georgia does not feel that this colloquy is doing anything to enlighten the Senate, I will desist from asking him questions.

Mr. RUSSELL. The Senator may make any statement he desires. I am glad to yield to him.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. One statement by the Senator in his prepared text puzzled me. He said:

Here we would accept, with childlike faith in mathematical formulas and extrapolation, the efficiency of the most intricate, complicated, and costly weapon without even one test under war conditions.

Mr. RUSSELL. That is with respect to the warheads.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is not the Senator's view, is it, that we must have a war in order to test a weapon under war conditions? Would the Senator care to explain that statement?

Mr. RUSSELL. The Senator is splitting hairs. I do not believe any Senator was confused by that statement. That means that the warhead has not been fired under conditions that would exist in the event of war. I am not advocating a war so that we can test the weapons under war conditions. I do not know whether they would work; and I certainly would not want to go into war when I did not know whether the weapons on which we would have to rely would function. No one knows that they will function. They have never been fired under the conditions with which we would be confronted if we were engaged in war. I hope that clears up that question.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Perhaps I am very dull in this field. I was under the impression—

Mr. RUSSELL. I could not so charge the Senator. I think he is mistaken in his views about the treaty, but I never would accuse him of being dull. Anyone who could make a sea gull speech is not dull.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator will agree that that was very good advice. The sea gull is very smart.

I do not wish to labor the question. Other Senators wish to speak. I deeply regret that the Senator from Georgia opposes the test ban treaty, as he did the Antarctic Treaty.

He may well state that we are taking a chance. We have signed the treaty. But I will say one further thing about the difficulty of getting out of our obligations, and the delay. The treaty has a lenient withdrawal clause, perhaps the most lenient of those with which I am familiar. Withdrawal does not require approval of the Senate. So that is one delay which will not be encountered.

The President can give notice, and in 90 days the whole thing will be over, so far as the United States is concerned.

Mr. RUSSELL. I appreciate that. I would feel better if a concurrent resolution or a simple resolution could take us out of the treaty in 90 days, even though 90 Senators are said to favor the treaty. But I do not wish to raise any new arguments with respect to the treaty.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not think the Senator ought to distress the Executive. He made the point that we should not embarrass the Executive. I recall that in the previous administration, with respect to the Formosa agreement, a great argument along that line was made to me as a member of the committee. It had certain significance. It was not determinative, and it should not be in this instance. I do not urge it as a ground for it, but it is not unusual to make that argument. The Senator from Georgia will recall that incident. I remember that in the Committee on Foreign Relations the Senator's late former colleague, Senator George, made the argument. It was made in connection with the Eisenhower doctrine treaty, which was brought before the Committee on Foreign Relations. I do not subscribe to that argument as being very persuasive, but it has been made.

Mr. RUSSELL. I think it carries weight.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It has some weight today, but I would not advance it as the sole reason.

I shall desist from further questioning. I regret that once again I find myself on a different side of the fence with respect to an important treaty—and I regard it as an important treaty.

Mr. RUSSELL. I have personal regard for the Senator from Arkansas. He says we are on opposite sides of the fence, but we both speak in the interests of our country. I regret that the Senator has the opportunity to take along with him so large a number of the forces of the Senate in favor of the ratification of the treaty.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I have often heard the Senator from Georgia praise the Senate as the greatest deliberative body on earth. I join with him in that expression. However, I cannot feel that suddenly the Senate has lost its good judgment. I have heard the Senator from Georgia praise the Senate highly probably more often than has any other Member of this body. I do not believe the Senate has suddenly gone astray.

Mr. RUSSELL. I believe in the Senate. I have defended its functions and its important place in history. But I have never said that many Senators could not be in error. But the Senate will work its will. I did not go into details when I said the President should not be embarrassed. The reason why I made that statement was that if there are any experts in the world on the division of powers in the United States Government, they are the ones who occupy positions in the chancelleries of the world. They know more about the division of powers in this Government than does the average American. They con-

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stantly follow our Government's operations.

When the foreign aid bill is before Congress, they know that the President proposes and Congress disposes. They have had experience with treaties. They know as much about the functioning of the Senate as does the average American. The world has been well educated since the beginning of World War I, in the operations of the American Government. That is why I said the President should feel no embarrassment if the Senate should decide to reject the treaty.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thank the Senator from Georgia for yielding to me.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Georgia yield?

Mr. RUSSELL. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Washington.

Mr. JACKSON. I compliment and commend the distinguished Senator from Georgia, chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, for the valuable contribution he has made to the debate.

Mr. RUSSELL. I thank the Senator.

Mr. JACKSON. The right of dissent is the heart and soul of our democratic process. I want to cite an example of how difficult it is to be sure the majority is right in dealing with crucial decisions.

I was a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in 1949, when every member of the Science Advisory Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission opposed our proceeding with the development of a thermonuclear bomb. All but one member of the Atomic Energy Commission opposed it. The Secretary of State, then Dean Acheson, and President Harry S. Truman took the initiative, along with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And there was the affirmative decision made by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The entire Science Advisory Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission opposed them.

At that time Edward Teller spoke out and warned that it was not just a question of whether we should go ahead on the hydrogen bomb. The question was: Would the Russians get it before we did?

We exploded our first device in November 1952; the Russians exploded theirs in July or August 1953. I make this point because a majority of people, or some long list of distinguished scientists or other persons, does not necessarily assure the right answer.

That is as good an example as I could cite of the importance of debate, discussion, and dissent on a problem as difficult as this. Honorable men can examine the record and come to different conclusions. I advocate strongly the right of dissent and its importance in trying to decide upon the correct answers.

I cannot commend the distinguished Senator from Georgia too highly for the contribution he is making to the sum total of the debate and discussion on the treaty.

Mr. RUSSELL. I thank the Senator from Washington. I am sure we can disagree without being disagreeable. I have deep convictions. I am never afraid to express my convictions; and I try not to offend other Senators in doing so.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Georgia yield?

Mr. RUSSELL. I yield to the Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. GORE. I have listened attentively to the able address delivered by the distinguished senior Senator from Georgia. I have twice read his statement during the course of subsequent colloquies.

The Senator and I serve on the same committee. I have advised with him many times on this subject. I consider the senior Senator from Georgia to be one of those in the United States who are charged with a primary responsibility for the security of the country. I have listened to his advice with much respect and concern.

If the Senator will permit me to interpret the three principal points which the Senator makes in a telling way in his speech, I should like to suggest that they are: First, the lack of inspection; second, that this is a disarmament treaty; third, the distinguished Senator fears that this is a first step which will be followed by other inadvisable steps. I wish to engage the Senator briefly on only one of those points.

As to the third one, this is an issue, upon which each Senator in his own right and in his own light must invest either faith or fear. I choose faith but I shall not discuss that point.

As to whether this is a disarmament treaty, I find myself in disagreement with the Senator from Georgia. This has been discussed with the senior Senator from Arkansas; so there is no need to engage him in a discussion of that subject. I do not feel that the treaty would bring about any disarmament. It would inhibit both nations from promoting an armament threat with atmospheric tests.

The most telling point the able Senator makes is the first one; namely, that this is a treaty that does not provide for inspection. I believe the Senator from Georgia was present during the hearings when I stressed the point that the failure to obtain with the Soviets an agreement to accept close inspection was a severe disappointment to our Government. As the Senator from Georgia knows, I have had close connection with this effort, and I know how assiduously our country sought to obtain, both during the Eisenhower administration, and thus far during the Kennedy administration, an agreement by which the Russians would agree to such inspection. However, the very political and psychological nature of the Soviet system seems to make them utterly unwilling to agree at this time to an inspection system of that sort. At least, they were utterly unwilling to do so.

My inability to agree on this point with the Senator from Georgia—and I say this with great respect—lies in the fact that he says we are "abandoning the basic principle of inspection." Those words appear on page 5 of his statement. I respectfully suggest that if I could fully concur in the statements of belief which the able Senator has made on the floor this afternoon, I, too, would conclude, as he has, that the treaty should be rejected.

But I do not believe we have abandoned the principle of inspection. True, the treaty represents a failure to achieve an agreement calling for inspection; but in this particular field the United States has shown great competency for detection. I recall, and point out to the able Senator, that the Soviet Union has not announced even one nuclear test. All the Soviet tests have been announced either by the United States or by one of the neighbors of the Soviets—either Japan or one of the Scandinavian countries. As the able Senator from Georgia knows, our Government has not announced to the American public some of the tests the Soviets have conducted.

So there is a great capacity for detection of atmospheric tests. Moreover, my feeling in this regard is buttressed by the fact that I did not decide to support this treaty until the President of the United States had personally assured me that we would continue weapons development in underground tests and would continue development of our detection system in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space.

It is to this point that I wish—I do not desire to use the word "challenge," but

Mr. RUSSELL. I do not find that word offensive at all.

Mr. GORE. At any rate, I wish to express disagreement. The Senator from Georgia has said the treaty represents—to use his words—"abandonment of the principle of inspection." I respectfully insist that it does not represent abandonment of it.

Mr. RUSSELL. Where in the treaty is any inspection provided for? If we have not abandoned the principle of inspection, I do not know how we could go about it. None is provided for by the treaty.

Mr. GORE. In this case, the treaty is a very limited one embodying tests in the areas in which present detection systems are already extremely good—as the Senator from Georgia has stated—and in which, so we are advised by scientists, vast improvements can be made, and in which improvements will be sought. In this regard, I respectfully disagree with the Senator's statement that the treaty represents abandonment of the principle of inspection.

Indeed, since 1958 our Government has sought, to terminate testing, even underground, above the threshold; but because we could not obtain inspection, the Government of the United States finally had to take the best it could get, which was a limited agreement which we did not believe required inspection in the Soviet Union.

The Senator from Georgia made one other statement with which, in part, I wish to associate myself: He expressed the view that in all probability the Senate would not approve by two-thirds vote a treaty involving underground tests without adequate inspection. I do not know whether that might have happened; but I know there were in the executive branch of our Government certain persons who wanted to go, in that regard, much further than I would have gone or much further than I believe

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the Senator from Georgia would have gone; and I am sure he recalls that I made numerous speeches in which I warned against such a treaty. So I respectfully insist that, from my point of view, this treaty does not amount to abandonment of the principle of inspection. Indeed, in it we reassert the principle of inspection.

I thank the Senator from Georgia for permitting me at this time to state my thoughts in this connection. But, by virtue of his eminence and his eloquence, he brings into the Chamber a number of Senators who might not be present when a Senator of lesser eloquence and lesser eminence addressed the Senate. So I have asked these questions and have made these points.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Tennessee does me an honor that I do not deserve. I have great respect for him, but I believe that when he examines his remarks, he will conclude that he has challenged himself. He has said that we have tried for years to obtain with the Russians an agreement on inspection, and that because we could not obtain such an agreement with them, we propose this treaty—which does not provide for inspection—in order to prove that we are insisting on inspection. I cannot follow such reasoning. It is beyond my capability to understand.

The Senator has been of great service in this field; and there is no Senator upon whom I rely more. He has rendered a great service in undertaking to secure the adoption of a treaty which really would assure this country of security for the United States in dealing with the Russians; and—if I am not mistaken—the Senator from Tennessee attended one of those conferences as a U.S. delegate, and by his presence, his intelligence, and his knowledge in this field, labored to obtain with the Soviets a treaty in the area of a nuclear test ban. Is not that correct? Did not the Senator from Tennessee attend the conference? I remember that during that period I felt somewhat better about the situation.

But I must say that there were then in our Government some who did not try to obtain an agreement which would afford this country that protection; and unfortunately, they are still in the Government. So we shall have to watch them every inch of the way when such amendments are submitted in the future.

However I cannot agree with the Senator from Tennessee that in surrendering our right to have inspection provided for by this treaty, we did not give up our right to require inspection. Actually, we now might, as a result, have to give them up in totality.

I hope the Senator from Tennessee will not be so carried away by his efforts to achieve peace—even a peace of death or of similar consequences—that he will be willing to vote for the adoption of treaty amendments which would eliminate inspection. I do not believe the Senator from Tennessee will do that.

But I do not believe I can follow his reasoning to the effect that we have strengthened our position in respect to

our demands for inspection by surrendering our demand for inspection—as we have done—in this treaty.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Georgia yield?

Mr. RUSSELL. I am glad to yield.

Mr. GORE. I point out to the Senator that inspection sites in the Soviet Union were sought primarily for the detection of underground tests. The Senator will recall the many hours of argument and the many days of testimony, before Senate committees, about seismic signals and about the ability to muffle—or what was the word Dr. Teller used in that connection?

Mr. PASTORE. Decouple.

Mr. GORE. Yes—to decouple underground explosions.

For years the argument made on detection and inspection has involved our proposal for a treaty to stop tests underground as well as in the atmosphere. When we were unable to obtain an agreement with the Russians for adequate inspection to provide safeguards against cheating on underground tests, an agreement was reached to stop atmospheric tests and underwater tests where detection is, if not fully adequate, at least quite efficient, and with respect to which adequacy, we are advised, much efficiency can be developed. So I reassert my view that we do not abandon the principle of inspection in the slightest degree. We have insisted and still insist before we agree upon stopping underground tests, that adequate inspection sites be maintained in the Soviet Union in order to prevent cheating upon such an agreement.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I have interpreted and dealt with that subject. I realize the difficulties we have had with the Russians in that area. To me it has been evident that the Russians did not intend to observe their treaties in good faith, if they were unwilling to permit the entry of impartial teams into their railroad marshaling yards, into their highway centers, and on the soil of Russia, to make sure that they do not take us with bows and arrows on the ground. If they are acting in good faith and give us evidence of such good faith, why will they not permit us to come into Russia for atomic inspections?

I interpret the history of our efforts in that field somewhat differently from the way in which the Senator from Tennessee interprets them. I know that his knowledge in that area is far superior to my own. But we started, under Mr. Baruch's plan, by demanding the right of inspection for all kinds of testing. We insisted on that for a long time. Finally we surrendered that demand. Perhaps I should not use the word "surrendered." We gave it up. We abandoned it. The Senator does not like the word "surrender." We abandoned that demand in our effort to obtain a treaty that provided that we would give up all inspection except underground testing. The Russians would not agree to that. So from the Baruch plan down to the treaty that is before the Senate today we have surrendered our demands for inspection. We have given up our demands for the right of inspection with which

we started under Mr. Baruch in 1948. They have been whittled away bit by bit. In the beginning the Russians were willing to agree to 8 or 10 on-site inspections of underground testing. We demanded 20; we got down to 10; they fell to 3; we went down to about 5; they continued to demand 3. The Senator from Tennessee and others said that they thought that three tests would not protect the security of the United States, and that provision was eliminated from the treaty. But we have been mouse-trapped in that regard.

When the Russians come forward now with a proposal for underground inspection, what is our reply? If they say, "Let us have an agreement relating to underground testing with no inspection," what have we to lose if we sign it, if we believe that the Russians are acting in good faith and will not catch us with inadequate weapons? I do not believe that we have nothing to lose, because we shall have let them reduce us in the areas in which we are strong. They will have tied our hands in areas in which they are strong, and they will be free in areas in which they are weak. I cannot see it in any other way. But the Senator is entitled to his opinion. I respect his opinion. I respect the Senator from Tennessee, but I cannot agree with him on that point.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. RUSSELL. I will yield, if the Senator will permit me one further statement.

The Senator said that he heartily disagreed with the contention that the treaty was in the nature of disarmament. He said that it was some kind of inhibition. I agree. But inhibition can certainly contribute to disarmament. We shall have agreed not to proceed in an area in which they are ahead of us; and we would permit them to proceed in an area in which we claim superiority over them. If there were two countries, one of which had its forces armed with shotguns and the other had its forces armed with rifles and machineguns, if they both signed a treaty that they would not improve their weapons, I would claim that the country that was disarmed and had the shotguns had practically disarmed itself. That is what we will have done.

We shall have dropped out of the development of weapons in areas where they are needed and left the Russians free to advance where they are behind. That would be an inhibition only against the country that had the shotguns. The inhibition would be on that country if the two countries were arrayed on the field of battle against the country having the rifles and machineguns.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (MR. YOUNG of Ohio in the chair). Does the Senator from Georgia yield?

Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.

Mr. GORE. First, I thank the Senator for his generous references to me.

Mr. RUSSELL. Sometimes such references on the floor of the Senate are rather perfunctorily made. Mine was

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not a perfunctory statement. I really meant that statement, and I am not given to tossing them around casually. I really think that the Senator from Tennessee has made a great contribution. I regret very much that he did not continue it by going over there and helping to negotiate the treaty. If he had done so, I do not believe it would be in the form in which it is before the Senate today.

Mr. GORE. I am most grateful to the distinguished Senator. Once again he has demonstrated that we are not only neighbors, but friends. The high regard in which I hold him is in no way a secret.

The Senator has recalled certain history—I believe somewhat inaccurately.

Mr. RUSSELL. I would thank the Senator if he would straighten it out. I know it is roughly accurate.

Mr. GORE. Except in one respect. The Senator said that the Soviets had proposed to accept two or three inspections. The fact is that the Soviets have never at any time agreed to accept a single meaningful on-site inspection within the Soviet Union.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, the treaty is worse than I thought it was. I thought that at one time the Russians had agreed to three inspections on underground testing.

Mr. GORE. I recall that there was a propaganda effort that led many people to believe that the Soviets had made a so-called concession. One of their tricks in the trade is to make a propaganda concession which is without substance. I have followed this subject closely, and with the greatest of care. I assert that the Soviets have never at any time formally agreed to accept a single meaningful inspection in Soviet territory.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I am sure that if there is any person on earth who has learned not to believe all that he reads in the newspapers, it is the Senator from Georgia. I have had a great deal of experience along that line, some of it very personal. But I read in the newspapers that Mr. Khrushchev said that if we would agree to three inspections, he would withdraw his objection. That may have been propaganda. It may have been propaganda from some of our representatives at those negotiations because some of them were long engaged in attempting to negotiate a treaty. At least it exhausted their patience. I am not blaming them. One of my temperament would long since have lost patience in negotiating with the Russians.

I would either have blown up and dissolved the treaty conference in great confusion, or I would have become so exhausted and confused that I would probably have signed the same statement.

Mr. GORE. For the sake of the accuracy of the record, I propose to search the record and tomorrow will make a brief statement in that regard.

Mr. RUSSELL. I hope the Senator will do so, and will go into the question. I hope that he will ascertain what occurred from the time we started with discussions of 20 on-site inspections and determine how far down we brought the

figure. That part of the statement is accurate.

Mr. GORE. The Senator will recall that he and I expressed jointly our exasperation when, in 1959, I believe it was, Prime Minister Macmillan made a visit to Russia and, according to all the reports, later confirmed, it was he who dropped the hint of seven or eight inspections. Like the Senator from Georgia, I resisted the constant whittling down of the number of inspections because I thought we were going below the number of inspections which would give an adequate system of detection of underground tests. Many times the Senator and I have talked in the Chamber or at the luncheon table. I have cautioned our administration. I have made speeches on the Senate floor.

Mr. RUSSELL. I have commended the Senator from Tennessee time and again, and have endeavored to encourage him in his position. The Senator has rendered real service. I cannot refrain from expressing my regret that the Senator did not go somewhat further. But I can understand the Senator's position.

I will listen to the Senator's remarks. If I am unable to be present in the Chamber, I will pay the Senator the greatest compliment one Senator can pay to another; I will read every line of this speech in the RECORD.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield again?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. NELSON in the chair). Does the Senator from Georgia yield to the Senator from Tennessee?

Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.

Mr. GORE. I have always favored, since the first day the conference met in Geneva on October 30, 1958, when I was present, the United States taking the lead in curbing and eliminating atmospheric tests, because I thought it was particularly in this medium in which the greatest hazard to the human race was involved, and that it was in this medium that the proliferation of weapons in the hands of other nations would be most likely to occur.

I assure the Senator that I have done everything I possibly could to obtain a workable and effective treaty.

Mr. RUSSELL. I subscribe to that statement.

Mr. GORE. This one is limited.

The able Senator referred to the Baruch plan. I believe the Senator said in his speech that he supported the Baruch plan. I point out to the Senator that that was far more comprehensive than the limited treaty before the Senate. I point out to the Senator that it involved a real military disadvantage as proposed, because then the United States had a monopoly on nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union had not even achieved an atomic explosion, let alone a thermonuclear one. It was then proposed that we go much further and vest these weapons in an international agency.

If I entertained the convictions which the able Senator has here expressed today, I would join him in opposition to the treaty.

Mr. RUSSELL. I know that. Much of my respect for the Senator grows from

the fact that the Senator from Tennessee is one Member of this body who is not afraid to stand alone when he reaches a conclusion.

Mr. GORE. I thank the able Senator.

Mr. RUSSELL. I said practically as much in my remarks. When Mr. Baruch made the proposal, we were giving up the monopoly which we had. We had a monopoly on atomic weapons that we were willing to surrender, but the Soviet Union refused to agree to the Baruch proposal.

Mr. GORE. I agree. The Senator has spoken well.

Mr. RUSSELL. I thank the Senator.

Mr. GORE. The Senator has spoken ably and diligently. I do not wish to trespass further upon his time. I realize that this is an issue which involves faith or lack of it, trust, or distrust, like or dislike. It is an issue with respect to which men search their souls and reach conscientious convictions. I am confident that the Senator's conviction has been so reached.

Mr. RUSSELL. I have tried to do so.

Mr. CANNON and Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.

Mr. RUSSELL. I yield first to the Senator from Nevada. Then I will yield to the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I compliment the Senator from Georgia for an excellent statement. The Senator pointed out that, in his opinion, this would be a step along the road toward unilateral disarmament, and that it would be extremely difficult, as amendments were proposed, after all the signatories had signed the agreement, to resist any proposed amendment or change.

I am aware of the fact that the Senator has an amendment which has been printed, which would insure that any proposed amendment to the treaty would be submitted to the Senate for its consideration and for its advice and consent; and I presume that would require the same number of votes.

I have heard assurances from individuals in this regard, but I wish to ask the distinguished Senator from Georgia his opinion as to the necessity for this type of insurance provision.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, if I had not thought it desirable I would not have suggested it.

I say to the distinguished Senator from Nevada that I have discussed this subject in some detail with the distinguished Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT]. The Senator is convinced that the necessity for submission for advice and consent is so clear that the amendment is not necessary. We are discussing the question. I hope that we shall be able to arrive at some agreement. I have some reason to believe that we will, though not in the exact terms I offered. It is very seldom that one gets exactly what he seeks in the Senate.

This will at least assert the position of the Senate, and the position of the administration as expressed by President Kennedy—which would be binding, we hope, on any of his successors in office—that any amendments to the treaty

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would be submitted to the advice and consent process as set forth in the Constitution.

Mr. CANNON. And that would require the same vote required for approval of the treaty?

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes. Article II, section 2, referring to the President's powers, states that "He shall have power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties; provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur."

I am hopeful in that regard, and have reason to believe that that question will be resolved.

Mr. CANNON. I thank the Senator for his assurance in that regard. I feel that some assurance should be given in connection with this ratification.

Mr. RUSSELL. I thank the Senator. I have a strong feeling that it should.

I now yield to the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I thank the Senator very much.

A great deal has been said about military men considering political matters. This seems to be somewhat of a turnaround.

I recall that in 1961 speeches by military officers about communism were being censored. They were not allowed to discuss that subject. It was considered to be political. I did not so consider it. I considered that communism was a subversive subject, not a political subject. At any rate, the speeches of the officers were censored.

Only recently Mr. McNamara put into effect the salient features of the Gesell report. The Gesell report instructs the military commanders of the camps, bases, and military installations to go into the surrounding communities and see that public facilities as well as private business establishments in the surrounding communities are integrated. If anything is political, that certainly is.

A few moments ago the Senator from Arkansas may have been attempting to chide the Senator from Georgia a bit about some statements it is alleged he made some time ago, about considering political as well as military matters, but I recall that on the Senate floor, on September 13, 1963, the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] made this statement:

This is an illustration of the fact that it is impossible to distinguish clearly between a military consideration and a political consideration. They are inextricably merged, in their judgment.

That statement is a far contrast from the position the Senator from Arkansas took in the Fulbright memorandum, in 1961. In 1961 the Senator from Arkansas said:

There is little in the education, training, or experience of most military officers to equip them with the balance of judgment necessary to put their own ultimate solutions—those with which their education, training, and experience are concerned—into proper perspective in the President's total "strategy for the nuclear age."

The Senator further said, in that memorandum which I made public in

the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on August 2, 1961:

Rather, the need is for understanding of the true nature of that menace, and the direction of the public's present and foreseeable awareness of the fact of the menace toward support of the President's own total program for survival in the nuclear age. There are no reasons to believe that military personnel generally can contribute to this need, beyond their specific, technical competence to explain their own role. On the contrary, there are many reasons, and some evidence, for believing that an effort by the military, beyond this limitation, involves considerable danger.

I do not understand why it is that in 1961, the military could not participate in conducting cold war seminars on the subject of communism, yet now the military can consider these great political questions, on which, according to one of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they are less informed.

General LeMay said, in his testimony before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee:

But the net result is that there are military and technical disadvantages to the treaty. All of the Joint Chiefs agreed on this point.

However, there are political advantages that may accrue from the treaty. This is a field that I don't consider myself an expert in, and I have depended to a large extent on the advice of others.

General LeMay says he does not consider himself an expert in political matters, but he was directed to come to a conclusion based on military as well as political considerations. He was not only directed, but was told to rely on political conclusions given him by the State Department. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were directed to consider what the State Department told them as being the valid political conclusions; and, on that basis, the Joint Chiefs arrived at their conclusion of qualified endorsement of the treaty.

There is no question that, from a military standpoint, there are serious disadvantages to the treaty. I am amazed at the position now being taken by this administration and some of the proponents of the treaty that military men must now consider political questions, whereas they could not consider what was described as political questions when the officers wanted to talk against communism, because that was considered a political question back in 1961.

Further, General LeMay was interrogated in regard to this matter by the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. BYRD], who posed this question:

You have indicated, General LeMay, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not to confine their judgment in connection with the treaty before us on the basis of purely military considerations, but that political considerations were also to be thought about.

Is this normal, General LeMay, or has it been the practice in the past for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to attempt to assess political considerations in reaching their judgments?

General LeMay answered:

It certainly has been true since President Kennedy came into office, because this is one of the first things that they told the Joint Chiefs they expected them to do. They expected them to put the political factors in at their level.

They told us this verbally many times. Actually, I think we have a note in writing on the subject.

So the military have been told to consider political questions whenever it is so desired, whenever it is thought the decision will be in favor of the administration; but when it comes to considering questions with regard to speaking against communism, which the administration considers political, but which I consider subversive, the military cannot do it. They get orders to stay out of it.

Does that make much sense to the Senator from Georgia?

Mr. RUSSELL. I could not evaluate all the Senator has said, because I am not familiar with all of it, but the question of the Senator reminds me of the old saying, "Oh, that mine enemy had written a book," and causes me to extend it to say, "Oh, to have had a Senator make five speeches in the Senate." Sometimes we meet words we have uttered under different circumstances.

Generally speaking, I accept the thesis that the military branch of our Government is under civilian control. Those able and dedicated men, who have spent their lifetime in the service of their country, have much information they can bring out on a number of subjects, and it is impossible to keep them from having their own political opinions.

Going back to a previous question, I stated to Secretary McNamara that the line of demarcation between the two was so thin that it could not be seen.

I do not believe military men should be hobbled in expressing their ideas. I do not mean that they should run around indiscriminately and find a soapbox in some square from which to make a speech, but certainly officers who have spent their lives in the service of the Nation have much advice that can be helpful to our people.

The Senator mentioned the Gesell report. I intend to say something about that report later. That introduces into the service the same system of commissars that we condemn so heatedly in the Russian Army. It brings a completely political complexion into the indoctrination of men who are trained to fight a war, not only to condition minds, such as what brought General Walker into disrepute, but seeks to influence the views on political questions of those who live in proximity to military posts. However, I do not wish to go into that subject now.

Mr. THURMOND. I could go into further questioning and quote it for the record, but I shall not do so at this time. I thank the Senator. I again wish to commend him for his most eloquent and convincing address.

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL. I yield to the Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. CURTIS. I commend the Senator from Georgia for the views he has given and the stand he has taken. I will not elaborate on his statement, but I point out for the RECORD that I doubt if there is any Senator in the history of the Republic who has been associated with the problems of the defense of the country for as many years, through two great

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of atomic energy as they have in the peaceful uses. A fearful world seeks some indication, no matter how small, that the powerful forces opposing each other in the East and in the West are able to find a path mutually advantageous to both, a path which may lead eventually to elimination of the threat of a nuclear holocaust. This treaty, while limited in scope, thus assumes tremendous importance in the eyes of the world because it represents the first step toward that greater goal which we pray we may some day achieve.

It is the first step, and like all first steps it does not traverse a great distance. Also, like all first steps, it was entered into cautiously and haltingly. May subsequent follow on steps be taken with greater assurance and encompass larger areas.

The treaty before us consists of five articles and, as clearly and unequivocally described by those charged with responsibility for its negotiations, by the President, by the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense, it is a self-contained document which embodies the whole of the agreement. There are no other arrangements, conditions, understandings, or additions of any kind.

In article I, the parties to the agreement agree to prohibit nuclear weapon tests and all other nuclear explosions in peacetime in three environments: in the atmosphere, underwater, and outer space. Signatories to this treaty agree not to aid any other nation in conducting nuclear explosions of the type prohibited under the treaty. Under article I, underground explosions are permitted as long as resulting radioactive debris is not carried to and deposited beyond the territorial limits of the nation conducting the tests.

By its very nature the treaty pertains to the testing of nuclear weapons, and does not affect the use of nuclear weapons in time of war. To the extent that the United States has always maintained the right to use nuclear weapons in its defense against armed aggression, such a right is not affected or limited by this agreement.

This point was clearly brought out by Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara in their testimony in support of the treaty. It is substantiated by a legal opinion set forth on page 76 of the printed hearings.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the opinion be printed at this point in the Record, in connection with my remarks.

There being no objection, the opinion was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

AUGUST 14, 1963.

OPINION OF THE LEGAL ADVISER

Subject: Meaning of the words "Or Any Other Nuclear Explosion" appearing in article I, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater.

Article I, paragraph 1, of the treaty provides:

"1. Each of the parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control: ***"

Article I, paragraph 2, provides:

"2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described or have the effect referred to in paragraph 1 of this article."

The question has been raised whether the words "or any other nuclear explosion" impose any limitation on the use of nuclear weapons by the parties in war.

The answer is no.

I. THE TEXT OF THE TREATY

The text of the treaty and its internal construction provide ample grounds for answering the question in the negative.

The title of the treaty is "Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater." This title delimits the operative scope of the treaty. It shows that the treaty was intended to deal with weapon tests and not with the use of nuclear weapons in combat or in connection with armed hostilities. The limited scope of the treaty in this respect is reinforced by its preamble. The second paragraph looks forward to more general disarmament, eliminating the incentive to the production and testing of nuclear weapons. If this treaty banned the use of such weapons in wartime, the incentive for further production and testing would already be gone. Similarly, the third paragraph of the preamble, looking to the future negotiation of a comprehensive test ban, shows that this treaty is limited in its application to nuclear weapons tests.

The agreed communique issued when the treaty was initialled refers to a series of meetings to discuss questions relating to the discontinuance of nuclear tests. It notes that agreement was reached on the "text of a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater." It refers to the agreement in several places as "the test ban treaty," and it refers specifically to discussions relating to a nonaggression pact. Had the negotiators agreed to ban the use of nuclear weapons in war it would surely have been mentioned in the agreed communique.

Moreover, the generals' scheme of the treaty is inconsistent with an interpretation of the words, "other nuclear explosion" to cover wartime use of nuclear weapons. The treaty has no effect on laboratory development of nuclear weapons. It permits weapons tests and other explosions underground, so long as the radioactive debris is confined within the territorial limits of the State in which the explosion is conducted. The treaty does not restrict weapons production, as appears from the second paragraph of the preamble. The Soviet Union has rejected any proposal even to restrict the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Finally the treaty does not require the destruction of any stockpiled weapons. It is hardly conceivable that a treaty which permits the development, testing, stockpiling, and production of nuclear weapons should be construed as banning their use in wartime.

II. NEGOTIATING HISTORY

The conclusions derived from the text of the treaty are supported by a review of the negotiating history. That history reveals that the words "or any other nuclear explosion" were inserted to prevent evasion of the treaty by the explosion in peacetime of tested nuclear weapons, whether for peaceful purposes or otherwise.

The basis for the Moscow negotiations was the draft of the limited nuclear test ban treaty tabled in Geneva on August 27, 1962, by the United States and United Kingdom delegations. Article I of that draft prohibited nuclear weapon tests. Explosions

were dealt with in article II. Such explosions were permitted, but were to be subjected to controls because of the difficulty of distinguishing peaceful purpose explosions from weapons tests.

In the course of the Moscow negotiations, the Soviets rejected article II of the August 1962 draft completely. This rejection would have left a loophole in the treaty if article I had remained confined to "nuclear weapon test explosions." A party might have conducted explosions revealing valuable military data or even weapon tests on the pretense that they were in fact peaceful purposes explosions and not "nuclear weapon test explosions." In order to close this loophole, the phrase "any other nuclear explosion" was inserted in article I at the appropriate points. Its purpose is to prevent, in the specified environments, peacetime nuclear explosions that are not weapons tests. That is its only significance.

III. GENERAL UNDERSTANDING

This construction of the phrase "or any other nuclear explosion" is supported by the public statements of United States and other officials prior to the signature and ratification of the treaty. Thus, in his radio address presenting the treaty to the American public, the President said:

"No nation's right of self-defense will in any way be impaired. Nor does this treaty mean an end to the threat of nuclear war. It will not reduce nuclear stockpiles; it will not halt the production of nuclear weapons; it will not restrict their use in time of war."

The President's message transmitting the treaty to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification makes the same point,¹ as does Acting Secretary Ball's letter transmitting the treaty to the President.² Secretary of State Rusk reiterated the point at the signing ceremony in Moscow, and again in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. There he said:

"This treaty does not affect the use of nuclear weapons in war. It has to do with nuclear weapon testing in time of peace."

This understanding of the import of the treaty is not confined to United States officials alone. For example, United Nations Secretary-General U Thant, appearing in Moscow at the treaty signing, listed a number of "other equally important measures aimed at the relaxation of tension." Among these he included the following:

"I would also hope that the proposal, initiated in the fall of 1961, for convening a special conference for signing the convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons for war purposes, will now receive wider support."

It would obviously be unnecessary to hold such a conference if the test ban treaty itself outlawed the use of such weapons in war.

IV. TACTICAL WEAPONS

There has been some suggestion that the phrase "or any other nuclear explosion" might outlaw the use of tactical, as opposed to strategic, weapons in wartime. There is no basis in the treaty for making any distinction whatever between tactical and stra-

¹ "While it will not end the threat of nuclear war or outlaw the use of nuclear weapons, it can reduce world tensions, open a way to further agreements, and thereby help to ease the threat of war."

² "The phrase 'any other nuclear explosion' includes explosions for peaceful purposes. Such explosions are prohibited by the treaty because of the difficulty of differentiating between weapon test explosions and peaceful explosions without additional controls. The article does not prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in the event of war nor restrict the exercise of the right of self-defense recognized in article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations."

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tic weapons. The analysis in this opinion applies fully to tactical as well as strategic weapons.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, article II provides a method for amending the treaty. It requires that any amendment receive the unanimous approval of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R., as well as the votes of a majority of all parties to the treaty. The treaty recognizes the ratification process of each of the original parties to any amendment. Accordingly, all proposed amendments prior to entering into force must come before the Senate of the United States, for approval by two-thirds vote. The President and the Secretary of State have given their assurances that no amendment will be agreed to without submission to the Senate.

I wish to say, for the Record, that we have entered with many nations into bilateral agreements on military and peaceful uses of atomic energy. Many of these bilateral agreements subsequently have been amended from time to time; and each time they were amended, the President of the United States gave to Congress and to the Joint Committee the same assurances that were given at the time of the original bilateral agreement; and all the amendments were submitted to the same governmental process of submitting them to Congress and the Joint Committee, as was done with the original bilateral agreement. This is precisely the way amendments to this agreement must be treated, and will be treated.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Rhode Island yield?

Mr. PASTORE. I am glad to yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I particularly appreciate the Senator's emphasis of this point, and his doing so with such great clarity and effectiveness.

I should like to ask a question: Does he know of any instance in which a treaty made by this country has been amended other than by following the procedure of submitting it to the Senate and obtaining its approval?

Mr. PASTORE. I certainly do not; and I believe it is elementary law and fundamental international law, and the law of our land, that whenever a treaty needs amendment, the amendment must be submitted to the Senate, just as the original treaty was. There can be no question about that. We received the assurance of the President and we received the assurance of the Secretary of State of that. If anyone now says that is not enough, let him look at the precedents; he will find the answer there.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thank the Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. PASTORE. Article III sets forth the procedures for ratification and accession, and permits all nations so desiring to become a signatory. Accordingly, East Germany and Communist China may subscribe to the treaty without constituting recognition by the United States. I think that point should be made abundantly clear.

As these treaties are signed by the nations of the world, they may be deposited with three depositaries: with the United States, Great Britain, and Rus-

sia. It is absolutely clear, and we have been told so unequivocally by the Secretary of State, that the mere fact that Red China, Cuba, or any other government which we do not recognize at this time becomes a signatory to the treaty, does not, in itself, compel us or oblige us to recognize that government or put us in the position of recognizing it. I do not know how much clearer one could make that point.

The able minority leader, the junior Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN], quite appropriately asked for clarification on this point when the treaty was first submitted. The West German Government also had a question on this point. Clear statements by the President and by the Department of State, and a legal opinion set forth on page 15 of the printed hearings, affirm the fact that no recognition is afforded to an unrecognized regime which may subscribe to the treaty.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that that opinion be made a part of the RECORD at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the opinion was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AUGUST 12, 1963.

OPINION OF THE LEGAL ADVISER

Subject: Questions of Recognition in Relation to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

Article III of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Underwater, provides that the Treaty shall be open to all States for signature, subject to later ratification, or for accession. It designates the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union as depositary governments.

The question has arisen whether recognition is accorded to an unrecognized regime that subscribes to the obligations of the test ban treaty. The answer is no; no change in the status of such a regime can occur.

I

In international law, the governing criterion in determining recognition is intent. Lauterpacht, Digest of International Law, 166. The intention is ordinarily express, but recognition can also be implied from acts if they manifest unequivocally the intention of a government to recognize a state or regime. It is, however, a well-established proposition of international law that participation with an unrecognized regime in a multilateral treaty open for general adherence does not give rise to such an implication of recognition.

"The legal position with respect to multilateral treaties may be correctly summarized to the effect that neither signature nor adherence on the part either of the nonrecognizing or the unrecognized state result by themselves in bringing about recognition." Lauterpacht, "Recognition in International Law," 374.

The American Law Institute Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States says:

"Section 107. Manifestation of Intention To Recognize, General: (1) Recognition is effected by manifestation of intention by the government of a state to treat an entity as a state, or to treat a regime as a government. Such manifestation may be made by an express indication that recognition is extended or by implication from certain relations or associations between the state and the entity or regime, unless such an implication is prevented by disclaimer of intention to recognize."

* * * * *

"(3) Except as stated in section 108 [which refers to participation in international organizations], participation by a state in a multilateral international agreement in which an entity not previously recognized by it also participates does not necessarily imply recognition of the entity as a state, or recognition, as its government, of the regime that makes the agreement for it." Restatement, Foreign Relations, section 107 (proposed official draft 1962).

Continental writers take the same position. For example:

"It seems, therefore, that the prevailing practice is, not to restrict the effects of a multilateral treaty to the relations between recognized contracting parties, but to admit the validity of the commitment of a government that is not recognized, even with respect to the states that refuse to recognize it without, nevertheless, that government's obtaining implicit recognition." Charpentier, *La Reconnaissance internationale et l'évolution du droit des gens*, 61 (1958).

II

The practice of the United States has been consistent with this rule that participation in a multilateral treaty to which the United States is a party, especially a treaty open for general adherence, does not accord recognition to regimes or authorities that the United States does not recognize.

"It is not considered . . . that adherence to a multilateral treaty of which the United States is a signatory or to which it is a party, by an unrecognized government, involves recognition of the latter by the United States. It is erroneous to attribute to the Government of the United States the doctrine that adherence to a multilateral treaty by governments to which previous recognition had not been accorded, constitutes recognition of such governments. Adherence by another government is its own unilateral act. Intention is a matter of primary importance in recognition, and intention on the part of the United States to recognize such a government could not be imputed to it from an act of the other government." Green Hackworth, *Digest of International Law*, 354.

The United States has also taken the position that no disclaimer is necessary in order to avoid recognition.

In 1929, in connection with the International Conference on the Safety of Life at Sea, Secretary of State Kellogg said:

"It is the view of the Government of the United States that neither participation of the United States through an American delegation in a conference in which delegates representing the Soviet regime are also participants, the signing by American plenipotentiaries of a multilateral convention which is signed also by delegates of the Soviet regime, nor the ratification of a convention signed by plenipotentiaries of the United States and representatives of the Soviet regime constitute recognition of the so-called Government of the Union of Russia, and that such actions by the United States or its plenipotentiaries are not fairly open to construction by foreign governments as constituting such recognition by the United States."

In 1932, Green Hackworth, then legal adviser, stated in connection with the International Sanitary Convention for Air Navigation:

"The mere signing of a multilateral treaty to which a nonrecognized government is also signatory does not constitute recognition of that government."

"Recognition, as has repeatedly been stated, is primarily a matter of intent. Intent to recognize cannot be validly imputed from the mere failure to raise objection or make reservation where no direct contractual obligation is undertaken."

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The United States has also taken the position that, within the framework of a general multilateral treaty, it could even have dealings with a nonrecognized regime without thereby recognizing it. It has been our view that any possible implication resulting from such dealings would be effectively negated by an appropriate disclaimer.

As depositary of the 1949 Geneva Conventions on Red Cross and Prisoners of War, the Swiss Government received acceptances from five regimes not then recognized by the United States. The U.S. Government, in replying to notifications of these acceptances, acknowledged that the nonrecognized regimes had committed themselves to apply the conventions.

More recently, the United States signed the protocol on the neutrality of Laos in 1962, which was also signed by Communist China and North Vietnam. Despite this co-signature, the United States continues to refuse to recognize both these regimes.

The United States is a party to some 11 conventions or treaties also subscribed to by the so-called German Democratic Republic.¹ The treatment given by the United States to these efforts of the German Democratic Republic to become a party to multilateral treaties has depended upon the particular treaty. In most cases (e.g., aviation, shipping, and industrial property), the United States, on receiving a notification from a depositary government that the German Democratic Republic purported to accede, has replied by stating that, since the United States does not recognize the so-called German Democratic Republic, the United States attached no significance to the purported action. However, in the case of the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, the United States responded to a notification that the German Democratic Republic had purported to accede by stating:

"The Government of the United States of America does not recognize the 'German Democratic Republic.' Bearing in mind, however, the purpose of the Geneva Conventions that their provisions should protect war victims in armed conflict, the Government of the United States *** notes that the 'Government of the German Democratic Republic' has accepted the provisions of the Geneva Conventions ***, and has indicated its intention to apply them, subject to certain reservations *** as to which the attitude of the *** United States parallels its attitude toward reservations to the Conventions as communicated at the time of deposit of the U.S. instruments of ratification."

The practice of other countries has been similar. The Federal Republic of Germany, for example, responded to the Swiss notification of the attempted East German adherence to the Prisoners of War Convention with a note of the same tenor as the U.S. note quoted above. When the International Sugar Agreement was signed in London in 1953, the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia declared that their signatures did not imply recognition of the authority of the Republic of China over Formosa. Treaty Series, No. 28 (1958), Cmd. 9815, at 223.

¹ Convention for the unification of certain rules relating to international transportation by air; International Load Line Convention; Convention on safety of life at sea; Geneva Convention relating to the treatment of prisoners of war; Red Cross Convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field; Red Cross Convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea; Convention relating to the protection of civil persons in time of war; Agreement for the suppression of the circulation of obscene publications; Convention for the protection of industrial property; Convention relating to the suppression of the abuse of opium and other drugs; Convention for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs.

III
The United States has also considered that, when acting as depositary of a multilateral treaty, it could receive and circulate communications from regimes it did not recognize without thereby extending recognition. For example, in the case of the International Civil Aviation Convention, Trans-Jordan forwarded a notice of adherence when the United States did not recognize the Trans-Jordan government. The United States accepted the notification, but pointed out in its notes to other governments that the United States had not accorded political recognition to Trans-Jordan and that application of the Convention between the United States and Trans-Jordan was not to be understood as implying political recognition of Trans-Jordan by the United States.

The United Kingdom adopted the same view as depositary of the Load Line Convention when the East German authorities filed a notification of adherence. The United Kingdom circulated the notice, emphasizing that it was acting solely in its capacity as depositary, and that its action in no way implied recognition of the East German authorities.

In the case of the test-ban treaty, however, it is understood among the original parties that no depositary need accept a signature or communications from a regime that it does not recognize. Thus the contacts between the United States as depositary and unrecognized regimes will be kept to an absolute minimum, and below the level which the general rules of international law would permit in a depositary without implying any change in recognition status of unrecognized subscribers to the treaty.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, each one of the three original parties to the agreement is designated a depositary government, and subsequent subscribers to the treaty may deposit their instruments of ratification or accession with any one of the three.

Article IV reserves to each nation the right to withdraw from the treaty "if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country." Three months advance notice of such withdrawal must be given to all other parties to the treaty. Accordingly, we reserve to ourselves the right to terminate if our overriding national interests necessitate withdrawal from the treaty. On the other hand, in the event of violation by the Soviet Union—and this point must be made abundantly clear—the treaty would, of course, be abrogated, and no time period would have to run before we could proceed to do as we pleased. A detailed legal opinion covers this point, and appears on pages 37 to 40 of the printed hearings.

I ask unanimous consent that the opinion be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the opinion was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

OPINION OF THE LEGAL ADVISER

Subject: Right of the United States to withdraw from the nuclear test ban treaty in the event of violation by another party.

Article IV of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Underwater provides, inter alia:

"Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the treaty three months in advance."

The question has been raised whether the United States would have to give 3 months' notice prior to withdrawing if another party conducted nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, or committed some other act in plain violation of the treaty. The answer is "No."

A breach of treaty obligations by one party is considered in international law to give other parties the right to terminate their obligations under the treaty. Article IV is not intended as a restriction of that right. The three original parties recognized that events other than violations of the treaty might jeopardize a country's "supreme interests" and require that country to resume testing in the prohibited environments. Article IV permits withdrawal, upon 3 months' notice, in this case. If another party violated the treaty, the United States could treat the violation as an "extraordinary event" within the meaning of article IV, or it could withdraw from the treaty immediately.

I. THE GENERAL RULE

In international law, violation of a treaty by one party makes the treaty voidable at the option of the other parties. I Lauterpacht, "Oppenheim's International Law" 947 (8th ed. 1955); see also Restatement, Foreign Relations, section 162 (proposed official draft 1962). Whether there has been a violation, and whether it is serious enough to justify termination is for each party, acting in good faith to decide. The right to void the treaty must be exercised within a reasonable time after the violation has become known (I Lauterpacht, 948).

The right of unilateral abrogation for cause has apparently never been adjudicated in an international court.¹ It has however, been confirmed by publicists generally, and by United States, British, and Soviet authorities, among others.

The British view is "that, in general terms, such a right exists; [and] that the exercise of this right is optional at the discretion of the party wronged." McNair, "The Law of Treaties, British Practice and Opinions" 515 (1st ed. 1938).² Soviet authorities have taken the same position:

"The annulment of a treaty by one signatory in the event of the nonfulfillment by the other of key terms is held to be legal," Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., Institute of State and Law, "International Law" 280.

The United States has consistently affirmed its unilateral right to terminate treaties in the event of violation by another party. Green Hackworth, then Legal Adviser of the Department of State and later a judge of the International Court of Justice, declared in 1935,

"The weight of opinion as expressed, at least in the United States, appears to incline to the view that a state may by its own unilateral act terminate a treaty as between itself and a state which it regards as having violated such treaty." Memorandum of the legal adviser of the Department of State,

¹ It has, however, been alluded to in at least two cases before the Permanent Court of International Justice, *Diversion of Water From the River Meuse*, P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 70, 50 (1937); *Case concerning the Factory at Cherzow*, P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9, 31 (1927).

² The second edition of McNair deals with the law of treaties generally, rather than with British practice. In the second edition, he limits the exercise of the right to cases of "fundamental breach." Id. at 571 (2d ed., 1961).

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February 27, 1935, V Hackworth, "Digest of International Law" 346 (1943).

In 1791, James Madison wrote that a breach of a treaty by one party "discharges the other," which is then "at liberty to take advantage or not of the breach, as dissolving the treaty." V. Moore, "Digest of International Law" 321 (1906).

At least four Secretaries of State and one President have expressed the same view. Secretary of State Frelinghuysen termed the Clayton-Bulwer treaty "voidable at the option of the United States" because Great Britain had "persistently violated her agreement not to colonize the Central American coast." Quoted in *Hooper v. U.S.*, 22 Ct. Cl. 408, 417 (1887). And in a memorandum for the President in 1896 concerning that treaty, Secretary of State Olney said Great Britain "undoubtedly did not fully comply with the provisions of the treaty" and that this "might well have been made the ground for an annulment of the treaty altogether." ³ III, Moore, 205. Secretary of State Lansing took the same position in a communication to the Swiss Minister in Washington concerning the effect of German violations of the treaty with Prussia of 1828, II Hyde, "International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States" 1542 (2d rev. ed. 1945). The right of abrogation upon breach by another party was affirmed in a dictum by President Coolidge in his award as arbitrator in a dispute between Chile and Peru. Opinion and award of the arbitrator, 19 Am. J. Int'l L. 393, 398 (1925). Secretary of State Hughes also signed the award.

Finally, the Supreme Court has also declared the principle. Mr. Justice Iredell, in *Ware v. Hylton*, said it was "a part of the law of nations, that if a treaty be violated by one party, it is at the option of the other party, if innocent, to declare, in consequence of the breach, that the treaty is void" (3 Dallas 199, 261 (1796); see also *Charlton v. Kelly*, 229 U.S. 447 (1913)).

The most restrictive position on the right of unilateral abrogation for cause is taken by the Harvard Law Research Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, which rejects the right and substitutes instead provisional suspension pending referral to an international tribunal, 29 Am. J. Int'l L., Supp. 1077, 1094 (1935). This position has been rejected by subsequent writers, and finds no support in international practice.

II. INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE

The right to abrogate or annul a treaty on the ground that another party has committed a breach has been exercised rarely. The United States appears to have invoked it only once. In 1798, when relations between France and the United States were strained, Congress passed an act, signed by the President, declaring that—

"Whereas the treaties concluded between the United States and France have been repeatedly violated on the part of the French Government; and the just claims of the United States for reparation of the injuries so committed have been refused, and their attempts to negotiate an amicable adjustment of all complaints between the two nations have been repelled with indignity: * * * the United States are of right freed and exonerated from the stipulations of the treaties and of the consular convention, heretofore concluded between the United

³ The United States alleged that Great Britain had violated the treaty by exercising sovereignty over British Honduras, and by treating that territory as a British colony. The British considered the allegation "wholly untenable," on the ground that the treaty was not intended to cover British Honduras. However, they also assumed that the United States would be entitled to abrogate the treaty if Great Britain had violated it, McNair, 567-568 (2d ed.).

States and France; * * * 1 Stat. 578, V Moore, 356.⁴

France did not recognize the U.S. termination. For an account of subsequent negotiations see V Moore, "History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to Which the United States Has Been a Party" 4429 (1898).

In 1933, a Greek Court refused to extradite Samuel Insull, then under indictment in the United States for violation of the bankruptcy laws. The United States denounced the treaty but did not abrogate it. In a communication to the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, the American Minister to Greece, termed the decision "utterly untenable and a clear violation of the American-Hellenic Treaty of Extradition" * * * and stated:

"Accordingly I am instructed to give formal notice herewith of my Government's denunciation of the treaty with a view to its termination at the earliest date possible under its pertinent provisions," 28 Am. J. Int'l L. 307, 311 (1934).

The issue was later resolved by a protocol to the extradition treaty, IV Hackworth, "Digest of International Law" 118.

In 1870, Russia denounced the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris on the ground that the other parties had violated several of its essential clauses. For an account of British practice, see McNair, 540-570 (2d ed.).

Unilateral abrogation has normally been met by vigorous protests from the other parties. However, the protests have been the result of disagreement over the facts rather than over the principle of law. See II Hyde, 1543, McNair, 568 (2d ed.).

III. MATERIALITY OF THE BREACH

Most publicists limit the right of abrogation to cases of a substantial breach by the other party. Hyde says abrogation by one party is justified by the "failure of a contracting state to observe a *material stipulation* of its agreement" * * *, although he also notes the futility of attempting "to enunciate rules pointing, decisively to the circumstances when abrogation by one party is to be excused." II Hyde, 1541. [Italics supplied.] The rule is sometimes stated in terms of the nonfulfillment of "key terms" (U.S.S.R., "International Law" 280) or "breach of a stipulation which is material to the main object," Hall, "A Treatise on International Law" 409 (8th ed. Higgins 1924). Under the proposed draft restatement, termination of the entire agreement is justified only when the violation "has the effect of depriving the aggrieved party of an essential benefit of the agreement," "Restatement," section 162. The draft articles on the Law of Treaties of the International Law Commission, prepared by G. C. Fitzmaurice, require a "fundamental breach of the treaty in an essential respect, going to the root or foundation of the treaty relationship between the parties." ⁵ II Yearbook of the International Law Commission 31 (1957), A/CN.4/SER.A/1957 (Add.1).

Hackworth, however, does not so limit the right of abrogation, and Lauterpacht states:

"There is no unanimity on the point, since some make a distinction between essential

⁴ The treaties with France were abrogated by act of Congress. However, the President may, acting alone, declare a treaty inoperative or suspended. See 40 Ops. Att'y Gen. 119, 123 (1941). See also "Restatement," sec. 167.

⁵ In the first edition of his "Law of Treaties" McNair said flatly, " * * * it is not possible to say that some stipulations are essential ones and some are not, and that only a breach of one of the former class gives rise to the right; it must be assumed that each stipulation forms part of the consideration which induces the other party to enter into the treaty," at 515.

and nonessential provisions of the treaty, and maintain that only violation of essential provisions creates a right for the other party to cancel the treaty. Others oppose this distinction, maintaining that it is not always possible to distinguish essential from non-essential provisions, that the binding force of a treaty protects nonessential as well as essential provisions, and that it is for the injured party to consider for itself whether violation of a treaty, even in its least essential parts, justifies its cancellation." I Lauterpacht, 947.

The primary undertakings of the nuclear test ban treaty are contained in articles I and IV. Article I obligates the parties not to conduct nuclear weapon tests or other derwater, or in outer space. Underground explosions are permitted if they do not spread radioactive debris beyond the territory of the country in which they are conducted. Parties are also prohibited from "causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in" the carrying out of prohibited tests or explosions by others. Article IV requires 3 months' notice of withdrawal in the case of an "extraordinary event" jeopardizing "supreme interests." Breach of any of these obligations, all of which are fundamental, would justify withdrawal from the treaty under appropriate circumstances.

IV. MULTILATERAL TREATIES

The right of a party to terminate its obligations under a multilateral treaty because another party has breached it depends upon the nature of the treaty. A breach by one party obviously does not give any other party the right to bring the whole treaty to an end. At most, the aggrieved party may consider itself released from its obligations under the treaty.

In the case of multilateral treaties creating obligations necessarily dependent on the corresponding performance of other parties, a breach by one party justifies withdrawal by any other party. A disarmament treaty has been cited as an example of such a treaty in an analysis of unilateral withdrawal from multilateral treaties, II Yearbook of the International Law Commission 52-55 (1957). The nuclear test ban is of the same character. The undertaking of each party to refrain from testing nuclear weapons is given in return for a similar undertaking by each of the other parties.

However, in the case of a multilateral treaty consisting of a mutual and reciprocal interchange of benefits and concessions, such as a copyright or consular convention, a breach by one party does not justify general withdrawal by another party. Rather, it justifies only a reciprocal breach of obligations. For example, if state A refused to honor its obligations to state B under a copyright convention, state B could be released, if it chose, from its obligations to state A. It would not, however, be released from its obligations to other parties to the convention. Ibid.

COMMITTEE HEARINGS

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, 11 days of hearings were held to consider this treaty, in an historic combined meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee, the Armed Services Committee, and the Senate section of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

As chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, I want to thank the distinguished junior Senator from Arkansas, the scholarly and capable chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee [Mr. FULBRIGHT]. As chairman of that committee, to which all treaties are referred, and which had primary responsibility for investigating and developing all its aspects of this one, he was most gracious and considerate in inviting Sen-

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temporary society. The present officers of the Los Alamos chapter are Franz Jahoda, chairman, and Robert Cowan, secretary.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ANDERSON. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. As chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, I know that I express the appreciation of the entire committee, as well as myself, for the cooperation the distinguished Senator from New Mexico, former chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and, of course, the present chairman, gave. Both these men very graciously accepted the invitation of the Foreign Relations Committee. They attended the hearings assiduously and rendered a great service, not only because of their general knowledge, but their capacity to ask the right questions of the list of witnesses whom the Senator has just named, many of them scientists of whom I and other members of the Committee on Foreign Relations had little knowledge and with whom we had little acquaintance.

The Senator from New Mexico was extremely helpful, not only in suggesting some of the witnesses, but in examining them.

I think the committee, the Senate, and the country owe the Senator from New Mexico a great debt for the contribution he has made to the record of this committee, in addition to the speech which he has just now made, which has so well clarified some of the questions that have been raised, such as the one he mentioned about high altitude tests.

Much has been said on this floor about that subject by persons far less qualified to know, and naturally, it has caused some confusion, in the minds of people.

I thank the Senator for all he has done in helping to make the hearings complete and to enlighten the people of this country on this question.

Mr. ANDERSON. I thank the Senator from Arkansas and say to him that, in the beginning, I thought the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy ought to have had the treaty referred to it for study, but when I saw the way in which the Foreign Relations Committee went about its consideration and the courtesy it extended to other committees, and the widespread questions they permitted, I was happy to recognize the fine service the committee had rendered and was happy to participate.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thank the Senator. This is a very special treaty, and I do not know of many precedents, if any, for such a matter as this. There is a certain cumbersomeness connected with it, but with the cooperation of the chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, I thought it went on reasonably happy and that we made an excellent record. I thank the Senator for his help.

Mr. ANDERSON. I thank the Senator.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ANDERSON. I yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I would not miss the opportunity to commend the Senator from New Mexico. The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee has

done so already, with his usual ability and precision. However, I recall that some years ago the Senator from New Mexico, in his role as a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and then as its chairman, gave us many good lessons in terms of nuclear energy and its relationship to the disarmament program, when we were discussing proposals for nuclear test ban treaties.

As the Senator from Arkansas has so well stated, the questions asked by the Senator from New Mexico in the committee hearings on the test ban treaty opened up new lines of questioning for all of us and brought us a considerable amount of information which was exceedingly helpful.

The Senator has demolished the arguments that have been made about the inadequacy of our Government's program in high altitude testing. By a simple statement of fact, based on information, he has made the RECORD unequivocally clear with relation to our testing capacity and our testing program.

Mr. ANDERSON. I thank the Senator.

Mr. BIBLE. Mr. President, first I wish to join the Senator from Arkansas and the Senator from Minnesota in their compliments to my distinguished colleague and seatmate in the Senate, the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON]. His contributions in the field of atomic energy are well known. Those of us who live in Nevada lean heavily upon his advice and suggestions, because we are an integral part of the entire program. We have had many problems in connection with it in the past few years, and he has certainly been of great assistance in this field. We lean heavily on him for his suggestion as to the possibility of using underground detonations in future mining. I am grateful to him for the contributions he has made. They are based upon the sound knowledge of a very talented man.

I support the nuclear test ban treaty. Over the past several weeks I have studied with deep interest the bulk of testimony given before the Foreign Relations Committee. After weighing it carefully, I am convinced the nuclear test ban treaty is a small step in the right direction. This small step toward controlling the threat of nuclear war is being heralded the world over. Already over 90 nations have shown their approval by ratifying the treaty. These people share with the United States our hopes for a just peace and relaxation of tensions caused by the threat of nuclear war.

It is unfortunately true, Mr. President, that the Soviet Union has displayed bad faith in the past, and it is very likely that in many areas we may expect more of this sorry performance in the future. I hope that in this vital area with which the test ban deals, we may expect better intentions from the Russians than they have displayed in other areas. It is unfortunate this treaty cannot be based on trust. However, in the present world situation, it is ironic but all too true that we must travel the road to peace carefully. We must be protected with adequate armament and safeguards while negotiating.

Early in the testimony heard on the

test ban treaty the Joint Chiefs of Staff called for several safeguards which the United States should adopt under the treaty to insure our continued growth and achievement. In the face of repeated bad faith in the past by the Russians, these were felt necessary, even though the treaty is designed as a first step away from the arms race. These safeguards include first, the maintenance of comprehensive and aggressive underground nuclear tests; second, the maintenance and expansion of our nuclear laboratory facilities; third, maintaining our ability to begin immediately a comprehensive atmospheric testing program should violations be discovered and if deemed essential to our security; and fourth, the improvement of our capabilities to detect treaty violations and the ability to monitor Sino-Soviet nuclear actions and achievements.

These safeguards were assured the Senate by the President through his press conferences and in various speeches and by the Defense Department through a letter to Senator RUSSELL from Under Secretary Roswell Gilpatric which outlined in detail measures underway or planned to implement the safeguards called for.

The Senate has shown its determination to implement them.

Recently the distinguished majority and minority leaders, in order to make crystal clear to the Senate and the people of the Nation this Government's intentions, called on the President to put his formal assurances forward in a letter to the Senate. This letter was read September 11 before this body. I would like to briefly cover again what was said.

The President made these points from which I quote.

- Underground nuclear testing, which is permitted under the treaty, will be vigorously and diligently carried forward, and the equipment, facilities, personnel, and funds necessary for that purpose will be provided.

- The United States will maintain a posture of readiness to resume testing in the environments prohibited by the present treaty, and it will take all the necessary steps to safeguard our national security in the event that there should be an abrogation or violation of any treaty provision. In particular, the United States retains the right to resume atmospheric testing forthwith if the Soviet Union should conduct tests in violation of the treaty.

- Our facilities for the detection of possible violations of this treaty will be expanded and improved as required to increase our assurance against clandestine violation by others.

- I am glad to emphasize again that the treaty in no way limits the authority of the Commander in Chief to use nuclear weapons for the defense of the United States and its allies, if a situation should develop requiring such a grave decision. Any decision to use such weapons would be made by the United States in accordance with its constitutional processes and would in no way be affected by the terms of the nuclear test ban treaty.

- I am able to assure the Senate that if that unhappy island (Cuba) should be used either directly or indirectly to circumvent or nullify this treaty, the United States will take all necessary action in response.

- The treaty in no way changes the status of the authorities in East Germany.

- This Government will maintain strong weapons laboratories in a vigorous program

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of weapons development, in order to insure that the United States will continue to have in the future a strength fully adequate for an effective national defense.

8. The United States will diligently pursue its programs for the further development of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes by underground tests within the terms of the treaty.

It appears to me, Mr. President, that with such a thorough slate of safeguards and resolutions by the President, the United States can proceed to adopt the treaty under any risks remaining.

Surely, in view of the limited designs written into the treaty and with such adequate measures taken to protect ourselves, the United States should pursue the hope in the treaty that may lead to an easing of tensions and indeed to a lessening of the arms race in time. We cannot afford to do less.

Without this treaty we can expect unlimited testing by nations of the East and the West. We can expect testing by as many nations as have the ability and the will to produce nuclear armament. Both our allies and those of the Soviet Union seem to feel the need to do their own testing and produce their own weapons capability. They seem unwilling to trust the United States or the Soviet Union to risk catastrophe by protesting them with nuclear weapons. Thus, they will continue to produce weapons to protect themselves. The atmosphere will continue to be filled with radioactive poisons which threaten potential harm to many people. Tensions inherent in testing will go unabated. Where will this dangerous road end?

There have been arguments that the United States is losing the nuclear race to Russia. According to Atomic Energy Commission figures available, the U.S.S.R. has conducted over 145 nuclear tests, of which 144 were atmospheric. The United States has conducted 283 tests, of which 171 were in the atmosphere. The United States, Britain, and France have conducted over 300 tests among them. The United States has conducted tests of all types and has produced weapons in many varieties. Secretary of Defense McNamara has stated in testimony:

Allowing for losses from an initial enemy attack and attrition enroute to target, we calculate that our forces today could still destroy the Soviet Union without any help from the deployed tactical air units or carrier task forces or Thor or Jupiter IRBM's.

He further stated that the United States maintains nuclear warheads in the tens of thousands.

The Soviet Union tests have yielded more total megatonnage than the United States, because they have concentrated their testing in the high-yield spectrum, whereas the United States, by calculated decision, has stayed in the low-yield area. The Soviet Union thus appears ahead in high-yield technology, while the United States appears ahead in the low-yield area. Some witnesses have indicated that the United States should not allow itself to fall behind in any area of nuclear technology. Is it, indeed, dangerous for the United States to lag

in this area? Dr. Harold Brown, Director of Defense, Research and Engineering of the Department of Defense, has advised us in his testimony:

The U.S. advantage in the low and intermediate part of the yield spectrum is important technologically and in its effect on military systems. Our high-yield-to-weight ratio in this range has facilitated the development of more powerful warheads for Minuteman and Polaris without concomitant increase in vehicle size or decrease in range. We have thus been able to deploy large numbers of hardened and dispersed Minuteman missiles and large numbers of long-range sublaunched Polaris missiles.

Dr. Herbert York, Director of Lawrence Radiation Laboratory in Livermore, Calif., from 1954 to 1958, in response to the same problem stated:

Very big weapons; that is, weapons in the 100 megaton class, are specialty weapons, suitable only under special circumstances against special targets. Even if one is thinking of very hard targets, improving the accuracy and reliability of our present missiles is a much more effective approach than increasing their yield *** the result of many careful considerations of the problem *** have yielded the conclusions that in view of all other possibilities and in view of the limited usefulness of such big bombs, their development was unnecessary.

On the topic of comparison of United States and Russian capabilities, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in his statement says the following:

As to net superiority in ability to inflict damage on the enemy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the United States at present is clearly ahead of the U.S.S.R. in the ability to wage strategic nuclear war, and is probably ahead in the ability to wage tactical nuclear war, whereas the Soviets have developed a substantial midrange ballistic missile capacity.

Are we likely to lose what lead we have in the low-yield range since underground testing is permitted under the treaty? Dr. Brown touched on this question in his testimony before the committee. He concluded that:

If the provisions of the treaty are strictly adhered to, the present differences as pointed out above, and any others that may exist, will tend to shrink more slowly than if unlimited testing were permitted by both sides.

It seems to me, Mr. President, that the United States is well ahead in the ability to wage nuclear war in case of attack. Our Minuteman dispersal and wide ranging Polaris submarines give us this insurance.

With the safeguards mentioned, I feel the United States is in a position where it cannot be taken by surprise, as it was after the last test moratorium.

I have received many letters from my constituents stating the well known fact that Soviet Russia cannot be trusted to keep any treaty. They point out that Russia has broken some 50 out of their last 53 agreements. We are all aware of this inexcusable record. It is indeed legitimate to ask why we should be party to another one and be caught by surprise. I feel that here is one area where the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States do truly converge.

There is one area in which both sides should have the greatest possible motives

to be honorable in their obligations. Both the United States and Russia have an interest in protecting their nations from nuclear holocaust and of warding off the dangers of radioactivity, with its inherent dangers to present and future generations.

During the testimony given before the Committee on Foreign Relations the question of fallout and its dangers was repeatedly raised. This is a problem with which I am familiar. It occurs in my State of Nevada and in neighboring States, because it involves the problem of fallout from nuclear testing. We hear also from different scientific organizations concerning the different interpretations of the extent of the danger. I am not capable of analyzing this controversy from a scientific viewpoint. In these matters I, like most Senators, have to rely on the opinions of those we most respect.

About all one can say with certainty is that no one has come out in favor of fallout. Expert witnesses are at variance; but taken on balance, they all point out some of the problems involved in this area.

Some of the expert witnesses testifying on this treaty tended to feel the fallout controversy is being exaggerated.

Dr. Edward Teller stated that background radiation from natural causes is 90 percent greater in Denver, Colo., than exposure radiation to nuclear testing. Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., current director of Lawrence Laboratories in Livermore, Calif., felt that fallout from all past tests is equal to deciding to live a few hundred feet higher in elevation.

On the other hand is the statement by the Technical Division, Greater St. Louis Citizens' Committee for Nuclear Information, before the Subcommittee on Research, Development and Radiation of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee of August 21, 1963. This group is composed of equally competent members, most of whom are M.D.'s or Ph. D.'s. I quote from their report:

Our analysis of the same monitoring data published by the AEC shows that as a result of nuclear tests at the Nevada Test Site, in the period 1951-62, a number of local populations in Nevada, Utah, and Idaho, and probably other communities scattered through the continental United States have been exposed to fallout so intense as to represent a medically unacceptable hazard to children who may drink locally produced milk.

I state these different views to show the inexact views competent people have on this important subject. I think it is valid to hope for a test ban treaty to end any more contamination until more adequate and complete knowledge is supplied on which to base our decisions. I commend the majority leader, the distinguished Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], for his able presentation of his feelings on this subject.

The problem of developing an antiballistic missile system has been given a great deal of attention. Testimony in this area, as on fallout, has been both favorable and unfavorable considered in relation with the test ban treaty. Both sides were represented by competent, highly skilled witnesses.

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I quote from those on the negative side:

Dr. Teller: "On that point I will say that indeed we can do a lot in this development without atmospheric tests, we cannot bring the development to a reliable conclusion without atmospheric tests."

Admiral Strauss: "When these new devices (missiles) are invented, they can only be dependably mated to the weapon by testing. Their theoretical compatibility with the weapon will be too uncertain to rely upon * * *. I will only add my layman's belief that underground testing will not suffice to prove an antiballistic missile system which must function in the atmosphere or perhaps even beyond the atmosphere."

And on the positive side:

Dr. Brown: "Most of these problems (to acquire early, to discriminate decoys * * * to handle large volumes of traffic * * * and to hit and kill targets) have little or nothing to do with further nuclear testing."

Secretary McNamara: "One important point stands out in connection with the antiballistic missile: The antiballistic missile problem is dominated by factors unrelated to the treaty—by reaction speed, missile performance, and capacity for decoy discrimination."

Dr. N. E. Bradbury, Director of Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory: "Underground testing will permit, I am convinced, essentially every technical warhead development which would be possible with atmospheric testing up to yields probably as great as a megaton * * *. With underground testing, I believe we can develop and test whatever type of warhead may be required for an antiballistic missile system if one is required."

On this subject which is so technical and hard for a layman to interpret and to base an educated opinion, I can only weigh the arguments in the framework of how they appear to me logically and convincingly.

The controversy, as I understand it, centers on whether an antiballistic missile system can be perfected under the treaty or whether the components can only be considered effective and compatible by actually testing them in the atmosphere.

The distinguished Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON] has spoken at length on that point a few minutes ago. His analysis is clear and convincing.

The preponderance of the testimony is of the view that an antiballistic missile system can be capably developed under the treaty. In any event, it seems the main problems concerned with the program are in areas where progress is not hampered by the treaty. The preponderance of testimony in favor of the treaty came from those who work most closely with the problems from day to day, or in the past, such as Dr. Brown, Secretary McNamara, Dr. Bradbury, and Dr. York.

I was further impressed that although the system could progress and should be vigorously pursued, witnesses on both sides doubted that the antiballistic missile would protect the population generally or would be any final answer. As Dr. York testified in an important statement:

It is simply easier to build devices that will penetrate a ballistic missile than it is to build an antimissile which can cope with it.

Since there were these misgivings about how effective such a system would be and since the treaty appears more fruitful, I would press the effort to find security in this way—through an attempt to break through the barriers of distrust, even though we continue work to perfect an antiballistic missile.

Concerning our program of peaceful development of nuclear energy, we have been assured by the President, Secretary Rusk, and Dr. Seaborg that we can progress on most development levels. A new isthmian canal in Panama may well be precluded under the treaty because of the problem of containing the radioactivity produced in such a small area. This program has yet to be produced in any event. Another area where development will be limited is in the area of propelling rockets with nuclear explosions.

I firmly believe in and subscribe to the need to continue our important and beneficial program of the peaceful development of nuclear energy.

An even greater need for development is in the ability of peoples of the world to live in harmony and mutual trust. This should be our No. 1 goal. We should never hesitate to work for peace and lessening of tensions between nations. If this treaty is a step in that direction, I would place first priority here.

Our experiences in the past have clearly proven beyond doubt we must proceed with caution. I firmly believe we must proceed. As the President has well said:

We must never negotiate out of fear but we must never fear to negotiate.

Our security does not increase with the yield of the weapons we have in stockpile. Since World War II, our nuclear capacity has increased many times, yet our security has inexorably declined.

The 100-megaton bomb in which we are asked by some to place our faith is 5,000 times more powerful than the weapon which destroyed Hiroshima and killed over 60,000 people.

Deterrence is not ultimate security. I feel we must seek relief from the fear of war somewhere other than in the production of more powerful weapons. Our only alternative is to seek this area of common interest with our avowed enemies with the hope that our interests in our national existence and our children's welfare are strong enough to make this treaty work.

Should the treaty be approved, I do not expect any immediate lessening of the conflict in which we are engaged. I hope that the treaty may in time point toward other areas in which tensions can be relaxed. In the meantime, the struggle may well intensify in the economic and political areas. I would welcome the competition. The United States, as the standard bearer of freedom in the world, has the clear advantage in these areas. In a military showdown, neither side has any advantage. Both would lose.

Should the treaty lead to positive steps toward disarmament, lessening of world tensions, and reduction of the

costly military effort, both the United States and the Soviet Union could enjoy the benefit of being able to shift resources from unproductive and uneconomical weapons to productive efforts of education, housing, and the eradication of poverty and disease.

We did not make the world safe for democracy in either World War I or World War II. War has never been a sane approach to solving problems, though nations would not or could not change. Today, war has inherent consequences which make it unthinkable. Other solutions must be found.

The world is still parent to jealousies, hatreds, bigotry and fear. Our great strides in science hold promise for more positive steps toward elimination of age-old problems. Men must learn to use the blessings of science to uproot evil.

A more purposeful, sustaining and peaceful environment throughout the world must not be marred by nuclear holocaust.

While science has given us a deterrence, one of terror, one where we are equal to our enemies, it has also provided a street to a more peaceful existence. We cannot afford to walk the avenue of disaster.

We in this body have an opportunity to take one step, a step which I am hopeful will lead to a better understanding among the peoples of all nations, a step which could insure more freedom than a thousand nuclear bombs.

I receive telegrams saying, in effect: "We have 'three children,' or 'four children,' or 'five children'—Please vote against the treaty." I recognize this problem. I have four children of my own and four grandchildren.

Certainly, in my considered judgment, we must leave our children a brighter future and heritage than a mushroom cloud of death. Can we afford to take this chance to melt the Iron Curtain? I am willing to assume that risk.

For these reasons, I shall vote in favor of approval of the nuclear test ban treaty.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Nevada yield?

Mr. BIBLE. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I rise to commend the Senator from Nevada for his address and for the emphasis he has placed upon what one might term the "social, political, and psychological factors involved in the treaty." We are really dealing with the life of man himself. The Senator from Nevada has very ably and with great conviction emphasized the fact that the treaty is dedicated toward—as the President put it—"the processes of peace" and the relieving of tensions and the achievement of harmony among nations. If we can make some contribution in this area, then—as the Senator from Nevada has indicated—this will be a very worthwhile endeavor.

The Senator's speech was both well documented, in terms of the scientific aspects involved in the treaty, and very well stated and developed in terms of the policy that this Government should

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follow as a government of the people, by the people, and for the people.

I am very pleased with the Senator's remarks, and I wish to join, as one of his many admirers and friends, in commanding him and in thanking him.

Mr. BIBLE. I appreciate very much the sentiments of the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. Mr. President, let me say, first of all, that it is a high honor to follow the senior Senator from Nevada [Mr. BIBLE] in participating in this debate, which is one of the most important the Senate has had on one of the most fundamental principles—namely, our search for sanity and peace in the world. Certainly I applaud the distinguished Senator from Nevada, and state that the deliberations in the Senate on this issue and on every other issue to which the Senator addresses himself are substantially more thoughtful because of his contributions.

Mr. BIBLE. I appreciate the kind statement of the Senator from New Jersey, and thank him very much.

Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. Mr. President, my speech at this time on this important issue will be abbreviated, because I know that the senior Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY], who, day in and day out, for a decade has been involved in the search for ways to reach a beginning of disarmament, which is the way to peace, will speak when I conclude my remarks.

Mr. President, I should like to say a few words about the proposed nuclear test ban treaty.

In my judgment, this treaty is clearly in our national interest, and deserves the overwhelming support of the Senate.

I say this with open eyes, and not merely because I, along with probably every other American, would like to say "yes" as an affirmation of hope that we may some day see a world truly at peace and secure from the threat of instant devastation to civilization as we know it.

This treaty represents only a symbol of the first faint progress toward that goal, and we cannot ignore the fact that it will last only as long as it suits the interests of the Soviet Union. We know full well that today's thaw may only bring tomorrow's freeze.

We know we cannot trust the Soviet Union. We know that the Soviets have not lost their desire to convert the world to a system of government that provides no place for individual freedom and individual dignity.

Yet, knowing this, we can still say this treaty is in our national interest, for several reasons.

First of all, the treaty does represent a step forward—no matter how small—toward bringing the arms race under control. It gives us time and opportunity to work for more substantial agreements.

I stress the word time, for time is our greatest hope. In time, change is possible, even within the Soviet Union. After all, it was only 20 years ago that two of our strongest allies of today were then our mortal enemies.

I think we should take this treaty for what it is: A gesture that moves the hands of the clock back a little.

We should take advantage of whatever time we have gained, and should make the most of whatever psychological breakthroughs have been achieved.

While we may not be optimistic about the extent of the gain we have made, pessimism is no reason for rejection.

Second, as long as the treaty remains in existence, it will provide two concrete advantages of no small importance: It will reduce the poison in the air from radioactive fallout. We really do not know the extent of this danger to us and to children yet unborn. Perhaps it is less serious a threat to our health than automobile fumes and ordinary air pollution. But it is a danger, and it is one that we know we can avoid.

Perhaps even more important is the value of the treaty in helping curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons into the hands of more and more nations. To me, this is truly a frightening prospect. With all the instability and conflict that exist in the world today, I shudder to think what might happen if nuclear weapons got into the hands of some of the paranoiac rulers now on the world scene.

Perhaps technological progress will some day make nuclear weapons available to all who want them. But certainly the inability to test the devices will help slow the rate of proliferation.

If for no other reason, I think the historical imperatives of our Nation's position as a leader in the quest for peace compel us to approve this treaty.

For 20 years, through three administrations, of both political parties, the United States has sought to bring the power of the atom, which we ourselves unleashed, under responsible and enforceable international control.

It seems inconceivable to me that we would repudiate this first, small step. I can think of no faster way to lose, not our international good will and prestige, which is an ephemeral thing, but our own national self-respect.

Mr. President, it seems to me that the only reason for rejecting this treaty would be compelling evidence that it represents a clear threat to our national security.

In this connection, I have had a chance to read the report of the Senate's Preparedness Subcommittee, which I think performs a valuable service in outlining the military disadvantages involved in accepting the treaty, for there is no question that there are risks, just as risks are involved in every course of human endeavor. But we cannot overlook the fact that there is no risk-free alternative for us to pursue.

The risk here, of course, is that the United States will not be able to develop the best possible nuclear-weapons-defense system that it is within our capacity to produce; and the Soviet Union may, as a result of its latest test series, have gained some advantages over us in the nuclear-weapons-development field.

But the fact remains that the Presi-

dent, the Secretary of Defense, and a large majority of the Nation's top military leaders have determined that the treaty is in the best interest of this Nation.

Furthermore, although the Soviet Union may possibly be ahead of us in certain sectors, I think it is important to note one paragraph of the report of the Preparedness Subcommittee, as follows:

From the testimony before the subcommittee, it is clear that neither nation has conducted a weapons effects test program of sufficient size and complexity to resolve whatever doubts may exist about the adequacy of the design and the survivability of their nuclear weapon systems; nor has either tested sufficiently to fulfill the needs of their system designers and military planners.

Thus, I think we must keep in mind the fact that the Soviet Union will also be laboring under serious limitations, just as we will.

In addition, from a purely military standpoint, there are risks in continued testing, as well as risks in not testing. By not testing, we run the risk of freezing the nuclear uncertainties that now exist on both sides of the iron curtain, and in some areas the Soviet Union may be less uncertain than the United States. On the other hand, if we continue to test, we run the risk of taking our chances in an unending race with the Russians toward some ultimate weapon. Since the Russians have caught up with us in the past, in some phases of the arms race, we can only assume that they have the capacity to move ahead of us in the future.

This is the risk we face if this treaty is not approved; and I think the distinguished Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] very clearly spelled this out in his statement to the Senate on September 10, when he cited General Taylor's testimony that there is no guarantee that the Soviet Union would not score a breakthrough if we continued testing, and that this would pose a military danger to the United States.

In my judgment, Mr. President, all these factors lead inescapably to the conclusion that the Senate should approve the nuclear test ban treaty.

I only hope that as we continue to debate the treaty, which merely puts our toe in the water, we also shall give some thought and discussion to the vast and uncertain sea beyond. To me, the central and overriding issue is how we can best insure humanity's survival in an atmosphere of dignity and freedom, in the long years that lie ahead. To date, we have relied on a balance of nuclear power, and have armed ourselves with the maximum possible military deterrent power. That has worked—so far.

But what are the chances that it will continue to work over the next 20, or 100 or 500 years? How long can we expect our luck to hold out against a pressing of the fatal button by design, accident, or madness?

I do not know; but I cannot help feel that some day, if the world continues on its present course, our time will run out.

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The other course lies down the path of arms control and disarmament. But there are risks there, too—risks that the inspections systems we devise may not be sufficiently foolproof, risks that the Soviets may cheat in areas of vital importance in the military field.

I am sure the risks involved in a truly meaningful arms-control treaty will make the risks involved in this treaty look like child's play.

But always we will be facing the risks of an ever expanding arms race in a very volatile world.

I hope we will give to this central issue more serious thought and attention than I think the people of the United States have given to it so far.

However, I must say, Mr. President, that I have been truly impressed by the extent of the thoughtful consideration that has been given to this treaty by the American people—at least, if its consideration by New Jersey residents is any indication. I have been literally overwhelmed by an enormous volume of mail on this treaty. Probably no other issue in my experience has prompted a greater number of lengthy and thoughtful letters, clearly indicating the great concern most people have for the issues of war or peace.

Some weeks ago, I asked the citizens of New Jersey to make known to me their views on the treaty. I also wrote to a broad cross-section of organizations, including business, professional, labor, veterans, educational, and civic groups, and requested the opinions of their memberships. The response has been most impressive. I have received over 3,000 letters on the subject. The regular mail ran about 3 to 1 in favor of the treaty; but the responses I then received were slightly over 86 percent, or about 6 to 1, in favor of ratification.

Even aside from these striking figures, there are several aspects of this mail that I think important: First, it is evident that the signing of the treaty has touched a deep yearning of the American people for the bringing of some kind of order into what often appears to be the chaos of the world situation.

One Montclair couple, for example, began their letter by stating:

We rarely write our Senators or Representative, but we feel that this is an important issue.

Almost all the letters appear to have been written after serious thought and consideration of the available information. Although many expressed deep-seated distrust of the Soviet Union and expressed misgivings over becoming involved with it, ratification of the treaty was favored.

It was common to receive letters, written on behalf of an entire family, expressing the writer's awareness of the immediate implications of the cold war for his family's future, and particularly that of the children.

One couple wrote:

Although we recognize the limitations of the proposed nuclear test ban, we feel strongly that a start must be made somewhere. We are parents of two young children, and the threat of nuclear war and its aftermath to us, our children, and their children, is unthinkable.

The connection between a nuclear test ban and the possibility of more substantive moves toward real disarmament seems to have been realized by a large number of citizens. One New Jersey resident wrote to me as follows:

I am not a ban-the-bomber. However, quite in the light of cold reason, I believe no person should discourage sober efforts to bring nuclear energy under responsible control.

Or again, as one letter from my own hometown of Westfield put it:

This is an important first step toward peaceful relations among nations—a vital move back from an uncontrolled arms race which leads inevitably to world disaster.

Another factor which I think deserves due consideration is the considered opinion of the Nation's editorial writers. I think it would be worthwhile and instructive to quote from some of the articles on the treaty that have appeared in New Jersey papers.

The Elizabeth Daily Journal made an important point in a recent editorial, when it commented:

The United States kept negotiations for this treaty alive when others would have left the conference table. It cannot abandon it now.

The Newark Star Ledger made much the same point, but one that in my opinion cannot be reiterated too often, when it said:

The signing of the limited nuclear test ban treaty is an important step down the road of world peace *** but it is only a step. Its importance, however, may be considerably advanced if it leads, as expected, to sincere negotiation on other major international problems.

The Ridgewood News commented:

For the first time in nearly 20 years of cold war, in which the will to war has driven the world again and again to the brink of disaster, a new motivation has emerged. The test ban treaty, with all its obvious limitations, is a declaration of the will to peace. Neither pride nor prejudice nor consideration of political partisanship must be allowed to bar the speedy confirmation of this historic step toward international sanity.

On the subject of reservations, about which we have heard so much, it seemed to me that the Trenton Times had some sensible things to say:

If we should actually try to write any (revisions) into the treaty, it is easy to imagine the reaction in Moscow. Trying to change the terms of a treaty signed by us and by our closest ally, a treaty reached only after years of striving and deadlock, could cause Russia to denounce it and us and blow out the feebly flickering light that has begun to point the road to peace. We made no bones about mistrusting Russia's sincerity. We must not forget that the Russians have similar doubts about us. We have an open covenant openly arrived at and cannot afford to justify their doubts so clearly (to them) as we would if we now went back on our word.

Mr. President, I have received, from great newspapers and from very thoughtful citizens in the State I have the honor to represent, overwhelming expressions of hope that the Senate will approve the treaty, and that it will be, indeed, the first small step toward the control of—and ultimately, we hope, the elimination of—the weapons that can

destroy civilization. Ultimately, of course, our freedom depends upon that.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the editorials I have discussed be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

HE TAKES THE STEP

Senator EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN has given the treaty limiting nuclear tests to underground explosions the strong bipartisan impetus that this vital proposal needs for a solid vote of ratification.

In giving the treaty his unqualified support, Senator DIRKSEN recalls a similar role played by the late Senator Arthur Vandenberg, of Michigan, a Republican with broad international leanings. Senator Vandenberg was a staunch bipartisan ally of former President Truman, helping him over the shoals in foreign affairs.

Now Senator DIRKSEN has donned the mantle. The transition comes at a time when President Kennedy can use all the support he can muster on both sides of the aisle to hold down the hard core of opposition to a minimum.

His action, detailed in his highly stylized rhetoric, makes it certain that the opposition will be confined to Senator BARRY GOLDWATER and a handful of Republican legislators of extreme conservative persuasion. Noting his advanced age (67), DIRKSEN pulled all the oratorical stops in an hour-long peroration in which he observed at the end:

"I'd hate to have it written on my stone: 'He knew what happened at Hiroshima, but he didn't take the first step.'"

Senator DIRKSEN took the big step, ruling out as "ungermane" Senator GOLDWATER's reservation that would make the effective date of the treaty contingent on the removal of all Soviet missiles and military personnel from Cuba.

Mr. Kennedy, in return for DIRKSEN's support, has agreed to draft a letter to the Senate giving the legislators unequivocal assurances that the ratification of the treaty would not be followed by any relaxation of nuclear arms development.

Since DIRKSEN's announcement, another potent objector to the treaty has come out for ratification. Senator HENRY JACKSON, Washington Democrat, concedes the risks are serious and formidable, but with added safeguards for the Nation's safety, he feels the Senate may prudently give its advice and consent to ratification.

The Senate hearings on the treaty have had a beneficial effect. They were a sounding board for thoughtful expositions on both sides of this fateful issue. The treaty is not a cureall for the arms race. It merely provides a moratorium on nuclear testing, a breathing space during which more negotiations can be carried on in an atmosphere of lessened tension and anxiety.

AUGUST 2, 1963.

WPEN EDITORIALS

We urge strong support for the test ban agreement, and we're certainly happy to hear that Senators SCOTT and CASE, both Republicans, as well as Senators CLARK and WILLIAMS, Democrats, from Pennsylvania and New Jersey, are going to support the ratification of the pact. We have been hearing rumblings from a minority group within both parties that they plan to vote against ratification. Averill Harriman, the man who developed the treaty for the United States says that a veto by the Senate of this all-important treaty would downgrade this country in the eyes of the world, and would lend credence to Red Chinese statements that we are warmongers. The presence of two Republicans of the stature of SALTONSTALL, of Massachusetts, and

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[From the Trenton (N.J.) Times,
Aug. 7, 1963]

TEST BAN TREATY IS SENATE ISSUE

Now that the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union have signed the nuclear test ban agreement, the next question is whether and when the Senate will accept it.

Ours is the only one of the three nations where the question arises. Under the Soviet system, Premier Khrushchev's signature is all that matters and there is no possibility of a legislature overriding him. In Britain there is almost as little chance of Parliament trying to upset what Prime Minister Macmillan has done.

But as Woodrow Wilson and the world found out to their cost in the League of Nations debate, the Senate can dispose of what an American President proposes. Though it seems unlikely now, it could reject the Moscow pact and put us right back where we were when the negotiations began.

Washington politicians reportedly are rating the pact as a political victory for President Kennedy. If Republican leaders swing to the same view they may decide to oppose it.

But if all indications are to be believed, the American public is solidly behind the treaty and it might be the worst possible strategy for the Republicans—or Kennedy's enemies among the southern Democrats—to oppose it. On the other hand, refusal to oppose him on a popular issue might neutralize its political benefit to him.

Republicans can claim, and doubtless will, that Eisenhower was the first President to propose the test ban, anyway. And reportedly the administration hopes to get him, as well as Herbert Hoover and other prominent GOP leaders, to endorse the treaty.

Many newsmen now believe that while there will be lengthy debate and perhaps some reservations, the Senate in the end will approve the pact by a one-sided vote.

Though two of the ranking Republican Senators, DIXKSEN and HICKENLOOPER, refused to go to Moscow for the signing, they stayed home more because of their position in the party hierarchy than from personal opposition to the treaty. Senators AIKEN and SALTONSTALL did make the trip at Kennedy's invitation, today's President being too good a reader and writer of history to make the same mistake Wilson did.

If there are enough Senators seriously opposed to the treaty to make a real fight on it, they will doubtless try to do so through revisions. But if we should actually write any into the treaty, it is easy to imagine the reaction in Moscow.

Trying to change the terms of a treaty signed there by us and by our closest ally, a treaty reached only after years of suriving and deadlock, could cause Russia to denounce it and us and blow out the feebly flickering light that has begun to point the road to peace.

We make no bones about mistrusting Russia's sincerity. We must not forget that the Russians have similar doubts about us. We have here an open covenant openly arrived at and cannot afford to justify their doubts so clearly (to them) as we would if we now went back on our word.

WHERE THERE'S A WILL

The three-power partial test ban treaty should be confirmed by the United States immediately and with a convincing majority, if for no other reason that the fact that failure to do so would cancel out the last hope of retaining world leadership in this country.

Criticism in some Senatorial circles is being directed toward the so-called escape clause, permitting any one of the contract-

AIKEN, of Vermont, lends considerable prestige and indicates to us that there'll be strong Republican as well as Democratic support for the treaty. A two-thirds vote is needed in the Senate. A popular support runs about 12 to 1. We are gratified by the statement of a Philadelphia citizen who wrote us saying prayerfully: "May God speed the ratification"; and continues, "if the treaty runs into opposition in the Senate, I would urge the President to take his case to the public, pinpointing where and who the obstruction is, so that we can bring public pressure to bear." One of the most exultant letterwriters says: "In common with every other rightminded American I feel like dancing in the streets—for the first time in their lives, I can look at my children and not be afraid." These quotes are favorable to the test ban agreement—unfortunately there have been letters, vitriolically written, opposing. We firmly feel that we should have both sides of any question; what bothers us is the apparent venom some people spew out in arguing their point of view. One letter in particular is so full of invective we wouldn't want it seen by children, as well as adults. What the majority, however, feel is—basically—gratitude for a step toward peace, relief from anxieties from radioactive fallout, and the future welfare of children. Again, we urge strong support for Senate ratification of the treaty.

[From the Newark (N.J.) Star-Ledger,
Aug. 12, 1963]

A VICTORY FOR RUSK

A collective sigh of relief swept the Western community of nations with the announcement by West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer that he will sign the historic limited nuclear test ban treaty. In a sense it can be chalked up as a victory for the soft sell approach of U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk.

But with Germany now committed to the treaty, there still remains another European power, France, loftily refusing to go international and accept the test ban agreement.

France's flat refusal and Germany's heretofore reluctance were based on sharply different motivations growing out of expediency for their own nations' futures.

Their positions are understandable when they are gaged in this light; they are not arbitrary stands, reflecting stubborn resistance to a treaty that solves some of the world's pressing problems.

West Germany's reluctance was based on the political considerations inherent in the treaty. Chancellor Adenauer has been fearful that his divided nation may suffer a setback under the treaty if the pact permits Communist East Germany to gain international recognition.

Adenauer displayed this concern over the treaty's political implications in his talks with Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. He asked McNamara to put off his departure reportedly to reemphasize Bonn's misgivings about the treaty and its effect on his country. He finally agreed to sign the treaty after reassurances from Secretary of State Rusk.

West Germany made strong representations to the Western Powers that a declaration be drafted that would make crystal clear that accession to the treaty would not strengthen East Germany's political stature.

These are legitimate, understandable fears and concern on the part of West Germany's leaders.

President de Gaulle's major concern is not primarily political, although he is firmly convinced that he should have played one of the dominant roles in the treaty negotiations.

This was never a practical approach, since France, despite De Gaulle's insistence to the

contrary, no longer is a major world power. The French leader is painfully aware of this privately, but he is an adroit nationalist who knows how to exploit every possible angle.

De Gaulle, however, is on firmer ground when he maintains that the pact would be much more effective if the major powers halted production of nuclear arms. This would make the treaty far more attractive, but it could have been an issue that would have forestalled any agreement.

The French President makes another pertinent point in calling for an "effective and practical" limitation of delivery systems that can carry nuclear arms.

The major flaw in De Gaulle's position is his dogged refusal to view the limited nuclear test treaty in its proper perspective. De Gaulle, notwithstanding, the treaty is a step forward. It may not be as big a step as many would like, but it marks the first time since the Hiroshima atomic bombing 18 years ago that an accord has been reached on limiting at least one phase of nuclear firepower.

The absence of France impairs the effectiveness of the treaty. It is not, however, an overwhelming obstacle to restricting the testing of nuclear weapons.

There is still a possibility that France will join the treaty signatories. De Gaulle may be a little more difficult than Adenauer but he, too, may find it to his country's advantage to sign.

The less exclusive the signatories are, the better off the world will be.

[From the Elizabeth (N.J.) Daily Journal]

U.S. SENATE HOLDS TREATY'S FATE

Activation or destruction of the nuclear testing compact signed last Monday in Moscow now is in the hands of the U.S. Senate, to whom President Kennedy has submitted it with assurance of its integrity. No secret agreements, the bogeyman of the hour, are involved, he has told the Senators.

Mr. Kennedy cited 10 specific reasons for senatorial "consent," but all are insignificant in the shadow of the single statement that the treaty will lead toward "a more secure and peaceful world."

Only the gravest fallacies, the deepest flaws, could undermine that estimate. It is both the presidential summary of the document and the hope of the people.

Lest it arouse unfounded exuberance, Mr. Kennedy added a specific definition of its impact: "This treaty advances, though it does not assure, world peace; and it will inhibit, though it does not prohibit, the nuclear arms race."

No more than that probably could be asked at this point and to activate and preserve this much is an accomplishment surpassing anything else since the first atomic bomb was dropped in the destructive anger of war. The approval of the Russians and British Governments is not in doubt, so the responsibility now rests upon the Senate.

Other governments are falling into line—some have signed the accord in England, some in Washington, some in Moscow. Dozens will have aligned themselves with this rejection of nuclear testing in the atmosphere or on the sea.

If the Senate, after its fill of oratory and questioning administration officials and diplomats, will align the United States with these other governments, world sentiment will assume dimensions that even the recalcitrant President De Gaulle may recognize. Mao Tse-tung, of course, is another matter, but he will observe the world is choosing the other side.

The United States kept negotiations for this treaty alive when others would have left the conference table. It cannot abandon it now.

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ing parties to resume testing under certain conditions.

This argument is specious. When one may ask, has a treaty ever had value when one or more of the contracting parties decided on grounds of national self-interest, to break it?

A treaty does not have the force of law and is weak to that degree. But it may have value as a declaration of interest.

This is the major value of the test ban treaty. For the first time in more than 20 years of cold war, in which the will to war has driven the world again and again to the brink of disaster, a new motivation has emerged. The test ban treaty, with all of its obvious limitations is a declaration of the will to peace.

Where there is a will, a way can be found, and the treaty is a first step in the quest for a pattern of peace.

Neither pride nor prejudice nor consideration of political partisanship must be permitted to bar the speedy confirmation of this historic step toward international sanity.

A STEP FORWARD

The signing of the limited nuclear test ban treaty is an important step down the road of world peace—but it is only a step.

Its importance, however, may be considerably enhanced if it leads, as expected, to sincere negotiation on other major international problems.

This thinking is shared by the three major powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain—who signed the historic document banning all nuclear testing except underground.

This hope was expressed by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at the treaty signing yesterday in Moscow when he said:

"The conclusion of the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests may pave the way to the solution of other still more important international problems, including the disarmament problem."

These hopeful words must be measured on the basis of past performance, and the Soviet Union has a poor record on this score. It has viewed the free world with deep mistrust, a view that has distorted a number of major meetings on critical world problems.

If the Soviet Union is undergoing a revisionist policy on foreign affairs, the change may be wholly or partially dictated by expediency, an expediency nurtured by the alarming revisionist hostility of its major Marxist ally, Red China, and its deep concern over the awesome destructive potential of thermonuclear weapons.

The motivation on the part of the signatories for the test ban treaty may be found deeply ingrained in the fear of the nuclear bomb itself, a weapon that has the potential of destroying our civilization.

But it does hold out, as Secretary of State Rusk noted at the signing ceremony, a hope for mankind that this will be a step on the road to a peaceful world.

If this world cannot live in peace, even with clashing ideologies, it is obvious that it's not going to be able to exist, let alone live, in a thermonuclear holocaust. The future of the world is being dictated by necessity; we have run out of alternatives.

A STEP BACKWARD

Before the signing of the limited test ban treaty, Premier Khrushchev warmly greeted Secretary of State Rusk in his office with the observation: "Things are going well, very well."

They were, in Moscow, but not in Red China.

Where it was formerly vituperative, the Chinese Communists have now mounted a four-way threat designed to increase tension throughout Asia, putting pressure on the Soviet Union and the United States.

The trouble spots being exploited by Peiping are in Korea, India, Laos and Vietnam.

The United States is directly involved in Korea, where the Communists are boldly infiltrating American-held positions in South Korea. This country has substantial interest in the delicate situation in India, Laos and Vietnam. So does the free world.

Strangely, we find our interests paralleling, to a degree, those of the Soviet Union in reference to Asia. The Kremlin is lending considerable aid to India and, at the same time, withdrawing vital assistance to Red China.

The motivation is different, however. The Soviet Union is determined to keep Peiping from an Asian takeover, which could create an intolerable situation for the Kremlin. The free world is determined to fight aggression in this sensitive part of the world.

The stakes are considerable for both the free world and the Soviet Union.

Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. Mr. President, as I have said, the volume of mail that has come to me on the treaty has to a remarkable degree been distinguished by its thoughtfulness and quality. I have selected a very few from among the many thousands of letters I have received on this issue. I request unanimous consent that they also be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE METHODIST CHURCH,
NEW JERSEY CONFERENCE,
NEW BRUNSWICK DISTRICT,
Ocean Grove, N.J., August 14, 1963.

Senator HARRISON A. WILLIAMS,
Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: I favor the test ban treaty.

In my opinion it will relieve, to some degree, East-West tensions and enable the nations to take a step toward disarmament.

World conditions, to my mind, call for more high-caliber statesmanship, as expressed in the proposed treaty, as contrasted with the blind obsession of the militarists with defense buildup.

I sincerely trust that with your help the Senate will approve the treaty.

Yours cordially,

WILLIAM R. GUFFICK.

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
Jersey City, N.J., August 15, 1963.

Senator HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, Jr.,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR WILLIAMS: In answer to your request in "Report Home" for your constituents to advise you of their feelings regarding the test ban treaty, my feeling very definitely is that I favor the proposed treaty between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union to ban nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater, but I have at the same time great fears that we are once again being treated to some Russian skulduggery.

I believe it is absolutely necessary that all nations strive and do everything within their power to create treaties to forestall any nuclear war of the future.

However, I just can't trust Russia and I believe that every time they warm up to us in the manner that they have with this treaty, we are dropping our defenses and that only in later months or years will we see the actual tactics of the Russians divulging why they had been agreeable to a treaty at this time.

So I believe that while we should favor the treaty and certainly endorse it, that we must constantly remain on guard and we must not allow this treaty to deter our ef-

orts to allow the democratic governments to remain free.

Respectfully yours,

THOMAS N. STAINBACK,
President.

MIDLAND PARK PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Midland Park, N.J., August 15, 1963.
Senator HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, Jr.,
Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR WILLIAMS: This letter is written in response to your request for an expression of feelings on the test ban treaty as expressed in your "Report Home" volume V, No. 16, for the week of August 5, 1963.

I personally do favor the test ban treaty.

I believe that any attempt to restrict any atmospheric or surface blast of any type should be encouraged. Since there is a clause in the treaty which would enable us to bow out with due cause and advance notice, it seems apparent to me that should we be falling behind in our military development of such weapons, we could take advantage of that clause.

I do not, for one moment, place much faith in the integrity of the present Russian Government to live by this treaty. There is no reason to believe that they will live by this one any better or more honestly than they have others in the past. Still there is a possibility that they might and that is a chance that we as a country should take. I also believe that in spite of the errors that have been made, the intelligent sources of this country will be able to reasonably ascertain how well the Russian Government is keeping its obligation.

Therefore I think that we have moral and patriotic obligations to take whatever steps we can take, even if we are not certain that they are the right ones, along the road to peace and the eventual complete outlawing of the use of nuclear and atomic fission in warfare.

I hope that this expression on one person's ideas will assist you in voting the way you determine best on this most complicated problem.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM D. POLHEMUS,
Principal.

R. B. MASON & SON,
Belleplain, N.J., August 15, 1963.
Senator HARRISON A. WILLIAMS,
Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR WILLIAMS: I wish to be recorded in favor of the treaty to ban nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater.

Thanking you, I remain.

Very truly yours,

CARLTON E. MASON.

JERSEY CITY, N.J.,
August 15, 1963.
Hon. HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, Jr.,
Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: Thank you for your "Reports Home" and your request as to how I stand on the test ban treaty.

I am in favor of this test ban treaty, provided the Government keeps a close watch on the testing of other countries in violation of our good faith to keep it.

Another reason I am in favor of reducing the tests above the ground is the increasing danger from fallout. This past spring I had occasion to visit a farming section of the State of Pennsylvania and learned that the farmers were instructed to delay the grazing of their cattle due to fallout. Mothers and children could be affected by milk from cows exposed to this increased fallout.

I was also pleased with the passage of the equal pay bill, for as president of the Jersey

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City Business and Professional Women's Club, we worked a long time for this bill. Cordially,

VIOLA M. BOOTH.

JERSEY CITY, N.J.
August 15, 1963.

Senator HARRISON A. WILLIAMS,
Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: In answer to your question, Mrs. Eichler and I most certainly favor the proposed treaty between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union to ban nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater.

Even though it may be regarded as only one step, the treaty is a step in the right direction. I am optimistic enough to believe that it will lead to a second step—a ban on underground tests.

Hoping you will vote in favor of the treaty, I am,

Most sincerely yours,
GEORGE M. EICHLER,
Counsellor at Law.

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
FIREMEN & OILERS,
Haddonfield, N.J., August 15, 1963.

Senator HARRISON A. WILLIAMS,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR WILLIAMS: This is in response to inquiry regarding my views on the test ban treaty issue.

I believe that the limited test ban treaty negotiated by the United States, Great Britain, and Russia offers the first glimmer of hope that the free and Communist worlds may have achieved a climate in which potentialities for true disarmament will be possible and future serenity in international affairs.

Even though we may have good cause to distrust Communist Russia and this test ban leaves much to be desired, nevertheless, morality and reason should dictate pursuit of the path of peace.

Senate ratification of the treaty should be unanimous to enhance our prestige.

Sincerely yours,
JOHN J. WASLOSKI,
International Representative.

CITY OF RAHWAY, N.J.
August 14, 1963.

DEAR PETE: Having observed past practices of the U.S.S.R. tearing up agreements, when they no longer suited their purposes, I wonder about their sincerity in signing this treaty.

However, as one charged with providing maximum safety for 28,000 lives should nuclear war ever be visited upon mankind, I am in a position to visualize the terrible destruction and loss of life above and beyond the comprehension of the average citizen, should these awesome weapons ever be employed. It is not an enviable position.

Weighing these factors, I find I must urge ratification of the treaty, though a slight step at this time, it is conceivable that it might lead to total disarmament of nuclear weapons, and become the forerunner of a permanent peace preserving procedure.

But let us not, under any circumstances, let apathy overtake us, or a false sense of security prevail, let us at all times, "keep our powder dry."

Sincerely,

WM. McBRIDE.

JERSEY CITY, N.J.
August 12, 1963.

DEAR SENATOR WILLIAMS: I am in favor of the proposed treaty between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union to ban nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater.

It is a beginning of friendlier relations between our three nations. When Russia sees that we keep our word, she will begin to trust us. The next step would be an exchange of one on-site inspection.

Radioactive fallout is damaging the health of the people of the United States. It results in respiratory illness, and may even contribute to our high rate of cancer. It falls on the ground in the vegetable gardens, which penetrates our vegetables. The cows eat the grass, and it is passed on, in milk. Chickens eat from the ground, it gets into the eggs. It has an effect on our fish, chicken, and cattle. Worst of all it has an effect on our mothers to be; they eat this impure food, and the unborn child becomes retarded, deformed, or has lung congestion. The impure air is passed on to the child, in the weakness of the mother. She must be able to breathe naturally. If she holds her breath, for just one moment, it can kill the child. I saw it happen. The child was stillborn. The woman heard the screech of auto brakes, and the scream of a child. She held her breath in fear, that it was her son that was hurt. It was a neighbor's son.

So if we can relieve the feeling of tension, and also active fallout, we will have a healthier Nation.

Now, we must watch Red China.

Will contact our Senior Citizen clubs and members and ask them to write to you.

Sincerely,
Mrs. LILLIAM ALLAN,
Membership Chairman, New Jersey
Council of Senior Citizens.

P.S.—I am in favor of the National Service Corps, too. Let the American people learn how to give of themselves and their talents to help others. I know it brings satisfaction and happiness. Time—effort and love—no pay.

MERCER COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION,
Trenton, N.J., August 14, 1963.
Senator HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, Jr.,
352 Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR WILLIAMS: Thank you very much for your letter of August 8, 1963.

I want you to know that I personally favor the proposed treaty between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union to ban nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater.

I am having the secretary of the Mercer County Bar Association include in our notice going out shortly to our membership in connection with our September meeting a plea to our members to let you have their views on this vital question before the Senate.

Sincerely yours,
SIDNEY S. STARK,
President.

BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Levittown, N.J., August 13, 1963.
Senator HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, Jr.,
352 Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR WILLIAMS: This is one of the very few letters that I have ever written to our elected representatives in Washington.

In response to your question in "Report Home," August 5, 1963,

I favor the proposed treaty between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union to ban nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater.

It is about time that we heeded the advice of our top scientists and began developing a sound nuclear test policy that may save the future of mankind.

Sincerely yours,
LEONARD E. COPLEIN,
Assistant Superintendent.

DISTILLERY, RECTIFYING, WINE AND
ALLIED WORKERS' INTERNATIONAL
UNION OF AMERICA, LOCAL 19,
Newark, N.J., August 12, 1963.

Senator HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, Jr.,
352 Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: I would like to go on record as asking you to vote in favor of the proposed treaty between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union to ban nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater.

It would be in the best interest of the United States and the world.

Very truly yours,
LOUIS KRONBERG,
President.

P. J. RITTER Co.,
Bridgeton, N.J., August 13, 1963.
Senator HARRISON A. WILLIAMS,
Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR WILLIAMS: In response to your question, "Do you favor or oppose the proposed treaty between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union to ban nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water?" My answer is to favor any action of this type with the hope that we would not be lulled into a feeling of false security and with the complete recognition of the eventual Soviet aims.

Yes, sign the treaty and maintain our vigilance.

Sincerely yours,
PAUL J. RITTER.

BANKERS NATIONAL LIFE
INSURANCE Co.,
Montclair, N.J., August 12, 1963.
Senator HARRISON A. WILLIAMS,
Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: I would urge you to vote yes for the proposed treaty on nuclear tests. Even though you and I both know that the odds are heavily in favor of the Soviets breaking this pact, I believe it should be endorsed.

I also hope that you will lend your weight to the tax reduction bills which are now being studied in committee.

Sincerely yours,
JOHN D. BRUNDAGE.

THE FIRST NATIONAL
BANK & TRUST Co.,
Paulsboro, N.J., August 12, 1963.
Senator HARRISON A. WILLIAMS,
Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

HONORABLE SIR: In your report you have asked for an expression of various opinions concerning the proposed test ban treaty. I am not qualified to pass upon the military security involved, but as a family man, I am intensely interested in the effects of nuclear fallout.

I believe any steps taken toward the ending of nuclear tests in the atmosphere are desirable. We all recognize that treaties made by some countries may turn out to be merely scraps of paper but in this case, I believe risk is worthwhile.

Unless you discover in the debate that the risk is not worthwhile, and entirely out of line with your thoughts, I believe you should vote for the proposed treaty.

Very truly yours,
FRANK S. FLOWERS,
President.

F. W. HOLBEIN SCHOOL,
Mount Holly, N.J., August 17, 1963.
Senator HARRISON A. WILLIAMS,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR WILLIAMS: I favor the proposed treaty between the United States,

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Great Britain, and the Soviet Union to ban nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water.

Thank you very much for sending me your news release. After reading it during the coming school year I plan to pass it on to our eighth grade American history teacher for use in her classes.

Respectfully yours,

F. W. HOLBEIN,

UNION CITY, N.J.,
August 15, 1963.

Senator HARRISON A. WILLIAMS,
Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

My DEAR SENATOR: I wish to urge immediate passage of the test ban treaty which is important for the encouragement of total disarmament and improved relations among the various countries for the pursuit of peace.

The efforts of the President must be given our united support so that the world at large will realize that all of us in this country—regardless of party—are behind every action taken toward any and all negotiation for peace.

Very truly yours,

BERNARD A. SCHWARZ,
Counselor at Law.

DISABLED AMERICAN VETERANS,
Jersey City, N.J., August 16, 1963.

Senator HARRISON A. WILLIAMS,
Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR FRIEND PETE: I feel definitely the way you and the President feel on this most important treaty. It looks like the first real step for peace in the cold war. A vote against it would be a vote for Red China or for that clown De Gaulle, who has always been against everything and everyone.

Pete, a real good friend of yours, Past State Commander Charles H. McSperrit, 679 Ridge Street, Newark, N.J., died in Dublin, Ireland, last Sunday, while on a visit with his two daughters to visit their relatives in Ireland.

Keep up the real great work you are doing in the U.S. Senate.

Sincerely yours,

BILL DODD,
Past National Commander, Disabled
Veterans, Inc.

MUSICIANS' PROTECTIVE UNION,
Vineland, N.J., August 26, 1963.

SENATOR HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, Jr.,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: At our meeting of Local 595, A.F. of M., August 26, the members are 100 percent in favor of the proposed treaty between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union to ban the nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water.

Respectfully yours,

ENRICO SERRA,
Secretary Treasurer.

DEMOCRATIC COUNTY COMMITTEE,
Ocean County, N.J., August 15, 1963.

Hon. HARRISON A. WILLIAMS,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR PETE: In response to your "Report Home" request for the opinions of your constituents on the test ban treaty, this is to advise you that the Ocean County Democratic Organization discussed the subject at its meeting on August 13.

It was unanimously voted by the membership to advise you that we favor the test ban treaty and we strongly support President Kennedy's position.

We respectfully ask, therefore, that you urge your colleagues in the Senate to vote in favor of ratification.

Sincerely,

ALBERT J. CUCCI,
Chairman.

LOCUST, N.J., August 23, 1963.
Senator HARRISON A. WILLIAMS,
Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR WILLIAMS: I am in favor of our acceptance of the nuclear test ban treaty.

I regard it as an essential step toward the future safety of the United States and mankind.

Sincerely,

MRS. R. O. RIPPERE,
President, League of Women Voters
of Middletown.

PRINCETON, N.J.,
August 26, 1963.

SENATOR HARRISON A. WILLIAMS,
352 Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

The test ban treaty must be passed if we Americans know what is good for us—and the rest of mankind.

STRINGFELLOW BARR.

MANHATTAN LODGE NO. 1679, IN-
TERNAITONAL ASSOCIATION OF MA-
CHINISTS,

Passaic, N.J., August 30, 1963.

Hon. HARRISON A. WILLIAMS,
U.S. Senator, New Jersey,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR WILLIAMS: I brought to the attention of our membership, at our last meeting, the fact that you are soliciting opinion from your constituents on what their thinking is on the ratification of the nuclear test ban treaty.

We did have a very short debate on this matter at this meeting. After the smoke cleared it was decided that I be authorized to write you and inform you that we go on record in favor of ratification at this time. I was also instructed to inform you that the membership is a bit skeptical but feel that under the circumstances it should be given an opportunity to operate.

Trusting that this is what you are asking for, I remain,

Sincerely,

ALEX SMOLLOK, Secretary.

TEMPLE SINAI OF BERGEN COUNTY,
Tenafly, N.J., August 21, 1963.

SENATOR HARRISON A. WILLIAMS,
Old Senate Office Building,
Washington D.C.

DEAR SENATOR WILLIAMS: May I respectfully urge you to do whatever you can to bring about the ratification of the Test Ban Treaty now being presented for consideration. Ratification of the treaty could very well provide us with the kind of international atmosphere which would give man pause to consider the utter insanity of nuclear warfare and the testing of nuclear weapons which pollute the atmosphere, endangering the future of mankind.

Cordially,

DR. IRWIN M. BLANK.

PENNINGTON, N.J., August 31, 1963.

Hon. HARRISON A. WILLIAMS,
Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

MY DEAR SENATOR WILLIAMS: Please add my name to those who would favor a test ban treaty. If we are in a position to do such unholly damage to millions of innocent people, I can see no reason for striving to be still more powerful. If this country were to reject the treaty, memories of what we did to the League of Nations would be revived and the conclusion would be inescapable that we do not want to live in a secure and peaceful world.

Very truly yours,

CARROLL C. PRATT,
Professor of Psychology Emeritus,
Princeton University.

LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF
HAMPTON TOWNSHIP,

Trenton, N.J., August 29, 1963.

Hon. HARRISON WILLIAMS,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR WILLIAMS: The president of the Hamilton Township League has requested me to report that its members are in favor of the disarmament treaty under consideration with Russia.

In addition, I would like to mention my personal opinion. I feel we have no choice but to make such a treaty, if only out of deference to world opinion. However, this country's past experience with Russian treaties leaves little room for elation, or hope for genuine results.

Yours truly,

TERESA DIETRICH.

PERTH AMBOY SMOELTER &
REFINERY WORKERS UNION,
Perth Amboy, N.J., August 29, 1963.

SENATOR HARRISON A. WILLIAMS,
Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: In reference to the question in your "Report Home" of August 5 on the proposed treaty between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union to ban nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water.

On behalf of the executive board of the Perth Amboy Smelter & Refinery Workers Union, Local 365, and representing 1,200 workers at the American Smelting & Refining Co. in Perth Amboy, N.J., we are in favor of this treaty to ban all nuclear tests.

In addition, we hope that in the future all nations will sign the treaty to have the entire nuclear tests banned.

Very truly yours,
JOHN INFUSINO, President.

PATERSON DIOCESAN COUNCIL OF
CATHOLIC WOMEN,

Paterson, N.J., August 29, 1963.

Hon. HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, Jr.,
Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: First I would like to commend you for making a major effort to get the opinion of the people of New Jersey in reference to the test ban treaty.

As president of the Paterson Diocesan Council of Catholic Women I brought this matter up at our recent board meeting and I hope you will be hearing from many of our members.

Personally, I am in favor of the test ban treaty and sincerely hope it will be in the interest of the American people.

Sincerely yours,
MAE REILLY
Mrs. Thomas W. Reilly,
President.

NEW JERSEY HEALTH OFFICERS
ASSOCIATION,

Orange, N.J., August 26, 1963.

SENATOR HARRISON A. WILLIAMS,
Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: Thank you very much for your letter of August 12 with reference to the proposed test ban treaty.

Unfortunately this association will not meet until October 3, and there will be no mailing to the membership until September 11. There is, therefore, no way in which it may be suggested to the members that they participate in this poll.

I have, however, discussed the matter with our president, Mr. Walter J. Nicol, health officer of Kearny, who agrees with me that the test ban treaty should be ratified. We are both of the opinion that most of our membership, when all facets of the matter are considered, would take a similar position. We agree that care and caution must

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be exercised, but that the advantages of the treaty far outweigh the disadvantages.

Respectfully yours,
EDWARD GERNEE,
Secretary.

DREW UNIVERSITY,
Madison, N.J., September 3, 1963.
Senator HARRISON A. WILLIAMS,
Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. WILLIAMS: I am writing you to express my support of the test ban treaty. I sincerely hope that the Senate will ratify the treaty with a resounding majority. I am confident that many of my fellow citizens join me in this wish. Thank you for the leadership which you are giving to your State and Nation on this matter.

Sincerely yours,
DAVID M. GRAYBEAL,
Director of Field Work.

THE FLEMINGTON BAPTIST CHURCH,
Flemington, N.J., August 16, 1963.
Senator HARRISON A. WILLIAMS,
Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

HONORABLE SIR: In complying with your request in "Report Home" for opinions on the adoption or rejection of the treaty to ban nuclear tests, I feel that the treaty should be adopted. It is, in my opinion, a step in the right direction toward peace. A vote to defeat adoption would be another argument that the United States does not want world peace.

Yours truly,
EDWARD C. DUNBAR.

THE LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS,
Trenton, N.J., September 4, 1963.
Senator HARRISON A. WILLIAMS,
Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR WILLIAMS: Thank you for seeking the opinions of members of the League of Women Voters on the proposed nuclear test ban treaty. Although the League of Women Voters as an organization has taken no position on the treaty, so far as I know, I personally am altogether in favor of it. At our first meeting in September I shall urge other members of the Trenton League to express to you their opinions on the proposed treaty.

Sincerely,
MARGARET A. THORNE,
President.

UPPER MONTCLAIR, N.J., September 4, 1963.
DEAR SENATOR WILLIAMS: By all means, support the treaty to ban nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and water.

The future of the world depends upon the establishment of the rule of law among the nations. This treaty is only a first step. But that, in a way, gives it special importance. We must take a first step to have any hope of getting somewhere in the long run.

Please, please, support the treaty.
Sincerely yours,
HAROLD S. OSBORNE,
Mayor of Montclair, N.J.

RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY,
New Brunswick, N.J., August 20, 1963.
Senator HARRISON A. WILLIAMS,
Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR WILLIAMS: I am in favor of the proposed test ban treaty.

Sincerely,
ABRAHAM YESELOVSKY,
Associate Professor, Department of
Political Sciences.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY,
Princeton, N.J., August 17, 1963.
Senator HARRISON WILLIAMS,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR WILLIAMS: It would be unthinkable for the Senate of the United States to fail to ratify the partial nuclear test ban treaty now before it, in view of the evidence that it will not decrease and may increase the security of the United States.

In view of the difficulty of policing underground explosions and to win responsible military support, the ban cannot at present be made a complete one. But "half a loaf is better than no bread." Any measure which will result in the relaxation of the tensions which are so greatly contributory to the outbreak of wars, without an accompanying relaxation of vigilance, is a step away from the holocaust the world dreads.

I trust you will vote for ratification of the treaty.

Yours faithfully,
R. B. Y. SCOTT.

NEW JERSEY HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION,
Trenton, N.J., August 19, 1963.
Hon. HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, Jr.,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR WILLIAMS: In regard to your question as to favoring or opposing the possible test ban treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, I can only speak for myself and not the association. I do favor this test ban treaty and also hope that the Senate will approve it.

Sincerely,
JACK W. OWEN.

ASBURY PARK, N.J., August 19, 1963.
Senator HARRISON A. WILLIAMS,
Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: Please be advised that I am greatly in favor of the proposed treaty between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union to bar nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water.

Very truly yours,
THOMAS F. SHEBELL, Jr.,
Lawyer.

UNIFORMED FIREMEN'S
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 198,
Atlantic City, N.J., August 1963.
Senator HARRISON WILLIAMS, New Jersey.

DEAR SIR: Received your newsletter and your request for my position regarding the nuclear test ban. I surely couldn't be considered well informed and I only know what I read in the papers. But I support every effort that our country can make to improve conditions. I know we are all mindful of the lack of good faith that the Russians place in treaties. But with our detection devices near the Russian borders we will immediately know if they have broken the treaty and can act accordingly. I believe we must make every effort to end this headlong dash to make more and better nuclear arms. To my way of thinking this can end only in total disaster for all concerned.

Thank you most sincerely for asking.
Sincerely,

THOMAS SCANLON,
Secretary.

LOCAL UNION NO. 429, UNITED
BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND
JOINERS OF AMERICA,
Montclair, N.J., August 18, 1963.
Senator H. A. WILLIAMS,
Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: I favor the treaty to ban nuclear tests, except for peaceful pursuits, which would benefit the people.

I am not in favor of strontium 90 increasing in the milk supply of the Nation.

We should block anything that is detrimental to the peace of the world.

I will read your letter at our next meeting September 9. I still post your report home on the bulletin board at the local.

With kindest regards.

H. J. RUDOLPH NELSON,
Recording Secretary.

TEMPLE EMANUEL,
Passaic, N.J., September 5, 1963.
Hon. HARRISON A. WILLIAMS,
Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: May I join the legion of peace-loving people, in the effort to minimize, through the ratification of the test ban treaty, the possibility of an all-out war. A self-imposed limitation upon the nuclear tests, even though minimal, will open the door to ultimate disarmament. I want to thank you for the sense of commitment to a noble purpose that characterizes your espousal of the treaty.

Very truly yours,

MAX ZUCKER,
Rabbit.

RETIED CITIZENS CLUB,
New Brunswick, N.J., August 20, 1963.
Hon. HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, Jr.,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: I respectfully urge you to vote for acceptance of the nuclear test ban. At least it is a start to test Soviet responsibility.

It could just be, that the terrors and rowdiness following revolutions have run their course in Russia; and their leaders find it to their advantage to accept at least a measure of civilization.

Respectfully yours,

HUGO P. BUELL.

RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY,
Newark, N.J., August 21, 1963.
Senator HARRISON A. WILLIAMS,
Old Senate House Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: I would like to record myself as being in favor of the ratification of the proposed treaty to partially ban nuclear tests.

Sincerely yours,

WILLARD HECKEL,
Dean, School of Law.

CITY OF PERTH AMBOY, N.J.
August 16, 1963.
Senator HARRISON A. WILLIAMS,
Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR WILLIAMS: It is my firm belief that the proposed treaty between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union to ban nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater is a definite step toward the relief of world tension and a more cooperative future.

It is also my firm belief that the treaty will be a giant step in the fight against contamination of the air by pollutants.

For the above reasons, I should like to voice my personal approval of the proposed treaty and urge you to support confirmation of same by the Senate.

Very truly yours,

JOSEPH J. SOPROWSKI,
Deputy Mayor and Director, Bureau of
Air Pollution Control.

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NEW JERSEY FEDERATION OF
PLANNING OFFICIALS,
August 14, 1963.

Senator HARRISON A. WILLIAMS,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: Thank you for your question on feelings on the proposed test ban treaty and request for dissemination of the problem of our national signature to such a pact, among our membership.

In my personal opinion, regardless of past records, of other signatories in keeping their word, we must approve this treaty.

When we sign it (and I must assume we will) it will increase the heavy burden our Representatives and Senators already have in insuring our guard is not dropped and that we continue to be able to speak from a position of strength as a democratic force in the world. But we would abnegate a tremendous deal for which we have fought if we declined to join in this joint promissory action. Much for which we as a nation might say in the future in the cause of human preservation might be vitiated by refusal (or even a niggardly acceptance) of this proposed treaty to ban nuclear tests in the air, water, or in space.

Sincerely,

THOMAS A. HYDE.

FIRST BAPTIST CHURCH,
Moorestown, N.J., August 16, 1963.

Hon. HARRISON A. WILLIAMS,
Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: Please use your vote and your influence to approve and ratify the test ban which will soon come before you. I agree with the New York Times' editorial which stated, "Risks are inescapable in today's troubled world, but the risks inherent in rejecting the treaty and thus giving a new spur to the worldwide nuclear arms race are much greater than any discernible in the pact's approval.

I am very appreciative of your service.

Sincerely yours,

NORMAN R. DEPUY.

BERNARDSVILLE, N.J.,

August 15, 1963.

Senator HARRISON A. WILLIAMS,
Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

In answer to the questionnaire in your "Report Home," volume V, No. 16, I favor the proposed treaty between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union to ban nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater.

ARCHIBALD S. ALEXANDER.

NEW JERSEY STATE AFL-CIO,

Newark, N.J., August 16, 1963.

Hon. HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, Jr.,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR WILLIAMS: I have your letter of August 12, concerning my views on the proposed nuclear test ban treaty.

The National AFL-CIO has gone on record in support of the treaty and this is a decision in which I heartily concur.

The alternative to peaceful coexistence is nuclear war and total annihilation of all human life. The choice appears to be quite simple. Even though the Goldwaters and the John Birchers don't realize it, we are really saving their lives.

You should have no doubt about how to vote on this one. Hope to see you soon.

Sincerely,

JOEL R. JACOBSON,
First Executive Vice President.

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McCARTER & ENGLISH,
COUNSELORS AT LAW,
Newark, N.J., September 9, 1963.

Senator HARRISON A. WILLIAMS,
Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

MY DEAR SENATOR WILLIAMS: As a member of the Monmouth County Bar Association, I am replying to your request for the views of members of that organization on the proposed limited nuclear test ban treaty. I note that Senate debate on the treaty will commence during this week.

Although many of the relevant considerations with regard to the proposed treaty are, for valid security reasons, hidden from the public view, from the information available, I can see only one possible reason for the Senate to fail to ratify the initialed treaty. That is the possibility that the Soviet Union, during its extensive testing last autumn, was successful in developing an anti-missile system. Some pronouncements of Soviet military men, to which I would not be inclined to give great weight, tend to support such a conclusion. The uncensored testimony of some of our scientific and military spokesmen before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee leads me to believe that no such breakthrough occurred and that neither the Russians nor the United States have successfully mastered the intricacies of such a system.

There does not seem to be much question but that our nuclear stockpile far outnumbers that of the Soviet Union or that we have more delivery vehicles available for nuclear weapons than do the Russians. It seems to me that the numbers of weapons and delivery vehicles available to us and to the Russians is largely irrelevant in the final analysis, since the view of most of our military-scientific personnel appears to be that both sides are fully capable at the present time of thoroughly devastating by nuclear weapons the industry, population, and food supply of the adversary.

Thus, with the slight reservation which I have mentioned, I see no valid practical reason for a failure on the part of the Senate to ratify the proposed treaty.

Even more important perhaps than the military and scientific aspects of the decision to ratify the treaty are the moral implications of such a decision. The United States has for years advocated a nuclear test ban and has even gone so far 2 years ago as to cease voluntarily its own testing (resumed, admittedly, upon resumption of testing by the Soviet Union). To fail to accept the present treaty, although limited in scope, would be a complete reversal of the publicly espoused position of this country and the private aspirations of a good portion of its population.

The proposed treaty is in my view a first step toward broader test ban agreements leading, it is hoped, to complete disarmament. Approval of the treaty has its risks. Its rejection would be disastrous. It would lend aid and comfort to the Communist portrayal of the United States as a warmongering nation bent upon a continuance and acceleration of the arms race. It would disillusion and alienate the many unaligned nations of the world, many of whom have already signified their adherence to the treaty. It would offend the sensibilities of peace-loving people in this country as well as abroad.

For the above reasons, I feel that the proposed treaty should be quickly and emphatically ratified by the Senate.

Respectfully yours,

MICHAEL D. LOPRETE.

MR. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I wish to commend the Senator from New Jersey, as I have others of our colleagues today, on his presentation. I know of his deep concern over the treaty. I am delighted that a man of his understanding and background in the field of government has declared his intention to vote for the ratification of the treaty. It will mean a great deal not only to the Senate, but to the citizens of his State. I am sure that the Senator from New Jersey knows, as do other Senators, that the American people are vitally concerned over this issue; and while most of the people who are for the treaty have not written to Senators, the public opinion polls that have been conducted in a very intensive and extensive manner show overwhelming support for the treaty. The words of the Senator from New Jersey are very helpful. I assure him that his support will be reassuring to Senators who support the treaty; to the Secretary of State, who signed the treaty; and to the President of the United States, who initiated the treaty. The Senator is to be commended, and I do so.

MR. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. Mr. President, I am very appreciative and deeply grateful for the remarks of our most beloved friend, the Senator from Minnesota. I do not believe we would be in this most historic moment of our national history if it had not been for his untiring and persistent devotion to the cause of peace. For that reason, among others, I am most grateful to him.

MR. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, the newspapers of the United States have participated in the great debate over the nuclear test ban treaty, as have Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives.

The editorial pages of newspapers in all sections of the country continue to express strong support for the limited test ban treaty. This is bipartisan support. It is found on editorial pages of conservative, middle-of-the-road, and liberal ideologies.

Editorial opinion corresponds with the overwhelming public vote of confidence disclosed by the Louis Harris and Gallup polls. The distinguished Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] inserted the Louis Harris poll in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD yesterday. I shall not do so again today, but I do wish to emphasize the marked shift of opinion in favor of the treaty which has occurred during the past 2 months. The percentage favoring the treaty rose from a narrow majority of 52 percent in July to an overwhelming 81 percent recorded last week and another 11 percent expressed qualified approval of the treaty, bringing the overall support of the test ban treaty at 92 percent. This is an impressive expression of public support on a matter of such importance.

I commend many of the editors from all sections of the country who have written of their strong support for the limited test ban treaty. We are in-

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debated to thoughtful editors and columnists for their contributions to this historic debate. I ask unanimous consent that these editorials be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Chicago Sun-Times, Sept. 14, 1963]

DIRKSEN'S PERSPECTIVE

Senator EVERETT M. DIRKSEN, Republican, of Illinois, will be 68 years old next January and his term in Congress will have another 5 years to run. He then will have reached an honorable retirement age and so he need no longer temper his views to suit shifting political winds in anticipation of the next election.

And so it is that he can, in 1 day, face two such disparate groups as the National Federation of Republican Women and demonstrators rallied by the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (Snick) and disagree with both.

The Illinois branch of the women's organization had passed a resolution urging rejection of the test ban treaty as "a cruel hoax on the American people." DIRKSEN threw away the speech he had planned to make before the Republican women and instead argued for the approval of the test ban treaty.

Earlier he had met the Snick demonstrators who read him a statement urging him to support that part of President Kennedy's civil rights program outlawing segregation in privately owned business establishments. He reminded them that he has long been a champion of civil rights legislation but he has not changed his mind on the public accommodation section because he believes this is an area reserved for State action as it is in Illinois.

The Illinois law has been on the books since 1885 and, until community mores with regard to discrimination began to change in recent years, it was observed mostly in the breach.

In his speech before the Republican women, DIRKSEN reminded them that a nuclear test ban was supported by the Republican platform of 1960. A review of that platform certainly shows such a pledge without strings. It reads:

"We advocate an early agreement by all nations to forgo nuclear tests in the atmosphere, and the suspension of other tests as verification techniques permit."

That is what the test ban treaty encompasses. Tests in the atmosphere are voluntarily foregone. Underground tests continue because verification techniques neither have been developed nor agreed on.

The Republican platform actually was more specific with relation to the present debate on the test ban than the Democratic platform of 1960. The Democratic platform read:

"A primary task is to develop responsible proposals that will break the deadlock on arms control. Such proposals should include means for ending nuclear tests under workable safeguards."

DIRKSEN had reservations about the test ban treaty when it was first initialed but he has satisfied himself that it is in the best interests of the United States and has no hidden dangers. He has taken the lead as spokesman for it.

Senator PAUL DOUGLAS, Democrat, of Illinois, has not spoken out for the test ban treaty as has his Republican colleague, but it is far more important that the Senate minority leader, DIRKSEN, speak out forcefully for the treaty, inasmuch as such opposition as there is comes largely from Republicans.

We assume Douglas will vote "aye" on the treaty when the roll is called, but meanwhile he ought to speak up as DIRKSEN has. Like

DIRKSEN, he should be unconcerned about the next election. When his term ends in 1967, he will be 3 months short of 75 years of age.

[From the New York Times, Sept. 9, 1963]

THE SENATE AND THE BAN

The time has come for the Senate as a whole to debate the nuclear test ban treaty. All the pundits—including the Senators themselves—agree that the treaty will be passed with a decisive majority.

This will not inhibit debate on the Senate floor, nor should it do so. We have our ways of getting things done—ways that often bewilder foreign observers. Yet, the occasions when we go tragically wrong, as in the close vote that defeated the League of Nations treaty after World War I, are very rare. Senator MANSFIELD, the majority leader, in his impressive presentation of the case for the treaty on Wednesday, said he would vote for the agreement because it is "a testament to the universal vitality of reason." In simpler terms, it makes sense.

The Foreign Relations Committee spent the month of August listening to scientists, military leaders and Government officials. It heard so many criticisms, so much doubt and suspicion, such a deal of faint praise, that it was extraordinary for the committee to come up with a 16-to-1 vote in favor. The committee's report was not exactly enthusiastic, but it reached the safe conclusion that the accord "represents a net advantage to the United States."

The members recommended approval without any crippling amendments, and this is the way the Senate, as a whole, should pass the treaty. Senator GOLDWATER, one of the few Senators out to make trouble for the treaty, wants to tack on a reservation to defer its implementation until the Russians get out of Cuba. There is no more reason to require this in connection with a nuclear test ban treaty than to demand that the Russians take away the Berlin wall. The test ban must stand by itself. Reservations of any kind would mean renegotiation, a long delay, and perhaps the collapse of the whole effort.

When President Kennedy addressed the Nation on July 26 after the signing of the accord he began by saying: "I speak to you tonight in a spirit of hope." There was magic in the first flash of hope that lit up the skies all around the world when the treaty was first announced. The Senate has an opportunity to rekindle at least a measure of that hope. Grant the risks, the loopholes and the limitations of the treaty, but weigh them against the reduction of fallout hazard and against the possibility that it can represent a building block for a more peaceful world, and there should be no doubts left in any Senator's mind.

As the spiritual leaders of the Catholic, Protestant and Jewish faiths declare in their statement to the Nation this morning it is time to "take this first step along the road to peace for the common good of the world."

[From the Indianapolis Times, Sept. 8, 1963]

THE GOLDWATER RESERVATION

Senator BARRY GOLDWATER, who has been proddin the nuclear test treaty for possible flaws, departs from that course in his suggestion that, as condition for ratification, the Russians be required to get their arms and men out of Cuba—with on-site inspection by a neutral power.

Senator GOLDWATER hasn't entirely committed himself on the treaty.

If he intends to vote against it, that is what he should do, rather than worry it to death by changing the subject. For the attachment of any such reservation obviously would mean no treaty.

Cuba should be handled separately. The Russians should be moved out regardless of what happens to this treaty.

The bomb test treaty should stand on its own feet. If—by itself—it is judged to serve the interests of the United States, it should be ratified.

If it doesn't, it should be rejected—even in the vastly unlikely event that Russia might agree to leave Cuba as a U.S. bonus for signing.

Cuba is an aggravation and an embarrassment but a minutely minor item compared to the nuclear defenses of this country.

[From the Raleigh (N.C.) News & Observer, Sept. 12, 1963]

LEAD, NOT FOLLOW

It is not only of the utmost importance that the Senate ratify the limited nuclear weapons test ban treaty. It is essential also that the Senate join President Kennedy in showing the world that this Nation is a leader, not merely a follower, in the search for peace and an easing of cold war tensions. And such a showing will require not half-hearted Senate acceptance of the treaty but Senate approval of the treaty by a decisive, unmistakable and enthusiastic margin.

Any fears anyone could have about this modest, first step toward an end to the chilling nuclear arms race should by now have been obliterated. There has been no evidence at all of any kind of a "deal" in the negotiation of this treaty by American and British statesmen with the Soviet Union. The treaty in no way restricts this Nation's reliance upon its truly awesome arsenal of nuclear weapons in the defense of the United States or its friends. President Kennedy properly made that clear again yesterday in giving unqualified assurances that safeguards recommended by the military Joint Chiefs of Staff, who endorsed the treaty, would be fully carried out.

The eyes of the world are, of course, upon the Senate in its current debate on the treaty. Nothing is clearer than that the people in this country and around the world are hungry for what measure of assurance and security this treaty provides them in these perilous times. The fact that upwards of 90 of the world's nations have already signed the treaty attests this hunger.

The Senate should safeguard this country's now established place in the forefront of mankind's efforts to survive in the nuclear age by giving this treaty overwhelming, enthusiastic approval.

Strangely and disappointingly, North Carolina Senators SAM J. ERVIN and B. EVERETT JORDAN have been conspicuous by their non-committal attitudes toward this treaty. They ought to put this State on the official record of those supporting the Nation's leadership in the hopeful step this treaty takes away from civilization's suicide.

[From the Boston Globe, Sept. 9, 1963]

THE BATTLE OPENS

The announcement of Democratic Senators RICHARD B. RUSSELL of Georgia, and JOHN C. STENNIS of Mississippi that they will vote against ratification of the nuclear test ban treaty portends trouble. It may mean a closer vote than seemed likely a week ago.

As the respected veteran chairman of the Armed Services Committee the Senator from Georgia wields much influence among his colleagues. Senator STENNIS is also strategically placed as chairman of the Preparedness Subcommittee. But neither has entertained much enthusiasm for the treaty in the long, confused hearings now ended.

Senator WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, who will lead the battle for ratification, was doubtless aware of this when he estimated 10 days ago that the treaty's foes would muster at most

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a possible 20 votes. That is a long way from the 34 needed to scuttle it.

Yet the danger exists. In view of the long history of the Senate in dealing with treaty ratifications it behoves the administration and the treaty's friends in the Republican ranks to take no risks. The emergency conference President Kennedy is holding today with Senate Republican and Democratic leaders indicates his concern. Senator MANSFIELD, administration leader, and Senator SALTONSTALL, a veteran of the Armed Services Committee on the Republican side of the aisle, display awareness of the new hazards facing the treaty by pledging their support anew.

No treaty since the U.N. covenant went to the Senate has equaled the importance of this one. The hopes of the world indicated by more than 80 nations already subscribing to it are involved. At stake also is the good sense, the international repute and the basic policy of the United States.

[From the Fort Wayne (Ind.) Journal Gazette, Sept. 9, 1963]

TREATY DEBATE BEGINS TODAY

Today the U.S. Senate is scheduled to begin debate on the nuclear test ban treaty signed recently with the Soviet Union and Great Britain.

It seems clear enough that the treaty will be approved by the Senate.

It will have heavy bipartisan support. Two-thirds of those Senators voting must be recorded for the pact to insure its ratification.

Yet the debate will take place even though it is doubtful whether a single Senator will be influenced by it.

Members will wish to explain their position. They will be talking to the folks back home.

The public should follow the debate, to see what kind of reasoning the solons use.

It is the hope of the supporters of the measure that the ratification of the treaty will bring a lessening of tensions between Moscow and the West to the end that war will become less likely.

The Soviet Union seems less hostile to the West since the feud between the Kremlin and Peking became so heated. But Americans will be on the alert to see that neither camp of the Reds puts anything over on us.

The United States will remain ready to resume the testing of atomic weapons in the atmosphere if Moscow suddenly renounces the treaty or begins to cheat on it.

If the testing is limited to underground, as the treaty provides, the atomic fallout in the atmosphere will be reduced and the threat to the health of children yet unborn removed.

The form of the treaty has been set. The Senate is not likely to try to change it after so many nations have signed it. So the issue seems one of acceptance or rejection, and acceptance is the general forecast.

This step toward a purer atmosphere and a reduction of tensions will serve the best interests of America and the cause of international peace.

[From the Boston Herald, Sept. 9, 1963]

THE CUBAN RESERVATION

We share Senator GOLDWATER's misgivings about the test ban treaty. But we see no merit in his proposal that the effective date of the treaty be linked to the final withdrawal from Cuba of all Soviet missiles and military personnel.

The treaty should stand or fall on its own merits. The presence of Soviet missiles and/or troops in Cuba has no relevance to the test ban question.

The overwhelming majority of the American people and of the Senate apparently

favor the treaty. Their judgment should not be thwarted by a gimmick such as the Cuban reservation. It would not be understood either in this country or abroad.

President Eisenhower, who earlier approved the treaty with certain reservations, has now made it clear, through Senator DIRKSEN, that he did not mean formal reservations, requiring renegotiation of the treaty. That kind of reservation is cumbersome and more often than not self-defeating.

The Senator's reservation, if it was to have any effect, would have to be formal, and it would certainly kill the test ban treaty. It is definitely the wrong way to combat the agreement.

There is more than a suspicion that the Senator, who is a candidate for the Republican presidential nomination in 1964, is simply straddling the issue. By means of the reservation he can oppose the treaty while seeming to leave the door open to it.

He owes the country better than that.

[From the Washington News, Sept. 12, 1963]

RATIFY THE TREATY

Again, in his letter to Senator DIRKSEN, President Kennedy has attempted to answer objections, heretofore raised, to ratification of the treaty imposing a partial ban on nuclear tests.

The President's statements are persuasive and we hope that, barring any significant new developments, the Senate will proceed to a favorable vote by a majority substantially larger than the required two-thirds.

In the "eight points" of his letter the President pretty well covered the field:

"Underground tests, not affected by the treaty, will be 'vigorously and diligently' carried forward.

"We will keep ready to test in the atmosphere 'forthwith' should the Soviet Union renege.

"Facilities for detection of violation will be expanded.

"The treaty will not limit the use of nuclear weapons in the defense of the United States or our allies.

"Cuba will not be permitted to be used to 'circumvent or nullify' the treaty.

"The status of East Germany is unchanged.

"We will maintain strong weapons laboratories and

"We will 'diligently pursue' a program for development of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes."

All these pledges are, of course, dependent on the will of the administration—any administration in power at the time—to honor them. But a determined policy in defense of U.S. security is not dependent on this treaty and need not be affected by it.

We cannot be 100-percent certain the treaty will serve our interest. There is no such certainty in any policy we may adopt. But, as Senator DIRKSEN notes, the preponderant evidence of those "most competent to judge" favors ratification. This preponderance includes 5 of 7 scientific authorities who have testified and 12 of 14 military leaders.

There isn't the slightest doubt the Soviets will violate this treaty the moment it appears in their interest to do so. But there is evidence—or at least hope—that the Soviets now are convinced an easing of the arms race serves their interest as well as ours. In any event, this actually is a 90-day agreement, subject to termination on that notice when any party to it feels its security menaced. And constant readiness to resume tests, as promised by the President, will diminish the risk that an abrupt break by the Soviets might give them substantial advantage.

It is, as Senator DIRKSEN says, a question how long the 18-year cold war can "be kept from generating heat." And a "risk in the domain of faith may be justified."

[From the Bridgeport (Conn.) Herald, Sept. 8, 1963]

DANGER IN LINKING TEST BAN, CUBA

Far be it from us to pick incessantly on Senator BARRY GOLDWATER because we believe he is a necessary gadfly on the national scene.

He is a mouthpiece for those who both passively and violently oppose the Kennedy administration and all it stands for. Simultaneously he is a target for those who support the administration's approach to national and world problems and must have a popular figure at whom to aim their darts.

Having said this, we acknowledge the appeal of Senator GOLDWATER's proposal to tie Senate approval of the test ban treaty to withdrawal of Russian forces from Cuba. It has appeal but is dangerously impractical.

The test ban treaty has worldwide application. Our differences with Cuba and Cuba's bond with communism fall in a different area of negotiations.

Every effort should be made to get the Russians out of Cuba and to get rid of Castro.

But these efforts must not be associated with banning atomic weapons testing other than underground.

Fortunately the Senate does not appear to be taking the Goldwater suggestion seriously.

[From the Philadelphia Bulletin, Sept. 8, 1963]

THE SENATE GETS THE TREATY

The Senate tomorrow opens floor debate on the treaty to stop all but underground nuclear explosions. Senator FULBRIGHT, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, expects the debate will not go more than a week. There appears little reason why it should.

Before his committee approved the pact by a 16-to-1 vote, it heard 44 witnesses, many of them of the highest competence and spanning a 180-degree range of opinion on the treaty. It is hard to see how prolonged Senate debate could add much light.

Last week Senator GOLDWATER said he will propose putting a formal "reservation" into the document to make it conditional on the withdrawal of Soviet arms and military personnel from Cuba. As a goal, this is of course most desirable. The question is whether a treaty reservation is the proper way to seek it.

Senators of both parties promptly pounced on the proposal for good reason: To add a reservation would require renegotiation of the treaty, and it would open the door to other reservations from other signatories. This undoubtedly would end in killing the treaty.

Former President Eisenhower, while approving the pact, also called for a reservation which would insure our right of self-defense with nuclear arms if need be. Mr. FULBRIGHT pointed out that the right is specified in the United Nations Charter. It does not need to be embodied in the reservation, he said, but will be included in a memo of understanding. This should suffice.

Probably, the treaty would rouse little opposition if Russia were a consistently honorable adversary. But she is not—remember that her Cuban adventure and gross deception occurred less than a year ago.

So, understandably, cries have been raised: How can we trust the Russians? The answer is we can't, and the administration has promised that our keenest detection ears will be bent to detect violations. This treaty is not based on trust; it will only be as good as the signers and it may be broken tomorrow.

Rather, it is rooted in hope—that sometimes flickering but never quite extinguished flame of hope that somehow mankind will find a way to live in peace. The treaty, of course, does not promise peace. But, as

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President Kennedy said, "A journey of a thousand miles must begin with a single step."

With all the opinions in the scale, it appears that the Senate should enable the step to be taken.

[From the Chicago Sun-Times,
Sept. 9, 1963]

THE TREATY DEBATE BEGINS

Today the Senate begins the formal debate necessary before that body can advise and consent to the ratification of the nuclear test ban treaty.

There are indications that the treaty will be approved with a comfortable margin over the necessary two-thirds vote for ratification. This is indicated by the thoroughness of the Foreign Relations report delivered to the Senate on Wednesday. The report dealt in detail with every voiced objection and apprehension raised during the hearings before the committee. The Foreign Relations Committee voted 16 to 1 to consent to ratification.

There will be some opposition to the treaty. Senator BARRY GOLDWATER, Republican of Arizona, has already gone on record with a demand that Russian troops and installations be removed from Cuba before the treaty can become effective.

This is a fallacious demand on the part of Senator GOLDWATER. It is founded in political motives. If this were the time for such an amendment to the treaty Senator GOLDWATER would have basis for argument. It is not the time. The time had passed once the treaty had been agreed upon by Russia, Great Britain and the United States and initialed in Moscow.

The matter of Russian troops and installations in Cuba is a grave one and a danger to the entire Western Hemisphere. This is a matter to be resolved by the United States and Russia. It should not be a condition of a treaty that has now been signed by almost every nation in the world.

The proposed partial nuclear test ban treaty is, as we have remarked on this page, only a first step toward the easing of tensions in this complicated and dangerous world. It is not a perfect document. It is not an all-encompassing treaty.

It is a step forward. It is a beginning, a tentative reaching toward a mutual accord. It gives rise to the hope that in the future even more can be accomplished, that one day the nations of this world may be able to settle larger and more difficult questions around the conference table.

The exhaustive report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee should give assurance to all Members of the Senate that there is no danger in this treaty for the United States, no compromise with security. The treaty in no way, to use the language of the report, "impairs the authority and discretion" of the U.S. Commander in Chief in time of crisis to use whatever weapons he judges are required.

There are risks in this treaty, as there are risks in any new venture. The military risks have been weighed and found acceptable to U.S. security. The Senate will review all judgments and debate the issues.

Senator EVERETT M. DIRKSEN, Republican of Illinois, the minority floor leader of the Senate and the leader of his party, admitted to many reservations when the treaty was first proposed. He now says he will vote for ratification. His reservations and doubts have been resolved by close study and conference with administration officials.

There are risks but they are worth taking for the prospect of opening a way to a lessening of tensions and a possible start toward the eventual elimination of the danger of nuclear war.

[From the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Sept. 7, 1963]

COLD WATER ON A-TREATY

When our negotiators went to Moscow in July to talk about a nuclear test ban treaty, administration officials were put to some pains to reassure critics that this was all that would be negotiated. This was because of a widespread belief that Soviet Premier Khrushchev was trying to link a nuclear test ban treaty to a nonaggression agreement between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its Communist counterpart, the Warsaw Pact nations of East Europe.

There was much relief, in this Nation at least, when the U.S. negotiator, Averell Harriman, came home with a nuclear test ban treaty to which no strings had been attached. It was a remarkably simple document which obligated the signatory powers only to refrain from testing nuclear devices in the atmosphere, in outer space, or underwater. On the surface, at least, it favored neither of the two great nuclear powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, nor did it upset the status quo in the various other areas of conflict between East and West.

Now that the treaty is up for ratification in the U.S. Senate, however, Senator BARRY GOLDWATER wants to change the conditions. He has proposed that the treaty's effective date be made conditional on the withdrawal from Cuba of Soviet nuclear weapons, missiles, and military personnel.

This is exactly the same as if the Soviets were to make acceptance of the treaty conditional upon our recognition of East Germany and the withdrawal of our military forces from Europe, southeast Asia, and/or Turkey.

We think Senator GOLDWATER's proposal is wrong, that it is politically inspired, and that it ought to be rejected. If the Senate went along with it, it would mean that the treaty would have to be renegotiated with no chance of success and that the slight gains to be expected under the treaty would be lost.

The treaty, as we see it, has two advantages. One is the protection of people from poisonous fallout from nuclear testing. The other is an easing of tensions that might lead to further agreement between the major powers on just such sensitive issues as the Russian base in Cuba and the American forces in Germany.

But if the test ban treaty is upset and an attempt is made to deal with these larger issues at one sitting, it is doomed to failure. Senator GOLDWATER knows that as well as anyone else. We cannot, therefore, think why he would attempt to upset the small beginning represented by the nuclear test ban treaty except that he sees in it some possible advantage to his presidential aspirations.

[From the Bridgeport (Conn.) Post, Sept. 11, 1963]

DIRKSEN SUPPORTS TREATY

Unqualified support for the limited nuclear test ban treaty (made in Moscow) has been given by the Republican minority leader, Senator EVERETT McK. DIRKSEN, of Illinois. This removes some of the fear that a coalition of GOP Senators and southern Democrats might be powerful enough to kill the United States-British-Soviet pact.

The Kennedy administration has made a gain toward its goal of solid bipartisan backing for the agreement to limit tests to underground explosions. It was after a long White House conference with President Kennedy, attended also by Majority Leader MIKE MANFIELD and Defense Secretary McNamara, that Senator DIRKSEN, evidently convinced, made his pledge of support.

He revealed that Mr. Kennedy had pro-

vided him with assurance that there will be no relaxation of U.S. security measures, which he had feared might result from ratification. Mr. DIRKSEN also took issue with Senator BARRY GOLDWATER, who had sought a reservation that would make the treaty effective only when the Soviet Government removed all its men and missiles from Cuba.

If the Arizona Senator's proposal had been accepted, there is no doubt about the fate of the treaty. It would have been killed. He received little if any backing, and even his Republican colleagues dissociated themselves from his protest. Senator KENNETH KEATING, New York Republican, who has fought consistently to get Soviet arms and troops out of Cuba, flatly rejected the Goldwater idea.

Proponents of the treaty argue that the Goldwater proposal made no more sense than a demand from Russia that the United States abandon its European bases. The extraneous issue introduced by Senator GOLDWATER is doomed. How he will vote on the treaty, since he is a frontrunner for the Republican presidential nomination, is perplexing to his friends in and out of the Senate.

The debate in the Senate, now underway, should convey to the public just what the treaty does, and does not do. And the people should make the decision on ratification, by immediate communication with Senators.

[From the St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
Sept. 9, 1963]

A BIPARTISAN TREATY

As Senate debate opens on the test ban treaty, a majority of both parties appears to be assured in favor of ratification. Senator DIRKSEN, the minority leader, intends to support it, and Senator AIKEN predicts that two-thirds of the minority will do so. That should be an eloquent response to Senator GOLDWATER's effort to exploit the issue for his personal political purposes.

Senator GOLDWATER says he will vote against the treaty, and he also has indicated that he will try to nibble it to death with reservations. President Eisenhower has withdrawn his own suggestion of a reservation proclaiming the right to use nuclear weapons in the event of aggression, but Senator GOLDWATER supports that idea as well as the idea of a reservation delaying the effective date of the treaty until Russia removes all military forces and any remaining nuclear weapons from Cuba.

As Mr. GOLDWATER himself acknowledges, international inspection would be required to certify the removal of Soviet forces. Castro vetoed inspection once, and he has the power to veto it again. It would be up to him, therefore, to decide whether inspection took place and hence whether the test ban treaty signed by 80 nations should go into effect.

In seeking to stall the test ban until something else happens, Senator GOLDWATER takes his place alongside De Gaulle, the Chinese Communists, and one faction of the Kremlin. De Gaulle wants no ban until nuclear delivery vehicles are dismantled, the Chinese want none until general disarmament has been achieved, and even the Russians tried for a long time to make the ban conditional upon some extraneous political concession, such as a European nonaggression pact.

American negotiators rightly insisted that the treaty must stand on its own feet. It is, in essence, a door opener—a token of possible further steps toward the settlement of other cold war issues. To drag those issues into the debate on the treaty means simply keeping the door closed.

If the Senate did attach extraneous conditions to the treaty, the way would be clear for the Russians to attach conditions of their own. They could, with equal justifica-

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tion, demand that the test ban be delayed until American troops had been withdrawn from Berlin, until Polaris submarines had been removed from the Mediterranean, or until all American forces had abandoned Turkey.

So Senator AIKEN, the Vermont Republican, is quite right in describing the GOLDWATER reservation as an attempt to kill the treaty. The question is how many Republicans—and Democrats—will follow him.

The Republican national platform of 1960 pledged the party to "an early agreement by all nations to forgo nuclear tests in the atmosphere, and the suspension of other tests as verification techniques permit." The Democratic platform pledged "ending nuclear tests under workable safeguards" as a means of breaking "the deadlock of arms control." How the Senators of each party vote will measure how seriously each takes its promises to the electorate.

[From the DeKalb (Ill.) Chronicle, Sept. 7, 1963]

IT'S WORTH A TRY

No one now expects that the U.S. Senate will give anything but overwhelming approval to the partial nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviet Union.

In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's nearly unanimous endorsement of the treaty, there is a clear assessment that whatever risk is involved is one this Nation can take without grave danger to its freedom and security.

It is a judgment which says in effect that if we are not willing to take some risk in order to test Russia's purposes at this stage, we are saying that negotiation is now and perhaps forever a futile device of diplomacy in the cold war.

Obviously we are not prepared to take so adamant and seemingly final a stance.

Soviet motives, in the nature of things, can seldom if ever be entirely clear to us. But we are not now measuring motive. We do not have to know all that goes on between the Kremlin and Red China in order to take this test ban chance.

We will be watching Soviet action. There is a strong conviction that if Russia breaks the treaty we will speedily know it and be able to act on our own to prevent Moscow from gaining a critical nuclear military advantage.

It is we who have the great advantage today, and we do not propose to yield it. We will have our guard up, prepared to test in the atmosphere again should the Russians resume.

And beyond doubt, we shall be constantly alert to assure that our massive stockpile of nuclear weapons—called by President Kennedy sufficient to kill 300 million people in 1 hour—remains an effective shield for us and the free world.

This means, of course, keeping the weapons in usable condition—and deliverable over targets.

Military men disagree on ways of assuring this effectiveness. But there would seem to be ample support for the idea that it can be done, notwithstanding the test ban treaty.

Not all our military and nuclear specialists like the treaty. But the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is a sober and responsible body. It listened to the doubts and reservations and yet decided to approve the document. At worst, the committee might in time be proved wrong. At best, this group, the full Senate and all associated with the treaty must recognize that it is not a guarantee of peace, but only a small beginning step down that road.

Up to now there has been almost no traffic on that road. We are simply making ready to try it. We may have to turn back. But, with the stakes so high, the try is one our sanest Senate leaders think we ought to make.

[From the Waterbury (Conn.) Republican, Sept. 7, 1963]

GOLDWATER'S GAMBIT
STATESMANSHIP RENOUNCED

Arizona's Senator BARRY GOLDWATER has to consider his actions and votes in the U.S. Senate in the context he finds himself as a leading candidate for the Republican presidential nomination.

Senator GOLDWATER's position on the limited nuclear test ban treaty, for example, will not decide whether or not the Senate will ratify the agreement, but it will affect his chances for the GOP prize. Mr. GOLDWATER is a hardliner in just about everything, but he is particularly adamant in cold war policies.

A candid stand against the treaty would hearten the legions of rightwingers who support, with and without his consent, the conservative spokesman of the Republican Party. A Goldwater vote in favor of ratification would edge the Senator closer to just right of center, a position which would earn him some approval in States presently hostile to his candidacy.

But BARRY GOLDWATER has come up with a way to be for the treaty yet opposed to its ratification on terms accepted by the signatories. He has proposed that ratification be joined with a pledge by the Soviet Union to withdraw weapons, troops, and military and technical advisers from Cuba, a proposal that must, and will, be rejected by the Senate.

First off, such a proposal would necessitate a renegotiation of the treaty, and one nation's rider to the pact would prompt similar reservations by other powers. Senator GOLDWATER's afterthought is plainly unacceptable.

[From the Detroit (Mich.) Free Press, Sept. 7, 1963]

GOLDWATER'S GREAT GAMBLE

The words of Senator HUMPHREY—"ill timed, ill considered, and illogical"—sum up reactions to Senator GOLDWATER's reservations about the nuclear test ban treaty.

When GOLDWATER said on the Senate floor that he was going to propose a reservation to the treaty, requiring Russia to pull troops out of Cuba, not a single Senator came to his defense. Even those who don't like the treaty agreed that such a reservation would doom it.

As Averell Harriman, the Under Secretary of State who negotiated the treaty, said here Thursday, the desirability of a nuclear test ban was really settled in the United States in 1946.

Our policy in trying to control atomic explosions and converting atomic energy to peacetime purposes has been reaffirmed repeatedly since then. The only question is finding the best way. Thus GOLDWATER's reservation is ill timed.

It was ill considered because it would doom all hopes. Not only Russia would propose counterreservations, but so might all the 80-plus nations which have signed it.

And it is illogical because the troops in Cuba have nothing to do with the central issue. The Russians have agreed to this much. Let us take this one step firmly, and then proceed to the next.

GOLDWATER's object, quite clearly, is not so much to get the troops out of Cuba, for which he has no reasonable answer, but to get himself the GOP presidential nomination.

As Ed Lahey, chief of our Washington bureau, put it, defeat of the treaty would be a paralyzing blow to the administration, and make GOLDWATER a short-price favorite for the nomination.

As such, GOLDWATER's was a callous move, and one almost overwhelmingly sure to rebound against him. We no longer have a choice of how we're going to live with atomic explosions.

Evidence of increased poisoning of the

atmosphere has shown that we can't live with them. Sooner or later the radioactive accumulation will be just as deadly as the explosions themselves.

Fortunately, almost all other Senators recognize this.

[From the Decatur (Ill.) Herald, Sept. 7, 1963]

RESERVATION WOULD STRANGLE TEST BAN HOPES

Senator BARRY GOLDWATER, Republican of Arizona appears to be trying to strike a popular chord in his proposed "reservation" to the nuclear test ban treaty—which would make its effective date conditional on a complete Soviet withdrawal from Cuba.

There has been considerable talk about Senate "reservations" even though it appears there will be few dissenting votes when the Senate takes action to "advise and consent" to the treaty.

In fact, it would appear that Senator GOLDWATER is not at all concerned about the votes in the Senate. His "reservation" seems clearly aimed at the votes he thinks it could collect on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November 1964.

As Senator MIKE MANSFIELD, Democratic leader in the Senate, pointed out: "In the end about one-half the world will ask reservations of one kind or another to the effect that the other half withdraw from the earth. And since the feeling will be mutual, we will be back where we started from."

Senator GOLDWATER's "reservation" is inherently dishonest in that it does not go to the subject matter of the treaty at all. The Russian base in Cuba is a mote in the eye of U.S. security, but perhaps no more so than the U.S. bases on the fringe of the Soviet Union. Logically, Moscow, which has been fairly quiet during the debate on the treaty in this country, could well demand American withdrawal from one or more foreign bases as its own riposte to any reservation introduced by the Senate.

The United States is still more vulnerable than the Soviet Union on the subject of base withdrawals. We have more foreign bases, and are more dependent upon them, although this dependence is lessening in the missile era.

Senator GOLDWATER's bold bid for votes in 1964 should be understood for what it is just that. It is a dangerous bid too, considering the risk to the worthwhile experiment that is the test ban treaty. For whatever reasons, the Soviet Union agreed to negotiate the treaty, it is certain that Moscow has lost none of its age-old suspicion of the Western powers. Senator GOLDWATER's "reservation" never should have left the reservation.

[From the Middletown (Conn.) Press, Sept. 9, 1963]

GOLDWATER'S STAND

Senator BARRY GOLDWATER has now made his position ineluctably evident: He is against the limited test ban agreement.

This dilemma has posed an extremely difficult problem for the Arizona presidential candidate. As Roscoe Drummond put it, opposing the treaty would have hurt him in one direction, supporting it would have hurt him in another. He has now made his choice.

Had GOLDWATER decided to vote for the treaty he would have alienated the powerful financial and political support of the radical right, the John Birch sympathizers, and all those who believe that no agreement of any kind is possible with the Soviet Union.

Now, by deciding to vote against the treaty, GOLDWATER separates himself from the overwhelming majority of Republican Senators, even from the conservative leaders of his own party (such as Senator DIERKSEN and Senator BOURKE HICKENLOOPER), not to mention the mainstream of the American public

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which has been polled as in favor of the treaty.

Despite GOLDWATER's decision, we find his stance improved over the last few days. He originally said that he would vote only for the treaty if the Russians agreed to pull their troops and missiles out of Cuba. This was, of course, a fraudulent stand. The test ban treaty is not an attempt to alter the territorial status quo of the world. We cannot demand as its price, concession in Cuba, destruction of the Berlin wall, free elections in the satellites, or any other group of desirable, but unattainable demands. By the same token the Russians cannot demand that we recognize East Germany, pull our missiles out of Italy or Turkey, or seek any of their familiar objectives. The treaty sets out to do what it says, and no more. It is only an attempt to reduce atmospheric fallout and hopefully to lay the groundwork for other negotiations.

Senator GOLDWATER certainly must have known this at the time he proposed his so-called reservation to the treaty. In any case, he now says flatly, "I am not going to vote for the treaty."

"There is nothing political in this. I'm worried about the military effect of the treaty." The Senate, he said, "will not take my reservation on Cuba and I don't see how the treaty could be revised so I could support it."

It is perhaps fair to point out that the Senator has again confronted the American people with evidence of his somewhat fuzzy thinking. If he is really worried about the military effect of the treaty, surely taking the Russians out of Cuba will not solve that problem. The 15,000 Russians and their apparently defensive missiles will certainly not affect the balance of power in the world, so once again GOLDWATER has produced an irrelevancy in support of his view.

This now happens to be the fourth position that GOLDWATER has taken on the treaty. At first he appeared to oppose it, then he announced he had "an open mind" on the subject, then he said he was against it unless there was a Cuban evacuation by the Russians, and now he says that he is against it on the grounds of its military effect.

We give the Senator credit for at last having the courage to state his position clearly, but we are not sure that we can give him equally high marks for the methods or the thought processes by which he arrived at his position.

In the months to come the Senator will be called upon more and more to be specific about his views, and we rather suspect that if he is honest these views will merely reflect the attitude of the extreme right in the United States, and not the bulk of the people. Whether this will change his popularity or not we do not know, because it would seem to us that in many cases his most avid supporters are not very clear about what he actually believes. This is one problem which we are sure that time will rectify.

[From the Meadville (Pa.) Tribune, Sept. 7, 1963]

TEST BAN THE ONLY ISSUE

Senator GOLDWATER raises unnecessarily a side issue when he suggests that effectiveness of the nuclear test ban treaty be delayed until the Soviet Union removes its troops from Cuba. We hope that his colleagues will not be diverted from considering only the main issue of the pact and taking positive action on it.

The treaty aims at a single objective—the prohibition of nuclear tests on land, underwater and in the atmosphere. The Soviet Union was persuaded not to link it to a nonaggression pact, and the United States now should not add to the treaty the nonrelated Cuban question. To do so would require its renegotiation and probably would

eliminate any opportunity to arrive at agreement on banning nuclear tests.

Most Americans share with Senator GOLDWATER grave concern about the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba. But their removal along with a nonaggression pact, the Berlin question and disarmament should be the subject of subsequent negotiations. The test ban treaty has been hailed as a possible opening of the door to further East-West agreements. The Cuban question may properly be raised after ratification of the treaty without fundamental change, which we hope the Senate will do next week.

[From the Greensburg (Pa.) Tribune-Review, Sept. 7, 1963]

HOW MUCH OVERKILL?

In connection with analysis of the nuclear test ban treaty's potential effect on U.S. security, it behooves us to examine the argument that an arms race can preserve the peace. We are being told that the treaty might mean loss of our supposed lead in this race. Is that a conclusive point against the treaty?

The argument goes that as long as we are stronger than any potential enemy and are willing to use our strength we can avert war by the mere threat of war. If the Russians can destroy 50 percent of our cities, according to this view, we must be able to retaliate by destroying 75 percent of their cities. When the Russians are capable of destroying the world three times over, we must be able to destroy it four times over.

Thus we arrive at the absurdity of the argument of overkill.

The important point to bear in mind is that the use of force is not the only way of settling international disputes. But even in the use of force, the importance of having the lead in capability can be exaggerated.

We are committed not to strike first. Therefore, the only value of our strength can be a psychological one. In an actual fight the stronger man must win. But if strength is used merely as a threat to prevent a fight the question of who is stronger is not nearly as important. In a barroom brawl one desperate man armed with a broken bottle can hold off two or three stronger men who don't want to get hurt.

Question: Is the race to be ahead in overkill capability really as vital as it is made out to be?

[From the Fairmont (W. Va.) Times, Sept. 9, 1963]

NO RESERVATION NEEDED

Senator LONG of Louisiana, who distinguishes himself by being the only member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to vote against recommending Senate ratification of the nuclear test ban treaty, plans a further attempt to obstruct it. He seeks a formal reservation which would spell out the right of the United States to use nuclear weapons in its own defense or in the defense of its allies.

This is a wholly unnecessary reservation. Nothing in the treaty signed by the United States, Russia, Britain, and now several score other nations would hinder our use of nuclear weapons in the event of war. Furthermore, it is universally accepted that when a nation's security is urgently threatened it can take whatever action it deems necessary to meet the threat.

This would include the right to use nuclear arms in such circumstances. Any suggestion that this treaty would prevent our doing so, merely because there is a provision that atmospheric tests cannot be resumed without 90-day notice to other signatory powers, is a foolish evasion of reality.

The record of Senate hearings, the formal report of the Foreign Relations Committee and—if this is thought advisable—an explicit statement on this aspect of the matter

in the letter of transmittal will adequately establish the point that we reserve the right to use nuclear weapons without notice in a dire emergency. Senator LONG's proposed reservation is not necessary.

More important, it would dangerously impair chances of having the treaty itself remain on the world record. For if the Senate appends a formal reservation the treaty must be renegotiated; the reservation must be approved not only by Russia but by two-thirds of the other signers. The chances of a slip would be great. Which may be what Senator LONG and other treaty opponents anticipate.

[From the Washington Star, Sept. 12, 1963]

SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT

President Kennedy has sent a strongly worded letter to the Senate which he hopes will smooth the path for ratification of the test ban treaty. It should help. But when the final word has been written and the last speech made, there doubtless will remain a sincere doubt in the minds of some, though apparently not many, Senators.

To these, one thought should command itself. The Senate's role in the treaty-making process is not to be belittled. A Senator should explore all the implications of any treaty and if, in the end, he finds himself definitely opposed he should vote against it. But if the testimony and the arguments pro and con leave him with nothing more than a doubt in his mind, that doubt should be resolved in favor of ratification.

This is so because the President has primary responsibility in making treaties. He also has the fullest access to the relevant information—military, political, economic or whatever. There is also the fact that any President, once he submits a treaty to the Senate, puts his prestige on the line. This is true even if nothing more than, say, fishing rights are involved. It is infinitely more true when the subject matter of the treaty conceivably deals with the ingredients of the difference between war and peace.

This latter surely is true of the proposed test ban treaty. For the Senate to reject it would be to deal a shattering blow to the President's stature throughout the world. A rejection could also strike a fatal blow at the hopes for peace. These are very large considerations. And when placed in the balance against mere doubts, they should tip the scales in the President's favor.

[From the Washington Star, Sept. 7, 1963]

MR. GOLDWATER ON THE BAN

Senator BARRY GOLDWATER has reserved 51 rooms at the Mark Hopkins Hotel for a period coinciding with the Republican National Convention next July. Putting two and two together, this is an impressively affluent move that embraces the hotel's entire 15th floor. It also constitutes strong additional evidence, if any more were needed, that the Senator intends to make a serious bid for his party's presidential nomination.

It is against this fact that one must judge the GOLDWATER position on the limited nuclear test ban. He has announced that he will vote for ratification, but only if there is attached to the treaty a spectacular reservation that would make the whole thing inoperable unless or until the Soviets withdraw all their missiles and all their troops from Cuba—and unless or until Fidel Castro agrees to on-the-spot international inspection, on Cuban soil, to confirm the withdrawal.

Quite obviously, as Senator GOLDWATER himself undoubtedly knows, such a non-germane condition would surely kill the pact. It would require a complete renegotiation in which the Kremlin would insist on the terms already agreed upon. So there would be an absolute stalemate, a finish to what Majority Leader MANSFIELD has described as

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"a flicker of light" on the long, dark road toward a possible detente and a peace in which all nations could have confidence. The gentleman from Arizona, however, does not seem to be worried about that.

Clearly, for a man who obviously aspires to be President of the United States, such an attitude, as Senator HUMPHREY has declared, "does not represent constructive policy, but rather partisan mischief." When he takes over the 15th floor of the hotel in San Francisco, Senator GOLDWATER may come to regret that he has dealt so shallowly, and even frivolously, with the test ban.

[From the Washington Star, Sept. 11, 1963]

MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE TREATY

There is a short but persuasive answer to the report of the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee which warns against military disadvantages in the test ban treaty: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered these disadvantages, and they support the treaty unanimously.

It is true that the disadvantages exist. The Chiefs themselves pointed them out in testimony before the Preparedness Subcommittee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Any restrictions on the development of new weapons is, of course, to some degree a military disadvantage, whether the restriction is imposed by a budget ceiling or a treaty. Reluctantly but realistically, military leaders accept budget restrictions, and the Nation agrees that this is necessary. The Chiefs, after studying the implications of the test ban treaty, concluded that while there are military disadvantages to the treaty, they are not so serious as to render it unacceptable.

The disadvantages, as cited by the subcommittee report and by the Chiefs are these: Under the treaty the Russians can remain ahead in multimegaton weapons and catch up in small nuclear weapons; we will be unable to prooftest our nuclear weapons, including an antimissile missile, or study the effects of explosions in the atmosphere or space.

The Chiefs pointed out in their testimony, however, that these disadvantages and risks can be reduced through certain safeguards, which the administration is taking to the satisfaction of the Chiefs. They said, furthermore, that their study of the treaty included its effects in the broad field of international relations and worldwide military strategy. The treaty, they concluded, could contribute to major political achievements with important and favorable military implications.

In case someone wants to charge that the Chiefs were coerced into supporting the treaty, the fact is that one chief, Adm. George W. Anderson, had already been dropped as Chief of Naval Operations after demonstrating his independence and that two others, Gen. Curtis E. LeMay of the Air Force and Gen. David M. Shoup of the Marine Corps, are coming to the end of their terms and are not bucking for anything. We do not believe, furthermore, that Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chief of Staff of the Army, Adm. David L. McDonald, new Chief of Naval Operations, or Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would even think of bowing to pressure in a matter that is so important to American security.

One subcommittee member, Senator SYMINGTON, Democrat, of Missouri, has followed the same path of reasoning as the military leaders. He signed the report and then added his own broader view: "This treaty, a very small step, nevertheless could be the first step toward bringing nuclear weapons under some form of satisfactory control, which action should promote the possibilities of just peace under law. Therefore, I plan to vote for the treaty."

The Senator's point is well taken, and this, combined with the weight of the military testimony, argues strongly for overwhelming ratification.

[From the New York World-Telegram & Sun, Sept. 9, 1963]

THE GOLDWATER RESERVATION

Partisan mischief is too strong a term for the so-called Goldwater reservation to the nuclear test treaty; but, as Senator HUBERT HUMPHREY said, it is ill-considered and illogical.

Senator BARRY GOLDWATER, who has done a good job prodding this treaty for possible flaws, departs from that course in his suggestion that, as a condition for ratification, the Russians be required to get their arms and men out of Cuba—with on-site inspection by a neutral power.

GOLDWATER hasn't entirely committed himself on the treaty.

If he intends to vote against it, that is what he should do, rather than worry it to death by changing the subject.

For the attachment of any such reservation obviously would mean no treaty.

Cuba should be handled separately.

The Russians should be moved out regardless of what happens to this treaty.

The bomb test treaty should stand on its own feet.

If—by itself—it is judged to serve the interests of the United States, it should be ratified.

If it doesn't, it should be rejected—even in the vastly unlikely event that Russia might agree to leave Cuba as a United States bonus for signing.

Cuba is an aggravation and an embarrassment but a minutely minor item compared to the nuclear defenses of this country.

[From the New York World-Telegram & Sun, Sept. 12, 1963]

RATIFY THE TREATY

Again, in his letter to Senator DIRKSEN, President Kennedy has attempted to answer objections, heretofore raised, to ratification of the treaty imposing a partial ban on nuclear tests.

The President's statements are persuasive.

Barring any significant new developments, the Senate ought to proceed to a favorable vote by a majority substantially larger than the required two-thirds.

In his letter the President pretty well covered the field:

Underground tests, not affected by the treaty, will be vigorously and diligently carried forward.

The United States will keep ready to test in the atmosphere should the Soviet Union renege.

Facilities for detection of violation will be expanded.

The treaty will not limit the use of nuclear weapons in the defense of the United States or its allies.

Cuba will not be permitted to be used to "circumvent or nullify" the treaty.

The status of East Germany is unchanged.

The United States will maintain strong weapons laboratories and will "diligently pursue" a program for development of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes.

All these pledges are, of course, dependent on the will of the administration—any administration in power at the time—to honor them.

But a determined policy in defense of U.S. security is not dependent on this treaty and need not be affected by it.

Nobody can be 100 percent certain the treaty will serve U.S. interest. There is no such certainty in any policy.

But, as DIRKSEN notes, the preponderance of those most competent to judge favors ratification. This preponderance in-

cludes 5 of 7 scientific authorities who have testified and 12 to 14 military leaders.

There isn't the slightest doubt the Soviets will violate this treaty the moment it appears in their interest to do so.

But there is evidence—or at least hope—that the Soviets now are convinced an easing of the arms race serves their interest as well as ours.

In any event, this actually is a 90-day agreement, subject to termination on that notice when any party to it feels its security menaced.

And constant readiness to resume tests, as promised by the President, will diminish the risk that an abrupt break by the Soviets might give them substantial advantage.

It is, as DIRKSEN says, a question how long the 18-year cold war can be kept from generating heat. And a risk in the domain of faith may be justified.

[From the Little Rock (Ark.) Arkansas Gazette, Sept. 7, 1963]

WHEN GOLDWATER TOYS WITH HEALTH AND HOPES

The gullibility that Senator MIKE MANSFIELD has brought to the essentially conspiratorial job of majority leader never ceases to amaze. After saying that Senator GOLDWATER's proposed reservation to the nuclear test ban treaty amounted to a mischievous toying with the health and hopes of the American people, Senator MANSFIELD added, wholly characteristically, that he was sure the Senator from Arizona hadn't meant it that way.

It, of course, does not matter in the slightest whether the author meant it that way or not, if that is the effect the reservation would have; and Senator MANSFIELD's implication that it does matter goes well beyond the minimum courtesies of the club to show just how sweet-spirited and generous of mind the majority leader really is.

A measure of Senator MANSFIELD's ingenuousness appears to have rubbed off on other senatorial critics of Senator GOLDWATER's obstructionist role who ordinarily are less soft spoken, for almost everybody appears to have arrived independently at the amazing deduction that attaching the GOLDWATER rider on Cuba would mean renegotiating the whole thing from scratch.

Of course it would, and that was the only purpose Senator GOLDWATER had in offering it: To try to sabotage the treaty. (Sabotage: To throw your shoe into the works.) The Arizonan obviously does not greatly care what happens after that, once that much has been accomplished.

But, someone might demur, isn't BARRY GOLDWATER "sincere?" Again, does it matter? The Chinese Communists are certainly sincere enough in their opposition to the treaty, as well as in a lot of other things: They "sincerely" hate and fear the Americans, the Russians and just about everybody else, including each other. But is that any reason why any of us should behave like the Chinese Communists?

President de Gaulle is sincere, but will that make France's further contributions to contamination of the atmosphere any more tolerable? Elements of the West German press that are attacking the treaty in terms that—as the Russians have rightly remarked—closely resemble those resorted to by the Chinese are no doubt "sincere," at least most of them. But is that enough? Not for us, it isn't.

Could it be that BARRY GOLDWATER, for once, is ahead of his time, in talking of a deal to remove the Russian presence from Cuba before the treaty, he is anticipating some sort of carefully hedged-about arrangement for mutual thinning of confronting American and Russian Communist forces after ratification. No, of course, it couldn't be. But this is no reason why the rest of

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us should not take time to dwell for a moment upon the possibility or, if one chooses, the dream.

For the moment, though, the treaty's the thing. It gives away nothing. It could save all of us—the whole race of men—quite a lot.

[From the Little Rock (Ark.) Democrat, Sept. 8, 1963]

GOLDWATER ON SHAKY GROUND

Arizona's Senator BARRY M. GOLDWATER steps out on shaky ground with a proposal about the antitest ban treaty. He said he will offer a reservation to defer it till Russia pulls all weapons out of Cuba.

This would make the treaty a bargaining basis with Russia. And when you bargain with a nation, as with an individual, you tacitly admit that the nation has some possession to give up for what you offer. Russia hasn't the ghost of a possessive claim to Cuba.

The Russians are there by a brazen defiance of our Monroe Doctrine and of the Cuban people's sacred right to govern themselves through free elections.

In the test ban, Russia has something to yield—the right, equally with our own, to test nuclear weapons. In Cuba, Khrushchev rightfully has nothing to yield.

We'd be admitting something rightful in his Cuban crime, if we dickered with him about it. We should tell him bluntly to get out.

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Sept. 14, 1963]

THE TREATY IS NOT A CATCHALL

The chief basis of Senator RUSSELL's concern over the test ban treaty turns out to be a distrust of the future practices of the American Presidency, rather than distrust of the Russians. He fears that the amendment provisions of the treaty (over which the United States, as an original signatory, has a veto) might lead this country into steps toward disarmament of which the Senate might not approve. And he wants a statement that any amendment must be ratified by the upper House to be included in the ratification resolution.

It is difficult to see how any amendment of a treaty could come into force under the Constitution without Senate ratification. Nor is it easy to understand why a clause to this effect—a matter purely of domestic concern—should be embodied in an international instrument of ratification; the inclusion of such a clause in the Atomic Energy Treaty arose from special circumstances, which do not obtain in this case.

The test ban treaty has been negotiated and debated in full accordance with constitutional processes. It is not a catchall for resolving all the doubts of every Senator about those processes.

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Sept. 8, 1963]

NO BOX TOPS WITH THE TEST BAN

The idea of getting some kind of premium with the test ban treaty, as proposed by Senator GOLDWATER, is not new. Mr. Khrushchev tried to hitch a nonaggression pact to the treaty, presumably on the assumption that the West was so anxious to stop nuclear testing that it would give away trading stamps for Russia's signature. But Mr. Khrushchev was soon disabused; the West's concession on the treaty was accepting a limited ban without inspection, and it considered that enough.

Mr. GOLDWATER, too, has been disabused—by his own colleagues in the Senate. They all admit that it would be a great thing to get Soviet troops out of Cuba, but they point out that to make this a precondition for bringing the test-ban arrangement into ef-

fect would entail opening up all outstanding cold war issues for international debate. And this would mean the continuance of nuclear testing.

For it is idle to expect the Russians to concede an evacuation of Cuba in return for an end to testing. Khrushchev is already under fierce fire from the Red Chinese (which also means a large number of unreconstructed Stalinists in Communist parties throughout the world, including the Soviet Union) not only for signing the test ban treaty but for pulling his missiles out of Cuba. Even if Khrushchev is prepared to withdraw his military from Castroland he would certainly prefer to do so with a minimum of fanfare and not, under any circumstances, as an appendix to the treaty.

We suspect that Senator GOLDWATER is quite as aware of this as anyone, and that he suggested the Cuban rider to the treaty as an indirect attack upon the treaty itself. By the same token, the pronounced Southern trend away from the treaty may be, at least in part, an indirect attack upon the Kennedy administration's stand for civil rights rather than an expression of any strong feelings about the need for continued testing.

It is to be hoped that the overwhelming majority of the Senate will neither try to get redeemable box tops with their treaty nor use it as a club with which to beat the administration. An end to atmospheric testing is a good thing in itself and, at this stage, virtually a necessity for the maintenance of American leadership in the free world. It should be ratified on that basis.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Sept. 7, 1963]

GOLDWATER RESERVATION

Senator GOLDWATER's proposed reservation on the test ban treaty may serve his own purpose of camouflaging his opposition to the treaty. But it is not likely to become a serious issue in the Senate debate. What the Senator is saying in effect is that this small step toward ironing out differences with the Soviet Union should not be taken unless it is linked with larger steps which cannot be taken.

His first proposal is that the treaty should not become effective until the U.S.S.R. has moved all nuclear weapons and military personnel from Cuba. This in itself would destroy the treaty. As Majority Leader MANSFIELD has pointed out, a new agreement would have to be negotiated, and the Soviets would match the American demand for Russia withdrawal from Cuba by demands for American withdrawal from Greece, Turkey or Berlin. The two sides would be right back where they started from.

Mr. GOLDWATER was not content, however, to reject the inch because it is not a mile. He also has proposed that the treaty should not become effective until "arrangements have been made for international inspection within Cuba to determine and confirm" the removal of Russian troops and missiles. Castro's government would never permit such inspection, and Moscow could not compel it to do so. Consequently the whole treaty, to which most of the world has subscribed, would go down the drain because the Senate had attached conditions which none of the negotiating powers could control.

This aspect of the proposed reservation fully justifies Senator HUMPHREY's comment that it does not represent constructive policy but rather partisan mischief. Mr. GOLDWATER is entitled to make as much political capital as he can out of the unsatisfactory situation in Cuba, but this is no excuse for extinguishing the flicker of light that the treaty has kindled. It is significant that in the preliminary debate in the Senate he got no support whatever.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Sept. 12, 1963]

THE TREATY'S GREAT BOON

Debate over the test ban treaty has been so crowded with examination of its purely military consequences that the virtue of eliminating radioactive fallout sometimes seems almost to be lost sight of in the overall discussion.

Senator HOLLAND and Senator PASTORE, among some others, have brought this forcibly to the attention of the Senate. The Senate and the country must not be allowed to minimize this very tangible boon. In the hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and in the debate, there have been frequent allusions to the relatively minor risks to health involved in testing. It has been stated frequently that the added hazards involved in testing can be tolerated, that the risks are not considerable, that they are in fact less menacing than many other sorts of environmental pollution.

The somatic and genetic damage that will flow from the tests already conducted, by any standard of measurement, are terrible and horrifying. This damage might be multiplied were indiscriminate tests by many nations to take place in the future. The consequences of testing alone, to say nothing of the risk of war itself, might well work an alteration upon the environment of this planet that would work dreadful injury to the health of all mankind.

Scientists have had to proceed with caution into this unknown area and they have stated their anxieties conservatively but there is no mistaking their apprehensions. The report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the effects of atomic radiation, last September, ought to be consulted anew. These scientists asked that great attention be given this risk because, they said: "The effects of any increase in radiation exposure may not be fully manifested for several decades in the case of somatic disease, and for many generations in the case of genetic damage." This report, like the reports of many other groups, emphasized that there is no threshold of added exposure up to which the tests are harmless. It stated: "Geneticists have consistently found both in mammals and other animals that the frequency of mutations is affected by radiation throughout the range of doses and dose rates investigated."

This committee pointed out, as has been so frequently observed in the debate, that testing has increased fractionally radiation risks due to natural sources. It put the increase in hereditary effects due to testing up to 1961 at 11 percent and the increase in somatic effects from 15 to 23 percent. The U.N. group found that the concentration of carbon 14, with its afterlife of thousands of years, is now 25 percent above the concentrations resulting from natural processes. This nuclide will continue to irradiate future generations for thousands of years. Only after 20,000 years will 90 percent of the total dose due to carbon 14 be delivered.

Dr. Herman J. Muller of Indiana, who won the Nobel prize in 1946 for discovering that X-rays cause changes in our genes, has calculated that the fallout radiation resulting from the above-ground testing of a single 100-megaton bomb would be likely to induce more than 100,000 cases of leukemia, bone cancer and other fatal ills to the present population of the world and a million harmful mutations in the next generation. Against the total population of the world, in terms of percentages, these casualties are not great. They are staggering in terms of the total human suffering conjured up in the mind of any sensitive man.

There has been a great deal of political conjecture about why the Soviet Union wished to sign the test-ban treaty. The

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reason may be much more simple than our conjectures. As early as December 1961, N. P. Dubinen of the Institute of Cytology and Genetics wrote in a Soviet scientific journal an article on the "Analysis of the Effect of Radiation on Cellular Nuclei of the Culture of Embryonal Human Tissues." He concluded: "The effect of ionizing radiation in the range of small doses, starting with fractions of roentgens and higher, acting on humanity as a whole, represents a real danger to future generations and threatens the irradiated individuals themselves as possible causes of malignant tumors."

The weight of the world's scientific opinion is that radioactive fallout from testing has increased (and future testing would further increase) the hazards due to natural radiation; that any increase is likely to cause some additional somatic and genetic damage.

When this country had to weigh unilateral suspension of testing it was required to place this hazard in the scales against the risk that a failure to test (while others were testing) might handicap this country to the point that it would increase the likelihood of thermonuclear war with its calamitous radioactive fallout, to say nothing of its direct effects on human life. The test ban treaty committing others to refrain from testing greatly diminishes this hazard. The suspension of atmospheric testing, in these altered circumstances, becomes an affirmative gain of the most enormous consequences to the human race.

Events may disappoint the hopes and expectations of those who have proposed this treaty. It does not, by itself, and for all time, automatically preclude the resumption of atmospheric testing, but it may well result in that most desirable end. And if it does, its adoption may spare unnumbered thousands of our own countrymen, and perhaps millions, around the world, the pain and sorrow of terrible, wasting, lifelong injury. And it may lift from mankind the dread menace and dire threat of damage to the genetic integrity of the human family that would cast its dark shadow forward through the generations down to children born 20,000 years from now.

[From the Kansas City (Mo.) Times, Sept. 9, 1963]

MEET THE TREATY DECISION HEAD ON

The debate begins this week. And, among the predictions that might be made about an unpredictable Senate, this one seems the safest: The nuclear test-ban treaty, which serves the interest of the Nation and the cause of peace, will be ratified.

The Senate, which must give its advice and consent, has all the information on the treaty and its meaning. So has the public. The hearings have been proper, thorough and informative. By now, it is obvious that the public as a whole not only expects ratification, but strongly demands it. This, in spite of the American citizen's obvious and justified distrust of the Soviet Union.

We fail to see how the Senate can flout public opinion and turn down the treaty. Indeed, it seems likely that the crucial test will not be between treaty or no treaty; but rather between the treaty as it stands, and the treaty with reservations or conditions that might destroy this opportunity for all of mankind.

You can be certain that, as the debate proceeds, there will be a plethora of reservations offered. By indirection, any Senate-endorsed condition would force the whole business back into renegotiation. The treaty thereby could be killed. It might happen. But for all the oratory that you will hear on the Senate floor, we doubt that it will.

Obviously some of the reservations have been and will be proposed in the best of

faith. Others are frankly political in nature, tossed out, as it were, for public consumption. Political motivations are always to be expected, whenever such matters and international treaties and agreements come up in the Senate of the United States.

Very probably, there will be two major lines of attack on the treaty:

The first has its genesis in the fear originally expressed by Lewis Strauss, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. Strauss has suggested that the treaty might be construed as a prohibition on the use of atomic weapons by the United States to repel aggression. As we see it, there should be no confusion on this score. After reading and rereading the limited agreement on testing in the atmosphere, beneath the seas and in space, we find nothing to justify this apprehension.

If such a doubt were justified, it would be foolish to ratify the agreement. For in this world of cold war, one fact stands out above all others: Our arsenal of devastating nuclear weapons guarantees the security of the United States. The same arsenal is the shield of the free world.

If we could see in the treaty any possible weakening of this shield of defense, we would certainly urge that the Senate not give its consent. But as The Star interprets it, the treaty in no way inhibits the United States in the use of its nuclear weapons.

There would be no harm, we suppose, should the Senate choose to clarify its interpretation of the treaty, perhaps by a separate resolution. But attached to the treaty as a reservation, such an interpretation would very likely undo all that has been done. The small but historic step toward nuclear peace would unquestionably not be taken.

The second main line of attack has been launched by Senator BARRY GOLDWATER. He says that the price of ratification should be final and complete withdrawal of the Russians from Cuba. His demand will figure prominently in the debate.

It is not necessary to discuss, here, whether this is simply Goldwater's indirect method of attempting to kill the treaty. Approved by the Senate, it would have that effect. It would be better, really, just to reject the pact outright.

Certainly all Americans want the Communists out of Cuba as quickly as possible. But Cuba is one matter; the treaty is another. Throw Cuba into the test ban consideration, and it could, as in the case of the other major reservation, set back the hopes of a world seeking to avoid nuclear holocaust. In short, Cuba, in this debate, is an irrelevancy.

We recognize and we share the distrust of the Soviet Union that has created most of the opposition to the treaty, especially among the military and in the Armed Services Committee of the Senate. But as we have said before, the world has reached a sorry state, if fears and distrust can block any move by mankind toward the ultimate goal of peace. The Star believes that the test ban treaty, for all its limitations, is a step toward that goal.

[From the Kansas City (Mo.) Times, Sept. 11, 1963]

BIPARTISANSHIP TO HELP THE TEST BAN PACT

The vote of Senator DIRKSEN, of Illinois, for the test ban pact will be much more than the vote of one Senator. As Republican leader he is placing the final stamp of bipartisanship on this small but significant step that would serve the national interest and the cause of world peace.

To be sure, there has been little question that most Republicans in the Senate would vote for the treaty. It has been equally obvious that a small minority of Democrats would vote against it. If there is bipartisan

support, there is bipartisan opposition. We can at least hope that the proposed pact has thereby been removed from the arena of political infighting. It is too important to too many people to become a plaything of partisanship.

Senator DIRKSEN, the minority leader, will do his best to see that it does not. For this, he deserves credit. There had, in fact, been little doubt about DIRKSEN's personal position. Only last week, he stated publicly that he had "a good many doubts" but that they had been resolved as a result of conferences with Secretary McNamara and others. On the other hand, DIRKSEN, for political reasons, could have swung the other way. He did not and that is the point.

So the opposition, as the debate continues, centers around Senator BARRY GOLDWATER among the Republicans, and around members of the Armed Services Committee among the Democrats. The committee members are headed by Senator RICHARD B. RUSSELL, of Georgia. It is not without meaning to note here that the hostility of Southern Democrats to the Kennedy administration may be a factor. GOLDWATER, unquestionably the leading contender for the GOP presidential nomination in 1964, is the rallying point for the extreme conservatives of his party. Many regard his proposal to attach a get-out-of-Cuba reservation as simply another way of indirectly killing the treaty.

There was at least a faint possibility that GOLDWATER could have taken more of the Republicans with him. We are pleased to note that he did not. For if there has been no question of Senate ratification, there has been some doubt on the degree of senatorial enthusiasm. EVERETT DIRKSEN has removed most of that doubt and his announcement helps clear the way for the Senate vote that certainly will reflect the deep desires of the American people.

[From the New York Times, Sept. 12, 1963]

BIPARTISANSHIP WHERE IT COUNTS

President Kennedy's letter to the Senate on the test ban treaty was impressive for the assurances of military security it gave, but more impressive for its presentation by the leader of the Republican minority, Senator DIRKSEN. His selection to make public the letter the President wrote to Mr. DIRKSEN and Majority Leader MANSFIELD underscored the firmness of bipartisan support for this first step toward a more peaceful world. The country will benefit if something of the same spirit will now reflect itself in the other great issues before Congress—civil rights, tax reduction, and foreign aid.

[From the New York Times, Sept. 9, 1963]

THE SENATE AND THE BAN

The time has come for the Senate as a whole to debate the nuclear test ban treaty. All the pundits—including the Senators themselves—agree that the treaty will be passed with a decisive majority.

This will not inhibit debate on the Senate floor, nor should it do so. We have our ways of getting things done—ways that often bewilder foreign observers. Yet, the occasions when we go tragically wrong, as in the close vote that defeated the League of Nations treaty after World War I, are very rare. Senator MANSFIELD, the majority leader, in his impressive presentation of the case for the treaty on Wednesday, said he would vote for the agreement because it is a testament to the universal vitality of reason. In simpler terms, it makes sense.

The Foreign Relations Committee spent the month of August listening to scientists, military leaders, and Government officials. It heard so many critics, so much doubt and suspicion, such a deal of faint praise, that it was extraordinary for the committee to come up with a 16-to-1 vote in favor.

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The committee's report was not exactly enthusiastic, but it reached the safe conclusion that the accord "represents a net advantage to the United States."

The members recommended approval without any crippling amendments, and this is the way the Senate as a whole should pass the treaty. Senator GOLDWATER, one of the few Senators out to make trouble for the treaty, wants to tack on a reservation to defer its implementation until the Russians get out of Cuba. There is no more reason to require this in connection with a nuclear test ban treaty than to demand that the Russians take away the Berlin wall. The test ban must stand by itself. Reservations of any kind would mean renegotiation, a long delay, and perhaps the collapse of the whole effort.

When President Kennedy addressed the Nation on July 26 after the signing of the accord he began by saying: "I speak to you tonight in a spirit of hope." There was magic in the first flash of hope that lit up the skies all around the world when the treaty was first announced. The Senate has an opportunity to rekindle at least a measure of that hope. Grant the risks, the loopholes, and the limitations of the treaty, but weigh them against the reduction of fallout hazard and against the possibility that it can represent a building block for a more peaceful world, and there should be no doubts left in any Senator's mind.

As the spiritual leaders of the Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish faiths declare in their statement to the Nation this morning, it is time to "take this first step along the road to peace for the common good of the world."

[From the Philadelphia Inquirer, Sept. 13, 1963]

A BIPARTISAN DISPLAY

The bipartisan support furnished the nuclear test ban treaty in the Senate was given dramatic accent on Wednesday by the Senate Republican leader, EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN.

President Kennedy had asked DIRKSEN to read to the Senate a letter giving unequivocal assurances that U.S. security will be protected under the terms of the treaty. The Illinois Republican not only read the letter but, in an impassioned speech, delivered with his own patented brand of eloquence, he gave the treaty his complete backing, without qualifications or reservations.

It was DIRKSEN's idea for the President to write the letter, so as to address himself directly to the misgivings entertained by some Senate Members and to suggestions for certain reservations. The assurances contained in the statement should not only have the desired effect in marshalling additional support in the Senate but should help dissipate any lingering doubts held by citizens generally concerning the worth of the test ban proposal.

It is difficult to see how President Kennedy could go any further than he did in his letter in answering such doubts. Not only did he declare that the United States would maintain a vigorous program of weapons development after ratification of the treaty and that we would be ready to resume atmosphere testing at once should the Soviet Union violate the treaty, but he assured the Senate that the treaty in no way prevents the United States from using nuclear weapons in war; that underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes will be conducted; that the treaty implies no recognition of Communist East Germany; and that this country will take all necessary action if Cuba is used directly or indirectly to circumvent the test ban treaty.

The proposed treaty is a first step, if a limited one, on the road to peace. Should it fail, as Senator DIRKSEN said, the Nation will have lost nothing because its strength and security will continue to be maintained.

"The longest journey begins with a first step," Senator DIRKSEN reminded his fellow Senators considering the treaty. "I would not want to have it written, 'He knew what happened at Hiroshima, but he didn't take a first step.' I want to make a step."

There are many others who want to make it, also, and their representatives in the Senate, Democratic and Republican, are showing firm resolve to make the test ban treaty this historic step.

The zeal displayed by DIRKSEN and other Senate Republicans in placing the country's best interests above petty partisanship is in sharp contrast with the performance of a number of Democratic Senators from the South who think they have to oppose the treaty because they oppose Kennedy.

[From the Philadelphia Inquirer, Sept. 8, 1963]

THE TREATY: A SUMMING UP

As the U.S. Senate prepares to debate and vote on ratification of the nuclear test ban treaty there should be a solemn awareness, not only on Capitol Hill but across the Nation, of what is at stake.

The treaty is limited and imperfect. It will not end testing underground and does not outlaw the use of any kind of atomic weapons in war. Conceding these obvious faults, which have been cited again and again by the treaty's critics, it remains an overriding truth that the pact pays an immediate dividend to all mankind in the form of less contaminated air and soil and water.

In the long view, the potential good of this treaty as a step toward peace is incalculable. A ban on all nuclear testing, and eventually the total abolishment of nuclear weapons, could result. To those who ridicule these goals as unrealistic we would reply that only a few months ago the skeptics were saying that Soviet agreement to any kind of a test ban treaty was impossible.

The Inquirer firmly believes—after sober reflection on arguments voiced by sincere and responsible Americans on both sides of the question—that the treaty ought to be ratified. We urge, moreover, that it be ratified without reservations or riders which would have the effect of invalidating the treaty pending renegotiation with the Soviets.

This is not to say that all objections to the treaty should be shunted aside. It will be permissible—and perhaps desirable—for the Senate to adopt one or more resolutions, entirely separate from the treaty itself, which would underscore America's position on a number of matters about which doubts exist.

Lewis L. Strauss, former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, set forth with exceptional clarity some areas of possible misunderstanding. He suggested, for example:

That the United States affirm its right to employ, without notice, any type of weapon, including nuclear weapons, that might be required to repel armed aggression against ourselves or any other free nation. Former President Eisenhower has made a similar suggestion;

That the United States reserve the right to use nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes such as digging canals and dredging harbors;

That appropriate Federal agencies be directed to maintain nuclear testing facilities in a constant state of readiness and that underground testing be continued at a vigorous rate.

Mr. Strauss and a number of other witnesses before the committee also expressed grave concern about potential obstacles that the treaty might put in the path of the U.S. program to develop an antimissile missile. A Senate resolution calling for full speed ahead in the anti-missile-missile program might be helpful. Scientific testimony indi-

cates it will be many years, if ever, before this defensive weapon will need to be tested with a nuclear explosion in the atmosphere.

Even Senator GOLDWATER's demand that Cuba be cleared of all Soviet missiles and troops could be incorporated in a Senate resolution, although we fail to see what this has to do with the test ban treaty. The gentleman from Arizona evidently is hedging in hope that he can avoid losing favor in either pro-treaty or anti-treaty circles.

Whatever resolutions are adopted, the treaty itself should be ratified without encumbrance.

[From the Baltimore Sun, Sept. 12, 1963]

HELP FOR THE FIRST STEP

In a letter to the majority and minority leaders of the Senate the President has—once again—given unqualified and unequivocal assurances that the nuclear testing treaty will not deliver the United States, bound, naked and helpless, into the hands of its potential enemies.

The country will vigorously and diligently carry on underground testing; it will keep its laboratories at work on a vigorous program of weapons development; it will be ready forthwith to resume testing in the atmosphere and other environments if the need arises; the right to use nuclear weapons for the defense of the United States and its allies is in no way limited by the treaty; and so on. This may seem to be like turning on all the lights at bright noon on a cloudless day. Still, those who think the treaty is full of secret traps, concealed pitfalls and buried bombs may, at last, be comforted and won to the side of ratification. That's the idea, of course.

While all these explanations and constructions are being read into the record it may not be inappropriate to remind ourselves that the purpose of the treaty, after all, is to limit testing and that the hope inspired by the treaty is that it will—eventually—encourage a real reduction and control of armaments. This is worth mentioning lest the scores of other nations that have stood in line to sign the agreement form the odd impression that the United States believes in an arms decrease only if it doesn't apply to much to its own arsenals, research and production. There is reason to be thankful, therefore, to Senator DIRKSEN, who read the letter to the Senate, for saying after he had done so:

I want to make a step. I would not want to have it written: "He knew what happened at Hiroshima, but he didn't take a first step." It isn't easy to imagine what megrims and palpitations the Senate will suffer if the day ever comes that it has to consider some sort of international understanding that would involve giving up a few bombs or restricting their manufacture. There's no need to worry about that now, though. It's a long, long time off. All that the Senate is asked to do at present is to take a first and very short step. The President has provided the crutches.

[From the Baltimore (Md.) Sun, Sept. 10, 1963]

EXAMPLE OF LEADERSHIP

Senator DIRKSEN, the minority leader in the Upper House, deserves the congratulations and commendations of the country for announcing his unqualified support of the nuclear testing treaty. In doing so he has displayed an order of statesmanship which should also earn him the gratitude of his own party.

To be sure, it had been expected that he would vote for the agreement. The important thing is that he has chosen, at the very outset of the senatorial debate, to say that he will do so and without understandings or conditions. In making clear the unreserved character of his backing he has rejected attempts to write into the treaty limitations

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which could force it to be renegotiated. Even more explicitly, he has dismissed Senator GOLDWATER's irrelevant proposal to make the effectiveness of the treaty dependent on Russia's removal of troops from Cuba; in effect, he said this ungermane suggestion is not worthy of serious attention. As for any apprehensions that the treaty might adversely affect the future strength of the United States as a nuclear power, Senator DIRKSEN has let it be known he will be satisfied with assurances in a letter from the President that this will not be permitted to happen.

The stand taken by the Illinois Republican will carry a great deal of weight and almost certainly guarantees ratification. It should more than offset the opposition of a small group of southern Democrats to which, regrettably, the name of Senator RUSSELL was recently added, and it promises to rally to his position the Republican Members who have hesitated to declare themselves. In fine, Senator DIRKSEN has handsomely provided his party with the kind of leadership that gives fresh and welcome vitality to the wise tradition of rising above politics where major international issues are at stake. It is an example of sound and positive bipartisanship at its best.

[From the Baltimore (Md.) Sun, Sept. 9, 1963]

THE TREATY DEBATE

The last and decisive stage of the Senate's consideration of the nuclear testing treaty begins today. After weeks of hearings, the upper Chamber opens its debate leading to the vote that will determine the fate of the agreement. Either it will be ratified or it will fail to win the two-thirds majority necessary for approval, or it will be conditionally accepted—that is with reservations attached to it which would require it to be renegotiated, rewritten by the United States, Britain, and Russia in a new form which would once again be satisfactory to all of them.

It is generally expected that the treaty will be ratified, not with reservations but with unilateral interpretations on the part of the Senate expressing the understanding of that body of certain aspects of the treaty that some Members feel require clarification. This is the outcome suggested by the drawing of the lines insofar as individual Senators have stated or indicated their positions in advance of the debate. Whether the discussion will change any minds—and if so how many and which way—cannot be predicted.

As the Senate addresses itself to this historic task a great many citizens—many more than two-thirds of them, we believe—will hope that the Senators will keep in mind what a failure to ratify would mean, and alterations in the treaty's substance compelling renegotiation would constitute a failure as much as an adverse vote. What they must ask themselves, will follow from such failure.

Three consequences could hardly be in question. First, a failure to approve would be a repudiation of hope that it is within the power of this generation to bring about a limitation or control of armaments. That hope is of a tentative and qualified kind at best. It would lose all reality if this country were to say to the world that it rejects even a restriction upon some forms of testing for the purpose of inventing new weapons.

Second, there would almost certainly follow an increase in international tension, suspicion and fear which would bring about new and heavier rounds of testing. Hitherto the belief that some kind of agreement could be reached that would hold testing in check has worked as a restraint. If that belief is dismissed the major nuclear powers will inevitably feel that to hold the balance of power they must engage in more and more testing lest they fall behind in the develop-

ment of more destructive weapons. Not only will the competitive race not be halted—it will be accelerated. And none will be able to foresee its end.

Last, such a contest will, of course, steadily add to atmospheric pollution. The Public Health Service has just reported that owing to last year's tests in Russia and America the national daily level of radioactive strontium 90 found in milk in June is nearly double what it was in that month in 1962. It is still well within the acceptable range, but who can say how high it will go if test followed test without prospect of cessation?

The risks carried by the treaty are, at worst, conjectural, as is shown by the division of technical and military opinion. The risks that would be created by failure to approve it seem clear, sure, and very terrible.

[From the Baltimore Sun, Sept. 8, 1963]

MOTHERS MAKE NEWS

Mothers, always acknowledged to be a consequential element in our society but usually wielding their influence by private devices, have lately been a good deal in the news.

In the test ban treaty discussions we have been hearing about "the mother vote," a phrase used by opponents of the treaty in a derogatory sense to include all who permit their niggles to be troubled by thoughts of radioactive fallout from nuclear testing.

It seems to us that in one way (not necessarily in all) these people are like Governor Wallace, of Alabama. They underestimate mothers.

On Friday in Huntsville, Ala., a group of mothers marched their children into East Clinton Grammar School, which Governor Wallace had ordered closed for the day. The Governor's State troopers, with their guns and helmets and superman suits, quailed and let them through, and the Governor, he lay low.

To a mother what matters is a child. The reason she worries about strontium 90 is that it might hurt her child—or her grandchild, or her great-great-great-grandchild, for if mothers are able to think no further into the future than other categories of citizens can, they do feel further into the future.

In schooling too if it is first things first, and the first thing about school is not what some Governor or other may say or do, or what the great national issues of the moment may be. It is seeing that the child gets his full share of whatever advantages may be around.

Some mothers may temporarily put lesser considerations ahead of those, but if they persist in it they become renegade mothers, outlaws, turncoats, apostates, strays, and no longer count as mothers.

The Huntsville mothers who made the troopers give way on Friday were acting in the oldest ways of motherhood, going back to the caves and beyond, but they were also acting from the most modern motives, for it happens that Huntsville is a city of a new age: its booming population, up from 16,000 to 105,000 in just over a decade, has been drawn there mainly by the vast and bustling George C. Marshall Space Flight Center.

Mother are apt to know instinctively a truth the rest of us have to think out, that in the human story what's past, what's now and what's now and what's to come are all one.

[From the Baltimore Sun, Sept. 12, 1963]

CROSS YOUR HEART

Is this really, honestly, the way you have to run a country?

Yesterday's Presidential letter to the Senate ought to answer the test ban treaty doubts of all Senators except those few who can think in military terms only—that is, who are incapable of considering foreign

policy as a whole—and those few others whose motivations on all issues are partisan or regional. The President gives unqualified and unequivocal assurance that the safeguards emphasized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be fully seen to, and trusts that this and the accompanying assurances will be helpful in dispelling any concern or misgiving which any Member of the Senate or citizen may have as to our determination to maintain the interests and security of the United States.

We too trust so, and we trust that Mr. Kennedy is as determined as he says he is—because we've got to trust, with the system we have.

In this, as in another matter to be mentioned in a moment, we find an element of the childish, and of the comic (not that childhood is comic). It may be high comedy, played on a stage that could be swept next by tragedy, but comedy it is all the same.

Each President of the United States, when he assumes office, solemnly swears or affirms that he will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of his ability preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, the purpose of which was and is to form a more perfect union, establish justice, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty.

What has happened now is that a number of Senators, not feeling the oath and the preamble to be quite final and firm enough, have demanded of the President: "Say it again, and Scout's oath this time, cross your heart and hope to die." And the President has said it again.

Similarly, on the more limited domestic scene, with the proposed tax cuts. Almost everybody agrees that tax cuts would be most welcome to individuals and corporations, and good for the economy. But when the House Ways and Means Committee on Tuesday brought out a bill for an \$11 million reduction in taxes, there was tied to it a formal demand that the President promise, cross his heart and hope to die, not to throw the country's money wildly away—that he pledge himself to all reasonable means to restrain Government spending.

In the first place, Congress can prevent a President's throwing money away, and can set any measure it likes of what is reasonable. In the second place, the President already has the duty of doing what he is being asked to vow he will do. And the President once more will undoubtedly vow, vouch and asservate.

The test ban treaty must be ratified: Senator DIRKSEN's 15 reasons for ratification say why it must, better than we can. And a tax cut should be enacted, for the general welfare, though our expectations of what it can do are not so high as the administration's are. But is this the way to go about getting those things done? Is this really the way you have to run a country?

[From the Baltimore Sun, Sept. 8, 1963]

LINING UP

Senator SALTONSTALL, of Massachusetts, has performed a service in announcing before the floor debate begins tomorrow, that he will vote for Senate ratification of the test ban treaty. Since Mr. SALTONSTALL is chairman of the conference of Republican Senators, and senior Republican on the Armed Services Committee as well as on its Preparedness Subcommittee, his announcement adds importantly to the bipartisan character of support for the treaty.

The lining up on the other side, and in our opinion the wrong side, proceeds too, with Senators RUSSELL, of Georgia, STENNIS, of Mississippi, and THURMOND, of South Carolina, all Democrats and all committee

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members (Mr. RUSSELL is chairman of Armed Services), announced against ratification. So the opposition for its part is bipartisan; and unless the situation should change sharply it looks like a bipartisan minority in a ratio of 1 to 5, or wider.

Prominent among those who have not made up their minds is Senator BYRD of Virginia. Mr. BYRD says he leans against ratification, and from the tenor of his remarks he is leaning far. Mr. GOLDWATER until yesterday was leaning the same way, though he hesitated flatly to declare himself (for him as a possible presidential candidate there are wheels within wheels) and now has plumped, all out against the treaty.

We hope that the lesser leaners are inclined mostly in the other direction, and that when the voting comes they will vote for ratification, so that the sense of the Nation may be expressed, through its highest legislative body, as unmistakably as possible.

[From the New York Post, Sept. 15, 1963]

POLITICAL COMMUNIQUE

After close study of Senator GOLDWATER's latest speeches, and especially his warning to the Republicans against nomination of a candidate who agrees with President Kennedy on any major matter, we have reached a clear-cut conclusion.

We are convinced that BARRY GOLDWATER, if nominated, will run and, if elected, will serve.

We are also convinced—on the basis of such recent Goldwater statesmanship as his demand that the nuclear test treaty be contingent on a Soviet withdrawal from Cuba, and his later announcement that he would vote against the treaty even if it were so amended—that Mr. Kennedy would enjoy a national contest with Mr. GOLDWATER.

[From the New York Post, Sept. 8, 1963]

LOST WORDS IN THE TREATY DEBATE

Senator HUMPHREY has called the attention of his colleagues to various polls—Gallup, Harris, Minneapolis Tribune—that show heartening public support for the nuclear test ban treaty.

In doing so he also voiced his distress that the Senate hearings have so far placed so much emphasis on prospective weapons development under the treaty and so little on what the country could do to achieve and maintain peace in the aftermath of this breakthrough.

"The Senate will make a good name for itself during its consideration of the nuclear test ban treaty," HUMPHREY declared, "if occasionally a voice is raised in this Chamber to indicate that one of the purposes of the treaty is to search for more reliable pathways to peace."

We hope HUMPHREY's colleagues heed these words and that the next installments of the debate nourish rather than snuff out what Senate Majority Leader MANSFIELD has called a flicker of light where there has been no light.

[From the New York Times, Sept. 15, 1963]

DUBIOUS TREATY SUPPORTERS

The endorsement given to the nuclear test ban treaty by Senator JACKSON, one of our more influential legislators on military affairs, was the most equivocal bit of support it has had since General LeMay told the Foreign Relations Committee that he was for the treaty but probably would have been against it if it had not already been signed. The spirit of Senator JACKSON's remarks is that the only true security for the United States lies in continued mistrust of the Soviet Union and in the maximum pileup of nuclear weapons. If both Moscow and Washington proceed on that theory, the treaty is not a first step toward eventual

peace and disarmament—but another step toward world annihilation. Risks attend either road, but surely the possibility of survival is more worth striving for than the certainty of destruction. The debate on a treaty designed to rid the atmosphere of pollution ought not become the medium for polluting the atmosphere of international relations. Happily, President Kennedy will have an opportunity to restore the initiative for peace in his address before the United Nations General Assembly Friday.

[From the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sept. 9, 1963]

LIMITED TEST BAN

Debate opened on ratification of the limited test ban treaty in the Senate today with approval apparently assured.

Only a handful of Senators are expected to oppose the document when it comes up for final vote; most seem to have made up their minds already and are not likely to be swayed by floor discussion or by appeals to attach reservations to the treaty which would require renegotiation.

Nor is it likely that any new information or arguments will be developed for or against the document. The proponents will argue that the treaty is a first small step toward easing the cold war; that it may lead to other steps toward better understanding between the West and the Soviet bloc; that it will reduce the danger and fears of radioactive fallout, slow down the nuclear arms race, and hamper the proliferation of nuclear weapons among smaller nations.

Opponents will argue that the treaty will allow the Soviet Union the opportunity to narrow the nuclear gap between it and the United States and thereby jeopardize our national security; that the Russians cannot be trusted to keep the treaty and will violate it as soon as it serves their purpose. Some others fear that the Russians are ahead of the West on development of an antimissile system and the treaty will give them a chance to exploit this advantage.

That there are risks involved for the United States in ratifying the treaty are undeniable. The administration, and a great majority of Senators who have probed the problem intensively since the pact was signed July 25 believe, however, that the risks are small and controllable and do not outweigh the political, diplomatic, and military advantages of acceptance.

Unless some substantial new evidence is presented to the contrary, the pact probably will be ratified with the full realization that Communist aims remain the same; that Soviet reasons for accepting the ban may change suddenly and the atmosphere which now appears conducive to easing the nuclear arms race and world tensions may dissipate quickly.

[From the Dayton (Ohio) Journal Herald, Sept. 7, 1963]

GOLDWATER'S TREATY PROPOSAL

If the desirability of U.S. Senator BARRY GOLDWATER as the Republican presidential nominee in 1964 was still an open question prior to Thursday, and it was, we would think the issue came near to being closed with his proposed reservation to the pending nuclear test ban treaty.

The Goldwater reservation would defer the treaty until Russia removed its military equipment and troops from Cuba and it called for on-site inspection to make sure that Russia did so.

Such a reservation would in fact kill the treaty and with it the hopes of America and the world for a lessening of United States-Soviet tension and the risks of nuclear war. The Republican Party will be hard pressed to make a creditable showing with a candidate so committed. That would commit the party, too. It would seem to mean the

United States was turning its back on its role as a world leader of nations working for peace, freedom, and a good life for all people. Such a commitment would be a heavy load to carry in the year 1964.

[From the Philadelphia Bulletin, Sept. 13, 1963]

DIRKSEN ON THE HIGH ROAD

The voice could be used to sell shampoo on television; the face and gestures are tank-town Hamlet. The name is EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN. On Wednesday in the Senate, where he is minority leader, he had what must be ranked as one of his finest hours.

The wide-arm stance was there. The oratory ("Oh, the tragedy. Oh, the despair.") was there. But no one would dismiss Senator DIRKSEN as a ham actor on the occasion.

In giving his unequivocal support to ratification of the treaty banning all but underground nuclear tests, he gave the Nation and politicians of both parties a lesson in nonpartisan statesmanship.

It would have been easy for the Republican senatorial leader to say in effect, all right, I guess I'll go along with this treaty. Some in both parties are saying just that, and of course a few are opposing it. Senator DIRKSEN revealed himself as a leader in more than title by embracing it forthrightly.

He reminded his party that its 1960 platform said, "We advocate an early agreement by all nations to forgo testing in the atmosphere."

He reminded all politicians of Edmund Burke's lectures to citizens: "Your representative owes you not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays instead of serving you if he sacrifices it to your opinion."

Mr. Kennedy's letter repeating assurances of preparedness and the use of arms in national defense no doubt made it easier for Mr. DIRKSEN to take his stand. It was nonetheless one of courage and in the best tradition of the "loyal opposition."

[From the Portland Oregonian, Sept. 7, 1963]

IT'S OUR TREATY

Those like Senator GOLDWATER who propose to rewrite and renegotiate the nuclear test ban treaty by Senate amendments and reservations disregard one salient point. This is that the treaty as written is exactly the treaty proposed by the United States last year. The Soviets did not originate it. They accepted it. And this left the United States in no position to bargain, to demand concessions such as the removal of Soviet troops and weapons from Cuba, or demolition of the Berlin wall, as the price of agreement.

The United States proposed a treaty to prohibit nuclear blasts in the atmosphere, in water, and in outer space—but not prohibiting underground testing which is not a hazard to health—because the treaty is believed to be in the best interests of the United States and of the world's people. Premier Khrushchev finally agreed, but wanted to attach a condition—a nonaggression treaty between the NATO and Warsaw powers. The condition was rejected by the United States and British negotiators. If our side also tried to impose conditions on the Russians—and this has not been disclosed—they must have been rejected by the Russians. The treaty is almost exactly the same as that offered by the United States and turned down by the Russians at Geneva last October.

This newspaper has suggested that the next efforts to reach sensible agreements with the Communist empire should be centered on getting the Russians out of Cuba and removal of the Berlin wall. It is no use to talk about nonaggression treaties so long as these symbols of Soviet aggression are not eliminated. But the nuclear ban treaty is another matter. It stands on its own feet.

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Senator GOLDWATER, whose aim evidently is to kill the treaty, will get very little support, even in his own political party, for his proposals for renegotiation of a treaty that has already been accepted by 80 nations.

[From the Des Moines (Iowa) Register, Sept. 7, 1963]

THE ONLY TREATY POSSIBLE

Several of the more outspoken opponents of the nuclear test ban treaty appear to be in the position of opposing any kind of an agreement with the Soviet Union at any time on any subject. Their arguments against the nuclear treaty and their proposals for reservations to be attached by the U.S. Senate are rational only from the point of view of killing the treaty.

An example of this is Senator BARRY GOLDWATER's proposal to defer effectiveness of the treaty until the Soviet Union had withdrawn all its military equipment and personnel from Cuba. Clearly, this would force renegotiation of the treaty, and Russia would reject it. GOLDWATER does not expect the Senate will approve such a reservation, but he expects to make political use of the idea, probably as an explanation if he votes against the treaty, which he has indicated is likely.

Outright opposition to any sort of pact with the Soviet Union would be more forthright. It is not reasonable to try to add on a number of conditions at this stage of the ratification process. It is not reasonable to bring in a number of other issues besides the limited one of stopping nuclear tests in the atmosphere.

As the administration has pointed out, the Russians almost certainly would demand withdrawal of U.S. military installations in Turkey, Greece, or other places in return for a withdrawal from Cuba. Agreement on such matters as closing down bases and withdrawing troops obviously is not possible at this stage of arms control talks—and may never be.

The test ban treaty, if it works out successfully, could be a step toward further agreements in the military field and in other fields. But that is only a hope. Pressing now for a larger package of agreement at best would complicate and delay a treaty, making it more open to evasion and less likely to be effective. In all probability, such additions to the agreement would stop the whole process at the start.

The treaty is limited. It does not cover underground tests. It is self-enforcing, since air and water tests can be spotted by present national surveillance methods. And any party can withdraw in 90 days if need be. It does not pretend to outlaw nuclear weapons, nor nuclear weapons research, to say nothing of all the other elements of modern warfare—including antimissile rocket development and methods of delivery, to use the callous military lingo for hurling nuclear explosives to their targets.

So, really, the treaty does not do much, and many of us, like GOLDWATER, wish it could be more comprehensive. We wish it could include banning all nuclear weapons tests, with rigid international inspection; reduction of armed forces, again with inspection; reduction of military bases and so on.

But these things are plainly not possible now. The best that can be done now is this tentative beginning. And we believe it is well worth doing. It should not be throttled at birth by attempts to reopen the negotiations. Clearly, the United States cannot get a treaty with all the advantages on its side, and neither can Russia get one that stacks the cards in its favor. What we can agree on is a very limited step, with advantages to both sides, and after seeing how that works, try another.

[From the Long Island (N.Y.) Star-Journal, Sept. 7, 1963]

GOLDWATER AND THE GOP

The political conservatives of this country really haven't had a presidential candidate they liked since Alf Landon went down the drain in 1936.

They voted in turn for Willkie, Dewey, Eisenhower and Nixon, but only because these men were not as bad as the Democrats. Recently, after 28 years in the political desert, the conservatives picked up Senator GOLDWATER, of Arizona. He is their hope and their champion. They are trying their hardest to get him the Republican nomination for President.

We fear the conservatives are out of luck again. With the test ban treaty assured of passage, Senator GOLDWATER wants to send it back for renegotiation. He wants, in effect, to embody a settlement of the Cuban issue in the same package. This puts him in so extreme a position that other Republican Senators cannot go along. For example, even Senator KEATING, who has been the sharpest critic of the Russo-Cuban conspiracy, doesn't believe the bomb treaty can be tied in with any other issue.

Senator GOLDWATER has committed himself beyond recall. The ultraconservatives will be pleased with him, but he stands before the country as a man of impractical views and ill-considered action, whom most Republicans will not follow.

[From the Troy (N.Y.) Times-Record, Sept. 7, 1963]

GOLDWATER SAYS "No".

Senator GOLDWATER has virtually said "no" in advance of the formal vote on ratification of the nuclear test ban treaty. His insistence Soviet withdrawal from Cuba be made a condition for treaty approval had the same effect as a negative vote.

For the United States to attach such a condition at this time would wreck chances for a treaty. Other signatory nations would demand conditions just as unacceptable to us. Senator GOLDWATER's demand ignores the fact not even the treaty's most ardent supporters claim it will solve all East-West differences. It is but a small step and should be considered as such. The Senator seems to want to settle everything at once.

There is some indication Senator GOLDWATER's introduction of the Cuban issue is just what Senator HUMPHREY called it—a case of partisan mischief. While paving the way for the negative vote which would please his supporters, Senator GOLDWATER's insistence on solution of the Cuban dispute would make his treaty rejection more palatable to liberal Republicans as well.

By linking the Cuban situation to the test ban treaty Senator GOLDWATER has made certain the matter will be an issue in the next presidential campaign. The Arizonian will be able to claim he demanded strong action to force Soviet withdrawal from Cuba only to have his demand rejected. And if Soviet Union actions in other areas lead to new crises in the cold war, as treaty supporters concede they might, Senator GOLDWATER will be able to say he told us so.

Opposing the test ban treaty is apparently a matter of conviction with Senator GOLDWATER. By introducing the Cuban issue he has also made it a matter of political strategy.

[From the Greensboro (N.C.) News, Sept. 7, 1963]

GOLDWATER AS BISMARCK

After weeks of searching for an advantageous way to beat the nuclear test treaty, Senator GOLDWATER has at last devised an ingenious position.

The Senate, he said this week, should not unreservedly ratify the treaty until the Rus-

sians withdraw all nuclear weapons, soldiers, and military technicians from Cuba, subject to inspection. So now we know. Rather than face a debate on the real merits and demerits of the nuclear test treaty, Senator GOLDWATER elects to take refuge in the silent and powerful unrest in the United States about Russian presence in Cuba—a real issue, but one that has not the remotest connection to nuclear testing.

No one, at least, has said what the connection is. Indeed the idea of linking the two issues, which is a bit like tying two human legs in a square knot, seems not to have occurred to Senator GOLDWATER—publicly—until August 27, almost a month after the treaty had been signed and sent to the Senate.

The dangers of the Goldwater maneuvers are readily apparent. It potentially offers a perfect out for Senators who would like to shoot the treaty down (in its present form, anyway) but fear to cast a vote in favor of fallout. By supporting Senator GOLDWATER's irrelevant rider, they could easily stall, and probably kill, the treaty without ever facing relevant issues.

Senators of both parties were quick to attack the Goldwater maneuver, and there are good reasons. In the first place, this parliamentary afterthought is too astonishingly irrelevant for serious comment.

The Russians are not, to anyone's knowledge, testing or preparing to test nuclear weapons in Cuba. Therefore it is patently so much mumbo-jumbo for Senator GOLDWATER to speak of the Russian presence there—distasteful as it is to all—as a stumbling block to the treaty.

If enough Senators bought Senator GOLDWATER's reservation, the treaty would be in for a tedious renegotiation, not only with the Soviets but with all the dozens of countries that have innocently signed believing that the United States would ratify it. Since there is little chance that the Russians would agree to remove their troops, or Castro allow an inspection if they did, the hopes for an agreed end to nuclear testing would crumble and the United States would be diplomatically humiliated.

Indeed, the United States would be in the familiar Russian position of agreeing to positions on one day and fudging out of them the next. Surely it is not forgotten that the American negotiators spent most of their time in Moscow dissuading the Russians from tying their own strings—in the form of a nonaggression pact—to the treaty.

The inescapable truth is that Senator GOLDWATER's maneuver is a device designed to free him, on the cheap, from the heavy responsibility of evaluating the treaty on its merits and finally voting yes or no. If he were forced to that point, he could no longer be both the hero of the further search for an ultimate and absolute missile or missile defense and an opponent of nuclear fallout from further testing. He could no longer sit on the fence. He could no longer claim an open mind on the nuclear treaty at the same time that he opposes and wishes to end diplomatic relations with Russia—which as things stand now amounts to sampling the devil's supper while resolutely opposing any meals with the devil at all.

It would doubtless be a political triumph for Senator GOLDWATER if his ploy should work and result in the destruction of the nuclear test treaty, but the consequences for the United States and for the world might not prove to be so happy. After all, the great game of Bismarck cannot be played casually.

[From the Denver Post, Sept. 8, 1963]

TREATY RATIFICATION APPEARS CERTAIN

Barring some unforeseen spectacular development, the partial nuclear test ban

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treaty will be ratified by the Senate, probably at the end of this week.

The treaty has been recommended for approval by a 16-to-1 vote of the Foreign Relations Committee, and as things now stand, it is expected that five votes at the most will be cast against the treaty when the full Senate votes.

But the Senate approval will not be as overwhelming as it might appear on the surface, for many of the "aye" votes will be cast reluctantly.

The reasons for this reluctance will be spelled out on the Senate floor this week when formal ratification debate is held. There will be more than a handful of Senators who will want it made clear for the record—and for their constituents—that they have misgivings about entering into the treaty.

These misgivings center on the historically established untrustworthiness of the Russians and on the fear that a false sense of security generated by the test ban might prompt us to relax a bit in maintaining and improving our nuclear defenses.

We can understand these misgivings; indeed, we have in these columns expressed doubts about various aspects and effects of the test ban treaty.

But we—along with the administration and the overwhelming majority of the Senate—believe that on balance the treaty is in the best interests of the United States and that the risks, assuming our Government does all it can to counter them, are worth taking.

We feel certain that the Senate will quickly and overwhelmingly defeat the formal reservation to the treaty that BARRY GOLDWATER says he intends to introduce this week. The reservation would make the treaty's effective date conditional on the withdrawal of Soviet troops and arms from Cuba.

Such a reservation would, of course, mean certain death for the treaty, and the Arizona Senator is perfectly aware of this. He knows that if we asked for a reservation, the Russians would in turn ask for a reservation and then all the treaty's signatories would ask reservations—and soon the whole thing would become a hopeless tangle of demands and counterdemands, and the treaty would die aborning.

As Colorado's Senator GORDON ALLOTT pointed out, regardless of the fact that the world's hopes about the treaty seem overinflated, the United States cannot afford to kill it. "This is a price we cannot afford to pay," he said, "if we are to retain the confidence of the world in our moral leadership."

[From the Rocky Mountain News, Sept. 9, 1963]

THE GOLDWATER RESERVATION

"Partisan mischief" is too strong a term for the so-called Goldwater reservation to the nuclear test treaty; but we agree with Senator HUBERT HUMPHREY, it is ill-considered and illogical.

Senator BARRY GOLDWATER, who has done a good job prodding this treaty for possible flaws, departs from that course in his suggestion that, as a condition for ratification, the Russians be required to get their arms and men out of Cuba—with on-site inspection by a neutral power.

Senator GOLDWATER hasn't entirely committed himself on the treaty. If he intends to vote against it, that is what he should do, rather than worry it to death by changing the subject. For the attachment of any such reservation obviously would mean no treaty.

Cuba should be handled separately. The Russians should be moved out regardless of what happens to this treaty.

The bomb test treaty should stand on its own feet. If—by itself—it is judged to serve the interests of the United States, it should

be ratified. If it doesn't, it should be rejected—even in the vastly unlikely event that Russia might agree to leave Cuba as a U.S. bonus for signing. Cuba is an aggravation and an embarrassment but a minutely minor item compared to the nuclear defenses of this country.

[From the Hartford (Conn.) Times, Sept. 9, 1963]

GOLDWATER'S TIMING REVEALS HIS MISCHIEF

It is impossible to view Senator GOLDWATER's nuclear test ban treaty reservation proposal regarding Cuba with anything but distinct dismay.

Americans generally share the Arizona Senator's sentiments with respect to the Soviet fortifications on Cuba 90 miles off our coast. But the mischief inherent in any such treaty reservation made at this time is plain to see.

Already some 80 nations have signed it. When all who have indicated intention to sign have done so, the total will be more than 100 nations.

If we were to insist on a reservation as suggested by Senator GOLDWATER, it would mean the whole treaty would have to be renegotiated and signed by every nation all over again, if they accepted the change.

What the Senator is demanding is that the Soviet Union remove all its military forces from Cuba before the test ban treaty becomes effective, Senator GOLDWATER said:

"This proposed test ban treaty cannot be a first step toward peace if it must stumble over Soviet missiles and troops in Cuba."

The tangle that implementation of the Senator's suggestion could create was vividly set forth by Montana Senator MANSFIELD, majority leader, who said sarcastically:

"We will ask for a reservation that the Russians withdraw from Cuba and the Russians will then ask that the United States withdraw from Greece or Turkey or Berlin or somewhere else."

"And Egypt will ask for an Israeli withdrawal from Palestine and Israel will ask for a comparable Egyptian withdrawal, and Pakistan and India will ask for comparable withdrawal from Kashmir."

It takes little imagination to envision the snarled international relations that would develop if such a situation as that pictured by Senator MANSFIELD became reality.

Democratic Senator HUMPHREY, of Minnesota, was blunt in his denunciation of the Goldwater proposal. He called it ill-timed, ill-considered, and illogical and added that it didn't represent constructive policy but rather partisan mischief.

Under Secretary of State Harriman, who participated in the treaty negotiations, said that the Goldwater proposal didn't make any sense. And so it doesn't.

The treaty is no panacea for all international tensions or a cure-all for every sore spot in the world today. There are risks in it.

However, these risks are worth taking because nuclear testing, unchecked, and armament races running wild can eventually bring only acute suffering to all mankind.

Senator GOLDWATER's suggestion is as unsound as it is impractical and is fraught with peril.

[From the Detroit News, Sept. 8, 1963]
GOLDWATER AND THE TREATY—DOES HE WANT TO KILL IT?

Senator BARRY GOLDWATER will put his political career to its most crucial test when the Senate begins its debate this week on the ratification of the limited nuclear test ban treaty.

The Arizona Senator has set the stage for his decision by announcing that he plans to offer a formal reservation to the limited nuclear test ban treaty and that, if it is defeated, he probably will vote against the treaty itself.

The Senator will run the risk, if he pursues his announced course, of alienating a large and important segment of public opinion, the support he needs to win the Republican nomination for the presidency in 1964, and the votes he would need to defeat President Kennedy's reelection bid.

It no doubt is true that the Senator's proposal to make the treaty effective only upon the withdrawal from Cuba of Soviet nuclear weapons and men will win some support in the United States.

But we suspect the Senator realizes that the treaty will be confirmed despite his reservation and opposition. Certainly all indications point to an overwhelming endorsement. And we think that he is counting on the confirmation of the treaty despite his intention to offer a reservation that would, if approved, kill it.

The point is that if the treaty were killed because of GOLDWATER's opposition and the Soviet Union and the United States then resumed nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water, he would be blamed for the increase in radioactive fallout and contamination that would occur. And we don't think that any presidential candidate would want that kind of worldwide notoriety. So we don't think GOLDWATER really intends to kill the treaty.

In announcing his opposition to the treaty, GOLDWATER instead is counting upon using it as a campaign issue in 1964. He may be expecting that the Soviet Union will break the agreement and resume testing by the time the U.S. election occurs in November, 1964. Then he could say, "I told you so." Such a result would be a powerful boost to his candidacy, assuming he is the 1964 GOP choice.

But even if the Soviet Union does not break the treaty, GOLDWATER would be able to raise the question all during the campaign as to whether the Soviets might resume testing the very next day. Concern about whether the Soviet Union will keep its word remains one of the most important questions about the treaty. GOLDWATER may well be intending to capitalize on that public distrust.

If we look at the substance of GOLDWATER's proposal, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that it would not accomplish either of the aims he supposedly seeks. If the United States demands as a condition to its approval of the treaty that the Soviet Union must withdraw its nuclear arms and men from Cuba, is it not likely that the Soviet Union in turn will attach conditions of its own, such as the U.S. withdrawals from bases close to the Soviet Union? If the Soviet Union would not pull all of its missiles and men out of Cuba after President Kennedy's threats of last fall, what reason is there to suppose the mere signing of a treaty would convince them to do so now?

If the United States attaches a formal reservation that changes the substance of a treaty—as GOLDWATER's reservation would do—the treaty must be renegotiated with all of the signers. U.S. officials have said that such a reservation would kill the treaty. We agree. And it still would not get the Russians out of Cuba. We would be left right where we are now.

But adoption of GOLDWATER's reservation would also be a backward step. For it would put out the tiny spark of hope for peace that arose in the world with the signing of the limited nuclear test ban. And it would do so without removing the threat that the Soviet troops and weapons in Cuba pose to the United States and to Latin America.

The limited nuclear test ban treaty stands alone. It is not now tied to any other agreements or conditions. It should not be limited by reservations that would require renegotiation and result in its death. So those who propose reservations with that thought in mind will assume a heavy responsibility.

As we have indicated, we think Senator GOLDWATER's purpose is to make the treaty

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as I see the fears of the southern moderate proved valid again and again by the failure of the southern establishment, that is, all those in power, to give him backing when the racist demagog goes after him.

The constant, unremitting humiliation which is suffered by the Negro in his country—in America—is something which no free man should be expected to tolerate.

The lack of educational opportunities for the Negro—and it is my firm belief that the failure to provide equal educational opportunities has been a calculated policy of the southern establishment—is unique for advanced nations.

The very real and terrible problems created by the migration of uneducated Negroes into the northern Negro ghettos—the crime rates and disorganized living patterns of the slum Negro in the North—are directly traceable to the callous and cynical policy of denying the southern Negro the opportunity to better himself through education.

I have said many times that the policy of separate but equal schools was detrimental to both white and colored, because no State is rich enough to operate two separate systems of public education. Therefore, that policy which was pursued for years denied all citizens the benefit of a really good first-class education.

To be sure, there is a world of improvement to be made in the treatment of our Negro fellow citizens in the North, but the policy of the political, cultural, business, and professional leadership in the North is to provide equal education opportunity, equal job opportunities, equal treatment. At least, these are the standards, the objectives of the official leadership.

To be sure, sometimes those standards are violated and those objectives are not fulfilled. Nevertheless, they are the declared objectives and policies.

But, that is not the policy of the Governor of Alabama and of all of those whom he represents who deliberately encourage, advocate, and enforce a policy of inequality and segregation for their fellow citizens of Negro ancestry.

It does little good to condemn the uneducated, the poor, and ill-informed white citizen who can only look to his leadership for guidance and direction.

But I do condemn that leadership—few in number but very influential—which has sought to keep wages down throughout the South by keeping Negroes uneducated and untrained. I condemn those leaders in the South who have sought to prevent the growth of labor unions by setting white worker against Negro worker.

And I condemn that leadership anywhere that has made professional political careers out of Negro-baiting or out of religious or racial bigotry and intolerance.

One cannot refuse the Negro a decent education and then say "the Negro is too ignorant, he cannot be employed." One cannot follow a policy of apartheid and then accuse the Negro of having social habits that make him undesirable for white company.

One cannot constantly, day by day, follow a policy of playing up Negro crime in the daily newspapers without knowing that this policy inflames race prejudice and makes any reasonable accommodation among the races almost impossible. One cannot drip that kind of poison daily into the homes of every family in the community without creating hate and passion.

Finally, I cannot accept the statement that the combined forces of the business and professional leadership in the South—those men who own and control the banks and the factories, the newspapers, the radios, the televisions, who own the land, who are the big contributors to the politicians—could not have before this, and cannot now, establish a rational and humane pattern of equality for the southern Negro. I know the power of these men. And I also know that much of their power is linked with, and subservient to, the economic power of the northern and eastern banks, insurance companies, and other corporations. The responsibility of the southern establishment for the state of affairs in the South during these past decades must be shared with their associates in the North who have at the very least acquiesced in the policies of racial degradation and humiliation.

Many large institutions—corporations, manufacturing establishments, and banks—are owned by people in the North. They profess to have policies of equal opportunity in the Northern areas or in the Western areas, but they do not advocate the same policies in the South. So I have little sympathy for them.

What is so sickening about the whole matter is that these policies have been to a large degree followed because of money—to save money that might otherwise have been used to educate, to save money that might otherwise have been used to raise worker's salaries and to improve their working conditions.

It is no accident that those who most loudly espouse the meanest and most reactionary of racist policies also oppose every effort to improve working conditions, to improve education, to provide more social security—not just for Negroes but for all Americans.

As one who engaged in this struggle for civil rights early, I have found that much of the opposition to the civil rights program did not emanate from the average citizen, but rather came from those who were talking about their State's rights only because the Federal Government would have the power to tax, to regulate, and to make certain financial and business institutions adopt and pursue policies which were fair and reasonable, decent and humane. The argument for State's rights was a coverup for State's wrongs and individual wrongs.

All too often the most reactionary forces in the Nation were identified with the "phony arguments" about State's rights, arguments designed only to prevent a worker from having a union of his choice so he could get a fair wage or have a decent home in which to live and bring up his family.

And so—for profit, for money—the

whirlwind of racial hatred and violence has been encouraged—not permitted—but encouraged and invited, by the stubborn and determined hard core of segregationist who are reactionary, politically and economically.

I repeat, they are a limited, small number, but they have maintained control and power frequently with the help of powerful economic and political influences in other areas of the country.

These are strong words. I have weighed them carefully. I feel them strongly.

When young girls are blown to death deliberately, in a Sunday school where they are worshiping God—when Negro leaders are assassinated in their own homes, when fire hoses and police dogs are turned on children who dare to protest nonviolently—there is something so savagely and shockingly bad about the society in which this could happen that I wonder that our Nation can dare to claim any moral leadership in the world.

Who are we to criticize excesses in the Congo, to point the finger at brutality in South Vietnam? Who are we to make pious statements about a breakdown of morality in Great Britain?

Who are we to do any of these things in the light of what has happened in our own country and what continues to happen day after day only because some Americans want full citizenship and equal rights.

What kind of a spectacle do we make in this world where we have prided ourselves on being the good society, where we have been demanding reforms from other governments—when duly constituted authority in parts of this Nation not only tolerates but also incites brutality, violence, and sadism?

We ought to be wearing ashes and sackcloth.

We ought to go into a period of public mourning.

I do not think that any single act could have been committed that would more humiliatingly lay bare the raw and ugly shame of this most massive failure of our society, than the bombing of last Sunday.

Charles Morgan, of Birmingham, has spoken up with singular courage and conviction. Now we will see.

Will the leadership of the community of Birmingham turn its back on him? I hope not, and I think it will not.

I have faith in those people, if they can only get some moral support from people throughout America, as to doing the right thing.

Will they permit him to be destroyed by the subhuman elements which they have released into the streets? I do not believe so.

Or will the leadership of Birmingham, Ala., recognize in Charles Morgan the voice of their own conscience? I hope so.

But what of us? What about the rest of us in this vast Nation? What will be our response to this senseless outrage in Birmingham, which, by the way, could happen in many other cities? Regrettably, I remind the Senate that only a few years ago it was the Jewish synagogues which were being bombed in

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a political issue in 1964. If so, we believe his intended course will serve as more of a barrier than as a benefit to his political hopes.

TRANSACTION OF ADDITIONAL ROUTINE BUSINESS

By unanimous consent, the following routine legislative business was transacted:

RESOLUTION
CONDOLENCES TO FAMILIES OF NEGRO CHILDREN KILLED IN BIRMINGHAM EXPLOSION

Mr. HART (for himself, Mr. KUCHEL, Mr. HUMPHREY, Mr. JAVITS, and Mr. CASE) submitted a resolution (S. Res. 200) extending condolences of the Senate to the families of Negro children killed in Birmingham and favoring the designation of Sunday, September 22, as a day of national observance to their memory, which was ordered to lie on the table.

CONDOLENCES TO FAMILIES OF NEGRO CHILDREN KILLED IN BIRMINGHAM, ALA.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, on behalf of myself, the distinguished Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY], the distinguished Senator from California [Mr. KUCHEL], the distinguished Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS], and the distinguished Senators from New Jersey [Mr. CASE and Mr. WILLIAMS], as in legislative session, I submit a resolution and ask unanimous consent that it lie on the table.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution will be received, printed, and lie on the table.

Mr. HART. Very briefly, Mr. President, this resolution seeks to give voice to what I believe is the feeling of the Senate. It takes note of the fact that on Sunday last there occurred the killing and maiming of children that shocked the conscience of America. It makes the further point that on Sunday next we celebrate the 101st anniversary of the signing of the Emancipation Proclamation. It suggests that by resolution the Senate—which at this moment can do so little—extend condolences to the families of the children, and it further suggests, that the Senate request the President to designate next Sunday as a day of memorial for those children.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I am very happy to associate myself with the resolution offered by the distinguished Senator from Michigan. I ask unanimous consent that a copy of a letter which was sent to the President and filed by the Senator from California [Mr. KUCHEL], the Senator from Michigan [Mr. HART], the Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS], and myself be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

The PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: We share your grief and outrage over the killing of young Americans in Birmingham last Sunday. This day will always be remembered with shame, remorse, and sorrow.

You have expressed the hope that these cruel and tragic events will awaken the conscience of every American to the folly and evil of this racial injustice, hatred and violence. In the same spirit, we respectfully urge you to issue a Presidential proclamation designating next Sunday, September 22, 1963, as a day of national mourning and remembrance for the young children who were so wantonly taken from us. This is particularly appropriate since next Sunday will also be the 101st anniversary of President Lincoln's announcement of the Emancipation Proclamation.

We are confident that the religious leaders of the Nation would cooperate in this day of national mourning and remembrance. Let us, as a free people, search our minds and hearts for the courage and sense of justice which is so urgently needed in this hour of moral crisis.

Sincerely,

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY.
THOMAS H. KUCHEL.
PHILIP A. HART.
JACOB K. JAVITS.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, of all the public comments made upon last Sunday's atrocity in which four young girls were murdered in Alabama this past Sunday, none is more moving or eloquent than that published in this morning's Washington Post and written by a young Alabama attorney, Charles Morgan, Jr.

I understand that that statement has been entered into the RECORD. Later today, before the Senate concludes its day's work, I wish to address myself to the subject matter of that statement along with certain other remarks; but at this time I merely wish to join with Senators in this resolution and to say to them that we have asked the President to declare the date of September 22 a special day of mourning and remembrance in the Nation out of respect for the great tragedy that took place last Sunday.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the resolution be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The resolution (S. Res. 200) is as follows:

Whereas on Sunday, September 15, 1963, the conscience of this Nation was shocked by the killing and maiming of Negro children while attending religious services in a church; and

Whereas Sunday, September 22, 1963, is the 101st anniversary of the signing of the Emancipation Proclamation by the President of the United States; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate of the United States, That it extends its deep condolence to the families of these innocent children; and

Further, that the President of the United States be informed that it is the sense of the Senate that he proclaim Sunday, September 22, 1963, a day of national observance in memory of these children and a day of rededication in this Nation to the principles of law, equality, and tolerance.

Mr. HUMPHREY subsequently said: Mr. President, I desire to speak briefly on a subject to which my friend the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. WILLIAMS] referred earlier.

Mr. President, of all the public comments made upon the shocking atrocity in which four young girls were murdered in Birmingham, Ala., this past Sunday, none has been more moving and eloquent than the statement which appeared in this morning's Washington Post written by a young Alabama attorney, Charles Morgan, Jr. A short time ago I made that same statement in the Senate, because it related to a resolution which was offered by the distinguished Senator from Michigan [Mr. HART], a resolution which I was privileged to cosponsor. But Mr. Morgan's statement will live in the memory of Members of Congress and the American public for a long time.

Written in grief and shame, Mr. Morgan's statement, I feel, reflects the feelings of virtually every American of sensibility and judgment in reaction to this culminating act of senseless racial violence.

Who did it? Who threw that bomb?

Mr. Morgan says that Birmingham is asking.

And his answer:
We all did it.

Indeed we all did it.

Mr. Morgan condemns the whole establishment of Birmingham—the political leaders, the business community, the press, the professional men and women—those, in short, who know better, those with the advantages of education and knowledge of the world. He condemns not only those who have deliberately inflamed the fears and passions of the whole community, but also those who have not dared to oppose the cold and cynical policies of leaders who have sought to perpetuate themselves in power by holding the Negro down "to his place."

What I have said is the statement of Mr. Morgan, repeating and paraphrasing what that fine citizen of Birmingham, Ala., has expressed from his heart and from his mind. I know that it is all too easy for one who comes from a State in which the Negro population is but a tiny fraction to speak out strongly against segregation and the humiliation of our Negro fellow citizens. It really does not require much courage. But it requires far more courage for a young man like Charles Morgan of Birmingham, Ala., to say the hard words of truth that were expressed in this morning's newspapers.

But how tragic that most of the enlightened southern leadership is silenced by their own fears of the consequences—fears that are not groundless—fears of brutal political and economic retaliation, fears of demagogues who could without a doubt bring them down, fears that a life of public service to the Nation could be destroyed by taking even a moderate position on the question of civil rights for Negroes.

Mr. President, I understand this terrible dilemma. And I stand by helplessly

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source of the funds provided for research support.

I feel sure that we all recognize the importance of science faculties that are free to pursue their own intellectual interests—uninhibited and free from the restraints imposed by the wishes and means of outside agencies or individuals. In those universities and colleges where scientists are simply considered in the same light as other scholars and are not considered as financial assets, this atmosphere, I believe, prevails. Such is the case, I am sure, on this campus, which is under the guidance of scholars and where scholarship is of paramount importance. But not all schools have a Father Hesburgh on their campuses.

It is obvious that much research remains to be done. Basic research is the foundation upon which technological and social advances are made, and I am convinced that strong and continued basic research support in our universities by the Federal Government is a necessity. In my judgment, the most important problems facing our universities today are those directly associated with the degree and manner in which our universities obtain their funds.

INVESTMENT IN RESEARCH AND THE FUTURE

To prevent the problems of fiscal instability in our universities, we must face up to the real costs of research and education at institutions of higher learning and provide financial support in a manner which is consistent with good scholarship and which will promote fiscal stability; for to accept their role in our Nation's long-range commitment to basic research, universities must be free to develop and pursue their own intellectual interests according to their own best judgment, and to do this universities must be free of any fiscal crises.

This building is completed, and standing here before your new library it portends the continued vigorous growth of your university. Its completion also fulfills the prophecy made by my predecessor, John McCone, at your 1958 commencement exercises when he said: "I can foresee a fine new laboratory on this campus which will be devoted to basic research in radiation chemistry."

This building, which has been constructed at a cost of some \$2 million, is a reflection of our confidence in your ability to maintain those qualities and attributes which have made Notre Dame a center of excellence.

ADDRESS FOR BUILDING DEDICATION AT NOTRE DAME UNIVERSITY

(Address of Dr. Frederick Seitz, Department of Physics, University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.; President, National Academy of Sciences)

Father Hesburgh, distinguished guests, it is a deep privilege to participate in the dedication of this new research laboratory. In fact, I must admit that I experience a mixture of happy emotions in being with you today.

First, I feel very conscious of being an honorary alumnus of the university, a privilege I share with Pope Paul VI.

Second, there are the emotions derived from seeing again so many old friends and associates—I might mention in particular Professor Burton and Dean Rossini—who are doing so much to add luster to this institution under the guidance of one of the most distinguished university presidents in our country.

Then, there is the pleasure of seeing an entire laboratory devoted to the field of radiation effects which has been so close to my heart for more than two decades. There is no doubt in my mind that this laboratory shall open up new chapters in the evolution of this very rich and productive field.

Finally, I should add that I look upon your new building with a certain sense of envy which you will find it easy to understand. When the Atomic Energy Commission introduced the bill which included the request for your building into Congress, it also included a building for somewhat similar purposes for my own university. Unfortunately, a highly influential Representative from one of our sister States decided that only Notre Dame was worthy of such a laboratory and removed the other laboratory from the budget. In the meantime, the distinguished Congressman has departed this earth and doubtless is looking down on us from heaven today with much pleasure because of the dedication. I wish, for many good reasons, that he were with us so that he could enjoy the occasion more directly. It would also give me an opportunity to assure him that I bear him no ill will. I might add that we finally did succeed in obtaining the funds for the building, partly with the help of the Atomic Energy Commission, although it was necessary to use somewhat more complex channels because of the obstacles that we faced in Congress.

NEW RESEARCH LABORATORIES

New research laboratories are not the rarity these days that they were during the depression years when I completed graduate work. Nevertheless, each new laboratory is worthy of a special celebration in which there is a mixture of the joyful and the serious. A new laboratory underscores a highly significant development of our time, namely the fact that science is now widely recognized as a major underpinning of society and is being well supported. Having lived through the depression years of the 1930's, I cannot continue but to marvel at the speed of growth of this concept since 1940. As I am sure all of you are aware, the support of science has essentially doubled on the average every 4 years or so since the end of the war. I think it is safe to say more wealth has been devoted to good science in the last 15 years than in all the centuries throughout the world prior to 1940.

Although this growth is in one sense remarkable, it is in another sense perhaps strange that it took so long for the present state of affairs to come about because the potentiality of science for improving man's lot was clearly recognized by Bacon and Descartes nearly 400 years ago. In fact, Descartes hoped that the golden era we are now experiencing would come about in his own lifetime in substantial part as a result of his own efforts.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

The reason for the long delay is fairly complex. However, I believe the main source of delay arises from the fact that the interplay between science and technology is one involving a certain reverberation time. A certain minimum number of generations had to pass before science and technology, working in tandem, could help one another in the way which has made the present golden age of science possible. We all recognize that technology now turns to science for many of its most productive ideas whereas science turns to technology for new tools. As significantly, however, science also turns to the profits of technology for the monetary wealth which supports science in a number of ways. It is only in the last generation or two that this wealth gained through technology has achieved a level which permits society to educate a sufficiently large fraction of the population to allow science to flower in a way in which it can really have a significant effect upon technology in a short period of time. In other words, many generations have been required for the feedback between science and technology to build up both to the present highly effective level.

In this connection, we may note that only in the last generation or two has the advance of technology depended on access to the most advanced type of scientist and his specialized scientific knowledge; that is, to the type of knowledge we now associate with education at the Ph. D level or its equivalent. At earlier periods, the half-educated person could accomplish a great deal for technology by a combination of patience and intuition. Today, there is scarcely a field of technology that does not need application of the most advanced and sophisticated scientific knowledge if it is to progress.

MATERIAL BENEFITS OF SCIENCE

Since the wealth required to support science on a large scale is generated by our technological effort, it is quite common these days to justify the support of science by the benefits of a material kind which it provides mankind whether they lie in the fields of commerce, defense, or health. This theme runs back and forth through all of the proposals which we prepare for gifts, grants, and contracts, whether governmental or private. Personally, I do not believe that we should be the least bit ashamed of this fact, for the material benefits derived from science have indeed lightened the burden of mankind enormously. Were it not for the products of research in agriculture, communications, medicine, and the like, most of us in this room would not be alive today and those of us who were would for the most part not enjoy anything approaching the sense of well-being which we do or the freedom of choice of careers. It is not for us who have reaped such enormous personal or collective benefits from science to frown upon its applications.

It also seems appropriate, however, particularly on an occasion such as this, to recognize that the complete man does not deal with material things alone. In fact, he has other highly important needs upon which I should like to dwell, noting as I do so that science is fully as important for these as for advancing the material aspects of life.

OTHER BENEFITS OF SCIENCE

Prominent among these needs, we may recognize that mankind will forever contemplate with awe the unfathomable mystery in which we are immersed; a mystery which is as much a part of our existence as the material world to which we warp so much of our efforts at the present time. At first sight, it may seem that science is of limited use in the contemplation of this mystery because the concepts relating to it basically lie not only beyond the capabilities of our rational apparatus but also beyond the scope of our language except in a relatively crude way. We must recognize, however, that science serves two valuable purposes in this connection: First, it provides intellectual and spiritual enlightenment on those matters which do lie within our range of comprehension. Second, it permits us to delineate more clearly the boundary between those areas which can be understood by the type of disciplined logical probing characteristic of science and those which we can hope to approach only through what is termed "faith." In this entire realm, science, philosophy, and religion walk hand in hand as partners. The level of sophistication or purity of our contemplation of the overall aspects of the universe in which we live is profoundly affected by the evolution of the knowledge gained through science.

KNOWLEDGE OF MAN

The other great issue to which man must continue to be dedicated is that of understanding himself both broadly and in depth. Whatever philosophical or ethical value this process of self-comprehension may have had in the past, it is now clear that our continual existence on this planet will prob-

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ably depend more on our ability to understand ourselves and our limitations than upon any other factor.

The problem of increasing self-comprehension is a task for mankind as a whole. The mission does not belong exclusively to any art or profession, for man is a many-faceted creature. He can and should be revealed to himself on many planes of vision. An indispensable part of this task belongs to the clergy. Moreover, as the late Pope John so clearly demonstrated through his example, this task transcends religious denominations if we are to consider mankind as a whole. Part of the task belongs to the artist—the poet, the novelist, the painter, the dramatist and the composer. Part belongs to the lawyer with his cases and his guiding precepts. Part belongs to the philosopher and the historian. And a highly important part belongs to the scientist.

Whatever great value we may place upon the role science plays in helping us accommodate ourselves to nature, the knowledge we gain of ourselves through science is fully as important in the larger sense.

Through anthropology and paleontology, which by this time have borrowed tools from all of science, we now realize that man emerged from his primate antecedents as a land rover with an erect posture about 10 or 15 million years ago. Somewhere along this path, he divided his family into carnivorous and herbivorous branches which one contributor with a touch of the poet has termed the branches of Cain and Abel. The remains that Cain has left behind show us not only that he slew Abel but that he probably devoured him in the process. The scientific evidence in hand also indicates more and more strongly that our species is the descendant of the family of Cain the implacable predator. It is highly important that we keep this fact about our origin in mind in the period ahead.

EVOLUTION OF MAN

At some point about 2 million years ago, our forebears began to evolve those special features of the central nervous system that ultimately transformed us into the reasoning creative artisan; that is, the inventor, and thereby gave our aggressive predatory instincts new capabilities to use in our mission on earth. The Homo sapiens that emerged from all of this about 50,000 years ago was genetically our twin. All he lacked was our knowledge, experience, and institutions. The difference between us lies in the level of education or knowledge.

There is little doubt that through this long period of evolutionary development, extending over 10 million or more years, our ancestors have been social beings much as we, entering as individuals within groups which, in turn, have interacted with one another as more or less unified entities. It is only reasonable to assume that this social side of our nature must have undergone very complex and diverse evolution in parallel with the evolution of all other aspects of our makeup that relate to the upper levels of the central nervous system. This aspect of our inheritance merits far more attention than it has received to date, for in it there may well lie the key to understanding the particular aspects of our nature which, when coupled with our growing power to destroy, have a good chance of driving us into extinction.

INTERHUMAN RELATIONS

In considering the evolution of those parts of our brain which have to do with interhuman relations, we may note, on the pleasant side, the gift we have gained which permits us to appreciate and treasure sophisticated art, poetry, and music, all of which do so much to enrich our lives. However, along with this we cannot help but ponder the complete range of social instincts we may have inherited from our ancestor Cain. It is

not possible for our generation to dwell on this issue very long without having images of the carnage of Auschwitz and Buchenwald arise before our minds, images which seem to make no rational sense unless we are prepared to admit that some of our inheritance is potentially lethal and must be controlled explicitly if we are to survive.

Since this inheritance presumably lies as a potential force within all of us, we must somehow manage to produce a mutation or its equivalent within ourselves to counteract it. Science can render no greater service to us at this time than to help us appreciate this matter and aid us in the search for a remedy.

Although the new discoveries concerning the physical and chemical form of our genetic apparatus, which have emerged through research in molecular biology, show great promise for future exciting research and possibly of applications, it seems like a forlorn hope at this stage of human affairs to believe that this knowledge will significantly help us resolve the great danger of suicide we face, at least in the short-range future. It appears instead that we must hope that a rise in collective human wisdom, accompanied by universal recognition of the dangers we face, will compel us to mold our social institutions in a way which removes the danger ever farther away.

I join with everyone here in the confident hope that the research carried on within this laboratory and the knowledge generated and transmitted within this great university will add significantly to the evolution of this collective wisdom, which is our great hope.

Mr. Speaker, I also ask unanimous consent to include at this point in the RECORD two editorials concerning the new Radiation Research Building, from the South Bend Tribune and the Mishawaka Times:

[From the South Bend (Ind.) Tribune,
Sept. 5, 1963]

PROGRESS AT NOTRE DAME

This has been a summer of fruition for the University of Notre Dame. Hard on the heels of the dedication of the new Notre Dame Computer Center came this week's dedication of the Radiation Research Center Building and the impressive ceremonies that surrounded the event.

Two statements made by Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, during the dedication were especially noteworthy.

One recognized the role played by Notre Dame's Milton Burton in the development of radiation chemistry and characterized Notre Dame as "the principal source of postgraduate trained personnel" in this highly specialized field.

The second referred to the new building. "It is," said Dr. Seaborg, "not a reward to the university for its contributions to our program; it is rather, a sound investment on our part to insure maximum intellectual growth in the discipline of radiation chemistry."

As the South Bend-Mishawaka community approaches Partners in Progress Week, a time for emphasizing community achievements, it is fitting that a spotlight has been trained on this impressive aspect of Notre Dame's growing excellence.

[From the Mishawaka Times, Sept. 3, 1963]
RADIATION RESEARCH BUILDING NOT JUST A
REWARD TO NOTRE DAME

The University of Notre Dame was warmly praised Sunday by Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Dr. Seaborg was on the Notre Dame campus to dedicate the university new \$2 million Radiation Research Building.

The radiation facility at Notre Dame is tangible evidence that the university has

gained national stature as a seat of higher learning and as a center of scientific research in an age when these disciplines are a necessity for the well-being of the human race.

Dr. Seaborg in his dedicatory address explained how Notre Dame and its radiation laboratory has grown and has contributed to the complex of radiation work and discovery since the early 1940's. The Atomic Energy Commission Chairman was positive in his admiration for the advancements made by Notre Dame's scientists, and he emphasized that the Radiation Research Building (built with Federal funds) was not a reward for the school. Rather it is evidence that the Atomic Energy Commission and others connected with scientific research have confidence that Notre Dame will continue to be a leader in the radiation field.

The dedication of the research facility was indeed a fine day in Notre Dame's long history. There is no question that the university is headed more and more into the areas of excellence to which Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh alludes. Father Hesburgh, Notre Dame's intense and scholarly president, has reason to be pleased at the progress his development program has made in the last decade.

NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

The SPEAKER. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York [MR. PILLION] is recognized for 60 minutes.

(Mr. PILLION asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PILLION. Mr. Speaker, the nuclear test ban treaty is not an isolated political instrument.

It is a major item of political contention between the Soviet and Red China. It is a major item in the Soviet-Communist world campaign of political war and subversion which is specifically targeted against the United States.

POPE PAUL VI CONDEMN'S COMMUNISM—RECOMMENDS THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL COMBAT

Mr. Speaker, on September 6, only 11 days ago, His Holiness, Pope Paul VI, reaffirmed the doctrinal condemnation of communism by the Roman Catholic Church.

Pope Paul described "communism" as a "contagious and lethal disease."

His Holiness, most wisely, pointed out that communism needs to be first diagnosed and then combated—not only theoretically but also practically.

NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

Mr. Speaker, the U.S. Senate is about to pronounce judgment for this Nation upon the nuclear test ban treaty. This treaty is not a simple contract between the United States and the Soviet Government to restrict nuclear explosions.

The treaty raises fundamental issues that will determine the future course of the world.

These issues cannot be resolved by ignoring the realities of world politics. They cannot be decided on the basis of desperation or sentimental gullibility.

If we fail to adequately and accurately diagnose the nature of communism, if we allow hope to displace reason, if we allow fear and hysteria to overcome objective analysis, then we risk not only our own freedom but that of the entire world.

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And Mr. Speaker, we are doing just that.

MILITARY ASPECTS OF TREATY

Up to now, the debate on this treaty has concentrated mainly upon its military aspects. This military analysis has been sober and realistic.

But, what is the final military verdict?

The Joint Chiefs of Staff is the highest military authority for this Nation. They have flatly stated that there are military disadvantages to the United States in this treaty.

The Stennis Military Preparedness Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate, reports this conclusion upon the treaty:

From the extensive evidence presented to us, we have come to the conclusion that the proposed treaty banning nuclear testing . . . will affect adversely the future quality of this Nation's arms and that it will result in serious and perhaps formidable military and technical disadvantages.

Therefore, Mr. Speaker, the purely military evaluations of the consequences of this treaty demand its rejection. The ratification of this treaty in its present form endangers the military security of our people.

POLITICAL RATIONALE FOR TREATY

Mr. Speaker, the next question we must ask is this: Is the political rationale for this treaty valid?

In spite of the adverse expert military judgment, the State Department and other administration witnesses have urged the ratification of this treaty. They contend that the political advantages outweigh the military disadvantages.

These political advantages are claimed to be:

First. The treaty will lead to a relaxation of world tensions.

Second. The treaty will restrain the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Third. The treaty will reduce the possibility of a nuclear war.

These are the concrete claims made for the treaty. In addition, the proponents of the treaty suggest to the American people that the treaty represents a hopeful first step toward an end to the cold war.

RELAXATION OF TENSIONS—"PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE"

Mr. Speaker, this Nation is suffering from a great delusion if it relies upon this treaty to become a first step for reducing world tensions.

Nuclear weapons testing is not the cause, but is a symptom of world tensions. The basic cause of world tensions is the unrelenting Marxist-Leninist goal to create one universal Communist social system.

This goal is reflected in the civil strife, class warfare and worldwide insurrections which were being incited by the Soviet-directed Communist parties around the world long before the appearance of nuclear weapons.

The nuclear test ban treaty does not in any way remove these basic causes of world tensions and cannot, therefore, serve to lessen them.

Following the signing of the nuclear

test ban treaty on August 5, 1963, Premier Khrushchev made this point tersely and frankly:

No treaties and agreements can overcome the radical contradictions which exist between the two social systems.

In the Communist dialect, he is restating the basic Marxist-Leninist doctrine that communism and the free world cannot permanently coexist.

It is only with this background that we can fully understand the Communist policy of peaceful coexistence, and its corollary slogan of relaxation of world tensions.

The Soviet High Command redefined its policy of peaceful coexistence just recently on March 30, 1963. I quote:

Peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems presupposes an unremitting ideological, political, and economic struggle between the two social systems, a class struggle by the workers inside the countries of the capitalist system, including armed struggle when the peoples deem it necessary.

Khrushchev stated this policy in simpler terms to the Members of the U.S. Senate, in this Capitol Building, on September 16, 1959:

We are not asking for your approval, we wish only one thing—that we should not be impeded. Admit this fact and peace will be assured. If you do not admit it, then it will be impossible to avoid war.

When the Communists offer interchangeably peaceful coexistence and relaxation of world tensions, they are demanding that the United States cease active opposition to the Communist drive for world power.

In plain simple English language, Khrushchev seeks to establish, and for the United States to accept, these Communist propositions:

First. The Communist governments and the Communist parties around the world shall be free to continue and to intensify their nonmilitary and paramilitary campaigns to subjugate every free nation in the world.

Second. The United States and the free world shall continue to be denied the right or opportunity to advance our beliefs and our social system among the people within the Communist nations.

Khrushchev demands complete freedom to destroy all free institutions, societies, and nations.

At the same time, he denies the United States the right to advance the cause of human liberty and material independence among the people of the Communist bloc.

This Moscow treaty will not alter any of these conflicts. On the other hand, this treaty will increase world tensions because Khrushchev's world Communist campaign will be intensified and accelerated.

World tensions will be eased, only when Communists are forced to abandon their drive for world conquest or when they achieve their goal by our surrender.

And this treaty in no way alters, modifies, or alleviates the basic objectives, world goals, policies, or programs of the Soviet Communist power system.

PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS

Mr. Speaker, the second claim made for this treaty is that it would restrain the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, France and Red China have already stated that they will not sign the treaty, and will not be restrained by it.

Other than France and Red China, there are only six to eight nations who have the industrial and scientific capacity to construct nuclear weapons systems. None of these nations has indicated any intent to do so. Therefore, if this treaty is signed, it will not, in fact, reduce the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, these six to eight nations capable of nuclear weapons production are associated with the free world and not with the Soviet-Communist bloc.

It is a military and political policy of the Soviet to maintain a monopoly over nuclear weapons. The Soviet cannot afford to aid Red China in the development of a nuclear weapons system. She is afraid of being blackmailed.

The independent development of a weapons system by Japan, or other nations of the free world, would not be accompanied by the same degree of danger to the United States as the danger to the Soviet from a nuclear weapons system in the hands of Red China.

If this treaty is not signed and if the nations who are capable do, in fact, build nuclear weapons, it will be a threat to the Soviet and not to the United States.

The proliferation of nuclear weapons among the nations of the free world would, in fact, restrain the Soviet from embarking upon a nuclear war. It would discourage Khrushchev's reckless threats to launch his 100-megaton bombs.

It would require the Soviet to take into calculation the political and military risks of being required to launch a nuclear attack where the targets are dispersed among a number of nations instead of upon targets concentrated in the United States.

The implied acceptance by the United States of the antiproliferation policy of the Soviet is a grave error of foreign policy.

TREATY INCREASES POSSIBILITY OF U.S. SURRENDER OR NUCLEAR WAR

Mr. Speaker, the third claim made for this treaty is that it will reduce the possibility of nuclear war. This claim is a catch phrase, an unwarranted conclusion. It is not supported by diagnosis, analysis and logic. The fear of nuclear war has been highly inflated and grossly exaggerated.

Khrushchev has successfully promoted and exploited this fear among the peoples of the world to his political and military advantage.

The State Department of the United States has likewise exploited this fear to promote the ratification of this treaty, and in part, to create a false image of peace for partisan political purposes.

CONDITIONS FOR NUCLEAR WAR

Mr. Speaker, what are the conditions under which nuclear war is likely to erupt?

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First, the conditions under which the United States may launch a war is the United States might be forced to launch a defensive nuclear war as its only alternative to a political surrender.

Radio Moscow, on July 24, 1963, stated the Soviet assessment of this possibility in the following language:

The Socialist Camp grows, the revolutionary atmosphere becomes hotter, the class warfare in the Western countries worsens; This inspires the Imperialist Camp to use war to stop the development of Socialist countries.

This means that Khrushchev is aware that the United States might panic and launch a nuclear war if the Communist political and paramilitary campaigns continue to drive the United States into a desperate choice of surrender or nuclear war.

Under today's political climate, the United States is more likely to accept a sugarcoated surrender.

Second, the condition under which Soviet would launch nuclear war is if the Soviet is locked or impeded in its drive for world power, under its political strategy of peaceful coexistence, and if it possesses a favorable nuclear capability, it is most likely to launch a nuclear war. There is little likelihood of this, because Soviet is winning its political war on every continent without military or nuclear war.

Mr. Speaker, neither of these conditions exist today. But, Mr. Speaker, the ratification of this treaty would advance the development of those conditions under which either the United States or the Soviet would launch a nuclear war.

If we are determined not to surrender in this political war, then this treaty accelerates instead of retarding or avoiding war.

Mr. Speaker, we do have a solemn duty to avoid war. But Mr. Speaker, we have double and primary duties to avoid and escape Communist tyranny.

TERMS OF MOSCOW TREATY

Mr. Speaker, the content, draftsmanship, implications, scope, and vagueness of the terms of this treaty are incredible.

This treaty has three original parties: the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. Article III provides that the treaty shall not enter into force until all of the three original parties ratify and deposit their ratifications.

Prior to ratification by the three original parties, this treaty was circulated to some 130 nations of the world; it has been signed by more than 100 nations.

Moscow has propagandized this treaty as the Moscow treaty leading to world peace.

The U.S. Senate is now debating the ratification of this treaty under heavy, psychological duress and political coercion.

The U.S. Senate cannot amend this treaty, stipulate reservations, or refuse its consent without flaunting world opinion.

The United States is placed in a most vulnerable position of being unable to debate this treaty upon its merits and to safeguard the security of this Nation by proper amendments.

The U.S. Senate has been deliberately placed in the dilemma of either consenting to or rejecting this treaty unconditionally.

The State Department should never have agreed to the procedure under this treaty whereby it was circulated around the world, before the original parties had an opportunity for full debate, amendment, and ratification.

I leave to the judgment of the American people the question of whether the State Department should be indicted for utter incompetence or whether it has resorted to a deliberate scheme to psychologically and politically coerce the U.S. Senate into a ratification of this treaty.

ARTICLE II—AMENDMENTS TO BE CIRCULATED AND WORLD CONFERENCES CONVENED PRIOR TO APPROVAL BY ORIGINAL PARTIES

Mr. Speaker, I now go back to article II of the treaty. Article II purports to establish a procedure for amending this treaty. The same procedure is to be allowed in the amending process as is now taking place in the ratification of this original treaty. The original parties—the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom are given a veto power, not before but after, the amendments are first circulated to all signatory nations and after these amendments are given world publicity by a world conference meeting to consider amendments.

This procedure will place the United States in the same disadvantageous world psychological blackjack position in regard to amendments that we find ourselves in now with regard to the original treaty before the U.S. Senate.

NEW INTERNATIONAL FORUM CREATED

Mr. Speaker, it is incredible that this most dangerous provision of this treaty has been so totally ignored in the public debates. In deliberate simple language, article II creates a new international organization.

Under its provisions, signatory nations may propose unlimited amendments. These must be circulated to all parties to the treaty.

The subject matter, the scope, the relevance of the amendments are wholly unrestricted.

Article II mandates the convening of a conference of all nations upon the call of one-third of the contracting parties.

The Soviet Union can muster, at will, one-third of the nations of the world in support of its purposes.

Thus, the Soviet Union is provided with a new world forum for propaganda, agitation and the manipulation of world opinion. The United States is thus compelled to discuss, negotiate and defend any and all charges and grievances, no matter how spurious or malicious at the will and at the time chosen by the Soviet Union.

A Secretariat and an organizational structure must be created to administer and process the amendments and the conferences to be authorized under Article II. An alternate, competing and conflicting world organization is thus created paralleling the United Nations in this treaty.

Mr. Speaker, it is elemental contract law and international law that a con-

tract or a treaty cannot be amended, except by the approval of all contracting parties.

But, under article II, amendments can bind the parties to this treaty, against their will, and without their approval, by a simple majority vote and ratification of the parties to the treaty, including all of the original parties to the treaty.

Thus, a superinternational quasi-government is created. The contractual relationship of the parties to the original treaty is transformed into a governmental, parliamentary relationship.

Mr. Speaker, article II is a colossal fraud upon the United States. The State Department is foisting upon this Nation a premeditated amorphous legal and political monstrosity.

SOVIET EXPECTATIONS FROM MOSCOW TREATY

Mr. Speaker, the Soviet expectations from the Moscow treaty have been repeatedly stated by Khrushchev and the Kremlin leadership. His first objective is to disintegrate our NATO military alliance with Western Europe by:

First. The conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the Warsaw Pact nations led by the Soviet Union and the NATO allies led by the United States.

Second. The detachment of West Berlin from the free world under Khrushchev's plans for its internationalization.

Third. The detachment of West Germany from the free world by Khrushchev's plan for a neutralized Germany.

COMMUNIST PURPOSE TO DESTROY U.S. NUCLEAR POWER

Mr. Speaker, Khrushchev's second expectation from the Moscow treaty is to destroy U.S. military power.

This Nation's Army, Navy, and Air Force are built around the maximum utilization of nuclear firepower. Without nuclear weapons, our total defense system would become a hollow shell.

A mutual disarmament of nuclear power would, immediately, give to the Soviet a clear superiority of manpower, firepower, and conventional military might.

Khrushchev does not need to rely upon nuclear power to defend the Soviet because the Soviet cannot be threatened by conventional military forces.

Mutual destruction of nuclear power by the Soviet Union and the United States will destroy the only deterrent this Nation has against Communist aggression, and leave the Russian-led international Communist forces intact, unchallenged, and unopposed.

The consequences of this Moscow treaty will advance both of these major Soviet objectives.

Mr. Speaker, the position in which we find ourselves with respect to this treaty, constitutes a major diplomatic and political defeat.

But, Mr. Speaker, there is a way out of this deplorable dilemma.

The treaty presents us with a great opportunity to advance freedom and to secure the true peace.

This is the moment when we can and we must challenge the Soviet Union, Premier Khrushchev, and the Communist parties around the world, to demon-

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strate the sincerity of their loudly proclaimed desire for a more peaceful and secure world.

Ours is the opportunity to place before the world, the Communist definition of peaceful coexistence and our own definition of peace.

We can reveal once and for all whether Khrushchev wants a complete and total disarmament or whether this treaty is another conniving scheme for the advancement of the Communist war of hatred, deceit, and totalitarian subjugation of peoples.

Let us clarify and join the issues which confront and divide the peoples of the world.

Let us determine whether the peoples of the world choose love of mankind or hatred and hostility of one class against the other.

Let us determine whether the peoples choose freedom for individuals and nations or want the Communist totalitarian form of life.

I respectfully submit that the following amendment to the preamble of the treaty be presented to Premier Khrushchev.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE PREAMBLE TO THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

At the end of the preamble, add the following clauses:

Proclaiming as a further principal joint aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete non-military disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United States which would put an end to direct and indirect political aggressions and eliminate the incentive to the creation in other nations of civil, paramilitary, and military strife and revolution, and

Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of the use of propaganda, agitation, financial and military aid which promote hate and hostility of any class, race, religion, nation, or people against others.

Mr. Speaker, this amendment will pose to Khrushchev the question of his good faith. It will test whether or not the Soviet-Communist government and party organization are truly and sincerely interested in reducing world tensions.

It will determine whether there is a will and a subsequent possibility to create conditions between communism and the free world for a concurrent and coordinate total disarmament of all military and political warfare weapons.

The presentation of this amendment, offering a total military and political subversion disarmament to the Soviet, will dissipate the clouds of confusion that blind the State Department of our Government.

It will return the people of this Nation from their vain hopes and confused despair, to a sober assessment of the practical measures needed to secure our freedom and avoid Khrushchev's alternatives of surrender or thermonuclear war.

Mr. Speaker, I, here and now, challenge Mr. Khrushchev to accept this amendment to the preamble of this Moscow treaty.

This treaty is a God-created opportunity to present Mr. Khrushchev with an ultimatum to truly disclose Soviet intentions. We can by this amendment to the preamble trap Mr. Khrushchev in his own mousetrap.

If the United States wishes to crystallize and clarify the issues that are causing world tensions and that are threatening thermonuclear war, it must, at this time, directly confront the Soviet Government with a demand for a total disarmament across the whole spectrum of the cold war.

If Khrushchev rejects this demand, then the United States can no longer doubt that Khrushchev is completely sincere when he states that the contradictions between the Communist nations and the Free World cannot be resolved by treaties and agreements.

If Mr. Khrushchev rejects this demand, then the United States can no longer doubt that his proposals for peaceful coexistence and relaxation of tensions are mere camouflage catch phrases to deceive the peoples of the world.

If Mr. Khrushchev rejects this demand, then the United States must believe that the Soviet-Communist policy is what they officially reaffirmed it to be on July 14, 1963, 2 months ago.

I quote this official Soviet statement:

We fully stand for the destruction of imperialism and capitalism. We not only believe in the inevitable destruction of capitalism, but are doing everything for this to be accomplished as soon as possible.

Mr. Speaker, as certainly as I stand here today, the Soviet Communist answer would be "No." If the Soviet rejects total disarmament—as the United States defines it—then the nuclear test ban treaty must be scrapped and the hopes that we hold for it evaporate.

The United States must then maintain a superior military deterrent. We must then use our superior military deterrent power as a shield and as an umbrella to fully engage and counter the total Soviet-Communist cold war of political destruction around the world.

URGES NATIONAL PUBLIC DEBATE

Mr. Speaker, there has been bipartisan support for the test ban treaty in the U.S. Senate. I trust that this bipartisanship is not misinterpreted.

I cannot believe that either the Democratic or Republican parties are committed to the policies that are inherent or implied in this treaty:

First, policies of non-resistance to the Soviet-Communist forces; or

Second, policies of peaceful collaboration with communism; or

Third, policies that would abandon military superiority as a deterrence to Soviet-Communist aggressions.

Mr. Speaker, the bipartisan support in the Senate for this treaty does not, and will not preclude the two major parties from entering into a full and free debate on the issues raised by the treaty. It is the responsibility of both major parties, between now and the 1964 elections, to forge their most effective alternative

policies and programs to meet Communist threats.

This Nation can and must find, adopt and carry out policies and programs that will avoid the cruel choices that Khrushchev presents—surrender or thermonuclear war. These are the transcendent issues that confront this nation.

Mr. Speaker, I now refer to the "Papal Encyclical" of His Holiness, Pope Pius, the Eleventh, in the year 1937. I quote:

Communism is intrinsically wrong, and no one who would save Christian civilization may collaborate with it in any undertaking whatsoever. Those who permit themselves to be deceived into lending their aid towards the triumph of Communism * * *, will be the first to fall victims of their error.

His words were true 26 years ago. Unfortunately, world events have repeatedly proven the wisdom of his warnings.

Mr. BRUCE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PILLION. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. BRUCE. I think it is interesting to note that the Interparliamentary Conference of the Union, going on at Belgrade, Yugoslavia, at the moment is faced with a resolution. Ostensibly it is a resolution of endorsement of the test ban agreement. I do not think there can be any question that the psychology and propaganda impact has created a tremendous support among the nations around the world, as an escape hatch, behind the test ban.

It is interesting to note, as reported by Roscoe Drummond, that imbedded in this resolution representatives from this body and the other body are going to have to vote on a paragraph which is endorsing the test ban treaty also endorses a nonaggression pact between NATO and Warsaw countries, and also calls for the creation of a denuclearized zone in various parts of the world, including central Europe.

So in this Soviet resolution we find the real program and we also recall in the briefing which we had from the gentlemen who negotiated it on our part the comment that the question of a nonaggression pact would be taken up later after this was out of the way.

What are our delegates to this conference supposed to do? If they vote against this resolution in an interparliamentary meeting they bring down the condemnation of the rest of the nations because they are "for war and nuclear tests." If they vote for it they have to take exceptions, not on the vote, but in their remarks, in effect saying we are voting for it, but we reserve our support from the other items. When they cast a vote in favor of this resolution that vote is in favor of a nonaggression pact between Warsaw and NATO and in favor of the denuclearized zones.

This is a striking example of what the Communists can and will do by diplomatic subterfuge as well as by psychological means, economic means, and military, where they can get away with it.

Mr. PILLION. The gentleman has made a great contribution by stating the expectation of Khrushchev and the

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Communist Party concerning the non-aggression pact which, of course, is just one of a series of steps by which we will be completely disarmed.

Does the gentleman know the Communist Party is propagandizing this nuclear test ban treaty around the world as being the Moscow Treaty, and their agents in Belgrade now are selling the treaty and attempting to submit and consolidate around the world their policies and their program, which is, of course, intended to completely disarm us and our deterrents and to destroy any possibility we may have to engage in and win a war.

Mr. BRUCE. In regard to the remarks the gentleman has made about the legal grounds of this treaty, may I point out that under article 49-0 of the Soviet Constitution the Soviet Government is authorized to abrogate any treaty instantly and without cause. This is the law of the Soviet Union. So when they break a treaty they are not violating the Soviet Constitution. This is the Soviet law.

Mr. PILLION. The gentleman is completely correct.

Mr. BRUCE. So there is no legal binding in this agreement so far as the Soviet Union is concerned.

Mr. PILLION. Of course, they know nothing about honor. A treaty depends on integrity.

Mr. BRUCE. From the Communist viewpoint there is a certain integrity, the integrity that anything goes that advances their cause.

Mr. PILLION. Their cause, part of which is the destruction of the United States.

Mr. BRUCE. But the point is that in their Constitution they frankly state it is the law of the Soviet Union that they may at any time abrogate any treaty without notice, so this treaty is absolutely meaningless as far as being binding on the Soviet Union is concerned.

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PILLION. Surely. I will be glad to yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HOSMER. I wish to congratulate the gentleman from New York on his very fine exposition and his very carefully detailed and documented statement of the situation as it exists today. I only wish that perhaps on the other side of the Capitol some of the remarks might have been as able as those made by the gentleman from New York today.

Mr. PILLION. I thank the gentleman for his generosity.

Mr. HOSMER. I have particularly in mind a reference by one of the gentlemen of the other body which had to do with an argument for ratifying the treaty on the basis that if we refused it the Chinese Communists would have an opportunity to ridicule and deride the Moscow Communists.

If we are to conduct matters that have to do so vitally with our national security on a proposition of making the Communists happy I think we are soon doomed to a dire fate.

This squabble between the Chinese and the Moscow Communists is a matter of

difference in interpretation of the Communist doctrines. They are both true Communists. They are both dedicated to the burial of the West. Each has the cemetery in mind insofar as freedom in Western civilization, as we know it, is concerned.

I think, too, we have had prevalent in this country what might be termed a soft-line policy toward the Communists. I certainly feel that the gentleman is not in that category. He illustrates the hard line.

Mr. PILLION. The gentleman is completely right about that.

Mr. HOSMER. But those who do argue taking the soft line say that if we do, if we are nice to those people, they, in turn, will be nice to us; that there are, they argue, on the other side of the Iron Curtain, those who would follow a soft line toward the West and that what we do by way of softness encourages and abets and gives strength to those on the other side who would likewise follow a soft policy. And they say Mr. Khrushchev, as an example, illustrates that policy. We must do these things to keep Mr. Khrushchev up and Mao Tse-tung down.

I think the fallacy of the argument lies in the fact that the exact opposite result is more likely to occur; that is, that when softness is observed on our side, Communist dogma indicates to them that it is time for the hard line. And Mr. Khrushchev can certainly switch between the soft line and the hard line and back again as he pleases.

Mr. PILLION. And the gentleman knows that the soft lines and the hard lines are merely tactical matters to them.

Mr. HOSMER. Certainly the external affairs of the Communist countries are carried on strictly in accordance with the Pavlovian philosophy and psychology, the creation of crisis and then the relaxation of the tension; the creation of the crisis and the relaxation of the tension in the animal, which so shatters the animal's mental being that he becomes of no decisive nature whatsoever. That kind of thing is calculated to do exactly the same thing to us.

It was only 9 months between Khrushchev as the frowning Russian rocket-rattler of Cuba and the Khrushchev who was the smiling test ban treaty peddler of Moscow. Let us look ahead another 9 months. That takes us up to the spring of 1964. And I would like to go on record right now as predicting that in that period of time we again will see a crisis period, a strong tension period aimed again at weakening our will to resist. And further than that, by the fall of next year we will see a relaxation period. The spring affair might be something in Europe, something around Berlin; it could be in Africa, where they have kicked up troubles, or in Asia, where they have kicked up troubles, or in our own Western Hemisphere, or any place in the world.

But mark my word, it will occur and the realization thereafter again will occur, because it will by the manipulation of the Soviets seem to be a justification of the soft-line policies that might pertain in this country, and it

would have an effect at that time upon the outcome of the American election.

Mr. PILLION. I agree with the gentleman's assessment completely. I think the gentleman is making a great contribution by stating it here today in connection with this nuclear test ban treaty.

Mr. HOSMER. If the gentleman will yield for just a moment further, as the gentleman has pointed out, what this test ban treaty does is not to accomplish the very things that its proponents claim it will accomplish.

Now, one of the things that the gentleman has not mentioned, because it is no longer claimed to be accomplished by the treaty, but which up until the very moment that the atmospheric treaty was negotiated, was one of the very strongest arguments that was made by treaty proponents for a test ban treaty. That was that the document, because it would continue inspection and detection procedures would serve to open up society and, mind you, that only by opening up the closed Soviet society could the world take that first step toward peace.

Now, that has been entirely abandoned. We have forgotten about it. It has been given up and it has been surrendered. With this kind of a treaty before us there is no longer compulsion for a treaty that does contain inspection and detection procedures. Therefore, we have abandoned the opportunity to achieve that very thing which so many claimed was the key to the first step toward a treaty.

Mr. PILLION. Does the gentleman agree with me that the U.S. public, the American public, the people of this Nation, are not acquainted with the implications and facts that underlie this treaty and underlie the dangers around the world?

Mr. HOSMER. If the gentleman will yield, I think that is true, particularly in the context of understanding the strategic situation—the fact that we do live in a world where there is a force that is dedicated to our destruction, that is dedicated to our destruction as immediately as possible, that uses coexistence or uses nuclear explosives alternatively, depending upon what historical facts or circumstances tell them to use according to the Marxist and Leninist dogma.

Certainly, the people of the United States have not had the opportunity fairly to judge this treaty in the context of that situation. They have only been allowed to see it as a small segment.

Mr. PILLION. Does the gentleman agree that the political parties of this Nation should not be precluded, no matter what the vote may be, no matter what the leadership may say in the Senate, from fully debating and discussing the facts surrounding this treaty, fully stating to the American public what the actual political and military condition is so that we can debate this between now and the election in 1964 so as to give to the American people the grounds for forming a judgment of what we have been doing?

Mr. HOSMER. If the gentleman will yield further, more than that. I believe that inasmuch as it seems likely that this treaty will be ratified, we must make

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a complete index of all of the disadvantages of the treaty. Now, these disadvantages have been admitted implicitly by the administration, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the Secretary of State, by the head of the Disarmament Agency, by all of those who are proponents of the treaty who say to do such things as try to keep the labs working as they should work, conducting a vigorous underground test series, and keeping a readiness for testing. All right, those are admissions that this is a defective and dangerous document. They say the dangers can be overcome by this kind of action. Now, let us list those actions.

Let us make sure that it is done to protect the United States. This has to do with the survival of the United States and if there are any errors to be made let us make them on the side of safety, not upon the side of running a further risk. This, Mr. Speaker, means the expenditure of many billions of dollars to prepare ourselves for readiness for testing alone. I intend to enlarge upon this subject at a later date. It will consume about \$1 billion if we are going to maintain that readiness year after year, and in the event of a serious breach it is going to cost us a quarter of a billion dollars a year. That is a basic, necessary expenditure to meet and try to overcome a danger that is otherwise absolute and admitted even by the most vigorous adherents of the treaty.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PILLION. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. PUCINSKI. The gentleman from California and the gentleman from New York have made a very significant contribution to this discussion this afternoon, but having said all the things the gentleman has said, would he venture an opinion as to whether or not the other body should or should not ratify the test ban treaty, in his judgment?

Mr. PILLION. As I stated in my remarks, this is a beautiful opportunity for the U.S. Senate to add a reservation that would require the Soviets to disarm completely its subversive weapons, its infiltration weapons, its weapons in mass communication and mass media by which it is waging this political warfare. It is a war of minds. The great genius of Lenin was in applying certain strategy and tactics to this political war. That is the war we are in at this time. Let us disarm both in the military field and in the political warfare field, then we can compete with them around the world. That is the opportunity we have now to insert that reservation and avoid his mousetrap, put him in the trap when we say to the world: "Let us have a true, enduring, real peace." Let us see what he says about that. If we do not have such a reservation, if we do not put that ultimatum to them, the treaty is a great disservice to the United States and to the world, and it should be rejected. If it is allowed to stand as it is without those safeguarding amendments, we are in trouble.

Mr. PUCINSKI. I believe the gentleman from New York has really spelled out the grand desire he has for the ulti-

mate conquest and collapse of the international Communist conspiracy. I do not think any Member of this Congress on either side of the aisle would quarrel with the gentleman in his ultimate goal. Certainly I agree with him, and all of the things he has said are necessary before this world can rest with some degree of security against the menace of international communism.

I agree this is the grand desire, this is the great hope of free people all over the world.

President Kennedy has properly stated that even a journey of a thousand miles requires a first step. Having made the statement he did, these are the things that we all hope for, but, certainly, one cannot be in touch with reality and believe that we can encompass this great plan that the gentleman described all in this one treaty. The President has stated most eloquently, and I think the President deserves a great deal of credit for being frank and honest with the American people, his position when he said do not place too much hope in the document. This is but the first flicker of hope. Where it is going to lead us we cannot say.

Now, I ask the gentleman, assuming that the gentleman's grand design is rejected as an amendment to the treaty, would the gentleman then suggest that the other body not agree to this beginning at some sort of understanding in the control of this very destructive weapon? Would the gentleman say that the other body should reject the treaty?

Mr. PILLION. I appreciate the gentleman's noble concept and patriotic intentions. I know that he is as interested as I am in a true peace, but this is not a first step to peace. It is not that at all. It is the first step to the negotiation of an agenda that was designed in Moscow for the purpose of permitting the Soviet Communist forces to accelerate their taking over the rest of the world by destroying our deterrence.

The policy that the United States has followed is to make itself strong enough so that it can engage communism around the world without fear of a thermonuclear war, and until the Communist Party discontinues or gives up its goal, until it gives up its policies, gives up its program under these policies and this goal, all you are doing is weakening yourself and failing to engage in the war that he is winning, the war of minds, winning the minds of the world. He ultimately wins political power, and political power is a power to which the military is subordinate. By winning political power he wins military power. That is how he is winning this war. He is winning the whole world politically, economically, and militarily.

Mr. PUCINSKI. My distinguished colleague from Buffalo knows I have the highest respect for him.

Mr. PILLION. And I have the highest respect for the gentleman.

Mr. PUCINSKI. I respectfully submit that my distinguished colleague tortures history slightly when he suggests that this plan originated in Moscow. Is it not a fact that this plan of a limited nuclear treaty actually had its genesis

right here in the White House when President Eisenhower suggested that we try to make a first step in this direction, when he suggested that we propose to the world that if we cannot reach an agreement on complete disarmament, if we cannot reach an agreement on a ban on nuclear testing, if we cannot reach an agreement on complete inspection and foolproofing the system, at least we can make a first step in that direction by barring nuclear testing in the air and underwater. I am under the impression that had its genesis right here in the Nation's Capital, not in Moscow.

Mr. PILLION. I was not referring to that portion of the treaty. That is a minor portion of the treaty. It is what Mr. Khrushchev expects from the treaty in the line of disarmament that is the important part of this treaty. That is just an entering wedge, exploiting the fears of people around the world about nuclear war. That is the minor part of the treaty. The major part is disarmament.

Mr. PUCINSKI. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. PILLION. I thank the gentleman for this contribution.

Mr. WYMAN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PILLION. I yield to the gentleman from New Hampshire.

Mr. WYMAN. Mr. Speaker, there has been a good deal of misunderstanding and misinformation concerning the real significance of the test ban treaty. It is unfortunate that the American people have been literally besieged by editorial opinion and much free lance comment motivated by exaggerated fear of fallout and general detestation of a nuclear holocaust.

Any such test ban treaty, even were we to assume good faith and performance by the countries signing it, leaves open atmospheric testing to nations that do not sign. As to these, the only deterrent is the sometimes nebulous restraint of world opinion. Thus we, in effect, agree that we will not test in the atmosphere although Red China or France may do so. This is scarcely a sound position for a nation whose experts virtually all agree that it has not completed its atmospheric testing requirements.

President Kennedy himself not very long ago was explicit in his assurance to our people that any test ban treaty to be signed by this Nation would contain iron-clad guarantees of onsite inspection. There are none whatever in the treaty now proposed to the Senate. Authorities also agree that in the vast reaches of the Soviet Union as well as in space itself atmospheric testing by a nation intending to violate its treaty commitment is difficult, if not impossible, to detect and identify.

The Soviet Union is infamous for its repeated violations of treaty obligations. The act of exacting a solemn commitment with the Soviet Union on a reciprocal covenant basis in a treaty implies a measure of faith in Communist promises that is both naive and offensive to many nations and peoples of the world who have witnessed Soviet lies, deceit, and

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trickery at close hand and at awful costs over decades.

The treaty proposed is less than a work of art in legal draftsmanship. Its loopholes are glaring. It can be withdrawn from by any signatory by its own terms on 90 days notice. It is in fact only a gesture toward the desirable goal of international regulation of nuclear power capable of mankind's destruction. Yet the fact of its execution, should it be ratified, will lull millions toward the false belief that somehow, because of its covenants, that things are better in the world, Communists have changed their spots and there will be peace in our time. Like the siren-song of Munich, this feeling will but enervate the determination and concern of most Americans to maintain a strong military posture.

No matter protestations by the Executive of awareness of communism's record of duplicity or its contentions that the United States enters into this treaty with its eyes open, there is somehow the suggestion implicit in the fact of the treaty itself that international communism is not as much of a mortal enemy as it has been in years past. This is contrary to historical fact and dangerous to the national security in the extreme. It amounts to letting down our guard at a time when Communist military and espionage activities are going on under our very noses in our own backyard in Cuba and along our coasts in the form of hundreds of Communist ships taking advantage of international law which they do not recognize but which they know we do and will. It is the same with this proposed test ban treaty. It is all to Communist advantage and our disadvantage or the Soviets would never have agreed to it.

The dangers of fallout from atomic testing are real. But the fallout is not yet anywhere near lethal limits nor has it reached proportions that will demonstrably adversely affect the genes of generations to come. Undoubtedly a dirty 100-megaton explosion would aggravate the fallout picture. But clean explosions, particularly of small bombs on a test basis, would not do this and we need to continue such explosions to perfect an antimissile defense that many informed persons indicate they believe Communists have already perfected.

As a matter of fact, the proposed nuclear test ban treaty makes atomic war more likely than less likely because American policy should and must be to make certain that Communists know they cannot attack us successfully without being destroyed in return. Our commitment to cease atomic testing forever freezes the Soviet advantage in their known superiority in heavy yield weapons. It does little good to say that five 20-megaton bombs are the equivalent of a 100-megaton monster or that we have such an overkill capacity that we no longer need to test. Nuclear missiles are an evolving science. Testing on a continual basis is essential. With the Vostok launch vehicle, it is not inconceivable that at some not too distant day the Soviets will orbit a 100-megaton bomb, controllable by pushbutton from within

the Soviet Union. We have not even tested to know that we can produce such a weapon.

In the same practical sense, the actual hardness of our missile sites has not been tested. This requires atmospheric testing. Likewise, certain atmospheric testing is incumbent in respect to submarine defenses.

Mr. Speaker, the hard fact of the matter is that we are losing our capability for a second strike. This means that our capability to deter Soviet aggression is steadily being rendered less and less. Are we agreeing, for example, by this treaty that if we need a second Panama Canal we will spend billions for it rather than to construct it by a few nuclear explosions?

Years ago Lenin said that disarmament for Communists means disarming the bourgeoisie and arming the proletariat. This was Khrushchev's theme in 1961. The Soviet strategy today is the same as it has always been. It is determined to neutralize the opposition. This test ban treaty does exactly that. Apparently this administration wants to help us to be neutralized.

I am compelled to observe that in the Kremlin there must be rejoicing as the Communists talk of "those stupid Americans" much the same as the Nazis talked of the "stupid British" after Munich. This Moscow manufactured test ban treaty, instead of being hailed by historians as a step toward peace, should it be ratified, will some day earn the title of the Munich of the sixties.

(Mr. HALL asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record.)

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, soon the Senate will vote on the question of giving its advice and consent to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Actually, the Senate had no opportunity to give its advice. All that is being sought is its consent. The action of the administration in first, suddenly withdrawing its previous insistence on "on-site" inspections, and second, initialing the treaty in advance of any public debate, has left the other body in an impossible position.

If it opposes the treaty, it subjects America to the possible scorn and verbal attacks by the other 80 signatories to the treaty—signatories for whom a pledge not to test weapons is rather meaningless in view of their nonpossession of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, if the Senators give their belated consent, in an "ex post facto" manner, they place our country once again in the position of trusting the word of the Communists with the very survival of our country at stake. This is a perplexing paradox—a dilemma.

It is not a choice that any Senator must relish. It is not a choice I would relish if voting on this treaty were a responsibility of the House of Representatives. But as a member of the House Armed Services Committee with knowledge of the reservations of our highly informed military leaders, I believe I would rather subject myself to the scorn of a few other nations than to the ominous military disadvantages imposed upon our

proud, freedom-loving sovereign Nation by this treaty.

Even those Senators friendly to the administration have given only grudging approval to this treaty. It is obvious that if their advice had been sought before the treaty was initiated they would have insisted that America stick by its insistence on "on-site" inspections. So anxious was this administration to seek an accommodation that political imagery took a priority over past experience in dealing with the Soviets.

About one provision in the treaty, I am particularly concerned, even though it is in the preamble. Paragraph 2 of the preamble states:

Proclaiming as their principal aim, the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons including nuclear weapons.

In the present state of world affairs, I am not at all convinced that we are ready to or that we should commit the Congress and the American people to a program of complete disarmament under the United Nations supervision. I do not have that much faith in the United Nations as a police force, certainly not under circumstances whereby the primitive and nonresponsible nations of Africa hold 25 times as many votes in the General Assembly as does the United States.

But by agreeing to paragraph 2 of this preamble, I can see where we enable Mr. Khrushchev to put increasing pressure on us to accept total disarmament, of all arms, by virtue of our total commitment in this treaty. I question whether President Kennedy himself wants to be put in this position, and I am sure that the occupant of the White House after the 1964 elections will not relish that commitment.

Many questions remain unanswered in spite of the debate in the Senate. These include the wisdom of any agreement with the Soviet Union which has a long history of abrogating treaties when it so suits them to do so. We should ask ourselves, would we enter such a treaty if there were no split between the Soviet Union and Red China, and as a logical follow-up, will be required to stand by our commitment not to test in the event that breach is resolved at some distant point in the future?

We should ask about the advisability of limiting our development of nuclear weapons which have been our only successful deterrent to war in the past 16 years.

We should ask whether instead of slowing down the nuclear arms race, we will not in fact impel countries like France to speed up their nuclear arms development out of fear that America can no longer be relied upon to maintain the nuclear strength and a deterrent of the free world.

My own duties on the Armed Services Committee compel me to ask whether we are abreast of the Soviet Union in our knowledge about the effect of fireball thermonuclear or other "blackout"

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from electrodynamic pulsation on untested and anti-missile-missile devices. Only the Soviet Union has tested nuclear devices in the 50-megaton range and we know that there is a serious impact on all types of communication facilities from the effect of such a blast. But we have no specific knowledge in an area that could mean life or death in case of nuclear attack, insofar as our reaction to an attack depends on continuity of communications. Only U.S.S.R. has fired a missile through a "fireball."

The questions that remain unanswered are these:

First. In the formulation and negotiations leading to the treaty and its terms, were all five members of the Atomic Energy Commission consulted? Also, were the Joint Chiefs fully consulted prior to initiating the treaty?

Second. Would article III of the proposed treaty give Cuba a back-door clearance to test underground? Would the same section allow back-door clearance to East Germany to become recognized in the family of nations?

Third. Will our agreement to the treaty delay if not inhibit our ability to develop an operational antimissile missile, and will it prevent us from testing later refinements of our long-range ICBM's insofar as assuring their capability to deliver a nuclear warhead—a test which the Soviets may already have conducted in their last test series? Our people should know that our ICBM's are not fully successful and one has never carried and fired a nuclear warhead.

Fourth. Will the terms of the treaty permit the Soviet Union to develop its tactical nuclear capability, the one area in which we are now in the lead?

Fifth. Will the treaty enable Khrushchev to perpetrate the myth that he is a peace loving man, in spite of the fact that without active Soviet support, current Communist subversion throughout the world would collapse?

Sixth. Do we give acquiescence to Soviet troops in Cuba, the Berlin wall, Soviet subversion in Latin America, and aggression in Laos and Vietnam by negotiating with the Soviet Union on other issues, before these instances of aggression are resolved?

Seventh. Is not the maintenance of a strong nuclear deterrent a vital weapon in the face of the manpower resources of the Soviet Union and Red China, and is an agreement which tends to restore the balance of military power to those nations with numerical superiority against our best interests?

Eighth. Are we not overlooking the entire history of Soviet aggression, the long record of treaties they have broken, and the alternate periods of thaw and attack which followed earlier supposed examples of Soviet mellowing in 1955 and 1959?

Ninth. Does the treaty continue to give the Soviet Union the right to test without detection underwater in their inland lakes near uninhabited areas, without any provision for on-site inspections?

Tenth. Is this treaty truly in the national interest of the United States or does it merely encourage hope for a future relaxation of tensions without any

evidence that the Soviet Union has abandoned its announced intentions of spreading communism throughout the world, by whatever means are required of the moment?

Mr. Speaker, I find it hard to understand how the Nation can so shortly forget President Kennedy's own words when, after the Soviets broke their word in October 1961, when he said "we would never again agree to any test ban without on-site inspections." Now he has called for national debate, yet few have printed or broadcast the text. By approving this treaty without reservations, we are in effect, demonstrating the success of Soviet strategy to push, and push, and push until we give. I do not believe we can lead the free world until our backbone proves at least as strong, and eventually stronger than those who have sworn to bury us.

NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. O'BRIEN of New York). Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Gross] is recognized for 60 minutes.

(Mr. GROSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, for days on end, first out of Moscow and now out of Washington, citizens of this Nation have been treated to some of the fastest verbal footwork ever perpetrated upon mankind in connection with the so-called limited nuclear test ban agreement.

In some respects the recent signing ceremonies in Moscow were reminiscent of nearly a quarter of a century ago, in late August of 1939, when, in an atmosphere of "friendship and joviality," the then Communist masters of the Kremlin suddenly did a complete about face and signed a nonaggression pact with Adolf Hitler and his Nazi Germany. Ten days later, Hitler invaded Poland and World War II was underway. But through this cynical pact the two dictators, Hitler and Stalin, bought time for their later bloody showdown that each knew was inevitable.

The limited nuclear test ban agreement is another of the infamous wheel-and-deal maneuvers of Soviet foreign policy and neither in Moscow nor in Washington has there been anything approaching an adequate or convincing explanation. The recent pictures of American and Communist Russian officials, vodka and champagne glasses in hand, beaming at each other—"friendly" and "jovial"—at the agreement signing ceremonies provided not the slightest clue that the present masters of the Kremlin are any less cynical than were their counterparts in 1939. Nor that they are in the slightest degree remorseful for the dozens of broken agreements and acts of aggression before and since World War II.

Citizens of this country should constantly bear in mind that the main thrust of the so-called limited test ban agreement is to stop testing in the upper atmosphere. Testing can and will go on underground with any size nuclear explosive force. This, then, is not dis-

armament for by the agreement not a single nuclear bomb or other weapon is caused to be eliminated from any nation's arsenal.

The treaty, says President Kennedy, will not "eliminate the dangers of war. But," he continues, "it is an important first step—a step toward peace—a step toward reason—a step away from war."

If it will not "eliminate the dangers of war"—any of them—how then does it become "an important first step toward peace?" This sounds like duplicity—political duplicity.

There is anger among the American people over the failure of the Kennedy administration to eliminate the Communist Soviet forces from Cuba; to eliminate the "wall of shame" in Berlin, and halt the Red advances, not only in Central and Latin America but in Europe, as attested by the astonishing increase in Communist votes in Italy in that country's recent national election. Can it be that the Kennedy administration, faced with trouble in the 1964 election, seeks a political "peace issue?" It goes without saying that the Russians have no desire to see a new administration in Washington instituting strong and positive policies in behalf of Americans.

What better way to make Americans forget Cuba and other depredations of the Communists than to convince them that the hierarchy in the Kremlin is no longer dangerous and unyielding?

It is significant that in all the headlines and stories concerning the Russian about face on the limited test ban, there was no mention of the Khrushchev approved statement, issued on July 14, 1963, which said:

We fully stand for the destruction of imperialism and capitalism. We not only believe in the inevitable destruction of capitalism but are doing everything possible for this to be accomplished as soon as possible.

In the light of this statement, preceding by only a month the signing of the test ban agreement, can President Kennedy say with a straight face that amid the clinking of vodka glasses in Moscow; amid the "joviality" that pervaded the Kremlin, "an important first step was taken toward reason?"

When the treaty was initialed in Moscow, a Member and leader in the other body, who declined to make the trip to the Red capital, claiming he did not want to become committed in advance, said he discerned a "gimmick" in the treaty. He said:

Khrushchev has not yet recanted his determination to bury us.

And then he added:

If this is the first step, when does the second shoe drop?

But a trip through or in the vicinity of the White House rose garden apparently wafted away the odor of any and all "gimmicks."

There followed an emotional speech on the floor of the other chamber on the destruction and devastation wrought by the bombs that were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but there was not one emotional word uttered by this Member and leader concerning the 35,000 American dead and 100,000 wounded

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in the Korean war that came 5 years later—victims of a sanquinary war that was made possible only because of Russian perfidy.

What is the meaning of this new found "friendship" and "coexistence" with the Soviet? Is this treaty part of a grand design to add Rumania and Hungary to the list of other members of the Communist conspiracy now feeding out of the foreign handout program?

The proposed treaty effectively blocks the United States from effective development of an antimissile missile, for scientists say these tests cannot be made underground with any degree of effectiveness. We are told that it blocks the perfection of missile detection and tracking systems against blackout through the explosion of high megaton devices in the atmosphere. As in 1958, when a moratorium on testing became effective, the proposed treaty will again give the Russians needed time to evaluate the results of the high-yield detonations they have carried on since 1961.

And let it be remembered that when the Russians resumed testing in the atmosphere in 1961, they announced their decision to break the moratorium on the eve of a conference with other Communist and so-called neutral nations. At the time they again displayed their perfidy by charging that the United States had broken the moratorium; that it was the warmongers of the United States that had caused them to again start testing in the atmosphere.

At this point it might well be asked: What has happened to the United States demand for on-site inspections. For years the representatives of this country have demanded a minimum of 27 on-site inspections. This number had gradually been reduced until today this demand has apparently been given up as a lost cause.

Rejecting the lessons of history and the cynical disregard of the Soviet Communists for adherence to agreements and treaties, we see our Nation being shackled to a proposed treaty in which there is not the slightest disarmament with respect to existing weapons, but which, I am convinced, gives to the Russians an insidious control of the development of our weapons systems and thereby threatens the very security of the United States.

Let us hope that the other body will test the sincerity of the Russians by adding reservations to the proposed treaty.

Mr. BRUCE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GROSS. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. BRUCE. I think a point ought to be made here that the proposal which was made by President Eisenhower called for inspection. The Soviet Union consistently refused to accept Mr. Eisenhower's proposal with adequate inspection. The current treaty does not have inspection in the countries involved. That has always been the Soviet position.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GROSS. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. PUCINSKI. I think the gentleman completely ignores the fact that we have understood and our allies have

understood that the present state of the art permits the virtual foolproof detection of nuclear detonations both in the atmosphere and underwater. The gentleman from California is here, perhaps, he would like to comment on that. He is a distinguished member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. It is my understanding we now have devised adequate inspection systems to detect any nuclear detonations in the atmosphere even at extremely high altitudes. Certainly, there is no question we now have adequate international inspection systems to detect any nuclear detonation underwater. Certainly, this is consistent with Mr. Eisenhower's suggestion. Mr. Eisenhower had pressed very hard and properly so for a ban on all nuclear testing. It is true, to the General's credit, that he was not going to be trapped into agreeing with a situation with the Soviet Union whereby we could not have foolproof inspection on the Soviet continent for underground testing. So this country has not accepted a treaty for a ban on all nuclear testing. We retain our right to continue our nuclear testing underground simply because we could not reach agreement with the Soviet Union for foolproof inspection of underground testing in the Soviet Union. The gentleman from California, perhaps, would like to tell us whether or not we have developed adequate systems for detecting nuclear detonations in the atmosphere and underwater.

Mr. GROSS. I am afraid the gentleman from Illinois is not completely informed with respect to the efficiency of our testing system. I yield to the gentleman from California to express his views.

Mr. HOSMER. I thank the gentleman from Iowa.

There are two items raised by the very able gentleman from Illinois that I would like to discuss. The first is that the offer by Eisenhower of an atmospheric treaty was in somewhat the same language as the present treaty, but in an entirely technological context. At the time, in 1958 or 1959, when the offer of an atmospheric treaty was made, the United States possessed absolute superiority in nuclear weapons technology. Since that time the Soviets breached the moratorium on testing, suddenly resumed tests in 1961, and carried on a series of tests into 1962 and as a result achieved undisputed superiority in high-yield weapons. They also claimed to have achieved a capability with anti-missile weapons, which claim we have not been able to make. That leaves us only then with a superiority at the present time, under the present treaty negotiating situation, a superiority in tactical nuclear weapons. Now, tactical nuclear weapons can be developed underground. Therefore, the Soviets have an opportunity to catch up with us in that field. Antimissile weapons cannot be developed underground nor can high-yield weapons. So we have no opportunity to catch up with them in those areas. So the inevitable consequence of this treaty will be the loss of U.S. nuclear weapons superiority, that has been the practical

umbrella which has maintained the peace of the world over a period of almost 15 years.

We are substituting for that umbrella the umbrella of a piece of paper signed in Moscow, an untested piece of paper, an ambiguous piece of paper, a piece of paper that can be subject to pulling and hauling and divers interpretations and quarrels and abrogation, either on a 3-month notice as provided in the treaty or abruptly and instantaneously as provided for by the customs of international law. So in that sense we are on an entirely different basis than when Eisenhower provided an opportunity for entering this kind of treaty earlier. The gentleman from Illinois made another point.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Will the gentleman yield at this point for a question?

Mr. GROSS. I believe the gentleman from California wants to discuss the question of detection systems.

Mr. HOSMER. I would like to talk about this detection system for a moment. It is not true that we have a system which will infallibly detect nuclear explosions in the atmosphere.

We have a system that may ambiguously record some data which cannot be classified either as nuclear or non-nuclear. If you recall, the President's speech here at American University on June 10 was the ushering in of this era of partial test ban treaty. On about the 12th we read in the newspapers here in Washington of the detection of some kind of a manifestation in the Soviet Union. I think there were either two or three such manifestations. Upon query the Atomic Energy Commission was unable to classify the manifestations as either nuclear or nonnuclear. As a consequence, whatever it was, whether it was a lightning storm, whether it was a high explosive conventional explosive, whether it was a low fission yield, or a clean type nuclear explosive or a very low yield nuclear explosion in the atmosphere we do not know. Therefore, at this very moment when this treaty is subject to ratification by the U.S. Senate we find developing an area of uncertainty that opens up a very confusing period for the defense of the United States, for we simply do not know and we cannot know, as we do not have the technical capability of knowing, what these people are up to with respect to the development of nuclear weapons.

Mr. GROSS. Is it not true that the Eisenhower administration insisted on 27 on-site inspections? Was not that a point?

Mr. HOSMER. Yes. Some figure of that nature. That had to do with a comprehensive treaty, however, and not the atmospheric treaty that we are talking about now. The inspection machinery with respect to an atmospheric treaty was not spelled out simply because the Russians said, "Nyet. We won't talk about it."

Mr. GROSS. That is right. And at present it appears that the agency reduced this demand to three or four or five.

Mr. HOSMER. That is again when they were talking about a comprehensive

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treaty, whatever it was, but there was a constant erosion of their position on safety to one of imperiling danger.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GROSS. I will yield.

Mr. PUCINSKI. It is my understanding, and I do not want to debate with the distinguished gentleman from California who is a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, so I would presume he would have a great deal more information on this subject than the average Member of Congress, but I am under the impression that there has not been a single responsible member of the scientific community in this country who first has had any doubts about our ability to detect nuclear detonations out in the atmosphere. More importantly I would like to ask the gentleman this question: He makes a great deal of the fact that the Atomic Energy Commission in its announcement of a blast had a failure positively to identify this particular blast that the gentleman mentioned a moment ago. Is it not a fact that to this day, some 15 years after the Soviet Union had allegedly developed all of this nuclear progress, the Atomic Energy Commission has never in any of its official releases stated that the Soviet Union has detonated an atomic or nuclear bomb but has merely described the detonations as a detonation of an atomic device with no further explanation? The point I am making in my question is, is not this a policy of the Atomic Energy Commission never positively to identify the scope of the Soviet activity in the nuclear field? Has it not been a long-standing policy from the very beginning?

Mr. HOSMER. If the gentleman will yield further, I will answer that.

Mr. GROSS. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HOSMER. I will answer the last query first, that is to say, I do not intend to become entrapped in semantics here. Of course, the Atomic Energy Commission often has been equivocal in what it said, but there was no equivocation in connection with the manifestations I mentioned where it stated it could not identify them as nuclear, which meant it could not identify them as nonnuclear. So there is no question about this.

The gentleman first asked if I knew of any competent scientific opinion that ever stated that nuclear testing in the atmosphere could not be detected. I believe the gentleman from Illinois will acknowledge that Dr. Edward Teller is a competent nuclear physicist and entitled to have a weighty opinion on this subject.

There are at least three or four or five gentlemen here in the room who sat with me about 6 weeks ago at a breakfast—on June 25, to be exact—at which Dr. Teller stated that anything up to 20 kilotons you could get away with for sure in the atmosphere, and possibly more than that.

Let me explain a little more about this atmospheric testing. Of course, all nuclear weapons progress is a record toward cleaner and cleaner weapons, and the closer you come to that the more difficult and then finally it becomes impossible to detect them in the atmos-

sphere, simply because you do not have sufficient product that you can collect and put back in the laboratory and label it definitely.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Iowa for yielding to me.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the gentleman from Iowa for yielding to me. Certainly this has been a very interesting discussion. I hope we will have the satisfaction of pursuing this subject further at a future date. I express my appreciation to the gentleman from Iowa for yielding.

Mr. PILLION. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GROSS. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. PILLION. May I just refer to the question of Red China and the Soviet, and the relationship there? The gentleman from California raised it. On May 17, 1954, about 9 years ago, I stated in this House:

The Soviet cannot and does not dare to industrialize China. The Soviet Union lives in dread fear of a unified, industrialized, and independent China. * * * The present rulers of China cannot condemn China to perpetual subservience to Moscow's purposes. * * * History demonstrates that two dictatorships cannot both govern the same area.

I made those remarks at that time knowing full well that while the Soviet and Red China are united in their purpose to destroy the free world they still have a great conflict of interest, a great conflict of national interest, which is now arising. It is shown by the eruption of the discord and differences and disagreements between Red China and the Soviet. I am most sorry to see that the United States, instead of exploiting the natural and conflicting interest between Red China and the Soviet is doing everything to prevent that split by assisting and helping the stronger of our two enemies—the Soviet Union. Anyone who has two enemies, a strong one and a weak one, is not going to help the stronger one. It is commonsense that you exploit those differences and you do not help the stronger of your two enemies.

It is the Soviet Union that is the leader at the present time of the 100 million people in its army around the world that is seeking to destroy us. If anything we should weaken the Soviet Union and strengthen Red China, and perpetuate that conflict of interest between those two great powers.

Instead of that, we are weakening our own allies, destroying our European allies, the only military strength that we have around the world.

Mr. Speaker, it is time that we reassessed our policies along this line. Instead of destroying our allies and helping our enemies we should help our friends and our allies and protect them with our umbrella of nuclear power, just the way the Soviet uses its nuclear power as an umbrella to protect Castro. That is why we are afraid of Castro and to go into Cuba. That is why we lost the Suez Canal, because Khrushchev threatened to use his nuclear weapons. And we have been afraid of them and, therefore, we do the exact opposite.

Mr. Speaker, I want to make those remarks in connection with the question raised by the gentleman from California [Mr. HOSMER], who has made a great contribution on this subject in this Congress.

Mr. BRUCE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GROSS. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. BRUCE. Just for the purpose of the RECORD and with a full and deep respect to my colleague, the gentleman from New York [Mr. PILLION], I would ask that the RECORD show that I dissent from the analysis concerning the alleged split between the Soviet Union and Red China just made by the gentleman from New York [Mr. PILLION].

Mr. UTT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GROSS. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. UTT. I thank the gentleman from Iowa. I wish to associate myself with the remarks of the gentleman from New York in his opening statement and congratulate the gentleman upon reserving the time to explore what I think is the most dangerous first step that the United States is making.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY

(Mr. UTT asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous articles.)

Mr. UTT. Mr. Speaker, the ratification of the limited test ban treaty by the U.S. Senate is probably the most important issue facing the Congress today. It is an emotional issue and highly political. In such an atmosphere, it is difficult to resolve the question dispassionately.

From a political standpoint, it is well-known that one of the main issues in the 1964 elections will be the position that each Senator and Congressman takes on the test ban treaty. Those who favor it will be claiming that they are for peace, and those who oppose it will be charged with being warmongers. Averell Harriman set the tempo when he stated that anyone opposing the treaty would find it difficult to explain to the mothers of this country why he was opposed to peace.

The truth of the matter is that the test ban treaty does not lay the groundwork for peace, as claimed by the administration, but rather sets the stage for national surrender on the installment plan.

Since the Bolshevik Revolution, Russia has alternately smiled and raged at American seven different times. You should remember that the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington the day before Pearl Harbor were also smiling, although they had full knowledge of the impending sneak attack which was to take place the following morning. The American people should realize that Russia has broken 51 of its 53 treaties and that the Russian Constitution provides that any treaty is null and void upon the say-so of their Government. We should also

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have in mind what Mr. Khrushchev said a few years ago:

If anyone thinks that our smiles mean the abandonment of the teachings of Marx, Engels and Lenin, he is deceiving himself cruelly. Those who expect this to happen might just as well wait for a shrimp to learn how to whistle.

If you don't like us, don't accept our invitations and don't invite us to come to see you. Whether you like it or not, history is on our side. We will bury you.

The "butcher of Budapest" has not changed his spots. He is simply buying the most precious time that has ever been for sale. He has nothing to give; he only takes. During the voluntary test ban a few years ago, Russia was able to develop a bomb with the equivalent of 50 million tons of TNT. The destruction of Hiroshima needed only a 20,000-ton bomb. The present nuclear capabilities of Russia in the big bomb are more than 2 to 1 over our capabilities, and they have developed an antimissile missile. America cannot develop the antimissile missile under the test ban treaty. It cannot even use a small tactical nuclear missile in Korea or South Vietnam, should it become necessary. Our hands are tied. The greatest danger lies in the fact that under this treaty the American people have been lulled into a sense of false security, falling all over themselves to believe that Khrushchev is our friend.

Under this aura of good feeling, the administration will make further concessions of appeasement and accommodation. We will negotiate a nonaggression pact with the Warsaw Treaty countries. We will recognize the Communist government of Hungary. The American public will be distracted from the fact that Russia is expanding its empire all over the world. We will be led to believe that Russian activities are commercial rather than military. Here are a few of the things that Russia is doing:

Yemen: The Russians built a modern port of Hodeida and placed their technicians in key posts.

Iraq: The Russians are helping the Iraqi to enlarge the port of Basra.

Egypt: Soviet warships, including submarines, have been given to the government of the ambitious, power-crazed Gamel Abdel Nasser.

Algeria: The Soviets are negotiating a contract with their friend, Ben Bella, to equip and train an Algerian navy. Soviet warships and technicians have been offered to the "Arab Castro."

Morocco: The Moroccan navy has acquired several small Russian vessels. A shipyard is planned in the port of Tangier, with a submarine base in Alhuecas, right opposite Gibraltar.

Guinea: The Russians established a spanking new naval base at Conakry to supply their South Atlantic fishing fleet. Sekou Toure signed a contract with the Soviets to "bring about the development of the national fishing industry."

Indonesia: A large maritime center is being constructed in the island of Amboina. This complex includes facilities for the processing of fish, a shipyard, gasoline tanks, and personnel training

by Russian technicians. Similar bases are being constructed in Java, Sumatra, Borneo, and Celebes.

Antarctica: Soviet naval bases exist at Novo Lazarevskaya, Molodeschnaya, and Mirnyi.

British Guiana: Cheddi Jagan and the Soviets have been negotiating the establishment of fishing port facilities at Georgetown with the assistance of Russian technicians.

Ghana: The port of Tema, near Accra, is being converted into a vast center of Soviet naval operations.

Meanwhile, America is phasing out its Strategic Air Command. Today SAC has a total capability of 30 billion tons of TNT and could completely demolish all of Russia in a few hours' time. This is what Khrushchev fears.

Peace can only come through strength, and not through weakness. If we do not reverse our trend of unilateral disarmament, we will be subject to military blackmail within the present decade. I subscribe to what Winston Churchill once said:

If you will not fight for the right when you can easily win without bloodshed; if you will not fight when your victory will be sure and not too costly; you may come to the moment when you will have to fight with all the odds against you and only a precarious chance of survival * * * there may even be a worse case. You may have to fight when there is no hope of victory, because it is better to perish than live as slaves.

Mr. Speaker, at this point I should like to include four articles by Mr. George Todt appearing in the Los Angeles Herald Examiner, dealing with the subject here under discussion.

[From the Los Angeles (Calif.) Herald Examiner, Aug. 12, 1963]

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

(By George Todt)

"I have but one lamp to guide my footsteps, and that is the lamp of experience. I have no way to judge the future but by the past."—PATRICK HENRY, 1773.

Recently I received an astonishing letter and intelligence report from the Korean patriot and superior underground agent, Kilsoo Haan.

I met this gentleman at a press conference in the Rodger Young Auditorium several months ago. He is a close friend of Dr. John Lechner, executive director of the Americanism Educational League (Post Office Box 90593, Airport Station, Los Angeles 9, Calif.; telephone OR 8-1641). The latter introduced us.

I found Haan a brilliant scholar and well-grounded intelligence agent—one who had called the shots correctly at Pearl Harbor and also with reference to Red Chinese aggression in Korea long before these tragic actions took place.

If only we had heeded wisely his advance information then—but that, unfortunately, is now only so much water down the sluices and over the spillways. Too late.

THE GIST

In the next few columns I will give you the gist of his remarks to me. They are his considered opinions about the Soviet-Sino operation against us in the cold war, now being waged on a global scale. Is he to be considered valid?

I don't have a crystal ball and cannot even vouch that we will most assuredly see the day after tomorrow. But Kilsoo Haan rings

true to me. After hearing him and questioning him—I believed him. Let's listen to him:

"DEAR MR. TODT: Many thanks for your confidence and support of our stand. I sincerely appreciate the article 'Exploit Red Split.'

"If one would evaluate President Kennedy's press conference comments in reference to Red China versus Communist Russia, it would seem apparent his administration is trying to choose the lesser of two evils.

"However, one cannot understand his reason and logic relating to the threat of nuclear war against us in the 1960's. The direct military threat of Russia to American security is 100 times greater than that of Red China.

"Actually, the Soviet Union provides a bona fide threat, possessing both nuclear war potential and capabilities. In addition, she has planned and adopted a devastating blueprint for war against the United States.

"This is the Korean intelligence agents' evaluation of the highly dangerous situation: The threat of nuclear war by Mao Tsetung is merely that of a barking dog; whereas Russia's threat is like Hitler-Tojo strategy.

"Russia now needs a breathing spell, a preparation period to organize her war strategy. During this period, she hopes to complete her three top priority nuclear weapons and delivery systems. These are:

THE LIST

"1. Antimissile missile defense system. Supermissile killers, somewhat akin to our Nike-X class.

"2. Superbombs achieved through series of high altitude tests in 1961-62 which, when detonated, can neutralize all electronic systems in enemy territory. In addition, they can neutralize ICBM bases—even to the depth of 280 feet underground.

"3. Space platforms—the ultimate weapon—to deliver up to 100-megaton bombs on enemy territory.

"These three top priority nuclear weapons will not be ready until the fall or winter of 1965. Russia must have this time, which is her critical 'preparatory period.' She will do anything to gain this needed respite—even to making a big propaganda show called 'The Sino-Soviet Split.'

"The present Khrushchev 'peace offensive' is definitely linked with Russian military strategy for the future. This wily war plan contemplates, besides Red Cuba, two or more additional Soviet bases close to the United States.

NEED TIME

"Russia wants the West to be kept busy fighting among ourselves concerning such divisive issues as disarmament and the protracted racial question during the next 3 or 4 years. They want this time to complete their fantastic nuclear armaments.

"Once Russia is ready, President Kennedy will reevaluate the precarious situation and learn quickly that the U.S.S.R.—not Red China—is our No. 1 worry and concern. The former is the real nuclear war threat.

"Red China's menace to us is merely that of more regional wars with conventional weapons. The United States can stop this activity very easily. But when Russia moves—you will have another Pearl Harbor."

So ends my remarkable letter from Mr. Kilsoo Haan.

[From the Los Angeles (Calif.) Herald Examiner, Aug. 13, 1963]

A CHILLING DOCUMENT

(By George Todt)

"A diplomat's words must have no relation to action. Words are one thing, action is another. Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water."—Joseph Stalin, Complete Works, volume 2, page 277.

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"So lucid is his discourse," FULBRIGHT then said, "that he makes us wonder what all the fuss has been over nuclear weapons and international tensions and unemployment and all the other stubborn problems that perplex the American people."

There was a lot more of this glib stuff. And it did go over big with GOLDWATER critics in the Senate, both Republicans and Democrats. So it makes sense to figure that FULBRIGHT thought he could poke sarcastic fun at those who don't agree with him on the present issue before the Senate. But this time no colleague slapped his back and praised him for giving anybody hell. They were too embarrassed by the needless taunts at the treaty opposition.

J. WILLIAM HAS BEEN CARRIED AWAY BEFORE

FULBRIGHT, the record shows, has occasionally in the past been carried away by his own ideas. For example, after the off year congressional elections in 1946 when the GOP swept House and Senate, he urged that President Truman resign in favor of a Republican Secretary of State.

Otherwise, FULBRIGHT said, the Democrats would suffer a disastrous defeat in 1948. And, what was worse, in the Senator's mind, "another world war" was likely to result if Truman stayed in the White House after his party had been repudiated by the voters.

At that time the name-calling between FULBRIGHT and Truman in private was close to unprintable. The Senator referred to Truman as a "nuncompoop." Truman referred to FULBRIGHT as an "overeducated ***."

This is a vendetta that has continued to this day and explains in part the low opinion that Truman had for Adlai Stevenson, who used FULBRIGHT as a top campaign aid.

It could be that FULBRIGHT's trouble goes back to the fact he was a sort of child prodigy. He graduated from the University of Arkansas when he was 20, then went to Oxford as a Rhodes scholar and before he entered politics 25 years ago he was a professor and later president of his alma mater. He cannot let a chance go by to show his erudition.

Mr. Speaker, I feel that one of the best bits of evidence as to the worth of this test ban treaty is the remarks of the President of the United States, John F. Kennedy.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to include in my remarks at this point nine instances of the views of the President telling the people of the United States how dangerous it was to enter into the kind of treaty that he is now for 100 percent.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

(The matter referred to follows;)

"I can say that as far as I am concerned, this report by a special panel on nuclear testing has made me feel more urgently than ever that without an inspection system of the kind proposed by the United States and the United Kingdom at Geneva no country in the world can ever be sure that a nation with a closed society is not conducting secret nuclear tests."—August 10, 1961.

"The Soviet Union has shown its complete disregard for the welfare of mankind, first, by breaking off the nuclear test cessation negotiations at Geneva, which had been underway since October 31, 1958, and second, by contemptuously exploding in the atmosphere a large number of nuclear weapons ranging into many megatons, including a device which, by their own admission, exceeded 50 megatons ***. In spite of the

evidence which shows very clearly that the Soviet Union was preparing its own tests while pretending to negotiate their cessation at Geneva, the United States maintains its determination to achieve a world free from the fear of nuclear tests and nuclear war. We will continue to be ready to sign the nuclear test treaty which provides for adequate inspection and control."—November 2, 1961.

"We are making necessary preparations for testing because of the wholly new situation created by the secretly prepared and massive series of 40 to 50 tests conducted by the Soviet Union last fall while active efforts for a test ban agreement were still going forward ***. Any other course would imply unilateral disarmament, and would serve no true course of peace, but at the same time, and with equal energy, we shall go on seeking a path toward a genuine and controlled disarmament. What this means for atmospheric testing is methods of inspection and control which could protect us against the repetition of prolonged secret preparations for a sudden series of major tests."—February 7, 1962.

"We will support the passage of an effective treaty which provides for effective inspection, but we cannot take less in view of the fact of our experience of the past months where it takes us many months to prepare for tests in the atmosphere. The Soviet Union prepares in secret. Unless we have adequate protection against a repetition of that incident, any such test agreement obviously would be extremely vulnerable."—February 7, 1962.

"It is a deadly business, this competition, and I don't say that much security comes out of it. But less security would certainly come out of it if we permitted them to make a decisive breakthrough in an area like an ICBM so we would certainly have to have some assurances against a repetition against this before we would feel that the treaty is a satisfactory one."—February 7, 1962.

"As new disarmament talks approach, the basic lesson of some 3 years and 353 negotiating sessions at Geneva is this—that the Soviets will not agree to an effective ban on nuclear tests as long as a new series of offers and prolonged negotiations, or a new uninspected moratorium, or a new agreement without controls, would enable them once again to prevent the West from testing while they prepare in secret ***. We now know enough about broken negotiations, secret preparations, and the advantages gained from a long test series never to offer again an uninspected moratorium."—March 2, 1962.

"We cannot accept any agreement that does not provide for an effective international process that will tell the world whether the treaty is being observed. The Soviet Government so far flatly rejects any such inspection of any shape or kind."—March 29, 1962.

"I must point out again that in order to end testing, we must have workable international agreements; gentlemen's agreements and moratoria do not provide the type of guarantees that are necessary. They do not give assurance against an abrupt renewal of testing by unilateral action. This is the lesson of the Soviet Government's tragic decision to renew testing just a year ago. Nor can such informal arrangements give any assurance against secret underground testing. That is why we must have definite agreement with reasonable and adequate assurance. The United States cannot be a party to any renewal of false hopes which the Soviet Government shattered last September."—August 29, 1962.

"We have suggested that we would not accept a test ban which would permit indefinite underground testing by the Soviet Union. We would not accept a test ban which did not give us every assurance that we could detect a series of tests underground. That is the administration's position. We

would not submit a treaty which did not provide that assurance to the U.S. Senate. Nor would the Senate approve it ***."—March 6, 1963.

Mr. DEROUMANIAN. Mr. Speaker, I know that the test ban treaty will be passed in the Senate by an overwhelming vote. Perhaps that is what the President wanted when he pushed the signatories to this treaty so that by the time it arrived at the Senate it was a fait accompli. I do not take too much to this type of approach to the Constitution of the United States because if the Constitution states that the advice and consent of the other body ought to be given, the President ought to follow the Constitution and not have one package already delivered and sealed and then tell them it will be embarrassing if you do not approve the treaty.

Mr. Speaker, again my thanks to the gentleman from New York [Mr. PILION] who has spent hours and hours on this subject. He testified in the other body. He has rendered a great public service not only to us in the House but to the people of the United States.

THE CALIFORNIA YOUNG DEMOCRATS: CAPTIVE OF THE RADICAL LEFT

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from California [Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON. Mr. Speaker, I continue my August 26 and September 10 reports to the House on the subject of Young Democrats.

I have requested this special time to allow myself the opportunity to present a full and complete report on the present situation in California. For the past week information has been flowing into my office, and I am now prepared to place the blame squarely on the shoulders of those individuals responsible for the recent disgraceful resolutions that have so seriously embarrassed the Democratic Party. I am also prepared to absolve from blame the vast majority of responsible Young Democrats in the Western States, who in fact had nothing to do with the much publicized policy positions. At the end of my prepared statement I will welcome any comments that Members, from either side of the aisle, may wish to make on this situation.

I have found that the root of the problem lies within my own State of California. The August 16 meeting of the Western States Young Democratic Conference was in fact controlled by the California delegation—at least as far as the resolutions report is concerned—and we can therefore dismiss this meeting and concentrate on the main issue of the California organization.

At his press conference of September 12 the President of the United States was asked the following question:

The Young Democrats out in the West have taken some unusual stands on Red China, East Germany, Cuba, and Vietnam. Have you seen them and would you care to comment on them?

The President replied:

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Yes. I didn't agree with any of them. I don't know what is happening with the Young Democrats and Young Republicans—but time is on our side.

Mr. Speaker, it is clear that this matter is of some importance when the President of the United States is asked for his comments, and I hope we will all better understand what is happening with the Young Democrats before we leave the floor of the House today.

Because of these Young Democratic resolutions conservative newspapers and politicians have been having a field day at our expense. Conservatives know full well that the National Democratic Party and Democratic Party officeholders do not subscribe to the recognition of Red China, reopening of trade and diplomatic relations with Castro, withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Far East, et cetera. They know this full well, but it is to their political advantage to exploit the situation.

It will relieve the President to know that the Young Democrats do not believe in these policy positions either—except for a handful of unscrupulous radicals in California, and I will discuss them in detail shortly.

As an organization the Young Democrats may not be important within the leadership councils of the party. To my knowledge, no elections have been won solely on the efforts of Young Democrats. However, this organization is the official youth arm of the party and as such should be attracting members—not driving them away. The Young Democrats provide schooling in the practical art of politics, and have been a valuable training ground for many distinguished officeholders both at the State and National level. I believe the party needs a strong and virile youth movement—we derive many benefits from it.

Both political parties, Mr. Speaker, can agree with my assessment of the value of a well-organized youth movement. The Republican Party no less than the Democratic Party has created and believed in this type of organization.

However, there are strange and peculiar individuals who join the youth organizations of the two great political parties for reasons other than those that motivate the majority of young people. They join the Young Democrats and the Young Republicans not to learn; not to take an interest; not to work for the party of their choice—but to distort and corrupt; to pervert the normal function of the organization and make it serve a purpose for which it was not designed.

These individuals seek to use the name of the group as a cover for their own brand of political philosophy. They seek to delude the people of their community and their State into believing that the policies they advocate are the policies of sizable sections of the Democratic or Republican Parties and as a result therefore are respectable opinions. They seek to use the major political parties for the publicity value that accompanies the use of the old and honorable party names. In addition, they mask their political philosophy under the label of "conservatism," if they are Republicans, and under

the label of "liberalism" if they are Democrats.

This is what we are faced with now in California. We are faced with it in both parties. The Young Republicans have been captured by the radical right—and as I shall soon demonstrate the Young Democrats have been captured by the radical left.

I am not responsible for the activities of any arm of the Republican Party. Members of that party must insure their own house is in order. I cannot do this for them.

However, when the Democratic Party is involved—it becomes my business. I must be sure that I have not stood idly by while my party has been taken-over and destroyed by extremists. I do not believe that any Democrat worth his salt would disagree with me. I wish to do my share toward saving my party in the State of California. There is still time to act, if we act in California now.

It is easy to shrug and say—what the heck. It is easy to say—they are only a bunch of emotional kids; leave them alone. The truth of the matter is they are not just a bunch of emotional kids. Or, I should say, they are a bunch of emotional kids but they are being led by a small hardcore group of professional political agitators who are certainly not kids and will not just go away if left alone.

These leaders work for a living at a variety of occupations, but their every spare moment is spent in some sort of political activity. They live, eat, and sleep politics, and so I call them professionals. They are not students. They left school years ago in most cases. They are men determined and convinced of the rightness of their cause, and they will use any means, any person, to achieve their ends.

These are the men who now control the Young Democratic movement in the State of California. A small number in point of fact, but with a tremendous potential for achieving publicity. Because, after all, publicity is what they really seek. Publicity for their resolutions and policy positions with the cloak of liberalism and the Democratic Party to give themselves a measure of respectability.

We cannot compromise with these men. We cannot convince them by reason and logic that they are wrong. They will not believe they are wrong. They are inspired by a fanatical zeal, and they seek converts to their philosophy; converts to their brand of radicalism. As long as they are permitted to use the name of the Democratic Party they will be a festering sore on our body politic. Under violent attack they will retreat two steps to the rear, but this is only done to enable them to take three steps forward when the right opportunity presents itself.

They are irrational and illogical. They are opposed by their own basic natures to the spirit of true liberalism that is the heart and blood of the Democratic Party. They hold the concept of party responsibility up to scorn and mockery unless they themselves are in charge of party

affairs. They will not attempt to reach an understanding with the elected public officeholders of their party. They hold the official platform of their party up to ridicule and abuse. They do all these things and more. They cannot help themselves; they cannot change themselves—they are radicals.

They will use our laws, our customs, and our political parties only as long as they serve a purpose. When they have achieved that purpose they will scrap our laws, junk our customs, and abolish our political parties. They do these things because they are radicals, and they cannot change.

If they are left in their positions of authority within the youth movement they will use those positions as the springboard from which to launch their next assault. They will prey on the young and immature; they will solicit support from the flotsam and jetsam of the political sphere; they will cultivate the pathetic social rejects of our society that comprise the militant and unruly activists. They will grow stronger and more vocal, until like the cancer they really are they will destroy the Democratic Party.

Mr. Speaker, to further their aims these individuals are free to join any type of organization they wish. They are free to join a Fair Play for Cuba Committee; a peace-at-any-price group; a better-Red-than-dead club. We allow this freedom in our democratic society and I would never wish this right restricted. The fact that they would be far less charitable to us if they were holding positions of power is not an argument against it.

However, I do not believe that these same people have the right to seize control of the Young Democrats when their only desire is to distort that organization into an instrument for their own peculiar brand of radicalism.

The Democratic Party is a party for all Americans—not just a select few. We must insure that all the arms of the Democratic Party are truly representative of the party, and that they provide a home for all reasonable people who may wish to join.

I have not yet seen a complete text, but if the press reports are true—I declare that the resolutions and policy positions adopted by the California Young Democrats at their September 8 meeting in San Diego are the most damning indictment that could be made against this organization. This meeting alone should prove that the party has lost control of its youth movement in California and that radical hands are now steering this group on a collision course to disaster.

I say that action must be taken by the appropriate party officials to restore this organization to its rightful members, and return it to the control of the party from whence it sprung. I say that all this should be done, and must be done, because of the San Diego meeting alone.

However, there is more than just one meeting in San Diego to document in the downfall of this organization. There is a history of a cold and calculated power

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I hold in my hand now a copy of the "Korean Underground Report of July 9, 1963," which, according to Mr. Kilsoo Haan, was submitted to President John F. Kennedy. It is a chilling document. Let's examine it.

What J.F.K. did with his original copy, I cannot say. Perhaps he agreed, or disagreed, as the case might be. Likely he saw it—but may have decided to sit on it. A presidential prerogative. Who knows?

In my case, I think this information ought to be shared with my readers. It is not classified. So why not? Read it and see what you think.

According to the Korean patriot and ace underground intelligence agent, Kilsoo Haan, the following are some important facts to be noted:

About a week before the Three-Power nuclear test ban talks began in Moscow last month, the Korean underground report of July 9 disclosed a preview of what was purportedly Soviet Russia's price—the conditions for an East-West rapprochement.

THE ALTERNATIVE

The report also revealed the alternative: War between the United States and U.S.S.R. possibly in this decade.

On May 1, 1963, six Russian military officers from the Soviet Union were visiting in Pyng-Yang, capital of North Korea. They revealed to six North Korean officers of equal rank these five conditions for "peaceful co-existence" between the United States and U.S.S.R.:

1. The United States must withdraw completely all its military forces and nuclear weapons from Europe and Asia.

2. The United States should be the first capitalist power to recognize the East German People's Government.

3. The United States must sign the non-aggression agreements with the Socialist commonwealth nations.

4. The United States must abandon the Monroe Doctrine policy and allow the Latin American countries the right of self-determination to choose the kind of government they prefer.

5. As a sign of good faith, the United States must initiate an unrestricted trade agreement negotiation with Red China and North Korea—not later than 1965.

ARROGANT REDS

If we American capitalists do not accept these proposals of the arrogant Reds, then what is our alternative? The ready answer is—war.

Of course, the Communists have already decided in advance that we are responsible for any conflict between us. As they see it:

"The determination of war in the 1960's will rest on the United States and not on the Soviet Union."

Here are nine reasons why the Soviets say we two world titans may have to fight:

1. The possibility of the United States initiating a "preventive war" on the U.S.S.R. in the 1960's is real.

2. The ruling class and the warmongers in the United States believe American security will depend on the destruction on the U.S.S.R. before 1970.

3. The warmongers are working fanatically for a monolithic control of NATO and re-armament of Germany with nuclear arms and weapons.

4. Therefore the Soviet Union is necessarily committed to war against the Republic of the United States.

5. The first military strike must be against the United States and not the NATO countries in Europe, nor American allies in Asia.

6. The Soviet Union does not intend to be caught unprepared. Hence, the preparation for nuclear war in the 1960's must be given top priority.

7. To insure an early victory, the Socialist camp civil defense troops must—swiftly and jointly—occupy all the strategic cities and areas of America.

8. The Soviet war plan calls for two or more advance bases close to the United States—in addition to Red Cuba—in order to deploy civil defense troops prior to the first strike.

9. Also, the Soviet war plan calls for specialized Negro liberation civil defense units. These specialized units can and will (according to the Soviets) play a very important role to insure the Soviet camp an early victory. On this note, the report ends.

K.'S CROWBAR

According to Kilsoo Haan, Premier Khrushchev launched his peace offensive on the eve of the nuclear test ban talks, which began in Moscow on July 15, 1963. He saw in the limited nuclear test ban agreement something of a diplomatic crowbar to gain his first objective.

And this is nothing less than the "conditions for peaceful coexistence," as revealed in the Korean report of July 9, 1963 (above).

Mr. K. put on another dramatic performance, as usual, and was a huge success from the Soviet point of view. He got his crowbar.

There should no longer be any doubt that we are facing a master chessman on the world stage today. Can we cope with him? Who on our side can give him a serious run for his money? Where is our David to stop this modern Goliath?

[From the Los Angeles (Calif.) Herald Examiner, Aug. 14, 1963]

RED PLAN FOR VICTORY

(By George Todt)

"The facts of the matter are that the Soviets and ourselves give wholly different meaning to words—war, peace, democracy, popular will—and we have wholly different meanings to the same words, such as internal affairs and aggression."—President John F. Kennedy, 1961.

My friend, Kilsoo Haan, the notably successful Korean patriot and underground intelligence agent, tells me that the Soviet image of diplomacy is the same today under Nikita Khrushchev as it was previously under Josef Stalin.

President Kennedy got the treatment in June 1961, at the time of his person-to-person summit conference with Mr. K. in Vienna. That was when he spoke as shown at the top of this column.

According to Haan, the Soviet politico-military strategists are extremely fearful of these three possibilities:

PREMATURE WAR

1. The U.S. "preventive war" school of thought might prevail over the appeasement "Rostow policy group" located in the Department of State. The latter backs the status quo containment of Communist nations. (And completely unrealistically, let it be added.)

2. Red China may provoke a nuclear war prematurely before she is prepared and ready.

3. The growing anti-Khrushchev underground movement behind the Iron Curtain countries in Europe may erupt into another Hungary-type revolt and upset Warsaw Pact security arrangements.

The Reds have worried and fretted much about these three potential items ever since the Soviets "reluctantly" pulled back their intermediate-range ballistic missiles—or did they?—from Communist Cuba last year.

PONDER THESE

And all thinking Americans ought to consider them, too.

The present nuclear test ban agreement, now before the U.S. Senate for possible approval and ratification, will inevitably have a far-reaching influence on the later security of NATO nations and ourselves.

Here are some factors for American critics to ponder upon:

1. This partial nuclear test ban agreement might become the key to a modern "Munich" fiasco with the role of Adolf Hitler portrayed by Old Nick, himself—and the Neville Chamberlain part played by J.F.K.

2. Khrushchev's peace offensive at this time is only a deceptive portion of an overall Soviet war strategy. It was planned and adopted over 1 year ago. Cannot be considered a genuine peace offer.

3. The proposed pact will give the U.S.S.R. the much-needed time necessary to complete its nuclear war preparations without fear of preventive actions or reprisals from us before 1966—its target date for a real showdown with the United States.

Haan makes the recommendation that all American patriotic societies—as well as every interested citizen whether in a group or acting as an individual—should get hold of an astounding Communist book called "Soviet Military Strategy."

THE BLUEPRINT

It was published by the Soviet Ministry of Defense in September 1962, and is a blueprint for war with us. Makes one think of Hitler's "Mein Kampf," another blueprint—and a true one—for a past holocaust.

This one seems quite as authentic, in fact even more so. It calls for a preparatory period to organize the defeat of the enemy. Meaning us. Let's look at some realistic interpretations from this revealing work:

"The book 'Soviet Military Strategy' represents the U.S.S.R.'s official military position," wrote Ralph de Toledano of King Features Syndicate last year. "Its major point is that the Soviet Union must and will launch an all-out nuclear attack on the United States once it has nuclear superiority.

"While the U.S.S.R. is in the process of seeking this lead, it will continue to operate behind a propaganda smoke screen—calling for negotiations with the West, relaxation of tension and an end to the cold war.

"All troops must be deployed long before the attack signal is given. These forces must be dug in as close to the American heartland as possible, so they can be moved rapidly after the knockout blow."

ALREADY FACT

This Red blueprint for war in the 1960's is already fact, not fiction. Inexorably it is being put into effect—and the proposed test ban agreement is only one of the prerequisite first steps.

For those who loftily and grandiloquently pooh-pooh the foresight of caution in matters such as this one, let's recall that months prior to Pearl Harbor—22 years ago—a Japanese war plan book was turned over to the U.S. government.

It outlined diplomatic and military procedures that later took place, almost exactly as indicated in the book. We scoffed at it. Smiled our fear away.

Today we are facing a similar situation—neatly outlined in "Soviet Military Strategy."

[From the Los Angeles (Calif.) Herald Examiner, Aug. 15, 1963]

MAO-K SPLIT PHONY

(By George Todt)

"America is morally and spiritually a defeated nation. If America is so afraid to occupy Cuba right on her doorstep to avoid a nuclear war, how can she face the Sino-Soviet

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viet alliance in Europe and Asia? We now can face any and all military contingencies without fear of defeat."—Mao Tse-tung.

Is it really true that the Sino-Soviet alliance is on the rocks, about to come apart at the seams? Or is this seemingly convenient arrangement only a cunning trick? What are we to believe actually in this instance?

Referring to previously reliable Kilsoo Haan's Korean report of December 4, 1962, we may find these pertinent passages:

"Red China's internal security and the need of industrial goods and machineries motivated his (Mao Tse-tung's) impatience. His persistent demands for these necessities caused Khrushchev much anxiety and concern."

WHAT HE SAID

"In November, 1962—during the 'post Cuban crisis' period—Red China pressed for action from Khrushchev. And at the suggestion of the Soviet Government, Mao reluctantly made the following observation and recommendation:

"1. It would be advantageous to the Sino-Soviet alliance to fully exploit the Western Powers' thinking that the Sino-Soviet alliance is in danger and will soon break apart.

"2. Suggested that the Soviet Union take an unprecedented initiative to ease the East-West tension and diplomatically lay the groundwork to bring about the negotiations for trade and commercial agreements—for the purchase of surplus grains, agricultural food machineries, surplus ships, et cetera."

It is Haan's considered and professional opinion that the present purported Sino-Soviet split is phony as the one we fell for before—that of strutting Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia and the equally trustworthy Kremlin.

In that clever little bit of ham acting on the world stage, Tito came away with some \$3 billion of U.S. taxpayers' enforced giveaway. And at last report, this worthy was yelling that he would march with the Soviet Union against us, when and if world war III might arrive someday. Nice work if you can get it.

The trouble with us frankly naive Americans is that we have been too gullible in dealing with Old World enemies, past and present. These are ancient, extremely effective hands in the art of subversion, espionage, guile, and deceit.

Sometimes we act like innocent children when in their presence. We are neither hardheaded nor toughminded enough when dealing with them. Their agents con us with the oldest self-serving line in the world—and, trustingly, we buy it.

We have eager-beavers who try to lead us, who cannot win for losing, but they never seem to lose their jobs at the Department of State and other administration sites. They appear frantic for victories of any kind, but seldom seem to gain yardage. Being over-anxious, perhaps they become set-ups for defeat.

A generation ago, then-President Franklin D. Roosevelt said manfully, "All we have to fear is fear itself."

FEAR

However true that may have been in the 1940's, the fact remains that we have been dominated apparently by fear of nuclear war for the past several years. How otherwise explain our sorry compromise on Laos, failure to force Soviet troops out of Cuba, the acceptance of the status quo at the Berlin wall?

"History proved again and again to us," said Kilsoo Haan in his Korean Underground Report of July 9, 1963 (submitted to J.F.K.), "that shadowboxing with dictators has not deterred them from war."

What the United States needs today is a bold, meaningful strategy—born of patriot-

ism and good sense—without impotent, wishful daydreaming.

Here are some down-to-earth suggestions by my friend, Kilsoo Haan:

Before the U.S. Senate approves or disapproves the partial nuclear test ban agreement, the citizens of our country ought to be given a 30-day period of time to freely discuss, debate, and inquire into the relative merits and demerits of the proposed treaty. What are its implications?

And, as a further safeguard, he proposes that the Senate and the House of Representatives adopt a joint resolution requesting the President to secure assurances of sincere intentions—with deeds, not hot air—from the U.S.S.R. before the nonaggression pact is negotiated.

UNCLE SAP

The joint resolution should request of the Soviet Union:

1. Pull all Soviet troops out of Cuba and dismantle fortifications now built.

2. Permit on-the-ground inspection by U.S. military experts—and report their findings to Senate and House Committees on Armed Services.

3. Dismantle and remove the Berlin wall, and grant freedom of travel to all East and West Berliners.

4. Terminate the Sino-Soviet alliance, recall all military advisers—including Soviet scientists, technicians, and engineers—and discontinue military collaboration.

Should we be the only ones to make concessions to our enemies? Let the Reds get into the act, too. Why continue to play "Uncle Sap?"

TACTICS USED BY PROPONENTS OF THE TEST BAN TREATY

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House the gentleman from New York [Mr. DEROUNIAN] is recognized for 60 minutes.

(Mr. DEROUNIAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. DEROUNIAN. Mr. Speaker, I shall not take the full 60 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, this has been a very educational afternoon for me and I would like to congratulate the gentleman from New York [Mr. PILLION], the gentleman from California [Mr. HOSMER], and all the other Members who have participated in enlightening some of us who are not quite experts in this field.

Mr. Speaker, something that has bothered me lately has been the type of campaign conducted by some of the proponents of the test ban treaty such as ridicule, Madison-Avenue tactics, bringing the matter up while people are on summer vacation. I have particular reference to one of the spokesmen for the administration who intimated that perhaps a seagull has more sense than those who oppose this treaty.

Mr. Speaker, under leave to include extraneous matter, I insert at this point in the RECORD a very wonderful article written by Ted Lewis in today's New York Daily News:

CAPITOL STUFF

(By Ted Lewis)

WASHINGTON, September 16.—The hope of the Senate leaders that the nuclear test ban treaty would be ratified before President Kennedy appears before the United Nations on Friday has now been knocked into a

cocked hat by the strange performance of one Senator.

What Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, Democrat, of Arkansas, has now done has infuriated the opposition to the treaty, which had a right to consider that its arguments should be taken seriously and not be brushed aside with cute scorn by the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.

By comparing the wisdom of sea gulls favorably with the IQ of treaty opponents, FULBRIGHT has probably delayed the ratification vote until next week at the earliest. His contrived levity and sarcasm were aimed at the 13 to 15 Senators, including the highly respected RICHARD B. RUSSELL, Democrat, of Georgia, who constitute the core of the treaty opposition. They definitely now will talk more, and with considerably more heat, because of the FULBRIGHT effort to hold them up to ridicule.

As a result Kennedy is not going to point with pride in New York on Friday to the Senate's rubberstamping of the nuclear agreement as he had hoped in order to give his U.N. speech significance.

The flippancy treatment of the opposition by FULBRIGHT amazed other Senate leaders in the treaty fight. It came at a time when the administration considered that it had won on the merits of the issue and was relieved that the debate had been high level and free of any cheap name calling.

What was worse was that the new, personalized note was injected by the head of the Foreign Relations Committee, which has sponsored the treaty. And by an individual Senator who prides himself on his fine sense of diplomacy, which is supposed to be an attribute of every chairman of the esteemed committee.

Yet there was FULBRIGHT, so taken by the peaceful behavior of sea gulls compared with man's inability to handle global affairs, that he could not resist giving the Senate a sardonic lecture.

IT'S ALL VERY LEARNED STUFF

His discourse on sea gull wisdom was larded with delicate little barbs, sharp as all getout, at Senate treaty opponents. It was all erudite stuff, but to be sure that the point went across he once extemporized to the effect that "even a 10-year-old child would be able to see that this treaty should be ratified."

The way FULBRIGHT told it, the sea gull has learned to live at peace with his fellows, substituting "ceremonial expressions of hostility for fighting."

He twitted the treaty opponents by suggesting that "the genius of modern science" should invent a smoke bomb which "would permit us the fun and excitement of nuclear war without getting killed."

There was no doubt that this sea gull stuff was not cleared with either the White House or State Department. Even Presidential adviser ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., who finds amusement in such ivy league type of banter as FULBRIGHT offered to a deadpanned Senate, would not be so gullible as to OK this extolling of sea gull virtues.

THINKS HIMSELF A GOOD PINPRICKER?

This FULBRIGHT faux pas can only be explained on the basis that he considers himself a real wit, a master of the art of gentle sarcasm and that he has found that among the eggheads he is admired for his skill in this area of the well rounded but pinpricking phrase.

The only clue as to why he decided to treat the Senate to his sardonic witticisms on the treaty issue is the fact that he had a certain amount of success in a previous performance.

This occurred August 2 in a sarcastic and sly appraisal of Senator BARRY GOLDWATER's "rare gift to clarity" in a political speech.